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Because many militant groups from the Islamist political landscape and beyond have suffered extinction, survival of 
insurgent groups in a context of insecurity and rivalry is not a fact. In 2010, the Islamic State in Iraq was near extinction 
and considered as defeated by a myriad of enemies regrouping 400 000 fighters (the US and Iraqi forces and militias). 
Four years later, it was able to control a significant part of the Iraqi and Syrian soil, outperform all Islamist groups in history, 
proclaim a caliphate and export its model, which will have long-lasting consequences at regional and international levels. 
This thesis seeks to explain the group’s resurgence from 2011 to 2015 by adopting a provincial perspective and with the 
theoretical framework of the indirect approach. By introducing a categorisation of operations based on their confrontational 
nature, this investigation tries to understand IS’ military effort in Iraq from a quantitative and qualitative perspective.  In 
addition, a study of its relations with challenging social structures (tribes and insurgent groups) and an analysis of the 
group’s propaganda frames give us the possibility to determine how the group introduced more flexibility in its overall 
strategy and articulated a particular discourse in order to attract deprived Sunni Iraqis during the 2012 Iraqi protests. The 
main contribution of using this model is to explain IS’ past resurgence and enrich the existing literature with a 
complementary explanation of the group tactics and rapid morphing from a guerrilla to conventional warfare. This research 
project possesses the following creative elements:  it provides a detailed and in-depth account of Islamic State’s strategy, 
applies theoretical frameworks from security studies to it and offers a better understanding of the group´s political 
behaviour by analysing its interactions with a range of actors ranging from its social incubator to competitive social 
structures and ideological rivals.  It aims to expand on the idea of the Islamic State as an insurgent group that has adopted 
a repertoire of different strategies to establish an expansive caliphate by closely examining its adoption of the indirect 
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List of acronyms and abbreviations for the group. 
AQ: Al-Qaeda  
AQI: Tanzim Al Qaeda fi Bilad Al Rafidayn Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Al 
Qaeda in Iraq in English  
TWJ: Jama’at al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (Group of Monotheism and Jihad)  
IS: Islamic State  
ISI: Islamic State in Iraq 
ISIS: Islamic State Iraq and Sham  
JN: Jabhat Al Nusra  
LH: Liddle Hart 
Regarding the use of the name for the group throughout this study I will use the 
group’s name used in a given period.  To avoid confusion and anachronism and 
because there are several names for the organisation, I will stick to the group’s 
nomenclature at each stage of its chronology, except for the ISIS and IS period, 
where I use indistinctively the same acronym IS. Following most of the studies on 
the Islamic State’s history, I follow a longitudinal approach of the group’s history 
since 2003 that transcends organisational markers and name changes. 
Timeline of Islamic State’s nomenclature evolution: 
TWJ: Tawheed wal-Jihad 2003-2004 
AQI: Al Qaeda in Iraq 2004-2005 
MSM: Majliss Shura Al-Mujahedeen 2006 
ISI: Islamic State in Iraq October 2006- mid2013 
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Sham 2013-2014 
IS: the Islamic State 2014 – onward  
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I – Introduction 
“Baqiya!” (Remaining), “Dawlat Islam Baqiya!” (The Islamic State 
remaining). For more than a decade, these two expressions have represented 
the rallying cry of thousands of Islamic State (IS) members and supporters all 
around the world. Both have been used by its leaders during their discourses, by 
its fighters after a pledge of allegiance, by its online supporters in social media 
and even by prisoners forced to voice them as a symbol of humiliation before 
their execution.  They represent the group’s state of mind, which has elevated its 
survival as a sign of victory after having been cornered many times by a countless 
number of enemies worldwide. In its 15 years of existence since 2003, the group 
has shown a strong capacity of resilience, which has made the concept itself a 
focal point of its ideology. The slogan took roots in a context when the group was 
pressured by tribal reversal before being ultimately expelled from Iraqi cities. This 
means that whatever happens, the group will survive and remain. As Romain 
Caillet1  records, this term was first used in an official media statement in 2007 
by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, (the first leader of the IS in Iraq) with an occurrence 
of 11 times. From that moment, when IS members and sympathisers were 
shouting this slogan they were claiming the group’s objective, which was 
completed after the expansion of 2013-2014 in Iraq and Syria by adding “wa 
tatamadad”, which means, “and expand”. Shouting “Baqiya” for the group’s 
members is a way of challenging the rest of the world by stressing its ability to 
survive, resurge and maintain its ideological appeal, for the higher purpose of 
creating a transnational Islamic State. Indeed, its initial political agenda was 
ambitious and considered as unrealistic. Starting with a handful of foreign fighters 
around the figure of Abu Mosab al-Zarqawi, it grew by attracting local hosts, 
dominating the Iraqi insurgency and ultimately creating a borderless Islamic state. 
Between 2003 and 2010, 175 000 US troops supported by 100 000 Sunni tribal 
fighters and 300 000 Iraqi security forces were necessary to defeat a group 
                                            





composed of roughly 5000 members. In 2010, ISI was on the verge of extinction; 
80 % of its leaders had been killed or jailed2, thousands of its members had been 
neutralised, and their political goal of creating an Islamic Sunni state in Iraq was 
considered as having failed. 
1-Academic debates on IS 
The academic discussion related to “Islamic State” organisation takes its 
root in the debate on Political Islam movements in general. The 1980s “orientalist/ 
essentialist” clash evolved until nowadays ongoing debates about the group’s 
nature. When studying Islam and the Muslim world and understanding how and 
where it intersects with global politics, two opposed schools of thought have 
emerged to explain it:  the “Essentialists” and the “Contextualists”. The most 
famous defender of the contextualist approach is Edward Said with his work 
“Orientalism”. He defended the idea that culture and power are closely related in 
the historical establishment of particular forms of world order. His work is 
considered as a rejection of Bernard Lewis’ article “the roots of Muslim rage”3,  
where he defends that Islam is itself the cause of anti-Western violence because 
of its non-compatibility with modernity. Muslims are connoted as exotic, lazy or 
violent as opposed to the rational westerner. Said argues that this subjective bias 
is part of the colonial legacy which he termed as “Orientalism”.4 For Reza 
Pankhurst, the main criticism directed at both essentialist and contextualist sides 
is the “reduction of Muslim societies to their simplest traits”5. The essentialists’ 
reading of Islam generally explains the rise of political Islam due to the inherent 
incompatibility of Islam with modernity and all its values, while the second 
                                            
2“U.S. Says 80% of al Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Removed”, 4/06/2010, BBC, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/10243585   
3Bernard Lewis, “the roots of Muslim Anger”, The Atlantic, 1990 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/issues/90sep/rage.htm  
4 Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies, Penguin 
Books March 29, 2005.  
5 Reza Pankhurst, The Inevitable Caliphate?, Hurst Company London, 2013, p 26 
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approach shed light on the failure of the societal problems of poverty and denial 
of political representation. Orientalists view the embracing of democracy by 
Islamists as solely utilitarian while the others see the use of Islamic tradition in 
the political arena as a call for participation and better governance.  
Contextualists consider that essentialists have detached Islam from the socio-
cultural specificities of Muslim societies that put the revealed text into practice. 
Besides their differences, as recalled by Pankhurst, both approaches share the 
idea of “liberal democracy as their ultimate reference point in their approach and 
analysis implicitly”6. Indeed, as noted by Michael Salla, the relation between 
liberal democracy and political Islam is unidirectional: “political Islam either 
responds to liberal democratic norms by demonstrating their consistency with the 
Islamic heritage or reacts to them as contrary to the Islamic heritage”.7 
The rise of IS in 2014 and the subsequent terrorist wave of attacks hitting 
the world reopened a heated debate among scholars and experts in how to 
consider a group such as the IS, regarding its origins as well as its inspirations. 
In a debate echoing the rift between the “essentialists” and “contextualists” of the 
’80s, different perspectives are facing each other. One group labelled as 
“Jihadologist” consider IS as a rational actor and is represented by academics 
such as Aaron Zellin, and Thomas Hegghammer and Romain Caillet in France. 
They consider jihadism as an ideology and its militants as rational political actors. 
Their detractors for their part tend to depict this new current as neo-essentialist, 
making IS’ interpretation of Islam and their ideology the driving force of their 
actions. This opposite side prefers to dismiss any religiosity or political 
motivations in IS’ actions. Represented by Olivier Roy’s thesis8, he considers 
people who join the group as marginal misfits, largely ignorant of religion and 
                                            
6 Ibid  
7 Michael Salla, “Political Islam and the West: a new Cold War or Convergence”, Third World 
Quarterly, vol 18 number4, 1997, p737 
8 Olivier Roy, “What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism?–A scientific perspective on the 





geopolitics. Being “nihilists”, Roy considers that they are more attracted by the 
radicalism and the violence of the group rather than its political or religious 
agenda. Roy’s reaction to the last attacks on Paris was that the people joining IS 
now could have joined leftist terrorist groups 40 years ago, and considers 
therefore that ”Radical Islam is more an Islamization of radicalism rather than a 
radicalisation of Islam”9. Another vision defended by Meriam Benraad considers 
that IS’ violence represents a reversed mirror of the entertainment society. This 
idea is based mostly on the propaganda effect of the group’s media production 
and how it mimics the codes of Hollywood productions and video games to attract 
westernised young people from all around the world.  The group’s ideological and 
theological dress is therefore just an excuse for the release of violence produced 
by western civilisation. 
Close to this idea is the crypto-Baathist explanation of IS’ actions. According to 
such a vision, the group’s ideology has little value in order to understand it. Its 
jihadist label and frames are just excuses representing a way for former regime 
elements to achieve the goal of coming back to power. Another current is what 
François Burgat calls “normative Islamology”10 and is quite popular in the media 
of the Arab world and among political leaders by stating what “true Islam is”. 
According to this vision, the group is not Islamic and its nomination should be 
“Daech”, its pejorative acronym in Arabic. Therefore, an analyst should not give 
any credit to the group’s religious motivations because it is corrupting Islam for 
other purposes. We can agree with him to say that this vision has political 
implications that bring very few clues to the comprehension of the phenomenon 
from an academic dimension. Also, the question of whether the group is Islamic 
or not does not bring so much to the academic debate to understand the group 
and is more the affair of religious scholars within Islam or even Islamologists.  
                                            
9 Olivier Roy, “France’s Oedipal Islamist Complex”, Foreign Policy, January 7 2016, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/frances-oedipal-islamist-complex-charlie-hebdo-islamic-
state-isis/  
10 François Burgat, “Islamologie normative”, 2015,  http://www.tunivers.com/2015/04/94448/  
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The debate on IS’ motivations suffers from two problems. Firstly, it can be partially 
true for some categories inside the group (western recruits mainly), but it suffers 
from a reductionist western-centric scope. In addition, all the debate on IS’ 
recruitment focuses mainly on the group’s recruitment process of foreign fighters 
and neglects the local dynamics. Secondly, the debate regarding IS is driven by 
questions about its motivations as an organisation and for its members rather 
than its methods, tactics or strategy. The approach of this thesis is different since 
it tries to bring new clues to the explanation of the group’s political and military 
behaviour. The purpose is not to understand the group’s nature by answering the 
“Why?” question (if IS’ actions are driven by, for example, religious purity, 
eschatology, nihilism, a Baathist comeback with new clothes, an anti-western 
backlash) but rather by answering the “How?” question. This means a focus on 
the group’s tactics, strategy, and discourse and developing a locally centred 
perspective regarding the issue of the support enjoyed by the group.  It examines 
the group’s initiatives, ideology, strategic and military decisions rather than 
exogenous factors and sheds light on the recruitment of the local Iraqis instead 
of its foreign fighter component. 
In the aftermath of IS’ rise in 2013-2014, a striking number of books and 
research pieces have emerged centred on the central question of explaining its 
resurgence.  Before that date, the group received little attention and was part of 
the academic debate explaining the fall of violence from 2007 in Iraq. Some books 
and studies are purely descriptive and informative; some have a sensationalist 
approach while others have decided to go back to history to make analogies. In 
recent years, research pieces have proved to be authoritative and tackle the issue 
from different perspectives. Researchers consider the group more as a 
resurgence of Saddam’s military apparatus, the result of the Western imperialist 
mistakes (from Sykes-Picot to Paul Bremmer’s policies) or the consequence of 
President Al Maliki’s sectarian policies. Others have advanced the political 
opportunities caused by the spillover of the Syrian crisis and the rise of the Sunni 
cause in Iraq as major factors behind its resurgence. Generally, publications’ 
conclusions are policy recommendations rather than research-based 
investigations about the group. The research agenda regarding the study of the 
group is driven by the imperatives of actions against the group as part of the 
14 
 
broad war against violent extremism. Consequently, for their majority, 
researchers tend to prioritise the subject of countering its message, forecasting 
its end or its persistence instead of taking the time to understand and explain 
from different perspectives the reasons behind its spectacular rebound.  
2-Common reasons advanced explaining IS´resurgence 
Before the 2014 pivotal moment, the media and academic’s interest in the 
group had been declining since 2010 and the US withdrawal from Iraq. In 2014 
the books “ISIS inside the Army of Terror”11 and “ISIS: the state of Terror” 12 were 
the first chronological research pieces with the objective of vulgarising the group 
to the general public after its spectacular takeover of large parts of Iraq in June 
2014.  Those books provide an important amount of information about the group 
pointing out to its terrorist nature primarily and share a similar explanation of its 
emergence in 2003 and re-emergence in 2014. External causes, political 
opportunities as well as perceived grievances, are generally considered as the 
main causes to explain its growth and successes. The cited reasons behind the 
growth of the Sunni insurgency from which Zarqawi profited are the following: the 
Faith Campaign previously led by Saddam in the 1990s, the excesses of the Dee-
Baathification process, and the exclusion of the Sunnis from the new Iraqi state’s 
share power. Paul Bremer’s decision to dismember the Iraqi Army is presented 
as the primary cause behind the sudden strengthening of the Sunni rebellion 
because it left unemployed thousands of men with a military formation. This 
controversial decision, combined with Saddam Hussein’s promotion of 
conservative Islamic values among the society, made it easier for Saddam 
officers to convert to Salafism. Prisons such as Camp Bucca, considered by the 
Jihadi as “the University of Jihad”, where the whole spectrum of the Iraqi 
                                            
11 Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss, ISIS : inside the army of Terror, Regan Arts New York, 
2015 
12 Jessica Stern and J.M Berger, ISIS: the state of Terror, William Collins, London, 2015 
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insurgency mingled, also played a significant part in the recruitment process of 
the group. 
The exhaustive study on IS conducted by Dr Muhammad Abu Ruhman and 
Hassan Abu Haniyeh entitled “The Islamic State the Sunni crisis and the struggle 
of Global Jihadism”13 targets a public much familiar with the subject and can be 
considered as authoritative in terms of understanding the group. The authors 
defend two arguments in relation to IS’ rise and dynamics since its inception by 
Zarqawi’s Tawheed Wal Jihad (TWJ) group:  its thriving was based on the Sunni 
resentment and sentiment of exclusion and that the seeds of the discord with Al 
Qaeda were planted at the very beginning of the group’s emergence in Iraq in 
2003.  Because of Al Qaeda’s inability and failure to establish themselves in the 
Arabian Peninsula they reluctantly submitted to Zarqawi’s conditions to have a 
presence in the highly strategic and symbolic Iraqi arena with its Iraqi branch 
(AQI) in 2004. During this period the first stages of the organisation’s “Iraqiisation” 
process occurred. Years later, Iraqis came to dominate the upper echelons of the 
organisation’s leadership, at the expense of the Arab and foreign fighters. 
According to both authors, this “Iraqiisation” permitted a deeper immersion of the 
group in the Sunni Iraqi society and was the main factor behind the orientation of 
the organisation’s goals and its later fixation on the Sunni cause. As they 
described, one of the most important arguments about the group’s success is the 
central rhetoric of the Sunni cause in “its doctrine, literature, speeches, and 
operations, and even into its strategic vision that later extended to include the 
Sunnis in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon”14. 
Haniyah concludes that the IS is the result of developing and accumulating 
elements and mistakes that took place between 2003 and 2014 such as the 
reality of the US occupation, the expansion of Iranian influence and its domination 
                                            
13 Hassan Abu Hanieh and Dr Mohamed Abu Ruhman, The Islamic State organization : the Sunni 
Organization and the struggle for Global Jihadism , Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amman (368p),2015 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/11458.pdf  
14Hassan Abu Hanieh and Dr Mohamed Abu Ruhman, The Islamic State organization : the Sunni 




of Iraqi politics. This result is characterised by the new state of affairs of the Sunni 
community with its growing exclusion, the Sunni political vacuum and the 
absence of an inclusive and uniting political platform in the post-US withdrawal 
Iraqi political order. Two key factors worked in favour of the group. First, there 
was the rise of counter-revolution policies that reproduced authoritative regimes 
in the Arab world like in Egypt. IS’ spectacular gains challenged the hope across 
the Arab world and especially among the Islamist groups which participated in 
elections that change was possible through peaceful means. Second, this “Sunni 
crisis” in Iraq and Syria erupted shifting the struggle and political allegiances in 
the region towards an identity and sectarian-driven conflict which fits into the IS’ 
paradigm. 
Finally, another research contribution regarding the question of Sunni grievances 
is that of Meriam Benraad and her book “Iraq: the revenge of History”15. She 
identifies the rise of the IS from a broader perspective among the Sunni Iraqi 
community. She describes the shift of their political horizon from the idea of an 
Iraqi national state to local protective secessionist aspirations that echo IS’ 
agenda. She considers that the US’ sectarian vision of a soft partition of Iraq and 
“Lebanese political power-sharing” planted the seeds of a partition which was 
welcomed by Kurds and the Islamic State of Iraq at the same time”16. The three-
state-solution idea was developed first by US think tanks and caused the 
exclusion of the Sunnis. According to Benraad, they were profoundly attached to 
Iraq’s unity.  2011 is, according to her, the year of the shift when Sunnis who 
participated in the political process and supported the secular candidate Iyad 
Alawi, felt betrayed and ended the dream of a unified Iraq. The fall of the influence 
of Sunni nationalist groups, such as the Council of the Ulemas of Iraq or 
nationalist insurgent groups such as the Army of Islam, symbolised this situation. 
Therefore, Sunnis began to reject Iraqi institutions as a solution to their 
marginalisation, at the same time as the rise in the promotion of the sectarian 
                                            
15 Myriam Benraad, Irak : la Revanche de l’histoire : de l’occupation étrangère à l’Etat Islamique, 
Vendemiare, Paris, 2015 
16 Ibid p 227 
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identity in the country and region. According to Benraad, by using the term 
“revenge”17, she considers that IS primarily thrived on the sentiment of revenge 
of the losers of the 2003 Iraq War. 
In his book “Why Muslims rebel?” Mohamed Hafez has turned the question from 
how to why to explain the use of violence by Islamic movements across the globe. 
For our case study, his thesis offers another type of structural strain in explaining 
the emergence of IS. His thesis puts forward a political process approach to 
Islamist rebellion by analysing the political environment, the mobilisation structure 
and the ideological frames of militant organisations in Egypt and Algeria in the 
1990s. According to Hafez, the key to explaining the use of violence by members 
of Islamist movements is not economic stagnation, excessive secularisation, or 
the groups’ ideology but mainly the lack of meaningful access to state institutions. 
He considers that state repression is at the root of Islamic rebellion movements. 
He argues that the timing and targeting of state-led repression are crucial 
elements that determine if a movement will rise and revolt — his in-depth study 
of Algerian and Egyptian Islamic armed groups in the 1990s argues that 
indiscriminate repression and targeting by the state has led to an ensuing circle 
of violence. It caused the emergence of the most extremely violent groups (such 
as the GIA) who lost touch with reality and constructed an “anti-system frame” 
that led to the denial of civilians’ neutrality.  For our case study, nearly the same 
idea is defended by Omar Ashour. According to him, the political environment in 
the Middle East can be considered as a breeding ground for IS’ recruitment and 
ideology because in the region, legitimacy “is still obtained through religious 
advisory opinions (fatwa) or extreme nationalism”18 while other factors such as 
constitutions, laws and elections are secondary factors. In addition, violence is 
still considered as an accepted way of accessing power. This repressive political 
environment is thus potentially giving credibility to IS’ tactics and generates cycles 
of violence from which the group can thrive. 
                                            
17 Ibid  p254 
18Omar Ashour, ““Enigma of ‘Baqiya wa Tatamadad’: The Islamic State Organization’s Military 
Survival”, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 19/04/2016 
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The weight of history has also had a profound impact on IS’ emergence according 
to Jean Pierre Luizard in his book “The Daesh trap”. The symbolic destruction of 
the Sykes-Picot Border by the IS in June 2014 is a focal point of his 
argumentation.  Because they denounced the legitimacy of all the existing states 
of the region, Luizard argues that IS were able to appear as the only actor in the 
area who could present itself as the real inheritor of the Arab Spring. Indeed, by 
pronouncing its autonomy and sole dependence on the local civil society which 
compose itself, IS can emphasise its independence and exceptionalism, while at 
the same time armed groups of the rebellion in Syria are funded by foreign 
states19. By referring to Sykes Picot’s agreement, IS was writing its struggle in 
the deep history against the imposed borders established by the French and 
British powers after the First World War. For Luizard, IS’ success can be traced 
back to the weaknesses and contradictions of both Iraqi and Syrian nation-state 
models20. For decades, both have shared a self-destructive process of 
delegitimization which culminated in their collapse while producing fertile ground 
for IS. The first Iraqi state was created by the British and lasted 80 years, with the 
domination of the Sunni community and more specifically, Saddam’s clan, which 
used pan Arabism and Iraqi nationalism to unite the country. In creating the 
second Iraqi state, the US relied on the Shia Arab majority to learn that 
paradoxically it is easier for a foreign power to install and put in power a minority 
rather than a majority. This is what France did in Syria with the Alawites and which 





                                            
19Jean Pierre Luizard, Le piège Daesh, Editions La Découverte, Paris, 2015, p35 




              Before entering into a detailed analysis of the core subject, I will explain 
the choice of strategy as a perspective to understand the resurgence of IS. 
Despite all the efforts against the group described previously, it managed to 
survive and manifested a tremendous capacity of resistance and adaptation. 
Moreover, it resurged with a meteoric rise between 2012 and 2014, achieving a 
result never attained by any Islamist or jihadi group in modern history: the control 
of territory across two countries and the proclamation of a caliphate in the heart 
of the Arab world.  For the case study, the term resurgence describes the group’s 
enterprise accurately in terms of the smallness of means while reaching 
achievements surpassing all expectations. Not only did the group recover from 
near destruction, but it bounced “back” from adversity, outperforming all its rivals 
to reach a position of dominance. The vast literature on the subject gives much 
more importance the endogenous dynamics of conflict with the combination of 
the flat terrain of Syria and Iraq and the military weakness of its opponents rather 
than the group’s strategy in order to explain it. Commentators have considered 
that IS’ resurgence had “less to do with its strategic acumen or compelling vision 
than with how Iraqi security institutions have come to embody the sectarianism, 
corruption and nepotism of the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki”. 21  
As precisely emphasised by a report of the RAND Corporation, until now “there 
is no empirically defensible assessment of a concise set of root causes that fuels 
and sustains IS”22.  
Explaining IS’ rebound by studying its strategy and its influence is also a way of 
assessing the group’s flexibility between the reality of the political terrain and its 
ideological aspirations. For that purpose, I tackle this subject from three different 
perspectives: the group’s tactics, strategy and grand strategy. These three 
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research scopes are divided accordingly to Liddle Hart’s indirect approach angles 
of analysis to explain decisive victories across history. I argue that IS’ resurgence 
in Iraq can be explained to a certain degree by the group’s adherence to the 
guidelines presented by Liddle Hart, especially at the tactical and strategic levels. 
Of course, monocausal determinism cannot explain the complex phenomenon 
that brought IS to control large areas in Iraq and Syria. In the literature, elements 
such as resources, political opportunities, weaknesses of its adversaries and 
topographical elements have been advanced as causes to explain IS’ lightning 
conquest in 2014. Many other factors have been suggested such as the structural 
strains of Iraqi society, the rise of sectarianism, the weakness of the Iraqi Army, 
the spillover of the Syrian conflict or the influx of foreign fighters but none of these 
possible explanations have focused on the group itself and its strategy.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the group’s resurgence between the end 
of 2011 and 2015 and contribute to filling this gap. It also tackles down some 
ideas about the lack of the strategy the group had or its limitation to the blind and 
exclusive following of its theorists. When associated with strategy, IS’ scope is 
limited to a blind following of Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery guidelines 
or to not have any at all. Max Abraham described IS as a group without a strategy 
and if it had one, was “infective and counterproductive”23 because of its use of 
violence and its failure to earn from its predecessors. William Mac Cants for his 
part neglected any possibility for the group in conducting a heart and mind 
strategy.24 I argue that IS developed a protracted strategy understood as 
identifying and prioritizing objectives; applying elements of power toward the 
attainment of the objectives; and balancing costs, risks, and expected gains. By 
explaining the resurgence only with endogenous factors and the weakness of the 
opposition can be considered to be limited. For example, the same analysts who 
neglect or refuse to IS any strategic thinking would only explain the success of 
the surge in 2006 from ISI’s mistakes that violated cultural norms with its nearly 
                                            
23 Max Abraham, Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History, Oxford University 
Press, 2018, p89 
24 William Mac Cants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the 
Islamic State, St Martin's Press, 2015  
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indiscriminate violence against Sunni tribes which caused a favourable 
turnaround of the Dulaimi Tribal Confederation. This large, cohesive tribe within 
Anbar province laid the foundation of the “Sahawat,” bringing in other tribal 
entities. It would neglect the fact that U.S. reinforcements on the ground and 
better COIN strategy gave the American ground forces the upper hand. 
The adoption of strategy as a scope of research to explain IS’ rise can contribute 
to expanding the research on the group and give additional insight into explaining 
its resurgence. Using the indirect approach as a theory to verify a hypothesis with 
empirical pieces of evidence has been done in very few studies. The mobilisation 
of the tactical guideline of non-confrontation and confrontation in a quantitative 
study of the operations claimed by the groups between 2012 and mid-2014 can 
offer a new vision of the tactical patterns and level of confidence the group had 
to confront the Iraqi Army at that time. The contribution of the study in 
understanding IS’ resurgence and IS’ rational decisions could also act as a 
counterweight to the importance given to ideology in IS’ military decisions.  
Throughout the literature, many theses confront the issues of what drives IS’ 
actions: eschatology, Islamic culture or crypto-Baathism... One of the originalities 
of the study would be to adopt a new perspective by applying a universal doctrine 
on the group's actions assessing its learning and eclectic nature. The adoption of 
Liddle Hart’s principles of Grand Strategy may show a capacity of pragmatism 
and rational strategic thinking which has often been disregarded in the debate 
regarding the group. Indeed, by adopting the framework of Liddle Hart’s 
paradigm, this study would shed light on the group’s flexibility and capacity of 
adapting to circumstances, which sometimes are underreported in favour of its 
ideological purity and its harsh use of violence.  
Sometimes considered as a terrorist group, an apocalyptic cult, a terrorist army, 
a proto-state, a revolutionary movement or a combination of these, there is a 
confusion not limited to academics regarding the nature of the Islamic State. As 
a result, most of the publications on the subject are mainly descriptive analyses 
of the ideology, structure and goals of the group. One of the obstacles to theory 
building in the study of a given group is that a shared research agenda does not 
unify multidisciplinary research. It is scattered among a variety of disciplines, 
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publications that tend to follow a narrow set of research questions, theoretical 
frameworks and methodologies, each determined by a particular disciplinary 
focus. For example, in the IS case, political scientists are most concerned by the 
Sunni grievances and the regional context to explain its growth. Sociologists tend 
to focus on the way the group is co-opting tribal components from its social 
incubator while religious and historical researchers will base their analysis by 
drawing parallels with past political manifestations comparable to IS’ experience 
or methodology. The result is that disciplinary fragmentation has certainly 
produced a greater understanding of each particular element of the group. 
However, this has been done without developing models or frameworks that 
explain how all these elements fit together and interact. This study’s contribution 
is to show how IS’ military, political and social policies are complementary.  For 
that reason, the study of IS’ tactics and strategy for military operations coupled 
with its Grand Strategy for the political and social dimension, provides a holistic 
study of the organisation. This study is therefore different in its large scope as it 
tries to transcend the gap between terrorism and military studies.  It also defies 
the essentialist approach of the group that requires an analysis only through the 
prism of its culture or ideology and instead, adopts a theory applicable to any 
other militant organisation or political entity that uses violence regardless of its 
size, ideology or goals. 
The thesis’ object of study, the Islamic State organisation, defies easy 
categorisation. It is a hybrid organisation in its nature as well as in its types of 
actions. In 2014-2015, it was able to shapeshift from an insurgent force into an 
army with a broad military repertoire. Its emergence and comeback were not 
random but took place in the context of a specific environment where it had to 
interact with a wide range of actors. I have chosen to study two kinds of 
interactions that fit its shapeshifting and multidimensional nature which are its 
strategy and propaganda. In its media, the group regularly engage in framing to 
justify its actions, articulate its goals and attract supporters. From a military 
perspective, it can evolve and mutate given the context and its strategic needs 
between the use of terrorism, insurgency or conventional warfare. This 
investigation tries to analyse the key development stages of this evolution more 
closely from a provincial perspective with the scope of Liddle Hart’s theory. The 
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purpose of this research is to contribute to the debate on its nature and verify its 
hybrid nature as a social movement and a military organisation that transcends 
terrorism studies’ narrow vision of the group.  
Finally, the last contribution of the research on its resurgence between 2011 and 
2015 is to put into perspective the group’s return to an insurgency in Iraq in 2018. 
On December 9, 2017, IS had lost all its strategic territory in Iraq. Structural 
strains leading to the group’s resurgence did not change much. The group did 
not vanish but retreated to remote areas waiting for an opportunity to come back.  
It has returned to guerrilla tactics in the country’s rural areas. Despite Iraqi 
officials’ claims, the group still has hundreds of fighters and hideouts in remote 
areas of the country like in 2011-2012 with the difference of having more 
resources and an international reach. With the progressive withdrawal of the US 
coalition from the country and the persistence of socio-economic and political 
strains in the country, the question of the group’s re-emergence is likely to remain 
on the table. For that reason, the question of its past resurgence and the driving 
forces behind it stays relevant for the research community and policymakers.  
4-Literature’s gaps and contributions of the study.    
I have identified the following gaps in the literature concerning the Islamist State 
in general and its resurgence in particular: 
        After scrutinising the extensive research on the subject, it emerges that a 
monocausal explanation of such a complex phenomenon as IS’ resurgence is not 
possible. Even though this question seems to have been answered, this 
observation is half-true. Exogenous factors (structural strains, grievances, 
geopolitical context) have been extensively studied because of the relative ease 
in accessing them and the high level of comprehension in the academic world of 
the post-Saddam Iraq era and the issue of sectarianism. Endogenous factors 
proper to the group are, however, generally more difficult to access and less 
exposed in the literature; the only exception would be its ideology, which can 
partly explain the group’s resilience. The group’s relationship with the population 
it controls, its relations with the tribes, its strategy, its political behaviour, the 
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decision-making process inside its structures or the driving force behind its 
actions are still under-researched fields and have more questions than answers. 
Furthermore, very few studies on IS follow a methodology of applying a deductive 
method by testing a hypothesis within a given theoretical framework. Most of the 
methods used in studies are somewhat inductive by collecting shreds of evidence 
and formulating a conclusion. In addition, most of the studies have a broader 
scope of analysis tending to adopt a holistic view of the group.  
The period of 2003-2010 received extensive treatment in terms of the analysis of 
the reasons behind the group’s demise as well as its organisational and 
resources structure. One of this study’s contributions is to shed light on episodes 
of the group’s recent history which remain under-investigated. IS’ relations with 
the Sunni insurgency and the tribes or IS’ prison breaks and urban assault 
campaigns can be considered as under-investigated so far. By adopting a 
provincial scope to study IS’ tactics, the study may give a new vision on IS’ tactical 
patterns. The provinces of Iraq are so different in terms of topography, actors 
involved, history of the group and social bonds that following a provincial angle 
of research can bring a new understanding of the phenomenon and explain more 
precisely the variations in the group’s performances in Iraq during its resurgence. 
To explain the mobilisation of people joining IS, most of the research has tended 
to hyper-focus on the foreign fighters flow rather than the local recruiting process, 
which is one of the focuses of the thesis. One of the study’s contributions would 
be to shed light on this dynamic by mobilising IS’ frames of reference towards its 
targeted audience in Iraq. 
Also, social movement theory (SMT) can provide a way to understand the group’s 
attraction and popular support. I used the framing mobilization theory and decided 
not to use the relative Deprivation theory (RDT) and resource mobilization 
theories (RMT) for two reasons. First, because structural strains and the 
consequent grievances among the Sunni population as a research angle to 
understand the IS’ resurgence is a subject widely tackled by many pieces of 
research focused on the state of the Sunni minority in Iraq since 2003. Other 
Sunni groups that could thrive on Sunni resentment did not witness the same 
successes that IS had and for that reason, the explanation of IS’ resurgence only 
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from this angle is not sufficient. Secondly, I consider that resources are not 
sufficient to explain the group’s resilience and resurgence especially because the 
group was always outnumbered and had less capacity than its opponents had.  
5-Research Question  
How can we explain IS’ resurgence in Iraq from 2011 to 2015 with the 
scope of the indirect approach theory?  
The research answers the two following sub-questions: 
To what extent did IS adhere to Liddle Hart’s indirect approach guidelines?  
Did IS’ frames in Iraq echoed the demands of the Sunni Arab population 
during the “Iraqi Spring”? 
The purpose of the study is to assess the reasons behind its resurgence 
from 2011 to 2015 using a new scope of research. This timeframe gives the 
possibility of having a comprehensive vision of the group’s evolution and 
transformations in its nature, strategy, and discourse. Indeed, this period 
corresponds to the shift in structure and tactics the group witnessed from a terror 
organisation to a semi-conventional army.  
The objectives of this research investigation are the following:  
 Explain the group’s rebound from two perspectives: Liddle Hart’s strategic 
approach and the framing mobilisation theory. 
 Assess to what extent the group’s resurgence in 2012-2014 and decisive 
victories were due to its following of the indirect approach’s principles.  
 Determine the possible origins and influences on IS’ strategy and discuss 
if the group had a Grand Strategy as defined by Liddle Hart and its 
implications in its relations with local and international actors. 
 Find tactical patterns for IS’ studied provinces. 
 Verify if the group’s frames have mirrored (or not) the protestors’ demands 
and more generally the feeling of deprivation among the Sunni Arab 
population in Iraq. 
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 Ultimately, to have enough evidence to argue that strategy and framing 
during that period had a positive impact on the group’s resurgence and 
discuss the implications, this can have on the debate on the group’s 
nature. 
       This research investigation consists of seven chapters. In Chapter 2, I 
provide the theoretical framework I use to analyse the group’s strategy based on 
the terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency doctrines, the indirect approach 
theory of Liddle Hart and the framing social movement theory. In Chapter 3, I 
provide a comprehensive methodological framework to explain IS’ resurgence. In 
chapter 4, I present the literature on the IS military strategy. In Chapter 5, I 
introduce to the reader a historical background of IS in its diverse manifestations 
as an organisation using a provincial scope from 2003 to 2011.  In Chapter 6, I 
analyse the group’s tactical patterns and evolution between 2012 and 2014 
following the same provincial scope by introducing a new categorisation of the 
group’s military operations. In Chapter 7, I assess the adherence to LH’s 
principles of the IS’ prison break campaign in 2012-2013 and its urban assaults 
of 2014-2015. In Chapter 8, I discuss whether IS had a Grand Strategy as defined 
by LH’s terms. I also study its relationship with Sunni tribes and Sunni insurgent 
groups and compare its frames of reference with the ones of the protestors during 
the Iraqi spring. As a conclusion, I summarise learning points from the study, 









II- Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis, and 
Variables. 
1-The validity of the terrorist organisation prism to 
analyse IS 
The concept of survival and success of militant organisations has 
particularly drawn the attention of researchers since the post-9/11 period. It has 
been studied more broadly in the framework of security and conflict studies by 
focusing not only on one defined group but by generally addressing the open 
question of under which conditions they end, survive or win.  In recent years, 
many scholars have tried to understand the factors affecting the success of 
terrorist groups. In an article 25 written by Bloomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler, 
the three authors address the question of the survival of terrorist organisations 
between 1970 and 2007. They applied their analysis to a diverse set of 367 
terrorist organisations. According to their findings, religious groups have better 
dispositions for survival than groups adopting other ideologies. A group’s size 
also has an impact on its resilience since they have shown that “large groups that 
pursue a diversified mix of attack modes survive longer”26. Transnational groups 
have less ability to survive than groups operating only in their country, while 
groups based in the Middle East and North Africa generally last longer than their 
counterparts in other regions.  Johns and Lebiki’s article27 conducted within the 
framework of the Pentagon-funded RAND foundation research department 
analysed 648 non-state actors that existed between 1968 and 2006. They found 
that the most common way a terrorist group ends is by undergoing a transition to 
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a political party (43 per cent). They also pointed out that religious groups are more 
resilient than other groups.28  However, they found that not one religious group 
since 1968 was able to achieve victory. According to them, the size of the groups 
is determinant since groups composed of more than 10 000 members tend to be 
victorious more than 25% of the time, while small groups of less than 1000 
members are systematically defeated. According to their data, 50% of insurgent 
groups ended after negotiating a settlement with the government, 25% achieved 
victory, and 19% were militarily defeated. In their assessment of Al-Qaeda’s 
chances of success, they concluded in 2008 that their chance in overthrowing 
any government was close to zero. 
Other recent works provide evidence for why terrorist groups fail. Blomberg, 
Engel, and Sawyer published a research article29 in 2010 on the duration and 
sustainability of transnational groups. They tried to produce survivorship patterns 
of transnational terrorist organisations. They measured a terrorist group’s 
sustainability through their capacity to mount attacks across successive periods. 
They consider that there are at least two types of terrorist organisations: 
“recidivists and one-hit wonders” and have shown that terrorist organisations, like 
firms, “display patterns of negative duration dependence”. In other words, the 
younger an organisation, the more likely it is to cease to exist in the next period. 
They found that regional, socioeconomic, and political factors affect the survival 
of organisations. However, these factors do not significantly change the direction 
of duration dependence. 
Laura Dugan and Joseph Young tried to answer the question of “why terrorist 
groups end?” 30 by applying the theory of outbidding to this issue and argue that 
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the strategic environment for groups affects their survival. They considered that 
both the number of competitors and where the group is in the food chain influence 
its likelihood of survival. The originality of their article is that they offer a new 
characteristic that influences longevity, which is competition among groups.   
Other researchers tried to assess the resilience of terrorist groups by examining 
if inter-organisational violence had an impact on their resilience. Brian J Phillips, 
in his study31, focused on how often terrorist organisations attack each other and 
the impact on their resilience. According to his findings, intra-war can 
paradoxically contribute to the longevity of participating groups. He considered 
that violent rivalries encourage “civilians to take a side, inspire innovation; provide 
new incentives to group members”32.  Martha Crenshaw, for her part, argued that 
when terrorist groups face stress from competing with each other, group 
members might defect or the group might splinter. 33  We see that in the research 
community there is a clear division on the question of whether or not, competition 
with other armed groups should ultimately help or hurt the survival of terrorist 
organisations.  
Jenna Jordan’s researches focused on studying the resilience of militant groups 
after having lost a leader34. She measured the organisational resilience of a range 
of terrorist organisations. In 2014, she extended her contribution to theoretically 
and empirically assess the efficiency of the US targeting campaign against Al 
Qaeda’s leadership35. By applying a theory of organisational resilience to this 
strategy, she concluded that it is inefficient and is likely counterproductive. She 
found that it did not have sufficient impact to degrade Al Qaeda’s “organisational 
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resilience”, which she referred to as “the capacity to a group that has experienced 
degradation to still engage in terrorist activity”.36   
From the range of studies conducted to explain the resilience of non-state political 
actors, we can say that ideology, geography, modes of attack, structure, and 
competition with other actors are factors affecting the resilience of a group. The 
profile of the IS as a religious group based in the Middle East having a diversified 
mode of attack and engaged in competition makes it, according to their findings, 
the perfect candidate for being a resilient terrorist organisation. However, the only 
scope of terrorism is not sufficient to fully understand the IS phenomenon even 
though this tactic constitutes a portion of the group’s overall activities. Hoffman 
explained that terrorist organisations "do not function in the open as armed units, 
generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging 
enemy military forces in combat, are constrained both numerically and logistically 
from undertaking concerted mass political mobilisation efforts, and exercise no 
direct control or governance over a populace at either the local or the national 
level."37 Daniel Byman argued that the majority of the groups that do not hold 
territory and lack popular support, yet use terrorism as a tactic, can be considered 
proto-insurgencies.38 The psychological effect of terrorism is according to Metz 
higher right now for insurgents because of the multiplying effect its mediatisation 
shape the beliefs, perceptions, or morale of those living far away.39 The fact that 
information technology amplifies the psychological effects of a terrorist incident 
by publicising it to a much wider audience makes the insurgent more prone to 
use this tactic.  Because IS does not represent only a terrorist organisation, it also 
evolved to an insurgency, the use of the "insurgent group" conceptual framework 
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can contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding of its resurgence and a 
better appreciation of the goals that the group is trying to attain40.Thus, this 
approach places terror attacks within the broader strategic framework of 
insurgency and can help avoid confusion between a mean and an end. 
2-The guerrilla warfare scope for explaining IS resurgence  
U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines 
insurgency. It describes insurgency as “an organised, protracted politico-military 
struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing 
insurgent control.”41 It synthesises the dominant view among insurgency and 
counter-insurgency (COIN) theorists Guerrilla warfare consists of the use of 
military and political resources to mobilise the population, conduct hit and run 
attacks and undermine the opponent’s will to fight. The primary goal is not to 
destroy a stronger enemy, but to undermine its morale by exhausting him, 
causing lethargy and defections among its ranks. This strategy is a long-term one 
that requires patience and resilience. Being outnumbered and outgunned, since 
the 1980s insurgent groups have improved their capacities and increased their 
success against conventional armies. Military theorists and researchers 
advanced many factors to explain it. Its modern root can be traced back to the 
first anti-colonial war of the 20th century led by Abdel Krim Al Khattabi in the Rif 
region in Northern Morocco against Spain and France.42 His tactics inspired many 
theorists such as Mao, Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and emulated other 
rebellions throughout the 20th century. First, the concept of popular support was 
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popularised by Mao Zedong as a critical factor behind the success of 
insurgencies. By evolving in their societies like “Fish in the water” 43, insurgents 
must possess the support of the population. Counterinsurgency manuals share 
this idea with their objective of winning the hearts and minds of a neutral public. 
Liddle Hart’s writings on guerrilla warfare also pointed to this factor: “guerrilla 
movements depend on the attitude of the people in the area where the struggle 
takes place, on their willingness to aid it by providing information and supplies.”44  
 According to Robert Bunker, the most identifiable form of insurgency was 
theorized by Mao in 1937 with the concept of people’s war “where peasant armies 
are integrated into a politico-military phase strategy in order to take over the 
state.”45. Mao believed that mobilisation of the population was key in order to 
achieve victory. The purpose of his doctrine was to provide the necessary 
strategy, tactics and techniques to defeat larger and better equipped military 
forces. The specificity of his strategy is its reliance on the peasantry as the main 
force for its Communist-led peasant insurrection.  Massive mobilization coupled 
with the indoctrination of the masses is considered as the basis for military 
mobilization in order to build a capable revolutionary army. His three-phase 
strategy before ultimate victory was developed during the early years of the Sino-
Japanese War. This long campaign starts with a preservation phase of defence 
and retreat, followed by an expansion phase corresponding to a long period of 
stalemate, during which the Chinese would build up their forces, and the decisive 
strategic counteroffensive that would achieve a final Chinese victory.  According 
to Ralph Powell, this three-stage nature of the protracted war does not apply to 
other insurgencies and take its strength in the specificities of China46. It relies on 
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the use of vast areas in order to strategic retreat. It requires absolute local 
superiority of forces while concentrating powers against an objective, despite 
overall inferiority of forces. This strategy believes that victory can be achieved 
with superior ratio against the enemy in a ratio of between two and six to one.47 
Therefore, Mao’s strategy requires a high number of ideologically motivated 
fighter scattered in a vast terrain who concentrate on the weak points of the 
enemy. His tactic requires manoeuvrability and a rapid concentration and 
dispersal of forces highlighted by this citation:  "The enemy advances, we retreat. 
The enemy halts, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, 
we pursue."48  
Two researchers have used Mao guerrilla warfare principles to explain IS’ 
resurgence. First, Craig Whiteside defends the idea that IS shares the attributes 
of revolutionary movements by establishing a parallel between its strategy and 
Mao’s guerrilla warfare principles. According to the author, “using Mao’s 
revolutionary warfare framework, particularly his three stages of a conflict, 
provides a more holistic view of the organisation for both understanding and 
action”49 . Regarding the question of IS’ nature he considers that often described 
as a ‘terror group’, the Islamic State fits the definition of a movement conducting 
an insurgency, defined as an armed struggle dedicated to replacing the 
government. For him, the Islamic State is revolutionary because it seeks to 
replace state governance and reject the international order utterly. After seizing 
territories, the group proved its ability to establish order and apply its ideology in 
areas where anarchy was prevailing, punish “defectors” while rewarding 
supporters, and provide basic services and governance to the population. For 
Whiteside, the group is primarily a guerrilla organisation conducting murders, 
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robberies, sabotages and terrorist attack and there are no conventional battles 
and no blitzkrieg in its ‘long attrition struggle’ to wear down the will of the enemy.50  
His statement is partially true, most of IS’ activity can be explained from the long 
recovery phase, even though its mobilisation of the population takes another 
shape and its manoeuvres in the decisive phase are completely different from the 
urban assaults of IS in 2014 that led to the fall of many cities in its hand. Whiteside 
also recognised that the difference between IS tactics and that Marxist groups 
are “the extent to which conventional military fighting is enacted from very early 
on, both in Syria and Iraq.”51 On the contrary, Stathis Kalyvas another author 
defending the revolutionary nature of IS considers that it is “the main type of 
combat that ISIS uses so far which differentiates it from other jihadi rebels, such 
as the Algerian GIA”52, for instance. 
Even though there are similarities between Mao’s strategy and the resurgence of 
the IS, there are some limits to attribute to this theory a comprehensive 
explanation to IS’ rise. Maoist doctrine envisioned conventional war as the final 
stage of the war where conventional mobile war and even positional war were to 
take place where ultimate victory could be won only by regular forces fighting a 
mobile fluid war. This scenario did not apply to many successful guerrillas later, 
where, as described by Ralph Powell, “protracted guerrilla conflict alone can win 
an insurrectionary war, or at least create a long and costly war that could help to 
overextend the United States, create increasing domestic opposition in the 
U.S.”53  For IS case study, it has the attributes of an insurgent revolutionary force, 
but it did not wait to match in firepower and human ratio the Iraqi Army after 
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having indoctrinated the “Sunni Masses” with its ideology to launch its decisive 
assaults on the Iraqi cities. For IS, mass recruitment of peasant was not an 
essential source of manpower compared to foreign fighters.  
The other criticism addressed to the comparison of IS’ resurgence to the success 
of past revolutionary insurgent is the significant place of external support from 
states in their performance. Galula considered outside support as one of the four 
conditions for a successful insurgency.  He added that during the middle and later 
stages of an insurgency, it might become a necessity.54John Pustay noted that 
insurgency might be supported by the supply of external aid from friendly 
Communist states 55. McCuen expressed a stronger view in his classic book, The 
Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency.  McCuen 
wrote, “Seeking outside support must be a vital principle of revolutionary strategy. 
There can be little question as to the importance of the revolutionaries to gain 
such outside support.”56 Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan found 
that although states remained the most important source of external support to 
insurgents, non-state actors also contributed significantly.57  Their conclusion 
confirmed that “external support for an insurgency can make a movement far 
more effective, prolong the war, and increase the scale and lethality of the 
struggle.”58 Maoist and communist insurgencies received revolutionary doctrine, 
training and arms support from states such as USSR, China or Cuba. We can 
conclude that evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that state-led external 
support is a decisive factor in determining the outcome of an insurgency. In the 
                                            
54 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A 
Praeger, 1964. Reprint, New York: Frederick A Praeger, 2005), 39-42. 
55 John S. Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York, The Free Press, 1965), 103-104. 
56 John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War:  The Strategy of Counterinsurgency 
(1966. Reprint, St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 66. 
57 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 1. 




case of IS, external support from states was absent. Therefore it lacked one of 
the most important causes of success for an insurgent guerrilla. 
The intertwining of political actions with kinetic actions in IS military doctrine is 
rarely mentioned today about the Islamic State. It contributes to the literature by 
making analogies with a revolutionary movement and can be relevant in order to 
understand this phenomenon better. However, viewing the Islamic State only 
through a revolutionary warfare prism can narrow down the explanation of its 
resurgence. First of all, because using only this lens can be considered as using 
an outdated scope to understand a modern phenomenon. As Metz argued, 
modern insurgencies are in essence different and more complex than classical 
insurgent models as defined by Mao.59 The requirement of mobilising the 
population is less critical for contemporary insurgencies which are more focused 
on violence. Organisations are more organized as flat flexible networks than rigid 
hierarchical organisations. The absence of state support makes these 
insurgencies to develop a wide array of partnership and alliances with new actors. 
They can use a base of supporters outside the country and ideological supporters 
who share a political perspective or business partners to provide information and 
armaments. As explained by Metz, a complex web of links means less need for 
a mass base. Insurgents nowadays still need the acquiescence of the population 
but rely less on them for information, money and labour. Social Media are used 
for recruitment and building linkages with other groups. Contemporary 
insurgencies are more focused on violence, on coercion rather than the 
patronage of the population. For example, before its assault on the city, IS in 
Mosul is said to have raised more than 8 million dollars of revenue through 
racketing.60 Modern insurgencies such as IS, also have a new kind of relationship 
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with new actors such as rival militias in a failed state context which affects and 
shape the conflict.   
Geography and topography are also considered as essential variables for the 
success of an insurgency. Liddle Hart defended this idea while commenting on 
the success of Lawrence of Arabia’s led insurgency against the Ottoman Empire. 
Mao believed that in massive countries, guerrilla warfare was more efficient 
because of how easy it was to target government forces’ supply lines.61 The 
vastness of the Anbar and Al Jazeera desert has indeed helped the group to hide 
in this ocean of sand. Nevertheless, the terrain in Iraq is desert and flat and not 
suitable (except Diyala) for guerrilla warfare. Zarqawi was aware of this 
geographic factor back in 2004 when describing the difficulty his nascent group 
was facing: “We are fighting a battle that is not equal in a sense. There is no 
comparison between our capabilities and the enemy’s resources. […] What the 
Mujahedeen possess cannot compare with the enemy’s resources... The land of 
Jihad in Iraq is different from Afghanistan and Chechenia.  The brothers are 
helped either by forests or mountains can hide from the enemy and prevent him 
from reaching. Iraq is flat without mountains, wadis or forests. Another problem 
is that the battlefront is a close engagement. The brothers are fighting one of the 
fiercest battles in human history. They are fighting while lacking many supportive 
conditions. They have no strategic depth or an area unattainable. The enemy is 
behind them in front of them, on their right and on their left”. 62 
Galula considered geography as an important factor. It helps the insurgent as it 
is rugged and difficult, either because of mountains and swamps or because of 
the vegetation.63He concluded that a cause, police and administrative weakness 
in the counterinsurgent camp are musts for a successful insurgency and a not-
too-hostile geographic environment. 
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The combination of the three elements behind the success of insurgencies in the 
recent period, namely, popular support and mass mobilisation, geography and 
external support, are insufficient in explaining the success of IS’ insurgency. IS’ 
ideology does not promote popular support as a key strategic objective, its 
recruitment strategy was not targeting the masses, Iraq’s terrain is flat and not 
suitable for guerrilla warfare and there is no substantial proof of any support 
received by IS in its history from state actors. For that reason, I prioritise in this 
research investigation a theoretical framework not limited to guerrilla strategy 
only. Studying the group’s strategy needs to take into account the transformation 
it has undergone in its 15 years of existence. Throughout this period, it has 
evolved from guerrilla and terrorist tactics to the use of conventional warfare with 
the objective to directly attack enemy forces and seize territory. Its abilities have 
also developed to hold sufficient skill and leadership attributes and defeat with 
minimal resources technologically and numerically superior foes. 
As developed by Whiteside, we agree that IS is a hybrid insurgent-terrorist group: 
It is at once a large-scale, semi conventional insurgent force that has seized 
considerable territory from the governments of Iraq and Syria, and an 
international terrorist organisation that encourages or conducts clandestine 
operations and attacks around the world. However, the fact that IS is a modern 
insurgent group as defined by Metz with all the new attributes of an insurgency 
make the guerilla scope a bit outdated.IS has also morphed to a conventional 
force so quickly and applied its rule over a country with the size of Great Britain 
governing 8 million inhabitants that it propelled the group to show new 
prerogatives in a new context that the Maoist guerrilla warfare theory cannot 
explain entirely.  
3-Inspiration from its enemies: IS’ COIN strategy. 
IS’ peak of power in late 2014-2015 upgraded its capabilities from a 
clandestine insurgent force focused on terrorist activities to a proto-state using 
counterinsurgent strategies. Even though the group reached a state level only at 
the end of 2014, It started to imagine itself as a state very early. From its inception 
as Tawheed wal-Jihad, IS’ prime objective was to create and sustain a 
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transnational state based on its interpretation of Sharia. It believed that this could 
be achieved only by violence and should be organised to control territory and a 
population. The general strategic long-term objective, which defines the purpose 
of war, comes from different Quran verses calling the believers to fight until there 
is no “Fitnah”64.This order poses the basis of the group’s state of peace for which 
war is waged until religion is dominant over other systems of belief. After the 
declaration of the caliphate, IS’ media became more vocal about the group’s 
overall strategy. In its first issue,65 Dabiq magazine outlined the five phases of IS’ 
strategy in an article entitled from Hijrah to Khalifah: 
1-Hijrah (lit emigration]); refers to the gathering towards a place when the group 
can find a haven from where it can operate without the threat of being harmed. It 
can be anywhere in the world, preferably in a land governed by a weak central 
authority to use as a base. There, a jama’ah can form, recruit members and train 
them.  
2-Jama’ah [congregation]; refers to the necessity to have ideological and 
theological cohesion among the group by following the Sunni Salafi creed. 
3. Nikaya [harming] is the phase when the group can thrive through violent 
actions creating as much as chaos as possible within the boundaries of Sharia.  
4. Tamkin [consolidation]; this phase constitutes a midterm achievement 
preceded by several Nikaya attacks. As described by the author, these attacks 
“will compel apostate forces to partially withdraw from a rural territory and regroup 
in major urban regions”. The jama’ah will use “tawahhush” (“mayhem”) in order 
to take advantage of the situation.  
5. Khalifah [God’s vicar on Earth] is the final step where the group fills the 
vacuum, building a state and expanding its territory. 
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These guidelines are not specific to the case study and are applicable to 
every terrain by the group’s affiliates in the world. This strategic declaration is 
long-term in its aspiration but still, not holistic since it mostly mentions the military 
means used to achieve the strategic objective of declaring the caliphate. The 
investigation’s timeframe corresponds to the resurgence period between 2012 
and 2014, following the setbacks underwent between 2007 and 2010. Abu Bakr 
Naji’s book appeared in hard copy in 2004, while Zarqawi had already begun his 
activities in Iraq. Naji was never part of his nascent group in 2003 nor the Islamic 
State and was most likely based in Afghanistan. When Abu Bakr Al Naji published 
his strategic guidelines in 2004, they were destined to guide jihadist groups for 
state-building in the post the 9/11 world in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Mali. Its 
work was never specific to the building of an Islamic State in Iraq.  
 We can find the traces of the elaboration of an IS’ Grand Strategy in a 
strategic document produced by the group between its fall in 2008 and the start 
of its resurgence in 2012. During that period, a 55-page document began to 
circulate in ISI’s forums online about a new strategy to gain the upper hand in 
Iraq. Entitled “Strategic Plan to improve Islamic State of Iraq’s political position“66, 
its title reveals its aspiration of adopting a new long-term political approach in its 
changing environment. It was published by an editor called Mufakirat Fallujah 
during the month of Moharram 1431 corresponding to January of 2010. 
Surprisingly, this strategic document was not a set of guerrilla warfare guidelines 
but rather a set of principles built upon counterinsurgency strategies. It exposes 
the long-term new approach of ISI’s recently almost defeated entity not only in 
military terms but mostly adopting a political approach. This focus on politics 
confirms Galula statement that “a revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action 
and 80 per cent political”67 or General  Sir  Frank  Kitson statement that “there 
can be no such thing as a purely military solution to an insurgency because 
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insurgency is not primarily a military activity”.68 This general strategy could have 
started to be implanted before its release to the public, as argued by Craig 
Whiteside69. 
The document appeared to build on Abu Naji’s work but was more specifically 
focused on ISI’s context and its environment in Iraq. The first idea defended by 
the author is to declare that the Islamic State will remain (Baqiya) despite its 
recent setback. Because its return is part of “Sunnan Allah”, which refers to God 
’s universal rules, its members will always come back after being tested by God 
with military setbacks. The document starts by forecasting the US withdrawal 
from Iraq and presenting the necessary measures in order to prepare itself for 
this game-changing event. 
The document states that ISI’s new strategy should follow three important 
guidelines for its military actions. While the first years of the US occupation 
consisted of having a reactive posture, this new phase requires being proactive. 
The maxim “nine bullets for the apostates and one bullet for the occupants” 70 
highlights the first guideline in a sentence. Its objective is to raise the level of fear 
to deter anyone from joining the security forces allied with the US. The 
perspective of being killed or injured should surpass the one of remaining safe 
for the average Iraqi citizen willing to join the security forces. This effort of 
deterrence should cause massive desertions and create widespread reluctance 
among the population in applying for this kind of job. It is also thought to be a 
long-term one to break the enemy’s morale. The author adds that this targeting 
campaign needs to be part of a holistic approach combined with a media 
campaign showing the Islamic forbidding of joining government forces. These 
threats should be counterbalanced by a positive discourse focusing on the 
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rewards and Islamic benefits in the afterlife of not collaborating with the 
government.  
The second strategic guideline developed by the document is “Cleansing”. 
Quoting Sun Tzu, the author considers that to decrease the number of its 
opponents, one has to “inflict on them destruction with possible damage and 
make them worry about their internal problems”71. “Cleansing the places”, equals 
a scorched earth policy by focusing only on destroying the enemy’s infrastructure. 
It also consists of an economic effort in order to damage the enemy’s 
infrastructure and keep him occupied with rebuilding concerns.  
The third guideline, called “Targeting”, is part of a comprehensive effort to 
eliminate Iraq’s charismatic leaders from the military and the political spheres. It 
also refers to the targeting of the Iraqi Army’s most experienced units, particularly 
the capable minority represented by the SWAT teams and the Golden Division. 
Prominent political figures must also be targeted in order to create a void in the 
political process and ignite tensions and frictions among communities. The 
success of such operations will have a strong repercussion by undermining the 
government’s reputation in society and abroad. In the tactical part of the study, 
we saw how the group applied a decapitation policy in each of the five provinces 
where political leaders, military commanders, and leaders of Sahawat militias 
method using different modus operandi. We will also show how the group, despite 
being an insurgency, developed the capabilities of Special operations forces by 
conducting sophisticated attacks on high-value targets using Special Forces units 
like during the Abu Ghraib prison break. 
In many aspects, the strategic document seems to have borrowed from the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps72. This 
strategy, designed in 2006 by General Petraeus is inspired by many principles of 
                                            
71 Ibid p36 
72 United States. Department of the Army. The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual: US Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5. 




the Indirect Approach to insurgency in Iraq between 2006 and 2010. This way of 
understanding COIN is now the ascendant strategy to confront low-intensity 
conflict, whether terrorism or insurgency. It is a population-centric approach 
based on irregular warfare techniques and COIN capabilities to combat violent 
subversion and to protect the indigenous population. It follows a sequence of 
“clear, hold, build, and transfer.” The following four principles are considered as 
the basis of this strategy 1) winning the hearts and minds of populations under 
insurgent threat; 2) gathering detailed intelligence on foes; 3) wielding 
psychological carrots more than military sticks; 4) and teaming SOF with 
surrogate forces most likely from part of the insurgents. One the most critical 
achievement of General Petraeus’ strategy was its ability to infiltrate and divide 
the Sunni insurgent movement in 2006 and try to make it ineffective with the 
creation of the Awakening Tribal councils or Sahawats.  
 The author of IS’ 2010 document recognises that the United States’ idea of 
creating Sahawat councils was smart and bold. By arming local tribes, they 
converted them as a shield for their forces against ISI’s attacks. The creation of 
the “Awakening Jihadi Council”73 is presented in the document as an important 
decision in order to achieve ISI’s long-term objectives. The author labelled 
Sahawat’s rise and successes with the Arabic word “ibtilia”, meaning “part of 
Allah’s trial”.74 According to him, tribal customs forbid tribes in Iraq from working 
with the occupation forces. However, this time two incentives pushed them: 
money, with the cash flow coming from the US and later from the Iraqi 
Government to tribal leaders; and also their reluctance and hate for the 
punishments included by the Sharia imposed by the ISI. For him, these two 
motives could not stand in the long term because one day the financial support 
would dry up and the morale, prestige and popular support of their leaders would 
vanish because of their corruption. For that reason, he considered that the seeds 
of Sahawat’s future failure had been planted during their creation.  ISI could, 
                                            
73Khitta Istratijiyya li Ta‘zeez al-Mawqif al-Siyasi li Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiya,” (Lit., A Strategic 
Plan to Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq),  Accessible in Arabic at 
https://issuu.com/13782/docs Ibid p38 
74 Ibid p39 
44 
 
therefore, use as a base the Sahawat experience and its awaited fall to create a 
more successful model. 
Another key point of the document is that the ISI should strengthen the local 
population it controls in order to provide stability and security in their area. ISI’s 
new tribal model should pass through tribal leaders in order to create militias of 
locals that will defend their neighbourhood from government forces and bandits. 
The “Islamic Awakening Jihadi Council”, according to the author, finds an echo in 
Islamic scriptures and Prophet Muhammad’s policy towards the “wofod”, “the 
newcomers” arriving at his capital Medina. When new tribes were coming to 
Medina and pledged allegiance to him, he named the leaders of these tribes as 
local leaders and empowered them by preserving their structure and arming 
them.  Each local tribal leader should be accompanied by a local military leader 
appointed and vetted by IS’ scholars. Local tribal leaders can receive financial 
support, not as mercenaries but after having genuinely espoused the group’s 
ideology. Financial incentives may come from the bounties as well as from the 
group’s budget. From the RAND corporation’s extensive report on ISI finances75, 
these types of resource allocation to tribes or local militias were not part of IS’ 
previous organisational financial model in 2006. By forming its own Sahawat, ISI 
may enjoy new strategic outcomes according to the writer. First, by not dispersing 
its troops and relying on auxiliaries, it will not concentrate its forces, which will 
make them less easily targeted. It confirms that using auxiliary forces is the 
element from counterinsurgency strategies that follow the spirit of the indirect 
approach. The use of minimum necessary force has been a fingerprint of the 
British army’s interventions.76  
Galula, one of the most important thinker on the subject considered that the battle 
for the population was a significant characteristic of the revolutionary war. The 
objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for 
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the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are 
primarily political in their nature. After cleaning an area, the population becomes 
the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy. Galula considered 
that the insurgent challenges its tacit support and submission to law and order 
which were taken for granted in normal times. He advanced the idea that the 
technique of power consists of “relying on the favourable minority in order to rally 
the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority”77. 
Keep it passive was more a realistic objective for IS whose codes and practices 
of religion could create rejection in cities such as Mosul for example. Except for 
some strongholds in the old city, IS did not reach the population before the fall of 
the city, (except by collecting taxes). Not being a mass movement, IS had to win 
over the population and conquer the hearts and minds after its takeover by 
providing services to the locals. It was a large scale application of its governance 
on one of the biggest cities of the Middle East. During the first month of the 
conquest of Mosul in 2014, it started by offering services and goods to the 
population in the same way a conventional army would carry out a COIN policy 
based on winning over the population. During the initial phase, it offered salaries, 
subsidies and support to the poor, claimed to fight corruption and improve the 
general daily life. According to Helene Sallon´s investigation, for the Sunni Arabs 
of the city, as long as they received salaries and paycheck from the Iraqi 
Government,78 the situation was acceptable. However, the end of their salaries 
in 2015, the harsh restrictions of war, the intense bombardment of the city and 
the paranoia of IS members degraded the relations deeply between IS and the 
population in Mosul. At the same time, against insurgents and potential spies, it 
launched a harsh counterinsurgent policy (based on extensive intelligence 
networks and local informants, forcible disappearance, assassinations). The fact 
that IS used insurgency and terrorism for anti-guerrilla warfare echoes general 
Kitson’s formula for waging asymmetric war with the concept of the ‘counter-gang’ 
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or ‘pseudo-gang’. To defeat an insurgency, he applied this concept in Kenya or 
Northern Ireland by conducting anti-insurgent raids with violent and insurgent 
methods by recruiting former insurgents embedded with regular troops. They had 
a better knowledge of their enemy, intelligence gathering superiority and could 
act outside the boundaries of the law (tortures, false flag operations, extra 
judiciary killings). 
4- Propaganda as a tool for mobilisation  
As an insurgent force or by using COIN methods in a position of 
dominance what characterises IS politico-military action is the necessity of 
defending a well-grounded cause that attracts supporters among the population. 
In the literature of the practice of insurgency and counterinsurgency, ideology 
rather than an organisation is considered as important. If ideology is necessary 
for producing popular support and mobilisation, the way it can spread it through 
and generate mobilisation is as important. First, the concept of popular support 
was popularised by Mao Zedong as a critical factor behind the success of 
insurgencies. By evolving in their societies like “Fish in the water”79, insurgents 
must possess the support of the population. 
As detailed by David Galula,  the first basic need for an insurgent who aims at 
more than merely making trouble is an attractive cause, particularly given the 
risks involved and because the early supporters and the active supporters—not 
necessarily the same persons—have to be recruited by persuasion. Propaganda 
becomes an essential and powerful weapon. The population represents the 
ground battle between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. 
Counterinsurgency manuals share this idea with their objective of winning the 
hearts and minds of a neutral public. Liddle Hart’s writings on guerrilla warfare 
also pointed to this factor: “guerrilla movements depend on the attitude of the 
                                            






people in the area where the struggle takes place, on their willingness to aid it by 
providing information and supplies.”80 A prime condition of success is that the 
enemy must be kept in the dark while the guerrilla operates in the light of superior 
local knowledge. A guerrilla movement needs this “mental light” to carry out 
security operations and surprise actions by night. As defended by David Galula81, 
if the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, 
to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in 
the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit 
agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.  For both the 
Insurgent and the Counterinsurgent support of the population is necessary. 
Galula simplifies the situation by stating that in any situation, whatever the cause, 
“there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active 
minority against the cause”82. 
ISI’s 2010 document was already preconising that popular support was top-down 
and passed by the allegiance of tribal leaders since tribes are a resilient social 
structure for Sunni Arabs in Iraq. By controlling tribal leaders through its councils, 
the organisation will have better leverage on society in order to educate the 
population about the necessity to live under an Islamic State. It will have the upper 
hand in the information war on Sunnis’ “hearts and minds” by showing the Sunni 
population the real face of the ISI and counter its demonisation by mainstream 
media. Finally, these councils should raise the trust between ISI and the 
population by a steady process of power decentralisation. This decentralised 
administrative system gives broad authority to tribal leaders in administering and 
securing their respective regions, under the auspices of the ISI. As we will see in 
the last part, during the IS offensive of 2014, the group managed to enter villages 
and small towns peacefully after reaching an agreement with locals allowing them 
to patrol with their weapons in their areas (in Udhaiym for example). These 
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techniques of power echo Galula’s advice of “relying on the favourable minority 
in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralise or eliminate the hostile 
minority”83.  
The other significant means preconized by ISI 2010 strategic document for 
gaining the Sunni’s “hearts and minds” is the use of political and religious 
symbolism of sacrifice to the cause and “no concessions” to distance itself from 
other armed groups. Morally, the group has to show its exceptionalism by being 
morally superior to other groups in terms of its transparency and integrity. It also 
has to raise a local political leader from the people that will unite them such as 
the Mullah Omar for the Pashtu in Afghanistan. The strategic document concedes 
that the absence of a local unifying figure caused the infightings and quarrels 
between insurgents in the first years of the insurgency in Iraq. The rise of Abu 
Omar Baghdadi and the further Iraqiisation of the leadership was, according to 
the author, a precursor in anchoring the group in its social incubator, unlike what 
happened during the period under Zarqawi and even Al Muhajir, when it was 
perceived as an exogenous force. The document shows that in 2010 a few 
months after the death of its leaders and before the appointment of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, the idea of further nationalising the group was germinating in the 
group’s circles without the explicit consent of Al Qaeda Central. Religious 
symbolism is also important in the author’s eyes concerning the relationship with 
the population. He states that the organisation needs to maintain its religious 
profile by promoting its independence and its self-fulfilment in the production of 
religious edicts (fatwa). This independence creates a solid bond with its citizens, 
like in Saudi Arabia, where the state’s religious scholars are the people’s religious 
reference.  However, unlike in Saudi Arabia, the group’s religious establishment 
needs to remain apart from the political power and be independent. The 
document considers that the population is important in order to isolate its rivals, 
as preconized by Galula that “victory is permanent isolation of the insurgent from 
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the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and 
with the population”84. 
In sum, ISI’s document released in 2010 provided a set of principles and 
guidelines that go beyond military affairs and the use of kinetic force. Through 
the concepts of “deterring”, “targeting” and “cleansing” it adheres to a military 
strategy attacking the economy of the enemy, dislocating its psychological 
equilibrium by targeting its leaders and damaging the troops’ morale. The 
document is holistic by proposing a set of long-term actions to prepare ISI’s re-
emergence from a social, economic, educational, religious and framing 
perspective. By inspiring itself with US counterinsurgency strategy shaped by 
General Petraeus in 2006, it confirms ISI’s awareness of its initial “alienness” to 
the Iraqi Sunni Arab society and the need to change this situation. It also confirms 
that the group can conceptualise a Strategy that goes beyond its kinetic activities; 
they cannot be limited to terrorism or insurgency and are permeable to 
exogenous concepts and ideas even from its enemies. 
IS was a capable insurgent guerrilla force, a learning terrorist organisation and a 
proto-state that inspired its strategy from COIN and shifted between military and 
political phases. To grasp this multidimensional approach, insurgent based or 
COIN theories are not sufficient, and a more comprehensive and holistic theory 
is needed. For that reason, a closer correspondence and cross-fertilisation 
between terrorism studies, the study of insurgency and counter-insurgency can 
offer a more lucid conceptualisation of this group and a better understanding of 
its resurgence. Each scope can bring some clues, but the use of the Indirect 
approach as umbrella concept can provide us with a holistic understanding of IS 
resurgence and take into account its shapeshifting nature as a terror organisation, 
an insurgency and proto-state using military and conventional political means.  
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5-The Jihadi warfare and the indirect approach 
Using the Indirect approach to assess IS’ resurgence requires to verify the 
level of influence LH’s had on Jihadi theorists. Before the emergence of the 
Islamic State, during the last two decades, Al Qaeda and jihadist theorists were 
prolific in elaborating strategies and theorising how jihad should be planned. 
Three modern figures emerged who produced a large corpus of texts that shaped 
jihadist strategies. First, Abu Mosab Al Suri for the post-9/11 period and as a 
retrospective critic of past failed insurgencies, Abu Bakr Naji after the 2003 US 
intervention in Iraq and Seif Al Adl for the revolutionary insurgent groups for the 
post-2011 Arab Spring. 
In his book “The Call for a Global Jihad”, Abu Musab Al Suri advocates leaderless 
resistance (lone wolf attacks) and discusses the issue of eschatology. The book 
also narrates Suri’s experience in jihad enterprises, which ended in failures such 
as in Syria against Hafez Assad in the ’80s or during the Algerian civil war in the 
’90s. It made him write a series of testimonies85and lessons learned from the 
mistakes that were committed. He enumerated the following lessons that he said 
should be applied to any jihadi uprising: to maintain a secret organisation even in 
times of success; to have a centralised strategy in a decentralised organisation; 
and to compartmentalise the organisation, avoid compromise and prefer quality 
over quantity in its recruitment process. IS adopted some elements from Abu 
Musab Al Suri’s scriptures such as the inspiration of individual actions all around 
the world and the use of eschatology for propaganda. However, Al Qaeda and 
Jabhat Al Nusra led by Jolani are considered the real inheritors of Al Suri’s 
methodology. Recently, IS’ media disavowed Al Suri‘s vision and methodology 
for jihad, saying that it had no relation to their methodology86. 
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Concerning the indirect approach’s principles, Abu Bakr Naji’s recommendations 
about space and dispersion of attacks mirror LH’s notion of distribution and 
concentration when he considers that military effort should take the shape of “a 
disturbance in the balance between the conglomeration of the forces of the 
enemy and their dispersion”87. Liddle Hart considered that for the success of 
guerrillas, the ratio space to force was paramount. He illustrated this with 
Lawrence’s calculation that the Ottoman army’s requirement to control the area 
where they were stationed was of 600 000 men while they had only 100 000.  Naji 
also asked to disperse enemy forces to focus on less guarded peripheries and 
push the enemy to concentrate its efforts on defending sensitive sites with its best 
elements from the security forces. He considered that the choice of the attack’s 
location is paramount since it defines the enemy’s reaction and if carefully 
chosen, can lead its troops to confusion88. This comes from the idea that when 
enemy forces are spread in large areas, they lose their efficiency. This vision 
finds an echo in military studies with Kenneth Boulding’s notion of “Loss of 
Strength Gradient”89.  According to him, the more battlefield and operation 
centres are far from centres, the more likely it is that they will lose strength. Naji, 
therefore, laments the fact that Islamist militant groups in Egypt never applied 
these principles.  They concentrated their activities in the urban areas of the Delta 
region rather than dispersing their forces across Egypt, which made it easy for 
the Egyptian security forces to crush them. His recommendations, thus, are in 
line with LH’s view of attacking the weakest point before concentrating on the 
centre and that psychological dislocation of an enemy combined with an indirect 
physical approach can reduce its will to fight. 
For the post-Arab Spring context, Saif Al Adl (Mohammed Salah al-Din Zidan) 
emerged as a leading strategist figure in the jihadist literature. Being one of the 
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highest military strategists for Al Qaeda, he survived the War on Terror and was 
an important voucher of Zarqawi’s entrance the organisation back in the ’90s.90 
In 2003, with contacts from Iran, he coordinated the exfiltration of Zarqawi from 
Afghanistan to Iraq. This move was decided because of the opportunities he 
foresaw of an imminent US invasion due to the creation of an Islamic state in the 
Middle East.  Nowadays, Zidan is the top military strategist for Al Qaeda in Yemen 
or Iran and someone who influenced Zarqawi. In his eulogy91 published in 2007, 
he presented himself as the one behind the idea of creating a military camp led 
by Zarqawi in Herat to train fighters coming from the Levant, Iraq and Turkey. His 
detention in Iran after 9/11 offered him an opportunity to expose his criticism of 
revolutionary jihadi movements and theorise his political and military strategy in 
2013, just before the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.  The second 
part of his book, “The revolution and the winds of change” presents his strategic 
vision and military doctrine from his experience as an ex-member of the Egyptian 
Special Forces. In the chapter dedicated to his strategic vision, Zidan starts with 
an examination of the different definitions of that term, as determined by various 
researchers. Zidan quotes ancient military historians and strategists (such as 
Liddell Hart and Clausewitz) and discusses in detail the difference between a 
direct strategy, and strategies that follow an indirect approach. This volume deals 
with the subject of guerrilla warfare and begins by defining that concept and 
characterising the groups that engage in guerrilla warfare. He mentions Liddle 
Hart92 multiple times and agrees with his definition of strategy, understood as “the 
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use of all the possible resources to reach a general political objective”93. From 
his Islamic perspective, a strategy consists of engaging all the resources to 
achieve the goals of the Islamic message. It is achieved by correcting the 
doctrinal deviance of humanity, following Sharia, applying social justice between 
the people, and protecting them and their properties. He considers that LH’s 
approach states the fact that confrontation should be avoided if there is a 
possibility to use alternative political, diplomatic and economic means. His 
adherence to the psychological dimension of Hart’s theory makes him say that 
the real stake of the struggle is not solely military but psychological and spiritual.   
He agrees with Liddle Hart by stating that the most successful strategy is to 
achieve goals by non-military means, in particular, using psychological means 
such as propaganda and predication, economic pressure and sedition in order to 
destroy the opponent’s morale. The best outcome would be the possibility to 
coerce the enemy without using the military option or by using minimum means. 
The armed struggle is, therefore just a part of the struggle and should be used 
carefully at the right moment and for the right reasons. War is not conceived as 
the “continuation of politics with other means” as defined by Clausewitz but as a 
tool among others designed to create a better environment for predication 
(Dawa’a). Behind an adherence to the indirect approach, especially against a 
stronger opponent, is the belief in the success of an alternative approach that 
avoids frontal confrontation and scatters the opponent’s forces like, as he 
compares, “the Toreros with the bull”94. 
It is evident that Seif Al Adl is the Jihadi theorist who is more influenced by Liddle 
Hart’s principles and explicitly declares his adherence to the adoption of a Grand 
Strategy. He proclaims his belief in them and stresses their relevance for 
Mujahedeen groups. Al Adl’s influence can be observed in the discourse Al 
Qaeda’s branches in the world.  Al Qaeda in the Arabic peninsula and its media 
                                            
93 Seif al-Adel, Struggle and Winds of Change – Revolution and  Guerrilla Strategies, Vol 2 ,2012, 
p182, http://www.gulfup.com/?tdroIU  
94 Ibid p218 
54 
 
wing Al Malaheem released between 2013 -2014 a compilation of six lectures95 
from its military academy. During his lecture, Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi a high-ranking 
leader of the group, emphasised the importance of the indirect approach.  He 
espoused the idea that winning was not by killing a high number of fighters but 
by undermining their morale and will to fight. He stated that Al Qaeda could not 
adhere to the direct approach because of the asymmetrical balance of power. 
Violence, according to him, was not a goal per se but a way to send messages 
to the enemy and its audience. To illustrate this, he pointed to small operations 
that may not be lethal but can have more impact than deadly operations. He also 
shed light on two types of indirect approaches, one that can be physical by taking 
the enemy by surprise or the other which is morale related, by targeting its 
“nervous system”, showing its incompetence and undermining its legitimacy. As 
Al Ansi states during one of his lectures “victory come from the spirit of the leaders 
not the bodies of the soldiers”. For that purpose, he considers that guerrilla 
warfare is the most suitable strategy for the group because “you control and 
impose on the enemy the timing and location of the attack”. 
 As we have underlined from Seif Al Adl’s intellectual and strategic contribution, 
Al Naji’s guidelines and Al Ansi lectures, jihadi strategists from Al Qaeda realm 
are familiar with the indirect approach, LH’s Grand strategy principles and can 
even embrace them publicly. Because of the asymmetrical balance of power the 
group faced in its different battlefields, it is more prone to adhere to a strategical 
thought which emphasises the importance of immaterial factors such as 
psychological equilibrium. Despite being reluctant to follow non-Islamic thinkers, 
the universal dimension of the indirect approach and guerrilla warfare strategy 
made these strategists rely on these principles to adapt them to their Islamic 
value system and build their strategic model. 
Multiple factors can explain the fact that Al Qaeda's strategists are more 
prone to espouse ideas coming from non-Islamic thinkers publicly. First, because 
of IS’ particularism and obsession with doctrinal purity, it will never publicly claim 
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to follow the principles of non-Islamic thinkers. The indirect approach and the 
guerrilla strategy in its broader sense, requires some pragmatism to avoid 
isolation and find a support zone. For that reason, in contrast to Al Qaeda, there 
is no mention in IS’ discourse of Liddle Hart or any other military strategist.    
Nevertheless, this does not exclude the fact that the group can follow some of 
the strategic guidelines outlined by LH. The main reproach that IS’ literature finds 
on guerrilla strategy is ideological, because of its dependence on popular support. 
IS’ ideologues do not believe in popular support as a goal per se and consider it 
as a “Marxist idea espoused by Al Qaeda’s strategists which delay full 
implantation of Sharia and permit alliances with other rebel groups” 96. Recently 
the group published in its official newspaper in 2019 a series of guerrilla warfare 
guidelines to its troops showing the formulation of principles of the indirect 
approach.97Many principles presented revealed themselves to be in line with 
Liddle Hart strategic guidelines that are presented in the methodological part. 
6-Liddle Hart’s three-dimensional application of the 
indirect approach. 
For the reasons explained above, considering the group from just one angle can 
limit its understanding. The terrorist group scope is not relevant in Iraq since the 
times of Tawheed wal Jihad. As a traditional insurgency, it remains obsolete given 
the evolution of the insurgencies nowadays. Finally, considering it only as a proto-
state using COIN methods is limited to only some experiences at a given time. 
Liddle Hart´s theory that explains decisive victory encompasses all these 
manifestations and has been embraced by jihadi theorists. The power of Liddle 
Hart is its universal nature, flexibility and explanation of success in war using 
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strategy. This part’s objective is to show that Liddle Hart indirect approach theory 
applies to guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, with a political and a non-
military dimension. Moreover, his thoughts have been influencing Jihadi thinkers 
and strategists during the last decades. Indeed, Jihadi warfare as we saw is 
familiar with Liddle Hart’s principles of the indirect approach and has expressed 
its embracement of it. Its use as a theoretical framework to study IS’ is not 
baseless but rather follows years of evolution of Jihadi warfare taught and 
broadening of its repertoire of inspiration since the ’70s from Guerrilla warfare 
theorist to Western military historians. 
Basil Liddle Hart was a British captain sent twice to the Western Front 
during WWI. His personal experience influenced the subsequent development of 
his military theories.  Following the war, he focused his researches on infantry 
tactics, seeking to develop a general theory of strategy that counters the 
widespread following of Clausewitz’s principles of war among the military 
commandment. He published a “Man in the Dark Formula” and “The Decisive 
Wars of History” in 1929. The main idea of both books was to articulate his tactical 
recommendations within the framework of a strategy of the indirect approach. He 
also theorised the use of armoured warfare as a way to strike a defensive 
stalemate, which characterised WW1 in a burgeoning version of what would be 
the blitzkrieg. After WW2, he updated his book and thesis by retitling it “The 
Strategy of the Indirect Approach”. In 1967, he again published an updated 
edition, which constitutes the support base of this thesis. Liddle Hart referred to 
strategy as “the art of distributing military means to fulfil the end of a policy”98 
while a modern definition of the US Department of Defence considers it as “the 
level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, 
and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theatres or other operational 
areas” 99.  
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The study’s theoretical framework is built to analyse the group’s strategy for its 
military expansion. The selection of LH‘s theory as a research scope to assess 
IS’ resurgence has to do first with its universal nature. The universality of this 
theory makes possible its application to almost any conflict. Indeed, he 
considered the human mind as a constant and the strategy it designs as a 
variable to win.  He used the type of strategy used by military commanders as a 
variable for studying the outcome of a conflict. Even though people tend to believe 
there are many strategies and methods for victory, Hart’s theory considers from 
its analysis of 2500 years of armed conflicts that unlike the general school of 
thought only one successful strategy exists for defeating the enemy, which is the 
indirect approach. His discovery of the indirect approach was the result of a 
systematic study of the whole history of war before concluding that: “throughout 
the ages, decisive results in war have only been reached when the approach has 
been indirect. In strategy, the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way 
home”100.Thus, two basic lessons emerged from the military theorist’s definition 
of his approach: no direct attack should be launched upon an enemy firmly in 
position and dislocation should precede destruction.  
This military theory publicised in the 1930s had an enduring relevance 
symbolised by its adoption until our days by a range of military actors. The US 
Army, for example, still follows its principles as is suggested by its Field Manual 
describing the offensive approach: “The ideal attack should resemble what Liddle 
Hart called the ’expanding torrent’. It should move fast, follow reconnaissance 
units or successful probes through gaps in enemy defences, and shift its strength 
quickly to widen penetrations and to reinforce its successes, thereby carrying the 
battle deep into the enemy rear”101.  
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Liddle Hart´s vision for Guerrilla Warfare  
Liddle Hart’s guidelines of the indirect approach were considered by him 
as applicable by soldiers on the battlefield and by government’s leaders. In other 
words, they were relevant to the tactical and strategic level102. Equally, he 
considered that “tactics lies in and fills the province of fighting”103.Tactics refer to 
the employment and arrangement of forces including arms, equipment, and 
personnel in battles or the immediate presence of the enemy. Clausewitz defines 
it as “the use of armed forces in the engagement, strategy the use of engagement 
for the object of the war”104. The US Department of Defence refers to tactics as 
“the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to 
achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces”105. Hart, when 
studying the Punic War and the Arab Revolt led by Lawrence of Arabia against 
the Ottomans at the beginning of the 20th century, analysed and developed his 
concept of guerrilla warfare106. In both cases, irregular warfare took the shape of 
a war of attrition by avoiding confrontation against a more powerful enemy. 
Lawrence of Arabia describes well how his army of irregular Bedouin warriors 
should behave to defeat the Ottoman troops in the giant ocean of desert that 
constitutes the Arabian Peninsula107. It mirrors the state of IS during the period of 
its rebound after its defeat in 2010: it retreated to remote areas, did not hold 
terrain and waged guerrilla warfare mainly in the desert and rural environments. 
As stated by Lawrence, the war waged was to be “a war of detachment by not 
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engaging the enemy”108. Hart has raised the success of the Arab revolt as a 
perfect example for the validity of the indirect approach to irregular and 
asymmetrical warfare. The Arab tribes’ unbalanced ratio in material and human 
resources was counterbalanced by Bedouins’ capacity for mobility (speed and 
time). Lawrence’s guerrilla campaign used the smallest force in the quickest time 
at the farthest place while not executing pushes but strokes. Against an Ottoman 
army highly dependent on railways and their maintenance, Arab rebels 
implemented a strategy of material attrition of the enemy. For that purpose, to 
disarm was more potent than to kill in his theory of irregular warfare, while range 
was considered more important for strategy than force.  
This strategy of avoiding confrontation embraced by Liddle Hart against a more 
powerful enemy takes its roots from the Punic Wars with the policy of refusing 
battles adopted by Roman General Fabian against Hannibal, the leader of 
Cartage. In military history, Fabian’s policy has been understood as an approach 
to military operations, avoiding massive battles and confrontation in favour of 
smaller actions designed to break the enemy’s psychological equilibrium.  For the 
success of such a war policy, the time has to be on the side of its user, who needs 
to avoid large-scale actions against a larger foe.  As defined by Hart, the Fabian 
approach was not an evasion of battle to gain time but a calculated decision to 
conduct raids and small-scale attacks to harass the morale of its enemy and wear 
down the invaders' endurance. From Lawrence’s and Fabian’s tactical conducts, 
we can affirm that guerrilla warfare in its essence fits the tactical purposes of their 
strategies. For the case study, the imperative of non-confrontation to succeed in 
guerrilla warfare is a variable of our assessment of IS’ following of the indirect 
approach at the tactical level. 
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Grand Strategy, propaganda and COIN strategy.  
Even though Hart’s model was for inter-state war, military 
strategists109have raised the idea of the indirect approach’s compatibility with the 
21st century´s strategic stakes. With the emergence of non-state actors and the 
profusion of internal conflicts dominating the security landscape, the indirect 
approach has become fashionable. For the US it took the shape of a counter-
insurgency campaign (COIN) in Iraq with the employment of surrogate forces 
against the Islamic State or the support for the Northern Alliance campaign by US 
Special Forces to topple the Taliban regime in 2001. For that reason, it made 
Thomas Henriksen think that the US’ success to destroy the group in 2007-2010 
was possible by following an indirect approach.110 COINs are per se, based on a 
strategy following the indirect approach of using local auxiliary forces and winning 
“the hearts and minds” of the population by improving their economic conditions.  
Scott Morrison identified Hart’s indirect approach as a “method to orient upon, 
target, and upset an adversary’s equilibrium to plan for and direct, decisive 
blows”111. LH defined strategy as “the practical adaptation of the means placed 
at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view”112. In contrast to 
the interpretations of Clausewitz about war and its inherent cost of blood, Liddell 
Hart argues that the “perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without 
any serious fighting”.113On a higher level, is Grand Strategy, as Hart refers to it 
when the aim is “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of 
nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war.”114 His vision of 
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the strategy is not limited to the movement of forces – as its role is often defined 
– but with the effect”115.Its does not reduce strategy to war and military 
manoeuvres but includes all possible other resources to attain war’s objectives. 
Grand Strategy equals a national policy guiding all aspects of social and 
economic activity towards the achievement of war. It can take the shape of 
applying financial and diplomatic pressure as well as moral pressure to cause the 
opponent’s will to weaken. By definition, it constitutes a holistic approach with 
long-term objectives comparable with the aims and methods of a COIN. This 
characteristic derives from Liddell Hart’s exhortation that Grand Strategy extends 
beyond the present war to plan for future peace. LH considered that Grand 
Strategy was inseparable from war since it is “practically synonymous with the 
policy which guides the conduct of war.”116  This approach does not have a unique 
military dimension but also has a political one that can take multiple shapes. This 
characteristic derives from Liddell Hart’s exhortation that Grand Strategy extends 
beyond the present war to plan for future peace.  It is also holistic in the sense of 
being concerned with all the resources at the state’s disposal.   
The existing literature almost exclusively tackles the subject by referring to 
superpowers rather than smaller or proto-states. As a result, the concept of Grand 
Strategy is very often linked to the United States of America’s strategy.  For one 
reason, this can be explained by the critical impact great powers have on the 
international system as well as their global ambitions. However, the definition of 
the concept by Liddle Hart does not narrow down its use exclusively to 
superpowers. Small states or political entities aspiring to become one can 
elaborate grand plans in which they theorise and prioritise the use of their 
resources in order to attain their long-term objectives. Size and means do not 
determine a strategy rather than the type of resources involved.  
This thesis follows other academic studies using the framing theory to explain the 
success of IS as a social movement. According to Andersen and Sandberg study 
                                            




of IS’ international propaganda, its diagnostic framing presents “concrete 
problems such as identifying enemies, the unjust treatment of Muslims, and 
Western values and practices that demand immediate change.”117 They add that 
“collective action framing further provides solutions in prognostic frames such as 
the construction of the Caliphate, jihad, emigrations, and the implementation of 
sharia”118.  IS’ success depends on the organisation’s “ability to promote specific 
version of reality and to make this version resonate with the worldview of potential 
recruits.”119 The majority of the studies and research papers on IS propaganda 
are more focused on its global message since 2014 with a particular interest on 
its international productions like Dabiq magazine, Al Itissam foundation and the 
infamous Flames of War movie which have been decorticated and analysed 
under different prisms120. 
Regarding IS propaganda towards its Iraqi audience, there are very few research 
papers. Kirk H. Sowell focused his attention on the Islamic State’s eastern Anbar 
propaganda efforts. According to him, they have been successful, in part because 
of IS’ perception of its target audience, but even more, because mainstream 
“Arabic-language media have either consciously or subconsciously amplified 
their message in a way to make it credible within the Sunni Arab world”121. 
According to him, the treatment of the regional press made that “a substantial 
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segment of the population which does not hold to IS’ core ideology but believes 
that working with it against the government makes sense, or that at least 
accepting it is no worse than the government.”122The argument that Arab media 
outlets played a significant role in the ability of the Islamic State to propagandise 
itself in time is valid in term propagation of the message, but it does not explain 
the change of posture of the population toward IS. It can be considered as an 
amplifier but not as a root cause to explain IS mobilisation.  
 
III-Methodology  
1 Ontology and epistemology of the thesis 
This section represents the ontology and epistemology of the thesis. It 
presents how this thesis will study IS’ strategy. This research is a qualitative one 
even though the first part can appear to be quantitative. Indeed, this first part on 
IS claimed operations is based not on an absolute truth that we can observe in 
the real world and accept or reject but on IS’ claims of activity diffused by its 
newspaper and taken as such. Because we are testing the adherence of IS 
military doctrine to LH’s strategy, the ontology of the thesis is based on the 
perceptions and consequent actions of social actors in reality. In other words, the 
world around in which social actors engage is formed by socially constructed 
events. The qualitative methodology seeks to understand the reasons behind 
particular human behaviour. In this research, I use non-numerical textual or 
descriptive data; thus, answering the “how” and ‘why’ question of the research 
question. This research is taking the point of view of the actor that cannot be 
explained entirely through analysing numerical data. This mixed-method is 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods sequentially (See Chart 1). In part 
one, I use an explanatory sequential mixed method where I collect quantitative 
data in the first phase, analyse the results, and then use them to build on the 




qualitative phase. In the mixed method in the tactical part of the study, I observe 
quantitative data to test a hypothesis which is qualitative to infer or not the shift 
in the strategy of the group. The quantitative phase will be based primarily on 
outlier cases that serve the general qualitative method of the research. There is 
a need to understand better IS‘ strategy from its point of view, in the impossibility 
to access primary sources with a groundwork, the use of the group’s claims of 
activity quantitatively can counterbalance this initial lack.  
     
Chart 1 presenting the Thesis’ methodological framework 
 
The epistemology of this thesis is based on the very limits of the art of war 
and the issue of knowledge in military doctrine. Military doctrine is a traditional 
belief about what works in war and military operations. War is dependent on an 
incalculable number of fact form the most brute to the most sophisticated ones. 
Many of the facts cannot be treated in this study as it is the case for all military 
analyses and doctrines (state of the material, quality of the weapons, fuel used 
for the vehicles, events not reported by any parties…). For example, we do not 
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know the routes taken by attackers in Samarra and Mosul raids, the non-expected 
events that took place, psychological and material factors that could have 
impacted the operations. One of the limits of our study is that we do not know if 
the axioms presented by Liddle Hart were followed on purpose or not by IS 
commanders. The other epistemology has to do with LH’s theory itself that 
applies to every military theory or doctrine. The study considers that the fruits of 
the human mind activity are not possible to be categorised since they are 
engaged in the process of continuous creation. We must take into account that 
war is an interaction of more than one actor which can adapt and influence 
themselves. In social science, there is the reflexivity of the object of scrutiny that 
is absent in sciences physics called “the influence of the prediction upon the 
predicted event”123. As defended by Edward Luttwak reflexivity is a part of a 
strategy where “a paradoxical logic of its own pervades the entire realm of 
strategy”124. Reflexivity is the sine qua non-strategy whose task is to anticipate 
what enemy will anticipate that you will anticipate ad infinitum125. In other words, 
during the research, the object of the study can adapt and change. If we can 
observe the following of the indirect approach in a case study, we cannot know 
the reasons behind it, if it was on purpose or by coincidence. This observation 
cannot grasp all the complexities of war which is intrinsic to its essence since the 
most important protagonists in war are humans. In every successful campaign, 
commanders can apply the universal principles of surprise, concealment or 
psychological warfare without formally applying a military doctrine.  
Lastly, the other epistemology of this research investigation takes its roots in the 
possible causal relationship between the following of LH’s axioms and IS 
resurgence by stating that, because IS followed LH’s it resurged. Since LH’s 
axioms are not provable, this possible causal relationship has to be nuanced 
                                            
123 Harald Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Cass Military 
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124 Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The logical of war and peace, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 
p4 
125Harald Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Cass Military 
Studies,) Taylor and Francis,2013, p59 
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because a military theory is not an exact science.  As stated by Naylor, “we must 
never imagine that we can induce infallible rule nor reduce war to an exact 
science”.  In 1958, Toulmin claimed in “The Uses of Argument”126, that not all 
argument was reducible to logic. He offered an alternative to the material or 
formal conditional; he envisaged a different inference principle, which he called a 
warrant. He insisted that warrants, rather than being abstractions like 
conditionals, were bounded by institutional and disciplinary constraints, 
contextual boundaries he called fields.  In military discourse, since no truth are 
possible, as explained by Harold Høiback, a rational discussion is possible only 
to the extent that there are interpersonal warrants. Hence, Liddle Hart presented 
what Høiback called “axiomatic foundationalism”127, defined as a qualitative 
deductive doctrine where military theory is inferred from a higher truth. 
Although it can be based on something evidentially true, there is no proof that the 
adherence to principles of war does guarantee victory. For that reason, it cannot 
be proved unless by the prerequisite acceptance of what Toulmain calls data. For 
him, a claim or a conclusion is based on a range of data and on a warrant which 
authorises the sort of step taken to get from a claim A to a conclusion B (See 
Chart 3).  LH’s axioms are not true or false in a meaningful sense. However, they 
can be backed by data. For that reason to say that IS resurgence is due to the 
following of the LH’s axioms is not possible. It is a part of the epistemology 
because it would have to prove them, which is not possible unequivocally. For 
example, the claim that surprise has been important for victory in the past can be 
presumably either true or false but it is backed by a countless amount of 
observations in the past that surprise was a factor to explain military victories. To 
consider that IS’ victories were due to the following of LH’s axiom on achieving 
psychological surprise and establish a direct causal relation, we will have to 
accept it first as a warrant as defined by Toulmin. For that reason, Liddle Hart’s 
theory does not pretend to be understood as a fail-proof formula for success (it is 
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impossible that any military historian will ever achieve one). Instead, it has to be 
taken as a working knowledge of a broad range of principles that can be used 
across space and time and are related to each other.  
Chart 2 Toulmin’s model of an Argument 
Sample selection  
To assess IS’ resurgence from the Liddle Hart perspective, I use a three-
dimensional perspective which corresponds to the tactics, strategy, and Grand 
Strategy. These three levels of analysis provide LH’s principles with sufficient 
scope to unfold on the analytical canvas of the study. I have chosen the angle of 
the provincial division to study the group’s military operations in Iraq. Because it 
follows the group’s structuration and decentralisation process, this choice is not 
casual. It offers the possibility to shed light on the differences and similarities 
between each province. It also allows an explanation of the group’s diverse 
performances and capacity to rebound depending on the region where it 
operates. 
Expanding the study to Syria would have added too many new variables to 
continue with this particular investigation confidently and would be too vast to 
cover. For that reason, I focused on Iraq and selected the following five Iraqi 
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wilayas128, each one having its specificities: Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Salahudeen 
and Northern Baghdad and Nineveh. The choice of these provinces is not random 
but follows the group’s quest for survival. It also supports the way the group has 
imagined itself in Iraq and its various strongholds throughout its short history. At 
the announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2006, its leaders adopted a 
provincial division of the country. Studies regarding the group’s structural 
organisation have proved that it has shaped itself according to this division. 
Throughout its quest for survival and growth in Iraq from 2003 to 2015, the IS in 
its different forms has shown to be a very fluid actor capable of retreating from 
one province to another and building safe heavens there. Despite each province 
having different landscapes and unique contexts affecting IS, they share the fact 
that they all hosted the group’s centre of command in its different forms. Indeed, 
Tawheed Wal Jihad was first based in Baghdad, later it moved to Anbar as AQI, 
and after the 2006 battle of Ramadi, it retreated to Diyala province.  After the 
2007 surge and the anti-insurgency campaign, Islamic State in Iraq’s (ISI’s) 
centre of command fled north towards Salahudeen and finally established its 
centre of gravity in Nineveh in 2008.   
The second reason behind the selection of five provinces out of seven, where the 
group operates in Iraq is because of the significant number of Arab Sunnis, which 
is the targeted population for IS’ frames. I did not incorporate into the study the 
two other provinces which the group claimed to be part of its State in Iraq and 
which are labelled as the South Province and the Kirkuk Province. Regarding 
Kirkuk, the study focuses on the group’s policy towards the Sunni Arab 
population, while Kurds mostly inhabit the region. However, because the Arab 
city of Hawijah was considered as a focal point for the 2013 protests, the city and 
its tribes are included in the study. The southern province is an area too vast 
encompassing all the territory south of Baghdad to Basra and is mostly inhabited 
by Shia Iraqis, except for the southern belt of Baghdad and the city of Babel. It 
never constituted a place where the group tried to achieve territorial control.  
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Hypothesis: IS’ resurgence adhered to LH’s indirect approach principles at the 
tactical, strategic and Grand Strategy levels. 
The study’s central hypothesis is to test the group’s application of the precepts of 
LH’s indirect approach at tactical (with the notion of non-confrontation), strategic 
and grand strategy level according to the principles defended in Hart’s axioms. 
To answer the research question from different angles, testing this hypothesis 
means building up a qualitative framework to understand IS’ strategy. This 
framework is explained in the above methodology. First, the methodology for IS 
tactical adherence to the principle of non-confrontation while waging Guerrilla 
warfare is presented. In this part, l assess the moment IS began to shift its 
strategy by observing the evolution of the ratio of confrontational operations in 
the selected sample provinces (mixed methodology). More notably, in the next 
part, I verify its adherence to the indirect approach while manoeuvring at a 
strategic level during its prison break and urban assaults operations. (Qualitative 
methodology) Finally, its adherence to the indirect approach in its Grands 
Strategy is verified by observing the resonance of its propaganda with grievances 
expressed by the Sunni Arabs during the 2013 Iraqi Spring movement and its 
interactions and political behaviour with competitive social structures such as 
tribes and armed groups of the Sunni Arab insurgency. (Qualitative methodology) 
2-Methodology on strategical shifts  
With respect to the subject of strategy, we shall point out first that strategy 
is not exclusive to state actors and can be a tool used by non-state actors such 
as terrorist organisations or insurgent groups. Contrary to the pre-conceived idea 
that conflates insurgent strategy and guerrilla warfare, insurgent movements 
have more options on the table that are not mutually exclusive. Seth Jones’ 
research129 on insurgent movements of the twentieth century confirms this by 
presenting three different options with strategic and tactical implications 
insurgents can choose to follow: guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare and 
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punishment.130 The choice of either of these strategies is determined by elements 
such as the balance of power, the level of territorial control and the existence of 
international backers. Guerrilla warfare consists of the use of military and political 
resources in order to mobilise the population, conduct hit and run attacks ( not 
facing the enemy) and undermine the opponent’s will to fight. The primary goal is 
not to destroy a stronger enemy, but to undermine its morale by exhausting him, 
causing lethargy and defections among its ranks. As described by Ivan Arreguín-
Toft, guerrilla warfare includes “the loss of soldiers, supplies, infrastructure, 
peace of mind, and most important, time”131. This strategy is a long-term one that 
requires patience and resilience.  
The second option for an insurgent group is what is called “Punishment” and 
involves targeting civilians. Winning is not achieved by defeating governmental 
forces or breaking the morale of its troops only but also by undermining the 
morale of its population. Punishment deters a population from collaborating with 
and supporting the government and undermines their confidence in the state by 
showing that it cannot protect them. It can be driven by ideological reasons, which 
resonates perfectly with IS’ clear-cut religious, ideological position to legitimate 
the targeting of civilians such as apostates in the case of the Shia community as 
a whole.  
Finally, the conventional strategy involves the use of heavy weaponry in order to 
capture or destroy the opponent’s armed forces as well as its population, territory 
or natural resources. The goal is to destroy the opponent’s physical capacity to 
resist by defeating its security forces rather than winning over the population or 
breaking the enemy’s morale. This strategy represents the final step before a total 
victory. For the case study, it refers to the period of the summer of 2014 when IS 
used a conventional strategy in its military campaign to seize territory in western 
and northern Iraq. 
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For the military and strategic part of the study, I build a research framework based 
on the Guerrilla warfare theory as taught and developed by major military 
theorists throughout history. Insurgent theorists such as Mao, Laurence of Arabia, 
counter-insurgency models developed by the Rand corporation Daniel  Byman, 
David Galula, or even Jihadi theorists writings on the subject by Abu Mosab Al 
Suri or Seif El Adl.  All of them share as a common ground, the idea that the 
lifespan of a successful insurgency follows multiple phases.  
As I argued in the section dedicated to the theoretical framework, guerrilla warfare 
is by its methods non-confrontational.132This understanding of non-
confrontational operations derives from LH’s adherence to the type of warfare 
waged by Lawrence of Arabia following the three guidelines he established: 
“Firstly that irregulars would not attack places, and so remained incapable of 
forcing a decision. Secondly, that they were as unable to defend a line or point 
as they were to attack it. Thirdly, that their virtue lies .in-depth, not in the face.”133 
Indeed, following this strategy, most of the military operations need to avoid 
contact and confrontation with the enemy.  As described by Galula, the initial 
asymmetry in the revolutionary war is logic and forces the insurgent to “carry the 
fight to a different ground where he has a better chance to balance the physical 
odds against him”.134This recommendation is repeated by Robert Taber in his 
book “War of the plea” when he states that given their inferiority of resources, 
guerrillas can survive only by avoiding confrontation with a superior enemy135.  
Applied to LH‘s approach, the guerrilla warfare strategy can succeed and change 
its tactics form indirect confrontation to confrontation only when the physical and 
moral equilibrium of the regular force is dislocated.  As Mao stated, "Attack 
dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated strong enemy forces 
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later"136. Otherwise, this shift of strategy is risky and can be disastrous if it is 
premature such as the North Vietnamese’s ruinous confrontation with US regular 
forces during the 1968 Tet Offensive. For IS’ experience, we could think of the 
urban assault on Kobane in the fall of 2014, where scores of its fighters were 
decimated by coalition airpower. Other urban assaults failed such as the attack 
of the Sinai branch against the city of Arish in July 2015 and the never officially 
claimed failed urban assault on the Southern Tunisian city of Ben Guerdan in 
March 2016. Galula writings emphasise the problem of timing. According to him, 
if premature, the evolution from a guerrilla to a regular army may lead to disaster. 
It needs to take places when “bases have been liberated and the enemy 
discouraged from invading them too frequently, and until the problem of 
armament is likely to be solved.”137 
The other famous strategist in the jihadi realm, Abu Mosab Al Suri, produced an 
extensive intellectual work on guerrilla warfare as part of his introspective study 
on the jihadi movement from 1960 to 2001. In his lectures138 recorded in Khost in 
1998 of the book “The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and 
Practice”,139 he presented and embraced many ideas developed by the author, 
Robert Taber. He agreed with him by stating that Guerrilla warfare was not 
exclusively Marxist, many of its principles being universals140. He recognised that 
popular support and mastering of the terrain were two critical variables for the 
success of a guerrilla. Taber makes an analogy between the flea and the damage 
it can do to a dog and what a guerrilla can inflict to a conventional army. As he 
states the conventional army can be defeated after addition of little victories as 
the dog can die from a plague of the flea as he becomes “too weakened- in 
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military terms, over-extended; in political terms, too unpopular; in economic 
terms, too expensive - to defend himself”141.  
More recently, the idea of shifting between its strategic and tactical options finds 
an echo in jihadi strategic thought with the exhaustive intellectual contribution of 
Seif al- Adl. His tactical guidelines, published in 2013 in three volumes under the 
title “The winds of change”142, are much more detailed than Abu Bakr Al Naji’s 
writings on military tactics. He describes step-by-step the different phases and 
modus operandi armed groups need to undertake to achieve victory, in the 
context of the post Arab Spring rise of rebel movements in Syria, Iraq, Yemen 
and Libya. From a tactical angle, he considers that indirect strategy is an attrition 
war using guerrilla tactics in order to break the opponent’s morale. It takes shape 
also by diverting the enemy’s attention or opening secondary fronts in the territory 
of the enemy and its allies.  
The research design of this project is based on two assumptions driven by 
insurgency theories. 
- The support of the population is paramount for an insurgency and can be 
achieved through propaganda. This assumption will give us the possibility 
to use the frame dimension to assess the resonance of IS frames. 
- The shift from guerrilla to conventional can be successful when it happens 
at the right moment after reaching some prerequisites.  
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Chart 2 illustrating the evolution in time of the scale of an insurgency with regards to its strength. 
This chart represents the Lifespan of Insurgencies as taught by classic 
jihadi Strategists and identifies three phases of insurgency where proto-
insurgents create a politically relevant identity fulled by popular grievances that 
inspire individuals to join a revolt against the government. McCuen described the 
four phases of revolutionary warfare: organisation, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, 
and mobile warfare.143 Mao has emphasised that this phase of organisation and 
preparation of base areas, usually takes place in an isolated and challenging 
terrain. During this period, the armed group needs to avoid direct concentrated 
confrontation with enemy forces because it can have harmful and 
counterproductive effects. Each phase of guerrilla warfare determines the use of 
weapons by insurgents. Here it consists of a stage of small guerrilla and limited 
terrorist warfare. Small raids, ambushes and assassinations are carried out using 
primitive weapons, light and medium machines, IEDs and grenades. The second 
stage of small-scale insurgency is a phase when the group can conduct limited 
attacks both terrorist ones and guerrilla ones. Here, the guerrillas move to more 
complex and strategic operations — progressive expansion by terror and attacks 
on isolated enemy units to obtain arms, supplies and political support. The 
second stage is called a phase of equilibrium. Open confrontation is not reached 
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yet and raids and ambushes continue to be the basis of the operations, but they 
expand. The guerrillas can control some territories but without consolidating 
them. Medium and heavy weaponry, artillery and specialised units in explosives 
and mines are then deployed. 
For Al Naji, Al Suri or Seif Al Adl, these two first phases are considered as one 
phase called “Nikaya phase”, the “exhaustion” phase. Regarding its tactical and 
military guidelines, Abu Bakr Al Naji’s vision is influenced by the failures and bitter 
experiences of the Islamist group in their asymmetrical warfare against the 
Egyptian state between the ’70s and ’90s. As a result, his recommendation was 
primarily destined for outnumbered and outgunned groups. His tactical 
recommendation during the “exhaustion” phase is to attack the enemy’s 
periphery with small battles and conduct ambushes by small groups following a 
guerrilla strategy (as an example, he stressed the critical role played by small 
Islamic factions in fighting the Crusaders by harassing them). In the current 
context, he envisions a global war against the “Tawagheets” states where the 
diversification and the expansion of terrorist attacks in quality and quantity and 
the targeting of their economy will overextend their resources. He also 
recommends evolving from simple operations to those that are more complex. 
Seif el-Adl identifies two phases in the confrontation that determines the strategy 
and tactics to adopt.144 During the first defensive asymmetrical phase, the armed 
group focuses on small and under-protected targets in order to secure rapid 
victories and attract recruits that will gain experience. He shares Abu Bakr Al 
Naji’s recommendation of starting small, using deception by attracting the enemy 
forces in multiple parts to scatter them. He also pinpoints the fact that “Hit and 
run” tactics are very efficient in order to avoid the enemy’s response. Attacks 
must be dispersed in vast areas, and the place of the attack should be carefully 
chosen in order to permit a quick and safe retreat. They should be used with 
parsimony only for high profile targets. During this period, the armed group needs 
to avoid direct concentrated confrontation with enemy forces because it can have 
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harmful and counterproductive effects. This asymmetrical phase is a war of 
attrition destroying the enemy’s morale and economy.  
The contribution of Al Suri was his linking of the weapons of insurgents used for 
each phase of the guerrilla warfare145. The first one is called exhaustion, “Nikaya” 
as used by Al Naji. It consists of a stage of small guerrilla and limited terrorist 
warfare where small raids, ambushes and assassinations are carried out using 
primitive weapons, light and medium machines, IEDs and grenades. The second 
stage is called a phase of equilibrium. Here, the guerrillas move to more complex 
and strategic operations. Open confrontation is not reached yet, and raids and 
ambushes continue to be the basis of the operations, but they expand. The 
guerrillas can control some territories but without consolidating them. Medium 
and heavy weaponry, artillery and specialised units in explosives and mines are 
then deployed. As defended by him146, an open confrontation at the wrong time 
in a permanent position is one of the guerrillas’ most vulnerable spots. He argues 
that opposing an opponent with incredible and incomparable abilities and 
technological superiority in an overt way remains catastrophic at the wrong time. 
In the third stage called large scale insurgency, insurgents have established 
physical control over various parts of the country. Mao refers to it as the decision 
phase with confrontation and destruction of the enemy in the battlefield. Before 
confronting the government forces and their allies, there is a sensitive issue of 
timing. If premature, the creation of a regular army, which necessarily is less 
elusive than guerrilla gangs, may lead to disaster. Indeed, following this strategy, 
most of the military operations need to avoid contact and confrontation with the 
enemy. The last phase is the one when guerrilla type armed groups convert 
themselves into conventional armies. “Hit and run” tactics are replaced by a 
comprehensive strategy to conquer cities using progressive blockades (cut off 
supply lines and sieges of cities, military bases and airports). The guerrillas use 
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regular and semi-regular forces and have the ability to control some areas they 
can use to project their forces. Seif el Adl described this phase that takes place 
when the enemy has retreated from remote areas and the countryside at the 
expense of armed groups. Armed groups can, therefore, operate in large areas 
after having acquired experience, military material and recruits. Having a 
permanent base, they can use new supply routes or build new ones with engines 
and tractors. These new routes have an essential effect in surprising the enemy. 
The surprise effect remains in the army’s ability in choosing the time, place, 
nature and intensity of the military operation. For Al Suri, the third stage is the 
final one and is called the “liberation stage”. The guerrillas use regular and semi-
regular forces and have the ability to control some areas they can use to project 
their forces. They can receive the support of the regular army’s units who 
deserted from the army. They have acquired sufficient tactical knowledge and 
level of armament to confront the enemy in open battle. Small guerrilla units still 
play a role in fomenting operations behind enemy lines in order to confuse it.  
3-Methodology for a tactical analysis of IS’ operations 
through LH’s scope.  
The use of the confrontational nature of the operation as a variable. 
Because IS’ decisive victory over the Iraqi Army cannot be limited to the 
analysis of the battle of Mosul or the urban 2014 offensive, this section of the 
study consists of analysing from a quantitative perspective the operations 
claimed from 2012.This will give the opportunity to study the shift of strategies 
from a provincial perspective. As stated by Liddle Hart, and especially in irregular 
warfare, “the success of a decision depends on the success of the preliminary 
distraction”147. He adds, “Distraction is far more than half of the battle, nine-tenths 
would be nearer the mark”148. Since no major battle or conquest took place in Iraq 
during the two years preceding the 2014 urban offensive, we can consider that 
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the sum of hundreds of security and military operations carried out by the group 
were part of this “preliminary distraction”. 
Most of the studies on IS’ operations have usually chosen to classify IS’ 
attacks from a support/attack zone perspective where the targets and modus 
operandi vary depending on each zone. Both investigations conducted by Alex 
Bilger149 on ISIS’ military annual reports and Jessica Lewis’ on ISIS’ VBIEDs 
waves150 have adopted this categorisation. Zones of support are areas where the 
group benefit from substantial popular support as a prelude to the control of 
terrain. Hence, there are more targeted operations that need freedom of 
manoeuvring to take place: IEDs, assassinations, targeted attacks and the 
establishment of checkpoints. From the pattern attacks of the provinces of 
Nineveh, Anbar and Diyala, these studies came to the same conclusion that in 
specific zones of those provinces the group had established support zones. In 
other areas, called “attack zones”, more operations that were devastating took 
place using SVBIEDs and VBIEDs and targeting civilians. This study adopts a 
new perspective to focus not on the target or place where the attack took place, 
but rather by focusing on the nature of the operation, more precisely its 
confrontational dimension.  
The objective of this part of the research on IS’ tactics is to adopt a provincial 
quantitative comparison of the volume of “confrontational” and “non-
confrontational” operations claimed by the group and their evolution between the 
end of 2011 and mid-2014. The operations claimed by the group were 
categorised between those that are by essence confrontational and those that 
avoid confrontation. At the tactical level, confrontation or not with the enemy in 
operation represents the dependent variable of study while the independent 
variable is the province selected. 
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The purpose of this mixed methodology is to determine which kind of operation 
the group has claimed the most in Iraq in the two years before its successful 
urban assaults of 2014. It will give us the ability to test the first hypothesis of the 
study on IS’ adherence to LH’s principles of non-confrontation while waging a 
guerrilla strategy. It may give an insight into which kind of tactic the group 
preferred to adopt in its campaign against the ISF and which provinces were 
ready for the 2014 shift from insurgency to conventional warfare. The 
investigation’s result could also say more about the group’s tactical patterns in 
Iraq from a provincial perspective. The study of the variables like the attacks 
claimed by the group may also help to point out when the shift to direct 
confrontation was possible and how it preceded the start of the conventional 
warfare campaign.    
Categorisation of the operations  
Before turning to an analysis of IS’ military operational claims through the 
scope of LH’s theory, it is important first to examine how the annual reports are 
organised and which methodology the investigation follows to categorise the 
military operations of the group. The group’s reports on its annual operations 
contain two essential features: attack types and the operating area where they 
are organised. Those two variables, the nature of the operation and its 
geography, fit the framework of research of the study.  The attacks were reported 
and classified across seven geographical areas of Iraq: Nineveh, Anbar, Diyala, 
South, Kirkuk, Salahudeen and Northern Baghdad and Baghdad. Following the 
selected sample of the investigation, I selected five provinces: Salahudeen and 
Northern Baghdad (SNB), Baghdad, Nineveh, Anbar and Diyala. Operations 
were classified according to their type. From the range of operations listed above, 
they have been classified according to their confrontational nature. 
Confrontational or non-confrontational operations generally differ in terms of cells 
involved, resources engaged, damages inflicted and targets. These 
characteristics are not clear-cut, and exceptions can be found for both cases. 
(See table 1)  
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NATO defines indirect fire as "Fire delivered at a target which cannot be seen by 
the aimer"151.  In the military realm, indirect fire is generally associated with field 
artillery and mortars. These combat operations possess the following attributes: 
the gunner has a covered position and can flee the operation zone. The target is 
usually in movement while taken by surprise. For insurgents, these kinds of 
operations can be useful, especially for guerrilla-type warfare, by using indirect-
fire weapons such as mortars, rockets or explosive devices.  In IS’ structure and 
jargon the teams involved in these operations are usually the Security cells 
(Mafariz Amniya), the explosive device cells (Mafariz O’bowat), the sniper cells 
(Mafariz al Qanasat), the air defence cells, (Mafariz Difaa’ jawi) and the support 
cells (Mafariz Isnad). Non-confrontational operations do not need many 
resources and cause limited damage even though their repetition can break the 
psychological equilibrium of the enemy. As indicated by its name, confrontational 
operations are conducted directly on the battlefield in order to inflict damage to 
the enemy. The attacker is facing the enemy at close range.  He is engaged in 
direct fire and exposes itself to return fire from the target. Incursion cells (Mafariz 
al iktiham), Martyrdom cells (Mafariz Istishhadyine) and Military cells (Mafariz 
A’askariya) are generally involved in these operations. The human and financial 
cost for these operations is usually higher for confrontational operations which 
are more likely to cause devastating damages (except for hand grenades).  
                                            
151 AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 
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 Confrontational operations   Non-confrontational operations   
Operation type  and 
weapon used 
SVBIEDs  
SVESTs   
armed clash  with light and middle weapons 
incursion raids and storming 
repelling of assaults  
hand grenades 
  
assassinations and kidnappings: 
sniping, knife attacks, 
decapitation,  
HBIEDs explosives sabotage 
VBIEDs,  
IEDs 
Indirect fire weapons: mortars, 
and missiles, rockets 
Response to target by the 
defender 
Likely: the attacker can be seen and 
responded to  
Not likely: it cannot’ be responded to   
Team mostly involved Incursion cells Mafariz al iktiham 
Martyrdom cells Mafariz Istishadyine   
Military cells   Mafariz A’askariya 
 Security cells  Mafariz Amniya, explosive 
device cells Mafariz obowat, sniper cells  
Mafariz al Qanasat, air defence cells, 
Mafariz difaa’ jawi, support cells Mafariz 
isnad   
 
Resources and costs High   ( except hand grenades) Limited ( except VBIED) 
Damage for the enemy  High (except hand grenades). Both Physical 
and psychological  
Limited (except VBIED). More 
Psychological than Physical 
Target type  Static ( except SVBIEDs used for 
assassinations) 





 Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs). 
  
Several aspects of IS’ ontology are worth noticing. First, it separates SVBIEDs 
from VBIEDs by designating suicide operations as unique and distinct from 
“regular” car bombs or VBIEDs. SVBIEDs are more often used in sophisticated 
attacks as artillery fire. It represents a kind of human guidance system where the 
driver can adjust to the tactical situation in order to hit the target.  They are direct 
operations used by attackers in order to break through lines and feign assaults. 
IS almost always deploys SVBIEDs against targets in fixed areas selected before 
a battle. In urban environments, they are projected directly at a fixed guarded 
target. SVBIEDs detonate using a combination of detonators including triggers 
initiated by the bomber or by a remote triggerman. Because it implies the sacrifice 
of a soldier who penetrates a fortification or a building, I classify SVBIEDs as a 
confrontational type of operation.  
 
 SVESTs (Suicide Vest) 
SVESTs consist of an explosive device taken and guided directly to its target by 
the human who brings and remains with it when it detonates and kills the bearer. 
This operation is termed in jihadi literature as a “Martyrdom operation”; S-VEST 
operations are often used to infiltrate mass groups of people. The suicide vest is 
compact and is packed with ball bearings or nails to target confined places with 
poor security gates. In a suicide operation, the bomber can have a fighting role 
before he explodes himself. This is the figure of the inghimassi152; it refers to a 
fighter equipped with rifles, hand grenades and a suicide vest, which is actioned 
after losing its ammunition. Generally, teams of inghimassis are tasked to storm 
a fixed target and inflict as much damage to the target as possible. Most of the 
time, SVESTs target civilians or are used in complex assaults involving other 
units. According to the British Medical Journal, the Lancet, suicide bombings in 
                                            
152 Inghimas comes from the Arabic Inghamassa which means go deep in  
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Iraq between 2003 and 2010 killed more than 12 000 civilians while only 200 
soldiers from the coalition were killed153. This kind of operation is considered as 
confrontational. 
 Armed attack by “incursions” or “Iktihamat”.  
This type of operation refers to assault teams targeting security and military 
stationary checkpoints and headquarters. Organised as Special Forces 
commandos, they are constituted as a small platoon of highly trained soldiers 
with the objective of storming and seizing a fixed target. These tactics rely on light 
infantry units (between 10 and 15 fighters) clashing with the enemy at close range 
(50 to 250 meters). These massed raids with light weapon attacks are often 
combined with other weapons such as SVBIEDs or mortars. These operations 
are primarily carried out by the storming cells (Mafariz Al Iktiham) deployed after 
the detonation of an SVBIED or a VBIED.  Because of their inherent offensive 
and penetrative nature, I consider this type of operations as confrontational ones. 
 Repelling of assault and defensive clashes.   
The group has claimed operations it called “repelling of assaults” carried against 
its positions. When obliged to withdraw, IS military units usually leave small teams 
of fighters willing to fight until death and occupy the enemy. Because of the 
defensive posture the fighters are obliged to adopt, this type of operation is 
considered as confrontational. 
  Non-confrontational operations 
 Improvised Explosive Device (IED). 
An IED is a jury-rigged bomb with a radio-controlled detonator left by the side of 
a road. When the target approaches, the command to detonate is given by a 
remote detonator. The detonation is made by a “triggerman”, who usually hides 
at a distance from the target and normally escapes after the attack.  An IED team 
supports him, consisting of an intelligence watcher, a builder, a layer and often a 
                                            
153 Michael S Schmidt, “Suicide Bombs in Iraq Have Killed 12,000 Civilians, Study Says”, New 




videographer. The intelligence team has to determine where the opposition 
forces routinely operate in the area. The layer has the most dangerous task of 
planting and masking the IED. Insurgents have developed very innovative 
methods to drop them off, by fashioning them as rocks or concealing them. At the 
beginning of the insurgency in Iraq, most of the IEDs were “command-detonated”. 
154 As a “men versus vehicle hunter-killer”, it is the perfect type of operation where 
the insurgent can choose the right place and time for its operation. This kind of 
military operation is a non-confrontational type of operation. 
 VBIEDs  (Vehicle Borne    Improvised    Explosive    Devices) and  
MCBIEDs (Motorcycle-Borne    Improvised    Explosive    Devices).  
A VBIED is an IED planted in a vehicle and capable of causing much more 
damage.  The use of VBIEDs or car bombs represents a weapon of projection for 
the group. They were used due to their lethality in order to inflict human casualties 
by targeting military and civilian targets. For our case study, the targets for VBIED 
operations carried out by IS’ cells are much more oriented against soft targets 
than SVBIEDs, which are used mostly by the group against hard targets. VBIED 
cells are part of what the group call in its jargon “security cells”, while SVBIED 
operations are executed by its “military cell” in the framework of sophisticated 
attacks. Because the vehicle is parked and actioned at a distance, there is no 
room for the defendant to confront the attacker, unlike for SVBIEDs, where the 
vehicle is observed and can be targeted before its detonation. For all these 
reasons, VBIEDs and MCBIEDs are non-confrontational operations.  
 Assassinations.   
 Assassination teams, called “Mafariz Amniya”, meaning security cells, 
exclusively carry out these operations against selected targets:  on duty or off 
duty soldiers, militiamen or government officials are targeted in their homes with 
silenced weapons. It also includes kidnapping and abduction for video execution 
with beheadings. Assassinations do not occur in the battlefield and resemble 
                                            
154 Malcolm W Nance, The Terrorists of Iraq , CRC Press; 1st  edition, December 18, 2014,  p188  
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targeted assassinations carried out by secret services or secret police.   Because 
the target is usually surprised and attacked by a concealed attacker, this type of 
attack is a non-confrontational operation.  
 
 Bombing (Mortars, and rockets DCA).  
An anti-rocket propelled grenade (RPG) is considered as the queen of the light 
battlefield weapons,155 with its ability to project a highly explosive warhead on the 
enemy’s vehicle. Also called, “Indirect fire weapon” it is effective in allowing an 
insurgent to project a weapon that could fly two or three kilometres and watch 
them fall onto their targets and explode.  The main weapons are the 60 mm and 
the 82 mm.  In 2012, thanks to the stockpiles taken from the rebels and the Syrian 
Army, IS had access to a large amount of anti-tank missiles or Cornet missiles. 
They used those missiles against helicopters and aircraft flying at low altitudes. 
These operations were carried out by the “air defence cells”, called Mafariz Difaa’ 
Jawi. All these operations were non-confrontational except for the hand grenade 
attacks. For that particular case, the propeller is situated at a distance but so 
close that it cannot avoid confrontation with its target. 
 
 HBIEDs (House-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices).  
During the first battle of Fallujah, buildings were rigged with a chain of IEDs in 
order to channel the American Forces into the houses and blow them up. This 
type of operation can take various forms by destroying the homes of soldiers, 
their families and tribal leaders or by ambushing enemy forces by attracting them 
in a house. These operations are non-confrontational and are carried out by the 
security cells.  
 Sniping.  
The Iraqi insurgency has witnessed the rise of skilled Iraqi snipers. Most of them 
using the Soviet SVD sniper, on a daily basis they target the enemy soldiers by 
generally killing or wounding them before fleeing. A sniper is often accompanied 
by a videographer who also acts as a spotter. The propaganda effect of such 
videos is essential. In the different reports redacted by the group, sniping is 
                                            
155 Malcolm W Nance,  The Terrorists of Iraq ,CRC Press; 1st edition, December 18, 2014, P208 
86 
 
conducted by the sniper cells (Mafariz al kans). Because they are carried out from 
a long-range distance and because the defendant cannot see the attacker, 
sniping is considered a non-confrontational operation.  
 
Some reports might be irregularly reported; for example, it is unclear from their 
reported numbers how IS categorises complex attacks that include more than 
one attack type (a raid of a building preceded by a suicide bomber attack, for 
example). At the strategical level, confrontational and non-confrontational 
operations can be orchestrated simultaneously during the same mission. 
Conveniently, regarding the counting of operations, the vast majority of the 
operations are claimed as single events. However, the group claimed complex 
operations involving many attacks as a single operation. For that reason, during 
the counting, they have been disarticulated as much as possible following the 
group’s provided details. For example, when it claimed one operation involving a 
suicide bombing with the support of mortars and IEDs, the number of operations 
counted would be considered to be three involving one confrontational and two 
non-confrontational ones. Regardless of the authenticity and validity of IS’ claims, 
this mixed-method considers this database as valuable for investigation because 
it reflects IS’ narrative. It represents an insight into the IS’ campaign against the 
ISF exposing the means at its disposal and the geography of its operations.  
4- Methodology for assessing IS’ adherence to LH’s 
Strategic axioms 
The choice of prison breaks and urban assaults 
         After focusing on the group’s tactical patterns and the volume of operations 
claimed, we need to understand how they were synchronised and orchestrated 
at a strategic level for its most important operations, its urban assaults or prison 
break attempts. The assessment of the group’s deployed strategy for such 
complex operations gives us the possibility to verify the investigation’s main 
hypothesis, which is the group’s adherence to LH’s indirect approach guidelines. 
This part is divided into four sections. First, there is a strategic assessment of the 
2012-2013 “Breaking the Walls” campaign of prison breaks attempts, which 
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culminated with the attack on the Abu Ghraib prison. The next parts follow the 
provincial scope of the investigation by analysing IS’ 2014-2015 urban assaults 
in Anbar, Nineveh, Salahudeen and Diyala.   
Regarding the nature of IS’ military operations, the literature generally has 
focused on the so-called “signature attacks” the group carried out since its 
inception as “Tawheed wal Jihad” in 2003. During the early period of the US 
occupation (2003-2006), it was agreed that most of the insurgency efforts during 
the insurrection against US troops were carried out by insurgent groups using 
roadside bombs and ambushes. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in Iraq was only 
responsible for 2% to 5% of the overall attacks156 on the coalition and its Iraqi 
partners. It had more the attributes of a terrorist organisation than a rebel group. 
Nevertheless, its limited number of operations, which were very often massive 
suicide truck operations, attracted most of the media attention and had a powerful 
resonance.  These attacks were the most lethal and spectacular in targeting 
symbolic targets. However, in the following years after the proclamation of the 
Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006, the group evolved from a tactic of pure 
urban terrorism to a broader tactic of guerrilla warfare, with a much higher number 
of operations claimed using a wide range of tactics and methods. This first of the 
study is a way of grasping the moment of transformation from guerrilla to a 
conventional army, with the non-confrontational nature of the group´s operations. 
This section presents different theoretical explanations to explain the success in 
manoeuvre warfare of an insurgent group from a strictly military perspective. As 
pointed out by Thomas Maurer, the quick metamorphosis in 2013-2014 of IS from 
a guerrilla to a conventional army able to conduct major offensive was “an 
extraordinary phenomenon – likely a military science novelty”157 that is worth an 
in-depth study. It takes the shape of adopting a more conventional way of making 
war by conquering and holding territories and carrying out sophisticated attacks. 
Indeed, conquests are essential because they strengthen the group’s resilience 
                                            
156 Malcolm W Nance,  Terrorists of Iraq, CRC Press; 1 edition, December 18, 2014,  p114 
157 Thomas Maurer, “ISIS’s Warfare Functions: A Systematized Review of a Proto-state’s 
Conventional Conduct of Combat Operations”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2,229-244, 2018, 
p238, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1435238  
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with new resources from the spoils of war and additional populations under the 
group’s control, which opens the possibility to raise taxes. At the same time, the 
group’s prestige increases, which feeds its ideological resilience and popular 
support. Since the period of 2013-2014, conventional warfare mixed with 
insurgency warfare and urban terrorism has been the main types of combat the 
IS used in Syria and Iraq.   
Omar Ashour has explained IS’ endurance and military capability despite being 
always outnumbered and outgunned.158Combat methods used by the group are 
considered by him to follow Sun Tzu’s guidelines, in particular with “the collection 
of intelligence information about the enemy, stealth before and after striking, 
beating the weak flank, using the element of surprise in a highly efficient way, 
avoiding the enemy in its strongholds and the time of readiness”159. This element 
of surprise is at the centre of the philosophy about war studies. On multiple 
occasions, LH quotes Sun Tzu by stating that in many ways, he was advocating 
for the indirect approach.160 The strong point of the use of LH theory other than 
older war theories is that LH has in many ways relearned and applied the indirect 
approach to new technologies which make it more relevant to study modern 
conflicts.  
During urban assaults, Ashour identifies the attack pattern like the following: a 
simultaneous attack by combat units from three sides while using high-intensity 
fire to push the defending forces to the fourth side. After driving the defender 
forces on the fourth side, they are hit by SVBIEDs, which causes their collapse.  
Improvised explosive devices have also, according to Ashour, proved to be highly 
effective in “breaking through frontlines, initiating attacks and as a defensive 
tactic”161. They can shock and confuse the enemy while inflicting extensive 
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damage that can bring a quick resolution of the battle despite being outnumbered. 
His conclusions are a mere generalisation of IS’ modus operandi while attacking 
cities. Its description is accurate, but he does not extend its observation to other 
case studies and does not include a more detailed analysis of IS’ military and 
political behaviour.   
Regarding the 2012-13 resurgence, Lewis considers that IS established support 
networks within disenfranchised Sunni communities in Iraq, in particular during 
the 2013 protests.  The year of 2013 was a shifting moment when IS brought its 
desert forces and urban terrorist cells into a new strategic framework. It changed 
its tactics from terrorist attacks against civilians to assaults on military targets. 
From that moment, IS started to use manoeuvre warfare to overrun the Iraqi 
Security Forces. For her, the first element of IS’ 2012-2014 resurgence was its 
belt manoeuvres, by projecting itself from desert or suburban areas into urban 
centres. She traces back this manoeuvre to Zarqawi’s time and describes it as a 
“way to organise a battle plan around a principal city using dispersed units, 
informal tactics, and freedom of manoeuvre to compromise the main defences of 
a conventional enemy”162. She also compares IS’ urban assaults to “pinch 
manoeuvres”163, designed to close the gap between cities under its control, 
isolate enemy forces and reduce their ability to counter its advance. Lewis’ 
contribution to the understanding of IS’ strategy and tactical patterns is essential 
since she was one of the first to point out to IS’ resurgence in 2013 by establishing 
an extensive study164 on IS’ car bombs waves in 2012 and 2013 showing the 
existence of a clear strategic pattern orchestrating these attacks. However, her 
study is an interpretation of its strategy centred on car bombs waves rather than 
a more comprehensive analysis through the scope of a military doctrine.  
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This study goes further and is dedicated to analysing sophisticated decisive 
attacks, and urban assault carried out by the group. For this case study, 
decisiveness is defined as the operation’s ability to achieve its overall objective. 
The sophisticated attacks are the prison breaks attempts launched in 2012 and 
2013, which took the shape of six sophisticated attacks in one year in different 
provinces. IS’ cells conducted missions that were so qualitatively different from 
its conventional approach to military and terror operations with outsized strategic 
results. Its predecessors tried to attack prisons but never reached the objective 
of successfully storming them. This kind of operations is crucial since it differs 
from classic terror attacks; it has a more significant impact on the general 
campaign. Even though they were labelled as terrorist attacks by the media, 
these operations evolved in their complexity as rightly pointed out by Jessica 
Lewis. The use of the indirect approach can determine if, behind the same 
attacks, the groups used comparable methods but on a different scale. The 
choice of studying IS’ prison breaks is not fortuitous; there is a research gap on 
how the group, planned and executed theses complex operations in 2012-2013. 
As stated by Whiteside, Ranieri and Rice165 much additional research is needed 
to understand prison breaks carried out by the group. According to them, the “Abu 
Ghraib/Taji raids should be evaluated in greater detail as it is quite possibly the 
most impressive undertaking ever conducted by the Islamic State, considering its 
scale and the difficulty in breaking key leaders out safely”.166  
Liddle Hart Axioms for his doctrine 
From a pure military-strategic perspective of conducting war, Liddle Hart 
presented a set of recommendations167 an army commander should take or avoid 
to achieve military success. From a general perspective, he instructs never to 
attack the enemy’s centre and focus on a peripheral strategy to dislocate and 
                                            
165 Craig Whiteside, Ian Rice & Daniele Raineri, Black OpsIslamic State and Innovation in Irregular 
Warfare, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 201910.1080/1057610X.2019.1628623 
166 Ibid  
167 This study will rely on LH’s second revised edition of Strategy originally published in 1967 to 
articulate his Strategy of the Indirect Approach.  
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exploit.  More precisely, he should follow eight axioms168. LH´s objective with 
these “maxims” would be to operationalise them and provides practitioners with 
a framework informing strategy development and subsequent tactical execution. 
The methodology is following a deductive top-down research design with Liddle 
Hart’s axioms by observing in different case studies the adherence or not of IS to 
these principles according to our sources. 
LH’s principles come from his understanding of strategy and his review of 
history. He concluded that wars are generally “won when the means of war are 
applied in a way that an opponent is unprepared to meet, that is, employed in an 
indirect fashion”169. He stressed out that “strategy does not need to overcome 
resistance, but rather exploit the elements of movement and surprise to achieve 
victory by throwing the enemy off balance before a potential strike”.170 The 
strategist’s aims are to “seek victory under the most advantageous circumstance 
in order to produce the most profitable result.”171 The notions of manoeuvre and 
surprise the best capture LH´s theory and have the following attributes: they are 
paramount for victory and should make the fighting as smooth and bloodless as 
possible. A broad definition of the indirect approach would be the combination of 
movement and surprise to dislocate the enemy and force him to a position of 
weakness to achieve with minimum violence a defined political objective. Indeed, 
for our case study, the firepower of the Iraqi Army and its allies was unmatched 
by IS. However, the group was able to provoke a dislocation and exploit it later. 
Liddle Hart envisioned exploitation as the commander’s ability to take advantage 
of dislocation without giving the enemy the time to recover. Because the 
explanation of dislocation is at the centre of LH’s military theory, it is one of the 
best-suited ones to explain this case study. There is a consensus in the literature 
that the Iraqi Army was poorly prepared and dislocated despite its human and 
material superiority over IS’ insurgency. This investigation does not just describe 
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this state of dislocation like most of the publications on the subject or explain it 
only from the prism of endogenous factors but rather operationalize a military 
doctrine to explain it.   
In this section, we will verify IS´ following of LH´s axioms for specific case 
studies. The prison breaks in Tikrit and Abu Ghraib /Taji, the assaults on Samara 
and Mosul, Fallujah, Ramadi and in Salahudeen province. These cases studies 
were selected because of their relevance to explain IS ‘resurgence, their decisive 
nature and their strategic outcome. They are documented events with a sufficient 
amount of information available from different sources. At the same time, these 
operations are still under-investigated generating more questions than answers. 
For example, the Abu Ghraib prison break was insufficiently examined and the 
Mosul urban assault is mostly studied through the prism of the fall of the Iraqi 
army or as the result of a conspiracy of generals and politicians who gave the city 
to IS.  
The use of LH is useful and have a high potential for giving us a better 
understanding of IS resurgence First, IS guerrilla warfare articles released in 
2019 are in line with the general ideas behind Liddle Hart indirect approach 
guideline for manoeuvring, provoke and exploit dislocation of the enemy. Second, 
dislocation must occur before any blow against an opponent, for our case study, 
it took place for the Iraqi Army all along the year of 2014. LH’s approach offers 
us a robust conceptual framework capable of explaining it and understand how 
IS exploited it to build up and achieve political gains.  For the 2012-2013 prison 
breaks or the 2014-2015 urban assaults, we will test if IS applied or not these 
strategic guidelines.  
1-“To adjust the end to the means”. 
 Liddle Hart states that the “usual reason for adopting a strategy of limited 
aim is that of awaiting a change in the balance of force – a change often sought 
and achieved by draining the enemy’s force, weakening him by pricks instead of 
risking blows”172.  We can understand it by the necessity of adopting a strategy 




of limited aim waiting for a favourable shift in the balance of power. The perfect 
example of that, according to him, is Fabian’s strategy of avoiding confrontation 
against Hannibal’s army. His patient strategy was not a sign of weakness but 
rather a wise way of avoiding an irrational waste of resources for an objective 
difficult to achieve.  Using the same rationale but with religious explanations IS 
guerrilla warfare article released in 2019 called the mujahedeen to “not entrust 
themselves with something beyond their power by attacking targets that surpass 
their ability to break the enemy in them, and they should not consider this type of 
battles to be fateful or decisive in documenting the course of war with their 
enemies. Instead, they are fight-and-flight, whose aim is to prepare for another 
fight, and so on”.173 Testing the adherence to this strategy will be achieved by 
observing when the group shifted the strategy from guerilla to open confrontation 
with its enemies.  
2- “To always focus on the objective and consider that there are many ways 
to reach it”.  
The accomplishment of an objective is more important than the means 
employed to reach it. It does not suggest that the end justifies the means but 
emphasises the importance of considering that accomplishing an objective is 
never possible just by one mean. Here, the idea is that the military option is not 
the only possible mean and that a military commander’s strategy should show 
adaptability and flexibility." This part will assess IS´ adherence to this 
recommendation by observing the versatility of the group in the methods and 
military tactics used to achieve a military objective (takeover of prisons, military 
bases or cities).  
3- “Choose the line (or course) of least expectation” and 4 -“Exploit the line 
of least resistance”.   
This refers to achieving psychological surprise. Axioms three and four are 
generally in the spirit of dislocating the enemy. Operation Overlord is an 
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applicable example where the Nazis were never expecting the operation to take 
place at that time and place. The line of least resistance is the physical equivalent 
of the line of least expectation as Liddell Hart suggests “They are the two faces 
of the same coin” 174.LH defines what he considers as physical dislocation when 
it takes shape in “upsetting the enemy’s dispositions and, by compelling a sudden 
‘change of front’, dislocates the distribution and organisation of his forces; 
separates his forces; endangers his supplies; menaces the route or routes by 
which he could retreat in case of need and re-establish himself in his base or 
homeland”175. Psychological dislocation follows almost immediately by affecting 
the minds of commanders.  It is stronger when sudden and emphasised by the 
feeling of being trapped176. It can also require the use of the least expected route, 
as Liddle Hart states: “In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way 
home.”177 IS’ articles on guerrilla tactics emphasised the importance of surprise 
by striking the points of least resistance. For example, by briefly occupying cities 
such as Haditha in 2012, when, pretending to be Iraqi SWAT forces, ISI fighters 
seized most of its parts, as they before withdrawing from them to the desert in a 
matter of hours. In other instances, the author stressed the importance of 
attacking poorly defended area he described as the following when 
“mujahedeen’s assaults on regions take the form of assaults that the police or 
security apparatuses carry out when the enemy's defences in the area are very 
weak or not present, which facilitates the mujahideen's entrance into the area and 
moving about in it with freedom during specific hours”178.To verify the application 
of these two axioms, we will observe, in the moments of dislocation of ISF during 
the assaults on prisons or urban centres the routes used by the group, the 
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175 Ibid p339 – 340 
176 Ibid p340 
177 Ibid p336 
178 See for a translation Aymen Tamimi, Islamic State Insurgent Tactics: Translation and Analysis, 
Apr 26, 2019 http://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/04/islamic-state-insurgent-tactics-translation 
95 
 
methods used to deceive their enemies and how IS’ troops exploited their 
dislocation.  
5-“Taking a line of operation, which offers alternative objectives”.  
This principle derives from the idea of putting the enemy on the “horns of 
a dilemma” by forcing him to disperse his forces. As Liddle Hart states, it should 
make him indecisive as he recalls that “a strategist should think in terms of 
paralysing, not of killing” 179. By attacking at the same time multiple objectives, it 
distracts the enemy from his opponent’s principal objective and makes the 
attainment of some objective easier180. It refuses to the enemy the possibility to 
concentrate its forces and disperse them on multiple objectives. The following of 
this recommendation will be observed through the study of the two of the most 
important assaults in different campaigns which involved a simultaneous attack. 
(Abu Ghraib prison break, Ramadi, Mosul and Samarra urban assaults).  
6-“Ensuring that both plans and dispositions are flexible―adaptable to 
circumstances”,  
This axiom means that the strategist has to be flexible and adapt his 
approach to each situation. It stresses the importance of planning and flexible 
troop deployment. IS’ Al Naba 2019 article on guerrilla doctrine stressed this 
principle. The writer considered that “the extent may change during the 
expedition, according to the degree of the resistance of the enemy and the speed 
of the advance of the mujahideen, as the amir may think in all probability that the 
rapid collapse of the enemy will help to realise a greater advance, with a weak 
possibility of the existence of an allurement plan on the part of the enemy, along 
with the presence of the safe path for withdrawal and preventing encirclement”181. 
Interestingly, the 2019 article on IS´ guerrilla warfare gives the example of the 
assault on Mosul in 2014 as a case of reactivity of the commander to a dislocation 
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of the enemy by broadening the attack during the operation. We will observe the 
adherence to this axiom by seeing the change of operations in scale and 
manpower distribution depending on the circumstances surrounding prison 
breaks attempts or urban assaults. 
The last two principles are negative ones, guiding the strategist’s actions not to 
repeat mistakes already done. 
7 -“Do not throw your weight into a stroke while your opponent is on 
guard―whilst he is well placed to parry or evade it”182.  
Attacks should not be waged in a way that strengthens the enemy’s 
defences.  Liddell Hart always considered that the enemy must first be 
“paralysed” before an attack may be successful.183 IS´ Al Naba article on guerrilla 
states that fighters can “embark on breaking the strong lines of resistance around 
the towns and countrysides, and entering them by force, in order to strike points 
of the enemy inside them, and thus seizing the area in the shade of the 
confrontation that may wound the enemy, then withdrawing before the enemy 
should regain its awareness and reorganise its ranks or bring auxiliary forces 
from outside its area to regain control.”184 In that case, we can see that IS’ is not 
reluctant to attack strong points at the contrary of LH’s recommendation. The 
adherence to this recommendation will be assessed through the observation of 
IS units that penetrate well-fortified targets during sieges, urban assaults or prison 
breaks.  
8- “Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it 
has once failed”.  
No additional resources should be used for an already failed operation 
without reassessing its variables and using different means. The following of this 
recommendation will be observed for case studies when IS first assault was 
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thwarted or failed. We will focus on IS attack on Abu Ghraib which was conducted 
a decade ago by IS´predecessors and the war of attrition the organisation 
conducted in Ramadi from January 2014 to May 2015 with multiple assaults 
conducted in order to take over the city centre. 
The adherence of some axioms will be observed in all cases studies, while the 
following of some others is only observable for some given cases for a question 
of available data or impossibility to observe. 
5- Grand Strategy, propaganda and framing  
From Hart’s definition of Grand Strategy, we will try to see what political, 
social or economic efforts the group has made to attain its military objectives and 
explain its political behaviour.  It also presents a way to verify if the takeover of 
cities such as Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit, and Ramadi was not exclusively due to the 
use of “hard power”. LH advanced three recommendations that should be 
followed at Grand strategy level that are in line with the indirect approach. IS as 
described by many publications as a resilient organisation (Whiteside, Hashim, 
Fishman, Mac Cants, Lewis) despite the extreme pressure it has been submitted 
to. As indicated at the beginning of this section, after receiving a shock, resilient 
organisations adopt a set of principles and routines that permit them to survive. 
Grand Strategy, because of its long-term reach and holistic nature, can 
correspond to this process of developing a new set of non-kinetic and long term 
principles inside an organisation. This Grand Strategy can also influence IS’ 
relations with other actors. Indeed, IS’ experience in Iraq towards other actors 
has been shaped by an approach which has oscillated between cooperation and 
open conflict, maximalist and gradualist objectives. 
1-The better your strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand and the 
less it will cost you. 
The first axiom of LH is general and refers to the use of non-kinetic means 
in the strategy in order to gain political and military objectives. “The better your 
strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand and the less it will cost you.” 
From LH´s perspective, a better strategy in Grand strategy is a one using non-
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military means that are less costly such as economic measures or diplomatic 
pressures. Liddell Hart considers that the political ends must be in line with the 
total military means available for achieving them, should this condition be met, a 
real economy of forces might be realized185.  
We will verify IS’ application of this guideline by focusing on IS´ non-kinetic 
interactions with competitive social structures such as the tribes and other 
insurgent groups. Regarding the tribes, we selected to study IS relations with two 
large tribal confederations: the Dulaim in Fallujah and the Jubur in Salahudeen. 
Their selection is not fortuitous both are large tribes, have been active in the 
Sahawat movement and have undergone divisions during IS ‘resurgence. The 
framing analysis of IS propaganda also lies into the umbrella concept of Gran 
Strategy and shows how the group mobilised the Sunni Community in a strategy 
in line with this axiom. We verify the success of this strategy by evaluating at what 
extent IS’ frame resonated among the Sunni protestors’ frames in 2012-2013. An 
alignment of these frames could explain the resonance of IS’ frames among its 
targeted audience that could lead to mobilise or make neutral some of them.  
2- The more brutal your methods, the more bitter you will make your 
opponents, with the natural result of hardening their resistance 
Regarding the use of violence, LH stated that excessive use of violence 
against its enemy could be counterproductive: “the more brutal your methods, the 
more bitter you will make your opponents, with the natural result of hardening 
their resistance”.186 We will compare the use of violence by IS with LH´s vision of 
how it should be used and explain IS ‘discriminatory use of violence. 
 
 
                                            




3-“The more you intend to impose your peace entirely of your own 
choosing the more likely your adversary will rise against you”.   
After achieving military victory, LH considered that “The more you intend 
to impose your peace entirely of your own choosing the more likely your 
adversary will rise against you”.187 Waging war while preparing for peace refers 
to foreseeing the peace condition and building the requirements for a durable 
peace. We will assess its adherence by IS after observing the 2014 post-military 
victory IS policy towards the Sunnis who were its enemies, the other communities 
it controlled, the regional powers and the International system. 
Frame analysis methodology 
As mentioned above, Liddle Hart produced some guidelines of the indirect 
approach to apply to Grand Strategy around three principles governing war 
policy. The one which can be expanded to the use of propaganda is when he 
states that “The better your strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand and 
the less it will cost you”.188 In other words, it refers to the ability to use limited 
resources to achieve its objective. Thanks to the digital age and the irruption of 
Social Medias the potential of reaching a very large audience with low-cost 
means is now possible for insurgents. A low-cost strategy is to generate 
mobilization for a movement like IS primarily through propaganda, the creation of 
frames with limited costs ( video productions easy to edit) that resonates among 
the population (through mass diffusion) and change the position of the targeted 
audience from neutrality to support or from hostility to passivity as described by 
Galulla. 
This part sheds light on the issue of IS’ rise and popular support it enjoyed in the 
context of the protests of Sunni Iraqis in 2012 and 2013.  The literature has 
pointed out how these protests, which started peacefully, certainly helped IS’ 
resurgence by dispersing the Iraqi Army and turning many tribes from fighting IS 
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to fighting the Iraqi Government. Facing these events, we will assess if the group 
had its Grand Strategy which goes beyond its military actions and focuses on its 
ability to generate support among the Sunni population in Iraq. The group labelled 
popular support (Hadina shaa’biya) as a Taghut in the case it delays the full 
application of sharia189. However, from the 2010 strategic document we 
mentioned before, it proved to be aware of the necessity of forming a constituency 
inside the Sunni population. Its strategy for gaining support is not based on a 
pragmatic gradualist approach but instead on the thriving on the sentiments of 
humiliation, the show of its moral superiority and the rise of sectarianism as the 
primary identity shaping political allegiances and solidarities. 
 This part methodology assesses the group’s ability to produce frames that 
resonate among its targeted audience in order to enjoy a critical mass of popular 
support. Framing is a form by which actors in a social movement diffuse ideas 
and discourse that resonate among those they intend to mobilise. The theory 
argues that frames are articulated to resonate with the grievances of the Iraqi 
Sunni population. When there is frame alignment, recruitment and mobilisation 
are possible. The objective of this last section is to determine the coincidences 
between IS’ discourse towards the Sunni population and its demands that were 
widely voiced during the 2012-2013 protests. This part of the study is articulated 
to verify if the group purposely voiced demands and grievances shared by a large 
part of the Sunni population which were not part of IS’ support base. It will be an 
opportunity not to focus on the ideological or religious frames the group is famous 
for diffusing, but rather emphasise the social and political dimension of its 
discourse. 
One of the aspects emphasised by the literature regarding IS’ propaganda was 
its mastering of new technologies and social media to diffuse its frames. Much of 
Atwan’s analysis in his book “ISIS the Digital Caliphate” focuses on the role that 
digital technology has played in its rise. From their prolific use of darknet, hacking 
                                            




and international cyber-attacks to the development of jihadist computer games 
and Islamist match-making apps, IS members have proven themselves to be, in 
Atwan’s words, “masters of the digital universe.”190 Its contribution echoes Stern’s 
and Berger’s extensive analysis of IS’ managing of social media recruitment ad 
propaganda, especially on Twitter and Facebook191. However, by showing the 
development of rivalry between IS and Al Qaeda supporters on social media, this 
tool which is by nature leaderless has proved to be very difficult to remain under 
control in case of defection or rising dissatisfaction among its ranks. 
Frame Resonance 
Frame resonance is explained by the framing theory developed in the 70’s 
by academicians to explain popular mobilization. Based on Goffman’s research, 
the term “framing” is employed to describe the justifications and appeals, and 
movements used to mobilise support. McAdam refers to it as the “conscious 
strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the 
world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”192. Snow and 
Benford argue “that variations in success, both within and across movements, 
depend in part on the degree to which movements attend to problems of 
consensus and action mobilisation through the core framing tasks of diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational framing” 193. They consider that at a minimum, a 
group needs to describe their grievances persuasively, called “the diagnostic 
frame”, and present a feasible solution, “the prognostic frame”. This involves the 
construction of “vocabularies of motive”194 in a risky and costly enterprise such 
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as collective action. Concerning the thesis’ subject, Snow and Byrd apply the 
framing theory to Islamist groups in their article released in 2007, “Ideology 
framing process and Islamic terrorist movement”195. They stated that the diversity 
in the political Islam spectrum across the world and the numerous internal 
debates among them have to do mainly with ideology. They considered ideology 
as “a homogenised, monochromatic manner and not conceptualised as tightly 
coupled, inelastic set of values, beliefs, and ideas”196. In other words, ideas, 
beliefs, and events are interconnected in ways that help to justify and inspire 
Islamist movements and their activities.  
Regarding their frame of reference, Islamic movements are considered as a new 
social movement that focuses primarily on creating identity and meanings.  
Contrary to the idea that frames for Islamist groups are rigid God-given principles 
based on sacred scriptures, Wiktorowicz argues that they are flexible and 
adaptable to changing political and socioeconomic circumstances. The discourse 
itself is less critical than how it is formed and adjusted to achieve frame 
resonance. For the case study, I use IS’ frames197 in terms of diagnostic and 
prognostic frames in a specific context, the rise of protests among the Iraqi 
population in 2012-2014. The possibility that some of its frames mirrored the 
demands of the Sunni Arab population and by achieving frame resonance, it 
could explain popular support enjoyed or at least its acceptance by the Sunni 
population after conquering Iraqi cities in 2014. 
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Selection of IS’ Al Furqan videos  
            Six major IS videos centred on Iraq and released in the years preceding 
the protests were selected to identify the main socio-political frames produced. 
From the video material released by IS, the group has identified grievances of 
the Sunni population in Iraq by spreading them before the start of the protests. 
After selecting them, we will compare them with the bulk of the protestors’ 
demands presented a few years later.  
Al Furqan is one of the media wings for the Islamic State and its prior incarnations 
and represents its oldest and most influential media production in Arabic.  
 “Khawanatu Al Assuna” (Lit the traitors of the Sunni) released in 2010 by 
the Islamic State of the Iraq Ministry of Information198. 
  “Saleel al-Sawarim”  ( Lit The Clanking of the  Swords);  four episodes 
were made available by Al Furqan Media Production in  July  2012,  August  
2012 and 2013 and May 2014 199. 
 “Khams A’wam Aala ikamat Adawla” (Lit Five years after the establishment 
of the state) released in 2011 produced by Al Furqan Media Production200. 
These sources are unique, not well studied (contrarily to the post 2014- material 
for Western Audience) and mainly focusing on the Sunni population with constant 
subjects and themes to mobilise the population. The inclusion of these sources 
not studied before is a part of the thesis’ originality.   IS has before the other 
groups based most of its propaganda on video rather than audio. Following the 
audio-visual revolution its media wing, Al Furqan has quickly developed itself and 
                                            
198 Lit “The traitors of the Sunni”, a video issued by the Islamic State’s Minister of Information,  
available  on  the following link;   https://archive.org/details/Koonah  
199 Lit “The  Clanking  of  the  Swords”,  al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the 
Islamic State of Iraq: “Clanging of the Swords available  on  the  following link 
https://archive.org/details/abohafsaalkaisy_gmail_HD4 and   https://jihadology.net/2012/08/16/al-
furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-clanging-of-the-
swords-part-2%E2%80%B3/  
200  Lit “Five  years after the establishment of the State”, a video  issued by the Islamic State’s Al-




sophisticated its propaganda. The group was also keen to distribute its 
propaganda with CDs containing videos depicting its production or with social 
media propaganda campaigns to develop them.  It includes pictures, magazines, 
videos, music that are shared on social media and different Internet sites. IS also 
maintains credibility by substantiating promoting claims through frame 
consistency, primarily by leaning on religious scripture.  The limit of these sources 
is we don’t know to what extent they have been diffused and what weight they 
had in changing the posture of the targeted audience toward the IS. The only way 
to make us infer that there is frame resonance is by comparing IS’ frames to the 
ones of the 2013 protestors. 
6- Sources and Study’s limitations  
For security issues, IS is naturally reluctant to share their data about their 
structure and resources. For that reason, I have chosen to study the group’s 
frames and strategy which are available and accessible. The group is a prolific 
producer of written records and press releases that allow some insight into its 
strategy and operations. In recent years, it has developed a metrically driven 
following of all of its military operations. The empirical data available is what the 
group has produced in internal and public documents (Al Naba newspaper 
published on a weekly or monthly basis and video productions from Al Furqan). 
Because of their growing activities on social media, primary online sources 
available on academic platforms such as Aaron Zellin’s website “Jihadology”201 
are an essential source for the study. Internal documents belonging to the group 
seized by opposing forces can also offer valuable insight into the group’s 
organisational structure or internal communications. Other leaks about the 
group’s structure have been found recently and were shared by newspapers and 
the researcher Ayman Tamimi, who collects authentic internal documents of IS 
from its private sources in Syria and Iraq.  
This thesis draws upon a range of sources which use different languages, 
Arabic, English and French. The sources of this study are part of its originality. 
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By focusing on IS main video series in 5 years, it can give a unique insight into 
IS propaganda efforts and frames, find patterns and recurring themes. Until now, 
no study has gone deep into IS’ frames before its resurgence targeting the Iraqi 
Sunni population and testing the resonance of its frames with the protesters. It 
will verify the evolution in IS prognostic of the situation in many years under 
different commandment showing the resilience of its ideology and frames. An 
important secondary source comes from articles from local and regional press. 
By using local Iraqi sources, it focuses on relatively under-reported events. Al 
Mada press, a daily Arabic newspaper published in Iraq, is one of the principal 
sources for local news reports. The limit of using only local news press is that 
they could omit events that do not attract media attention. At the same time, it 
should be stressed that, because of their ties to government and state apparatus, 
they can have incentives to downplay their impact.  
For the tactical analysis part of the study, I examined the statistics provided 
by the organisation in its two consecutive annual reports of the years of 1433 
(27th November 2011 to 14th November 2012) and 1434 (15th November 2012 
12th November 2013) of the Islamic lunar calendar202. For these two reports, all 
the military operations claimed by the group were already classified by the 
authors of the document. Also, for the period between November 2013 and April 
2014, I selected the statistics published by the group’s newspaper Al Naba 
Magazine203 during these five months. 
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(issue 50).  
106 
 
 Researchers and commentators can genuinely be sceptical about the 
validity of the group’s figures in these reports. A team of researchers undertook 
an examination of IS’ claims by selecting a small sample of the operations 
claimed by the group in Baghdad in one month and tried to corroborate them by 
cross-checking them with local media.204 They found that press releases 
confirmed IS' claims at a reasonable level. Inventions of attacks are not common 
in IS’ communications in Iraq; what appears more is an inflation of the death toll 
for propaganda purposes. In order to make an assessment of IS’ claims, the 
authors undertook an examination205 by selecting a small sample of the 
operations claimed by IS in Baghdad and tried to corroborate them by 
crosschecking them with local media reports. They found out that of 345 attacks 
claimed by ISI between in 1433 of the Hijri calendar, 57% were reported by local 
media.  Without excluding the fact that IS could overstate its numbers, the 
operations of the group which were underreported were mostly minor operation 
with a very limited number of casualties which were not reported by medias (85% 
produced fewer than three casualties).  However, within the 198 operations in 
Baghdad which had a media match, they found that the average number of 
casualties as reported by the ISI was 25,95 which was close of the one reported 
by the media 21,47.  A more profound analysis of the veracity of IS claims 
extended to other provinces would be helpful to tackle this issue. Because minor 
operations do not receive media attention, the idea of cross-checking the 
operations claimed by the group with press coverage is unrealistic for this study 
because of the vast number they represent.   
This research thesis has also other limits. First, it is not a policy book as it offers 
no great recommendations and is neither a counterinsurgency nor a 
counterterrorism investigation. The primary objective is to provide an analysis of 
the group’s resurgence from a new perspective that could add to other existing 
explanations of the complex phenomenon of IS’ resurgence. Second, being a war 
zone, Iraq is not an accessible terrain due to its danger. A researcher needs 
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sponsorship from the state or the group to visit, which creates an inherent bias 
since the researcher can only access the sources the group want to show him. 
At the same time, the reliance on IS’ figures in the quantitative part of the study 
makes its results dependent on the reliability of their claims, which affects the 
research’s findings. Third, I will not discuss the group’s military performance or 
strategy of the group in the Syrian theatre because of the issue of space and the 
importance of Iraq for the object of the study, which remains an Iraqi creation.  
Regarding the use of LH’s theory of the indirect approach to the study, some of 
its limitations are related to criticisms of the method by its detractors. The leading 
criticism of Liddle Hart’s belief was the possible vicious circle it creates. Liddle 
Hart’s analysis of World War II and the blitzkrieg made its critics accuse him of 
retroactively fitting his arguments to explain history.  John Mearsheimer criticised 
his scholar methodology as “constantly comparing events, individuals, and 
situations to find generalisations that would hold across space and time”.206 
Deeply traumatised by the bloodbath during the First World War, Liddle Hart’s 
concerns about Britain’s national security problems were theorised in reaction to 
his personal experience and disapproval of mass battles generating bloodbaths. 
In other words, his indirect principles could be an outgrowth of this desire. Despite 
disagreeing with some of Liddle Hart’s historical methods, Brian Bond offers us 
the reasons behind the relevance of Liddle Hart‘s contribution as a military 
historian and theorist by stating that “whatever its shortcomings from the 
viewpoint of scholarship, the strategy of indirect approach can be strongly 
defended as an educational doctrine (… ) There was a great deal to be said for 
encouraging a new generation of officers to think for themselves, and in particular 
to think in terms of achieving success by surprise and superior mobility; to value 
intellect and professional skill more than tradition and seniority, and to make the 
fullest use of science and technology to minimise casualties”.207 
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Furthermore, the use of the indirect approach strategy as a conceptual framework 
for other researchers shows the validity of this theory by the number of research 
papers and theses developed around it during the last decades. Tuvia Ben-
Moshe and Brian Bond used the indirect approach’s guidelines to analyse its 
influence on the Israeli military doctrine208. Liddle Hart’s principles are said to 
have had a profound impact on a generation of military commanders of the Israeli 
Defence Forces during the successive Arab – Israel wars209. It was applied first 
by the militia under the Haganah by using tactics of guerrilla warfare and avoiding 
a direct clash with the main body of its enemy or as a conventional army in 1968, 
where it was used to surprise and for the targeting of supply routes against Arab 
armies. More recently a research thesis210 defended in 2016 by Lieutenant 
Brandon Thomas Euhus analysed cyberwarfare case studies through Liddle 
Hart’s approach. He concluded that they applied many of LH’s strategic 
principles. Phillip Meilinger also published an article211 in 2017 on the applicability 
of LH’s approach to modern warfare and specifically to the War on Terror. Since 
the beginning of the War on Terror from 2001, he considered that the direct 
approach had been used widely with limited results. He argued that the use of 
airpower, special operations forces with intelligence assets and local ground 
forces were sufficient to achieve objectives with limited costs and following the 
indirect approach, the best examples cited being the strategy adopted during the 
fall of the Taliban or the Libyan Regime.    
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IV- Factors influencing IS’ 
resurgence and military 
performance. 
 
          This part is a background section presenting factors debated to be behind 
the resurgence of IS and its military performance. There has been an increasing 
number of books on IS; the literature is vast and is continually evolving. 
Nevertheless, the quality is debatable; there have been great pieces which are 
authoritative while others were hastily written following the media coverage the 
group received from its takeover of Mosul. I present in this chapter most of the 
available and relevant literature explaining IS’ performance from 2003 until the 
end of 2018. Because the literature on the movement is vast, I decided to classify 
it according to different angles of research and explanations of the group’s 
various manifestations:  
1. The group’s military strategy and tactics. 
2. The military doctrine of the Baathist Iraqi Army and its supposed influence 
on IS. 
3. The resources and the group’s structure. 
4. IS’ discourse and ideology. 
The last part is about literature gaps and what could be the contributions of the 






1- IS’ Military commanders and the central figure of Hajji 
Bakr in its 2012 resurgence  
The figure of the Military general commander has been advanced to 
explain IS’ military improvement. Military strategy in IS’ organisational apparatus 
is devoted to the Minister of War, which became separated from the Amir, the 
political leader, after Zarqawi’s death. The Minister of War only has the task of 
developing the group organisation’s military capacity. The first was Abu Hamza 
Al-Muhajir (2006-2010), followed by  Numa Mansour Al Zeedi (2010), Haji Bakr 
(2011-2014), Mohammed Al Bilawi (2014), Omar al Shishani (2014-2016) and 
Gulmurod Khalimov, from 2016. The timeframe that interests us the most is when 
Haji Bakr was the military leader, which corresponds to the period of rebound 
from 2011 to 2014. Haji Bakr was a veteran battlefield commander and former 
colonel of Saddam Hussein’s army.  He was assigned as a security official in the 
Islamic State’s assassination squads hunting principally Sahawat leaders. He 
was elevated to the position of head of the military council in 2010. He is said to 
have been an adherent of the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu212.  
Known as “the prince of shadows”, he defended Abu Bakr Baghdadi’s 
appointment as chief of the ISI because of the group’s need for a powerful and 
representative avatar behind which to rally (as argued in the strategic plan of 
2010). After his appointment, he recommended striking back when the Americans 
began their withdrawal from Iraq. The situation, he wrote “will be strongest 
politically and militarily for the Islamic plan to completely seize the reins of control 
in Iraq“213. After becoming ISI’s supreme military commander, he was considered 
as having the responsibility for improving the group’s military organisation. Under 
his command, the organisation saw the development of specialised units with 
specific skills called mafariz (see Annex 1). What changed also was the 
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recognition that warfare was holistic. It was not only limited to kinetic military 
actions but part of a more comprehensive and broad strategy. 
Haji Bakr was dispatched to Syria in 2012 to overview Jolani’s achievements with 
Jabhat Al Nusra. He began to manifest its independence from the leadership in 
Syria by going too far in its cooperation with other rebel groups and refused to 
publicly acknowledge his links to ISI and carry out attacks against Syrian rebels 
in Turkey. Journalist Christoph Reuter of Der Spiegel214 revealed in 2015 the 
paramount role played by Hajji Bakr in Syria. He discovered documents seized 
by the rebels after his killing in January 2014 in Tel Rifaat. The documents 
describe the process and mechanism of seizing power in a permanent place. It 
consisted of a technically precise plan for an "Islamic State Intelligence service” 
in order to take control of society. It starts with the infiltration of villages and 
neighbourhoods with the opening of a “Dawah office”. It refers to an Islamic 
missionary centre to recruit followers and spread its ideas. Recruits are required 
to provide information about their relatives, their village and district.215 
These political warfare actions require an in-depth knowledge of the socio-
political landscape in order to launch actions such as assassinations of key 
figures, bribing and co-optation. During the first state building experience by 
Zarqawi, he had little knowledge of the socio-political and cultural landscape of 
Iraq. At that time, according to Ahmed Hashim, the group did not have the 
“capability, resources or mindset to shape the environment in his favour”216. The 
rise of a generation of ex-Baathist leaders such as Haji Bakr with a state 
experience could have pushed IS to think as a state and not as an organisation. 
It affected its hybrid warfare capacity as well as paved the way for a new holistic 
strategy. Haji Bakr was also known to be the architect of the “Amniyat” structure 
inside the IS security apparatus. Such units are tasked with clandestine work in 
                                            
214 Christoph Reuter, “Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State”, Spiegel Online, 
18/08/2015,http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-
islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html  
215 The authenticity of Reuter’s documents given by Syria rebels has been put into question by 
researchers and specialists.  
216 Ahmed S Hashim, The Caliphate at war, Hurst and Company London, 2017, p211 
112 
 
the organisation, the society and behind enemy lines. It constituted itself as a real 
intelligence apparatus for domestic and external surveillance and clandestine 
operations such as targeted assassinations. These efforts have made it easier 
for the group to grasp territory, control the population and impose stability. 
2- IS’ Military doctrine and tactical improvements to 
explain its resurgence. 
Jessica Lewis made another important contribution to the understanding 
of IS' tactics and strategy in 2015. She explained IS’ strategy during the 2014 
summer offensive and pointed to three crucial elements explaining its success. 
She recognised that IS is a strategic organisation which has used different 
warfare style types of action in what she calls “Hybridized warfare.”217 This 
concept challenges conventional militaries with distinct doctrines for traditional 
war, irregular war, and counter-terrorism. IS’ resurgence was also due to its ability 
to manoeuvre in three types of terrain: deserts, cities, and suburban areas. 
Regarding the 2012-13 resurgence, Lewis considers that IS established support 
networks within disenfranchised Sunni communities in Iraq, in particular during 
the 2013 protests.  The year of 2013 was a shifting moment according to her 
when IS brought its desert forces and urban terrorist cells into a new strategic 
framework. It changed its tactics from terrorist attacks against civilians to assaults 
on military targets. From that moment, IS started to use manoeuvre warfare to 
overrun the Iraqi Security Forces. For her, the first element of IS’ 2012-2014 
resurgence was its belt manoeuvres, by projecting itself from desert or suburban 
areas into urban centres. She traces back this manoeuvre to Zarqawi’s time and 
describes it as a “way to organise a battle plan around a principal city using 
dispersed units, informal tactics, and freedom of manoeuvre to compromise the 
main defences of a conventional enemy”218. She also compares IS’ urban 
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assaults to “pinch manoeuvres”219, designed to close the gap between cities 
under its control, isolate enemy forces and reduce their ability to counter its 
advance. Lewis’ contribution to the understanding of IS’ strategy and tactical 
patterns is important since she was one of the first to point out to IS’ resurgence 
in 2013 by establishing an extensive study220 on IS’ car bombs waves in 2012 
and 2013 showing the existence of a clear strategic pattern orchestrating these 
attacks.  
According to Charles Lister, we have witnessed three attempts by IS to create a 
state in the areas where it has operated since 2006.221 IS’ first state-building 
project undeniably failed in Iraq in 2006 and another partial attempt failed in 
Northern Syria in 2013 with a similar fightback of local forces. The third attempt 
of 2014 has been the most successful one so far, with significant elements of 
operational learnings incorporated. Lister cites the rise of its capabilities from an 
insurgent group to the characteristics of a conventional army’s infantry coupled 
with the application of a qualitatively superior model of governance. Without 
inflating it, Lister considers the foreign fighters element as a paramount factor. 
Foreign fighters constitute an elite force, ideologically resilient with a high 
readiness to sacrifice and can be used against locals. However, their extensive 
use can be counterproductive since they can be perceived as an occupying force. 
Their massive arrival was thus important in order to explain the group’s 
resurgence.  
Michael Knights’ analysis of the group’s tactics describes IS’ defensive style as 
reminiscent of the German military between 1944 and 1945 because of its lack 
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of manpower and weaponry. 222  Regarding IS ‘offensive style, he considers that 
its “cult of the offensive,” manifested in tactical restlessness, is due to the group’s 
motivation and significant level of autonomy on the field. In another article on IS’ 
military-political strategy, he explains IS’ military victories by the mobility and 
tactical surprise it had shown against its enemies. The other purpose of their 
offensives is to provide good footage for IS’ propaganda videos that fit its 
“winner’s messaging” and its slogan “remaining and expanding”223. 
Omar Ashour describes precisely the tactics and strategy of the group’s affiliate 
in Sinai224. He argues that the group’s strategy is similar to other under resources 
provinces of the group (Diyala and Hama) and has two shapes, a defensive and 
offensive version. In its defensive form, it has an aim of “endurance”, with three 
objectives: recruiting locals, controlling villages and tunnels, and blinding the 
authorities by targeting informants and spies. As an offence strategy, the group 
aims at attrition and fear by targeting the security forces relentlessly using 
conventional tactics and urban terrorism. The goal is to continue to follow the 
objectives cited above until the exhaustion of the enemy forces.225 
 “Caliphate at War” is a recent book written by Ahmed Hashim to explain the 
evolution of the group from 2003 to 2017. The author adopts a holistic approach, 
tackling all the possible manifestations of the group, and this can be considered 
as one of the most relevant books on the group. Regarding IS’ military strategy,   
he defends the idea of the emergence of a jihadist way of warfare226. He defines 
it as a product of contemporaneous warfare and not as a legacy of historical 
Islamic warfare. He also adds that the way of warfare is not self-sufficient and it 
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has borrowed from “the enormous body of non-Islamic ways of warfare”227. This 
way of warfare is different between jihadist groups and depends on the 
geography and topography of each theatre of operation. Zarqawi’s warfare was 
first conditioned by his awareness of the imbalance of power. Consequently, he 
waged an indirect war against the US by targeting its Iraqi partners in what he 
called “unrestricted warfare”. He used this term to show first the important volume 
of resources allocated by the group and the indiscriminate use of violence. 
Regarding IS’ resurgence, he suggests that the US withdrawal put an end to ISI’s 
decline in Iraq. Iraqi forces did not have the “the energy to plan, execute fast-
paced operations […] the kind the Americans were capable of”228.  The ease of 
the pressure from the US special operation forces coupled with the end of the 
CIA 24h satellite surveillance and intelligence gathering effort in Iraq helped the 
group to rebuild its capabilities. Another element advanced by Ahmed Hashim as 
explaining the rise of IS’ military and organisational capacity is the Darwinist 
evolution inside the organisation. Being hunted during that period resulted in the 
decimation of 80% of the leadership, which left “the smarter and more powerful 
operatives in place”.229 As confirmed by researcher Kyle Orton, most of these 
leaders were former regime elements with sufficient military and intelligence 
experience to survive and attain the pyramid of the organisation naturally.230 
The other factor advanced to explain the rise of IS’ military capability is the 
development of a more professional and institutionalised military council in 
2012231. The emergence of a new body inside the military structure called the 
“Committee for Military Manufacturing and Development” initiated an increase of 
the group’s organisational capability by organising an effective categorisation of 
its weaponry seized and an equal distribution to its units dispatched in both Syria 
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and Iraq. This Committee was also behind the evolution of IS’ logistical chain and 
the upgrade of its weapon construction abilities to an industrial grade. The last 
factor presented by Hashim is the specialisation of its units and the experience 
coming from skilled fighters from abroad (mainly Chechnya). Specialised units 
were better coordinated between assault teams, artillery sappers and anti-tank 
units. The group’s fighter quality was also pointed out by Ashour as a factor 
explaining its performance and increased military capabilities. He divided its 
fighters into three categories: former members of regular armies, unlawful 
combatants with military experience and local recruits who have long-term 
experience in combating local regime troops. The synchronisation of such units 
on the battlefield was the proof for Hashim of the emergence of an “organised, 
professional military force”232. However, he mitigates the explanation of IS’ 
military resurgence being solely due to the increase of IS’ capability by 
emphasising the weaknesses and ill-preparedness of its foes, the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) and the Peshmerga.   
Very recently in 2018, two other articles have been published in order to 
understand better IS’ military doctrine from the perspective of its hybrid nature 
and the way it evolved from a guerrilla to a conventional army.  Andrea Becarro 
studied IS warfare in the light of hybrid warfare theory. He stressed the increasing 
role of terrorist tactics and urban space, and more widespread use of modern 
technology regarding the use of drones, suicide attacks and the Internet.233 
Thomas Maurer assessed in his research paper published in March of 2018 that 
IS military approach respected fundamental principles of the conventional 
conduct of combat operations matching the attributes of a conventional army.234 
According to him, it includes systematising the weapons employed into 
categories, their synchronisation in the battlefield under a hierarchical military 
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command and control executed by experienced commanders.   Has also raised 
the question of the development the group has witnessed from insurgency to 
conventional army in its capacities and capabilities.  
Finally, some opinions consider IS’ military strategy from the scope of its 
religious creed, which can be traced to early Islamic warfare and conquests. 
Norvell B. De Atkine235considers that Islamic scriptures shape the group’s use of 
weather, terrain, their zeal and the use of deception. According to De Atkine, 
Islamic heritage is shaping IS’ strategy, which is influenced by historical battles 
led by military commanders such as  Khalid Ibn Walid in Yarmuk River in the  
Levant against Byzantines or in Qadisiyah against the Persians. Guy Y. 
Dampier236  develops the same idea by trying to establish the historical influence 
of the ghazis on IS’ strategy. A ghazi corresponds to an Islamic warrior who 
fought wars of raiding and counter-raiding in frontiers of Islamic empires in a low 
scale type of warfare. The article is more a comparison of IS’ culture and how it 
creates its identity based on Islamic history rather than a real analysis of its 
military tactics. This vision wants to identify the group as a resurgent army from 
the Middle Ages with modernised weaponry and horses replaced by Toyota cars. 
We can say this vision about the influence of the ghazi’ figures or Islamic sources 
on IS’ military doctrine is cultural rather than strategic or tactical; it falls quickly 
into a narrow essentialist perspective of the group. Another point of view comes 
from an analysis of the parallelism of IS’ strategy with historical figures who are 
not Islamic. This is the case with Gary Anderson’s article237, which makes a 
comparison of the strategic rationale behind IS’ and the Mongols’ offensive led 
by Genghis Khan which involved the use of terror and a small group of 
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professional fighters. Anderson also draws other parallels between Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi’s policy and Stalin and Hitler’s political-strategic approach with the use 
of collaborators and the way they took advantage of the grievances of the 
conquered populations. 
3-The military doctrine of the Baathist Iraqi Army and its 
supposed influence on IS. 
The influence IS’ leaders might have received from their Iraqi commanders 
who have undergone different experiences in the Baathist Army is one of the 
main subjects of debate among researchers. The discussion situates in 
determining the level of influence ex-Baathist members have had on the group’s 
organisation, strategy and tactics. Mingling in Camp Bucca and fighting alongside 
al-Zarqawi’s fighters some ex Baathist officers were propelled as leaders of the 
group’s military apparatus such as Haji Bakr (a colonel in the Air Force 
intelligence), Abu Muhanad Al Suweidawi (lieutenant in the same Air Force 
intelligence unit) or Mohamed Al Bilawi (captain in the Iraqi Army). All were part 
of the first high-ranking Iraqi officer circle espousing Salafi jihadism and joining 
the nucleus of fighters around Zarqawi in 2003. If they did adopt IS’ ideology and 
interpretation of Islam, they also imported their skills, military tactics and doctrines 
from their experience with the Iraqi Army. According to the Governor of Anbar 
Province, Ahmed al-Dulaimi, the three men graduated from the same military 
academy at the beginning of the ’90s238.  
From a historical perspective, the war between Iraq and Iran shaped the military 
doctrine of the Iraqi Army. The conflict started in 1982 over a territorial dispute in 
a war that neither Iran nor Iraq thought would expand to a total war killing one 
million people during eight years.  Indeed, the conflict escalated progressively 
from a limited to a “total war” between the two armies. At the beginning of the 
                                            





conflict, Saddam’s fear of a potential military coup forced him to centralise the 
Iraqi command and control structure model.  
The Iraqi Army had “a rigid top-down command and control system”239 where 
senior commanders made all the decisions. Consequently, junior officers and 
ground commanders feared to take any decision or hold responsibilities. A 
decade later, facing the US ground invasion in 1991, division and corps 
commanders did not have any authority over units”240.  After deliberately 
weakening its command with purges, Saddam’s army lacked any doctrinal basis 
on which to conduct operations during the first years of the conflict with Iran. 
Accurate information from the battlefield, unless very positive, was rarely relayed 
to the commanders because of the fear of punishment241. The use of high force 
ratios in offensive battles for the Iraqi Army did not guarantee success against 
the religious zeal of highly motivated Iranian troops.  When the war started, Iraq’s 
troops outnumbered Iran's by a ratio of 5:1. In the end, and after mass 
conscriptions imposed by the Iranian regime, it was closer to 2:1. Until 1987, the 
Iraqi Army adopted a static defensive posture against the repeated direct mass 
attacks from the Iranian troops to counter their human-wave direct attacks. 
Following this defensive modus operandi, the Iraqi Army established a broad, 
integrated fortified zone augmented by large quantities of artillery.  After suffering 
heavy losses, Saddam changed his strategy, ordering his troops to surround 
cities and to starve them out and avoid confrontation242.  He planned to hold the 
area captured and to pressure Khomeini into negotiating a formal settlement. On 
certain occasions, the Iraqi Army used deception to lure its enemy, as in the 
                                            
239 Pelletiere and Douglas Johnson, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War, U.S. Marine Corps, v. 
1,1991, pp. 10 and 39 
240 Kevin Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday, Saddam’s War: An Iraqi Military 
Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, 2009, p95 
241 Sean McKnight, “The forgotten war: The Iraqi army and the Iran‐Iraq war”, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 2:1, p9, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592319108422972  
242  L Pelletiere and Douglas Johnson, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War, U.S. Marine Corps, 
v. 1,19910 , p9 -8 
120 
 
battle243 fought near Susangard. Three hundred tanks participated on each side, 
and the Iraqis won by using a double envelopment tactic. They tricked the 
Iranians into thinking that they were giving way, and then they closed their flanks 
on the Iranians and destroyed almost 200 Iranian tanks. This episode could 
constitute one of the few chapters where the Iraqi Army applied LH’s indirect 
approach principles on the battlefield. To highlight the Iraqi Army’s performance, 
three crucial factors were behind its success at the end of the conflict: air 
superiority, an immobile opponent, and an abundance of resources used 
extravagantly.  
Despite those shifts in action (deception and siege of cities), the Iraqi Army’s 
adherence to LH’s guidelines was limited by the narrow margin of flexibility 
accorded to field commanders, the high confidence in ratio and firepower 
superiority and the waste of resources to achieve its objectives.  Throughout the 
conflict, because of its numerical superiority and airpower, the Baathist army 
preferred to adopt frontal assaults at the indirect expense approach such as 
manoeuvring and flanking operations. It relied heavily on its artillery, which was 
deployed according to a predetermined firing plan in a static position. As reported 
by the CIA, assaults were “preceded by artillery barrages” and relied “heavily 
upon armoured units for offensive operations”244.  
In his article published by CTC Sentinel magazine245, Barak Barfi considers that 
“somehow Baathist military doctrines have continued to shape the Islamic State’s 
practices in the case of the use of SVBIED as an alternative for heavy artillery in 
breaking through lines and feigning assaults”246. The most striking difference he 
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points out is that the Iraqi Army did not rely much on intelligence. In contrast, he 
confirms that Ba’athists “did not learn from one battle to the next”247, largely 
because tactical forces were only successful in heavily scripted operations and 
static positions. For these reasons, Ba’athist forces were not only trained but 
indoctrinated to conduct purely static defensive operations”248. Unlike IS’ high 
degree of decentralisation, Iraqi army commanders could not innovate and 
improvise without high-level orders. For IS, its bottom-up decision-making 
process, giving a large margin of manoeuvre to its local commanders, according 
to Ashour, permitted the group to “make quick decisions when facing superior 
forces”249.  
Baathist strategists during the First and Second Gulf War did not rely on indirect 
approaches and manoeuvring, preferring frontal attacks and relying on a superior 
ratio, heavy artillery and airpower. Its highly centralised command accorded little 
margin of manoeuvre to its field commanders with limited intelligence gathering 
for pre-battle reconnaissance.  Those features seem to be opposite to the Islamic 
State command structure, which is decentralised, giving a margin of manoeuvre 
to local commanders and relying heavily on Intel. From his experience with 
Peshmerga forces, Dr Andreas Krieg was brought to the same conclusion.250 He 
states that IS ground commanders enjoy a wide margin for manoeuvring. 
The group’s decentralised structure gives the ability to the tactical commanders 
to take crucial decisions without the authorisation of his superiors. This flexibility, 
combined with the group’s high mobility, has been essential for its successful 
asymmetrical warfare. According to Hashim251, IS’ small unit’s performance in 
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firefights is better than the one of the insurgencies and Baathist army units. This 
tactical engagement of units requires a high level of training, quick decision-
making and good quality and quantity of firepower. The Iraqi Army had bad 
training, and its small units had poor skills while the Iraqi insurgency from 2003 
to 2011 did not have a tactical proficiency and lacked basic military skills to 
confront the US Army, which was excelling at those levels. For that reason, the 
insurgency opted in the majority for indirect fire (mortars) and IEDs. The 
development of IS’ capability of small units in firefights was possible later because 
of the establishment of safe havens and training camps from 2011 to 2014. As a 
conclusion, there is a consensus that former regime elements brought the 
organisation valuable military experience. Nevertheless, except for the use of 
artillery with suicide car bombs in offensive attacks or defensive reply, the military 
tactics of the Baathist Iraqi Army differed mostly from those of IS and its 
adherence to the indirect approach was very limited. 
4- The resource and structural organizational perspective 
explaining IS’ resilience.  
Another scope of research explaining IS’ performance, whether its demise 
in 2008 or re-emergence in 2013, focused its attention on the group’s resources 
and structural organisation. From the period between 2006 and 2010, the Rand 
Foundation published exhaustive pieces of research on the group’s financial 
records, as well as its internal structures, using as the main source the 
Department of Defence’s Harmony database252. The most important and 
exhaustive research piece was recently released and entitled “Foundations of the 
Islamic State Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010”253. It 
answered the following research questions: how the group organised and 
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financed itself and how it trained and allocated its members? The research team 
concluded that ISI assigned human capital rationally, with the suicide-bomber 
corps dominated by foreign fighters and the intelligence and security sections 
governed by Iraqis. ISI had a sophisticated, diversified fundraising system that 
relied almost entirely on raising money from within its operating territory. Its 
wages were not high enough to attract opportunists but sufficient to draw true 
believers to their project. It was a vertically integrated organisation with a central 
management structure and a functional bureaucracy. It sought to replicate these 
structures at multiple lower geographic levels in its provinces. Each geographic 
unit had substantial autonomy to pursue the group's strategic objectives but had 
routinely to send reports to the leadership; the central organisation used these 
reports to inform decisions and provide strategic guidance.   
In Shapiro’s chapter of his book “The Terrorist Dilemma”254, he studied the 
managerial challenges facing terrorist organisations and focused part of his 
research on ISI. He stressed that back in 2006-2008, the group had an important 
level of bureaucratisation. It took shape in the way that leaders delegated duties 
and monitored this process. Shapiro states that “Leaders typically exercise 
control over their agents through a standard set of bureaucratic tools including 
policy memoranda, reporting requirements, and tracking spreadsheets”255. This 
process of monitoring their agents is consistent with Peter Bergen’s article, where 
he stated that AQI was “highly bureaucratized”256. Brian Fishman qualified the 
group as “extremely resilient”257 because it was based on a centralised model 
that was paying off with time. The autonomy of local cells in their actions and self-
funding permitted the group to maintain a profile despite having lost 80% of its 
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leadership. As a result, in case a section of the group was destroyed the other 
sections could continue to exist, recruit and wage attacks.  
According to Meriam Benraad258, the group also benefited from the release of 
thousands of Iraqis detained since 2008. Throughout 2008, more than half of the 
total detainee population in Iraq was released, which consisted of 17,800 inmates 
out of 33,600. Suicide bombers of attacks perpetrated by the group in October 
2009 were former detainees. They were released as part of the amnesty law. 
Because prisons have always been an incubator for radical ideology, ISI 
extensively recruited inmates from different backgrounds inside Iraqi jails. One of 
the elements behind IS’ resilience is its ability to continue to reconstitute, recruit, 
organise itself from inside prisons. Thus, Benraad considers that this was one of 
the most significant factors behind the group’s resurgence in 2012.  
 5-Ideology and framing to explain IS’ resilience. 
Another scope of analysis of the group’s rebound has centred its focus on 
its discourse and ideology on explaining its performances. Will McCants book’s 
originality lies in his focus on the group’s ideology. He argues that eschatology is 
determining its discourse and sometimes its actions. He points out that the 
group’s actions have been shaped by eschatology. Unlike Al Qaeda’s leaders 
who were careful in using end of time predictions, IS’ leaders can act to 
precipitate events depicted by the Prophet Muhammad in a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy. According to McCants, the leader of ISI after Zarqawi’s death, Abu 
Hamza Al Muhajir, was convinced that the days of the Mahdi259 were coming, 
which caused the group’s errors in 2006-2007 before its defeat260.  However, the 
use of eschatology can represent with the use of prophecies related to the Levant, 
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a potent tool for recruitment and appeal. McCants’ main thesis261, that 
eschatology shapes IS’ action, is at the heart of the debate explaining jihadi 
politics and their adjustment of theological arguments to fit operational realities.  
One of the ideas coming back in the literature is that the weakness of the ISI 
during the 2007-2010 period is attributed to the incompetence of Zarqawi’s 
successors, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. As defended by 
McCants, Abu Hamza AL Muhajir was so profoundly influenced by eschatology 
that its leadership was irrational and counterproductive. Fishman mitigates this 
claim by recalling that “Abu Umar had built an organisation so resilient in a 
structure that it could survive a near-total decapitation and begin an under-the-
radar rebuilding program”262. Regarding the organisation evolution, he identified 
a pattern seen since Fallujah in 2004, that military losses were being translated 
into political legitimacy at the expense of the Iraqi state. While ISI was losing in 
the short term, it was winning in the long-term, transforming battlefield setbacks 
into political gains. 
“The Master Plan”263of Brian H. Fishman is another important book covering the 
evolution of the IS as an organisation and as an ideology. The group’s evolution 
mirrors a plan conceived in November 2001 by Seif Al Adl, Al Qaeda’s highest 
military strategist. He planned a seven-stage plan for world domination by 2020 
after the creation of a global caliphate in the Levant in 2013. The book starts 
describing Al Adl‘s influence on Osama Bin Laden to accept al-Zarqawi despite 
his initial reluctance. Fishman’s main contribution in explaining IS’ evolution was 
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by introducing the concept of “Zarkawism”264as an ideological substrate 
explaining the group’s actions. According to Fishman, “Zarkawism” was built on 
a paradox since it seeks to establish an Islamic state but without the religious 
establishment.  This idea can be mitigated by the fact that this paradox is inherent 
in the roots of Islamism itself and is not exclusive to IS’ ideology. Noah Feldman 
argues265 that the fall of the concept of an Islamic state was the result of the 
marginalisation of the Ulama (religious scholars) by the post-colonial state in the 
Arab world. Before that period, they represented a counterweight to the dominant 
power of the executive branch. In response to that situation, the call for the return 
of an Islamic state in the Sunni world was ironically not made by scholars whose 
authority was put into jeopardy but by groups not linked to them and sometimes 
with western education. This protest was crystalized with the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, whose main criticisms were towards Al Azhari scholars. 
Identified as State’s functionaries or “Scholars of the Palace”, their role ceased 
for Islamists to appear necessary for the application and interpretation of Islamic 
law and more generally for the restoration of the Islamic society. 
 One of the most relevant ideas in Feldman’s research is the paradox he 
emphasises in the discourse of Islamist groups. Given that Islamic law is the 
product of the scholarly community, how is it possible to build an Islamic state 
without scholars? The answer for him is the same paradox as the one pointed 
out by Fishman: Sharia without the scholars266. “Zarqawism” would only be a 
younger, more populist, violent and absolute version of this paradox by stating 
that religious legitimacy was only possible by engaging in violence. Fishman 
develops an interesting idea that the same factor limiting a broad appeal is 
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contributing to its resilience: its ideology, and what he labels “Zarqawiism”267. 
“Zarqawism” is a revolutionary movement, a cult for doctrinal purity and an ethos 
that glorifies action over intellectualism. Also, on a strategic level, it discourages 
the Islamic State from having a peaceful status with its neighbour268. Fishman 
concludes that because of “Zarkawism”, IS is therefore condemned to an 
ideological inflexibility that will never give them the ability to inspire a broad 
coalition in the Islamic world that could give them the final victory in 2020 as 
forecasted by Al Adl. 
At the very inception of the modern jihadi movement in Afghanistan in the ’80s, 
this ideological and strategical rift was starting to divide the partisans of 
cooperation like Abu Musab Al Suri or confrontation against their Taliban hosts 
such as Abu Hassan Al Muhajir, the future religious mentor of Zarqawi. The 
Taliban movement comes from the Deobandi creed, which is closer to Sufism 
than Salafism, and consider certain tribal rules above Sharia in resolving their 
disputes, making them a candidate for Jihadi theorists to cooperation through 
pragmatism or reject by ex-communication. For that reason, IS does not consider 
widespread popular support as a strategic goal in societies with singular codes 
and social practices. Contrary to other Islamist groups, IS’ strategic spectrum 
does not include adapting or changing its ideology, even if strategy requires it like 
in the case of popular support. In the case of applying Sharia punishments 
(huddoud) to its population, Al Qaeda requires the education of the population by 
applying it gradually while IS’ application is maximalist since its complete 
application is one of the war’s objectives.   
However, when Al Jolani was dispatched to Syria, he presented to the ISI 
leadership an amended strategy to be applied in Syria because of the difference 
in context between the two theatres. Iraq was under foreign occupation while 
Syria was witnessing a popular revolution. Tribes and the Muslim Brotherhood 
were powerful in Iraq while weak in Syria, and finally, Shia was a majority in Iraq 
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while being a minority in Syria. As explained by Hassan Hassan269, Abu Abdullah 
Al Shami, one of the most prominent ideologues of Jabhat Al Nusra Sham, 
explained that, according to him, IS in Iraq agreed first with Jolani’s strategy. 
Baghdadi, while commenting on Jolani’s proposition, said: “that he was right and 
that transposing the situation of Iraq to Syria was a suicide”270. However, he does 
not elaborate precisely on the specific points of Jolani’s methodology implanted 
in Syria with Baghdadi's blessing, whether it was the concealment of JN’s 
affiliation to Al Qaeda and ISI, the cooperation with other rebel groups or the 
gradualist approach to Sharia. Before JN was a force holding territory, Jolani’s 
and Baghdadi’s strategies were the same but differed radically after group’s 
empowerment. Regardless of the validity of Al Shami’s testimony and the level of 
coordination between Jolani and Baghdadi, it confirms at least ISI leadership’s 
strategic flexibility when the organisation dispatched Al Jolani to Syria in 2011. 
More investigation is necessary for the future to explain the level of dependence 
and synchronisation in methodology and strategy between Jabhat al Nusra and 
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V- Islamic State’s Ideological 
Hybridisation Process, Organisational 
Mutation and Quest for Survival Before 
2011.     
This part was written to familiarise the reader with the group’s ideological 
roots, theological influences, personages, objectives and organisational history. 
As truthfully described in the literature, throughout its various manifestations and 
expansions in history, the Islamic State has evolved as a hybrid force and 
structured itself according to principles defined by its founding figures. The group 
has benefited from the expertise and skills of its military commanders coming 
from diverse backgrounds and diverse historical, theological and ideological 
influences. Because its ideology and theological doctrine profoundly influence its 
strategy, an overview of the group’s ideological roots is necessary. Indeed, it has 
an impact on its strategy because it identifies the enemy, the way it has to be 
confronted and offers the theological justification for the war and how it can be 
conducted. For that reason, before analysing the group’s military rebound and its 
strategy through LH’s approach, I present the origins of its ideological and 
theological doctrine that shapes its strategy.  
1-The Iraqi Salafi scene and Saddam’s Faith Campaign 
during the ’90s 
   In retrospect, before the arrival of Zarqawi in Iraq in 2003, the local Salafi 
scene presented elements for being a fertile breeding ground for IS’ ideology. In 
the 1980s, the Iraq-Iran war and the rise in oil prices made it easy for the Saudi 
state to promote their brand of Salafism in Iraq, while some analysts have also 
pointed to Saddam Hussein’s “Faith Campaign” in the 1990s to explain the 
appearance of Salafism amongst the ranks of the Iraqi military and intelligence. 
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However, this latter explanation should not be exaggerated. Zarqawi later 
recruited former Iraqi Baath military commanders for their skills and military 
experience, not much for their religious credentials, and they would not have any 
influence on the group’s ideological doctrine. In his book Saddam Hussein and 
Islam, Amatzia Baram271 explains in great detail the reasons underpinning 
Saddam Hussein’s 180-degree shift concerning Islam, from absolute secularism 
and nationalism to the promotion of Islam throughout society (construction of 
mosques, education, law, enforcement of Islamic punishments). It appears that 
the Faith Campaign, conducted under the supervision of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri 
(considered at that time as the number two of the regime), promoted religion by 
following a way closer to Sufism rather than Salafism. The version of Islam that 
developed was apolitical and ecumenical, tightly controlled by the Baath party, 
so very different from the ideological and theological views of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
or Al Maqdissi.  
Amatzia Baram identified the “U-turn point” from which the regime in Baghdad 
decided to change its relationship with Islam completely. This decision was highly 
influenced by many factors including the failure of pan Arabism, the war against 
Iran and the will of Saddam to attract support from the Sunni world and internally 
because of the increasing role of Islam as a social bond in society. The evolution 
took place during a 1986 secret meeting272 between members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood from Sudan with the participation of Michel Aflak. For the author, this 
cooperation was more conceived as a political manoeuvre to gain support against 
its two competing neighbouring states, Syria and Iran, rather than an alliance with 
political Islam. Nevertheless, it developed as a strategy to domestically control 
religious affairs. The regime was fully aware of the increasing role of Islam in 
society among Sunni and Shia. By following Hassan Turabi’s advice, Saddam 
considered that if the state “Islamized” itself, he would be fully justified to 
suppress all non-governmental Sunni and Shia religious opposition such as the 
Shia Daawa Party, the Salafi or the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Faith Campaign, 
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therefore, was more a decision to extend its grip on the religious affairs in the 
country and promote a new trans-sectarian Islam to give more legitimacy to 
Saddam Hussein’s regime rather than a conversion of the state from Baathism to 
Salafism. 
Indeed, the Baath Party did not change its ways to convert to Islam. The leaders 
and cadres of the party were going through “faith classes”, but this did not alter 
their secular worldview. The army was the state apparatus body less exposed to 
the Faith Campaign. The supposed army’s Islamization was limited to the use of 
Islamic symbols such as the renaming of divisions after Islamic heroes or 
historical battles. This makes us think that the widespread idea that Saddam’s 
officers turned to Salafism because of the Faith Campaign needs mitigation. 
Moreover, this idea that Baathists shaped IS’ ideological and political outlook is 
also considered as unfounded273 by specialists such as Brian Fishman.  Indeed, 
most of the Iraqi leaders of the political and religious apparatus of the Islamic 
State – such as the caliphs Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or 
Abu Ali al-Anbari (former Minister of Finances) – were already part of the Iraqi 
Salafi underground circles in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 As recently described by Whiteside274, the influence of Wahhabism in Iraq began 
to rise in the 1980s and led to the creation of an Iraqi Salafi community which had 
little to do with the official Faith Campaign. The Iraq-Iran war caused an entente 
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the latter actively promoted Salafi thought in 
the former, flooding Iraq with Salafi literature. For those reasons, before 2003 the 
Iraqi Salafi scene was already virulently anti-Shia by nature. Abu Ali al-Anbari’s 
two-part eulogy in the Islamic State media 275shows how he was already a Salafi 
cleric with sharp anti-Shia and anti-Baath views, operating in Tel Afar before the 
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US invasion. Al Anbari’s biography276written by his son and released in November 
2018 by IS’ dissidents informs us that he was already forming a local group before 
the invasion waiting the fall of Baathist regime to start his operations. After 9/11 
he adopted the understandings of Takfir of modern jihadist thinkers, such as Abu 
Baseer al-Tartusi, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdissi. 
Shortly before the US invasion with the intervention of an Ansar Al Islam‘s 
emissary he met Zarqawi in Baghdad. His local group joined Ansar Al Islam as 
an insurgent group operating in Northern Iraq. His first action with his Salafi group 
was to target as a priority the Shia mosques, known as Husayniyat, in the region 
of Tel Afar. In 2004 he left Ansar Al Islam to pledged allegiance to AQI and 
became Zarqawi’s deputy and later the head of Council of Consultation of the 
Mujahedeen (Majlis Shura Mujahideen). Hassan Hassan’s main thesis in his 
article277 on Anbari’s legacy is to defend the idea that Al Anbari ideologically 
influenced Zarqawi and played a key role in shaping IS’ ideology. Zarqawi 
himself, a Jordanian who did not have any experience confronting the Shias, 
became vigorously anti-Shia under the influence of Iraqi Salafists after observing 
Shia political party’s and Iran’s collaboration with the Americans during their 
invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq. Underground Salafi circles were thus 
already present in Iraq in the 1990s and waited for opportunities to grow. These 
circles would later form the bulk of IS’ key early members, and form the group’s 
religious and ideological leadership a decade later.  
2 –The central figure of Zarqawi in the creation of ISI from 
2003 to 2006.    
After having exposed the ideological and theological roots of the group, 
this section sheds light on the different evolutions the group witnessed from 2003 
until 2011 from a military and organisational perspective. From a nucleus of 
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fighters gathered around the figure of Zarqawi, a decade later it became a proto-
state, claiming to be the heir of the past caliphates in Islamic history. After the 
2003 invasion of Iraq by the US coalition, Zarqawi established the basis of its 
organisation, Tawheed Wal Jihad (TWJ).  He surrounded himself with a group of 
trusted lieutenants and veterans from Afghanistan. They formed the elite of the 
organisation: the Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Muhajir his successor, Sheikh  Abu 
Abdullah al-Muhajir his religious mentor, Abu Anas al-Shami named as the first 
official religious leader and the Lebanese national, Mustafa  Ramadan Darwish. 
Composed roughly of 70 members278, the group pledged to fight against the US 
occupation as well as against the new Iraqi institutions. The structure of the 
organisation was headed by Zarqawi and a Shura Council (consultation 
council)279. It was divided into five committees: military, media, security, finances 
and religious. 
The spectacular emergence of TWJ in Baghdad.  
Baghdad played a vital role in the Iraq war and the Sunni insurgency. In 
the collective mind of the jihadist movement, the city is considered as the former 
symbol of Islamic civilization’s apogee during the ruling of the Abbasside Empire. 
Early on, Zarqawi recognised Baghdad as critical to its overall success while 
Osama Bin Laden called it “the epicentre of jihad”280. In 2003, Zarqawi managed 
to move its network from the isolated northern mountain areas of Kurdistan to the 
core of the Iraqi state capital. TWJ spearheaded the insurgency in Iraq in terms 
of violence, media attention and skills. Its first attack against the Jordanian 
Embassy in Baghdad on 7th August 2003 was the first recorded car bomb in the 
history of the Iraqi Insurgency. During the same month, the group launched 
devastating attacks with suicide cars against the UN headquarters and the Shia 
political leader Bakr Hakim. By targeting Arab states, the international community 
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and the Shia community, these operations posed as the basis of Zarqawi’s 
strategy in Iraq.   
During the year of 2005, the US coalition retreated from the city, giving the power 
to the new Iraqi security forces. Consequently, the security situation quickly 
deteriorated with the infiltration of Shia militias among ISF.  In 2005, the group 
successfully found support in some areas in Baghdad such as Haifa Street and 
its belt and launched waves of attacks principally targeting the Shia community. 
TWJ’s cells were composed of “security cells” named Mafarez amniya281, formed 
by a maximum of five members specialized in assassinations and IED attacks 
targeting the US forces as well the Iraqi security apparatus and the Shia 
community.  Its presence in Baghdad’s belts was critical for the group from a 
logistical and operational point of view. This presence granted it the possibility to 
transport weapons and fighters, finance their activities, run kidnapping rings, and 
run vehicle-bomb-making factories, all of which were necessary for the network 
to operate in the capital. 
The Fallujah battles and the reinforcement in Anbar under the name of AQI 
Close to Baghdad, TWJ embedded its presence in the neighbouring 
province of Anbar, a large, mostly desert area in the western Iraqi desert and 
home to a 1.4 million Sunni population. For all the groups belonging to the Sunni 
insurgency, the province presented multiple elements considered as favourable 
for their resilience in a sociodemographic structure close to the Syrian border with 
existing Salafist networks in a region known for its deep resentment towards the 
US occupation. Situated 40km west of Baghdad, the city of Fallujah was the first 
place where Zarqawi established the group’s command. Rapidly, the group made 
some neighbourhood of the town its stronghold at the expense of the other 
groups. Capitalising on local resentment and anger towards coalition forces, the 
killing of a US contractor in June 2004 triggered the first US major operation after 
the 2003 invasion. The city felt entirely in the hands of the Sunni rebellion 
composed of a myriad of 30 groups of 5000 fighters with an extreme majority of 
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Iraqis. TWJ, which was at that time mostly filled with foreigners, was not the main 
component of the rebellion. During the talks between the rebels, Zarqawi’s 
posture, despite his religious zeal, was to avoid a frontal confrontation282 with the 
US Marines who were imposing a siege on the city. 
Before the beginning of the Second Battle of Falluja, in October 2004, Zarqawi 
pledged allegiance to al Qaeda and changed the name of his group to Al Qaeda 
in Mesopotamia or Iraq (AQI). With financial support from donors reaching 
680 000 euros per month283 and the possibility to enjoy the support of all Al 
Qaeda’s constituency (supporters, financiers, webmasters), Zarqawi’s group 
became more powerful and gained in prestige. In return, Al Qaeda took 
advantage of the international resonance offered by the confrontation in Fallujah. 
The US mobilised for the Second Battle of Fallujah, called “the Phantom Fury”, a 
force that surpassed by far the previous operation with more than 15 000 soldiers 
and the use of massive airpower to take the city. Two months of heavy urban 
fighting resulted in the killing of 2000 insurgents and civilians and 150 US 
Marines. However, the leaders of the rebellion, including Zarqawi, were able to 
escape the city, taking profit from the flow of refugees and the porosity of the 
American siege. 
Despite the destruction of Fallujah, the whole Anbar Province witnessed the rise 
of AQI’s activity in 2005 especially around and in the city of Ramadi. The level of 
dissatisfaction in the region regarding the government in Baghdad and the US 
coalition presence was at its highest at the beginning of 2005 with only 2% of 
participation of Anbari citizens in the first parliamentary election after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein. In 2005 alone, 158 Marines and soldiers were killed in Anbar, 
representing 58% of that year's combat deaths in Iraq. Anbar would be the most 
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lethal province during the war for the US coalition with more than 1337 soldiers 
killed.284   
Zarqawi organised TWJ as a covert commando force that represented only 5% 
of the Sunni rebellion in terms of manpower and became Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
in 2004. In this new structure and for the first time, a deputy of Zarqawi was 
appointed, he followed him and was aware of all his decisions285. Considered as 
his Vice Emir, he was tasked to take the lead in the case of the leader’s death. 
According to his son, Abu Ali Al Anbari held that position secretly within AQI 
before his imprisonment by US forces in 2005286. According to a study on the 
Sunni insurgency made by Malcolm W Nance287, AQI’s attacks in 2004-2005 
counted for only 2%-5% of the attacks of the insurgents. The estimated number 
of AQI members, including supporters, was about 2000 men including cell 
members, facilitators and supporters288. This small force had a hugely 
disproportionate impact because of the group’s ability to launch large-scale 
attacks using suicide car bombs. The first day of AQI’s operation was on June 
24, 2004, when it orchestrated multi-scale attacks across Iraq against police 
stations, US forces and the city of Baqubah. The Year of 2005 saw AQI’s version 
of the “Shock and Awe” campaign with the massive use of SVBIEDs as the 
primary weapon used by the group. 
After retreating from Fallujah, Zarqawi established himself in western Anbar and 
declared the border city of Al Qaim as his capital. AQI was also operating in Hit 
and the Haditha Triangle.  Regionally, the group was able to attract and recruit 
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thousands of volunteers through the Syrian border. The Battle of Al Qaim (code-
named Operation Matador) 289 in May 2005, lasted eleven days. US troops killed 
more than 125 suspected insurgents and captured 39. However, the Marines did 
not have sufficient numbers to set up a permanent garrison there. Consequently, 
as soon as they left, insurgents were back in town and re-established control over 
it. Regionally, the group tried to destabilise the Jordanian monarchy by 
conducting coordinated suicide bombings in Amman in October 2005.  
Following the necessary Iraqiisation of the organisation in the eyes of the Iraqi 
public, AQI decided in December 2005 to form with seven smaller insurgent 
groups290 an umbrella organisation called the Council of Consultation of the 
Mujahedeen (Majlis Shura Mujahideen, MSM). Zarqawi was appointed chief of 
the government, and the position of the head of the committee was held by an 
Iraqi named Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi who was one of the many nicknames 
used by Abu Ali Al Anbari. Nevertheless, Zarqawi’s leadership remained intact, 
and he stayed the real chief of the organisation by concentrating military and 
political power. At that point, the organisation was well established in the Iraqi 
Sunni heartland in its strongholds in Baghdad and Anbar. It gained prestige and 
became better structured and powerful with roughly 10 000 fighters291 .  
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The beginning of 2006 witnessed the rise of Zarqawi’s group’s influence in 
Ramadi, the capital of Anbar governorate, inhabited by roughly 400 000 
inhabitants. In 2006, the insurgents destroyed every police station in the city on 
the same day. The local police were entirely neglected by the Anbaris, who were 
deterred from joining it. MSM’s fighters were sufficiently confident to conduct 
armed parades in some streets of the city in February 2006292. Marine Col. Pete 
Devlin was the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Marine units operating in the 
province of Anbar.  In August 2006, he published a report on the situation which 
was leaked to the Washington Post in mid-September 2006. He considered that 
MSM had evolved to be an “integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq” 293  
and had become so powerful that U.S. forces no longer had the option “for a 
decapitating strike that would cripple the organisation” 294. Boosted by its control 
of large parts of territories in al Qaim, Ramadi, and Baqubah, Zarqawi was about 
to declare an Islamic emirate three months before his death in June 2006. 
 
Zarqawi and Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir’s theological influence 
       Zarqawi’s strategy in Iraq followed Maqdissi's idea that the consolidation 
of power (tamkeen), achieved by fighting the “near enemy” (as opposed to Al-
Qaeda’s resolve to hit the “far enemy”), should be the prime objective. As noted 
earlier, Zarqawi’s former prison companion believed that today's rulers in the 
Muslim world are apostates whose unbelief should be considered worse than that 
of the Jews and Christians, and must therefore be fought in priority295. Zarqawi 
always defended this idea against its Al-Qaeda interlocutors, insisting on the 
strategic necessity to not only fight the US presence in Iraq but also, and more 
importantly, to wage an all-out war against the “Crusaders”’ partners from the 
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Shia majority or rival Sunni groups. However, despite this agreement on fighting 
the “near enemy”, many differences between Zarqawi and Maqdissi persisted on 
ideological and methodological issues, which would eventually lead to a schism 
between the two old acquaintances. Abu Haniyeh and Abu Ruhman 296maintain 
that after the first battle of Fallujah Zarqawi became heavily influenced at the 
religious jurisprudential level by another scholar, Sheikh Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir. 
He was an Egyptian veteran of the Afghan jihad with an exhaustive theological 
and literary heritage. Most of Zarqawi’s methodology, which would later become 
trademarks of the Islamic State’s methods, have indeed been theorised and 
religiously justified by al-Muhajir. Al-Muhajir’s book “Issues in the Jurisprudence 
of Jihad” (Masa’il fi Fiqh al-Jihad) truly provided the jurisprudential basis and 
“guidebook” for Islamic State’s actions. As a religious source, his frames of 
reference are found in the Qur’an, the Sunnah and the jurisprudential corpus of 
the Hanbali School, complemented by references to the religious teachings of Ibn 
Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayim Al Jawziya, and al-Wahhab. The book is divided into 12 
chapters, each one treating an issue related to jihad and bearing the marks of the 
influence of these thinkers, but also making the extra step towards even more 
radical interpretations. 
In the first one, al-Muhajir considers that entirely all the contemporary political 
systems fall into the state of “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda), and must, 
therefore, be fought as they form together Dar Al-Harb. He also stresses the 
permissibility of using against this enemy all kind of weapons including non-
conventional ones. Moreover, the blood of all the non-believers is considered as 
legal and permissible to spill unless they pay the jizya (the tax that would give 
them protection by the Muslims). When attacking them, the presence of Muslims 
(whom it is unlawful to kill) among them is not sufficient to prevent those attacks. 
While considered nawazil (calamities or momentous events), suicide operations 
are nonetheless allowed from a religious point of view297. Another discussion is 
dedicated to justifying beheading infidels, which Zarqawi will be the first to 
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broadcast on the Internet in 2004 with the beheading of Nicholas Berg. Al-
Maqdissi was very reluctant and called to use them only as an exceptional mean. 
The dispute and ideological rift between Zarqawi and al-Maqdissi culminated 
in 2005 when Maqdissi published a letter to Zarqawi entitled “Al-Zarqawi: 
Advocacy and Advice, Hopes and Pains” (al-Zarqawi: Munasara wa Munasaha, 
Aamaal wa Aalaam), in which he expresses his reserves regarding the general 
takfir on the Shia, the extensive use of “martyrdom” operations, and Zarqawi’s 
very permissive rules of engagement. In 2006, Maqdissi’s criticisms expanded to 
all the doctrinal justifications based on the concept of “barricading” (tatarrus), 
which was defended by Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir and used to legitimise and 
exonerate civilian deaths as collateral damage if they happen to be present at a 
legitimate target. In sum, coupled with al-Muhajir’s influence, the process of 
“Iraqiisation” of the Islamic State experienced after Zarqawi’s death in 2006 
remove any further influence of al-Maqdissi on the group.  
3-The management of savagery and Zarkawism as a 
strategy   
Regarding the ideological influences on the group, most of the literature 
on IS share the idea that the original book shaping its methodology and actions 
was “The Management of Savagery” written by Abu Bakr Naji298. Several 
sources299 consider that the identity of Abu Bakr AL Naji would be an Egyptian Al 
Qaeda veteran from Afghanistan, Muhamad Khalil Al Haykamah who knew al-
Zarqawi. The extent to which his book was influential to explain IS’ methodology 
is discussed. IS’ media in an issue of its official Magazine stated, “It is 
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exaggerated to say that the book defined the methodology of the mujahidin”300.  
However, the same source from the organisation recognises that when al-
Zarqawi read Abu Bakr Naji 100 pages, he commented: “it is as if the author 
knows what I am planning”301. Even though Al Naji’s book accurately describes 
the overall strategy of IS in Iraq, IS literature considers that AL Naji fell in some 
mistakes regarding the subject of cooperation with other groups who resist 
applying the Sharia fully. Abu Bakr Naji’s work consists of a strategical guidance 
destined for jihadi movements who are planning to destroy governments and 
build a new society. It outlines three stages for this struggle: disruption and 
exhaustion, management of savagery and empowerment.  “Savagery” is the state 
of nature in an anarchical system where different factions struggle to take power. 
In this Hobbesian context where the “law of the jungle prevails”, the mujahedeen 
should apply his recommendations to manage this situation.  It requires the 
management of the people’s need, providing security and defending borders, 
deterring the enemies, building a local intelligence network, co-opting local 
leaders and establishing coalitions. The most sensitive stage is considered to be 
the transitional phase between the second phase of building “Shawkat al-Nikaya” 
(the strength to vex and harm), and the final one of “Shawkat al-Tamkeen” (the 
strength to consolidate power and influence). The last important idea behind 
Naji’s vision is the use of violence, not as a tool limited to the war machine but as 
a means to a higher end. For Al Naji, the purpose of force is part of a broader 
movement of attraction and polarisation of society302 . 
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According to Hassan Abu Haniyeh303, IS’ Iraqi branch was influenced on a 
practical level by Abu Bakr Naji’s theories especially regarding the governance of 
its controlled territory. Brian Fishman and Craig Whiteside304complete this idea 
by stating that Al Naji’s strategic guidelines did not influence Zarqawi but rather 
codified and contextualised his practices and strategy. Zarqawi was portrayed as 
a rude personage lacking intellectual qualities in comparison to his mentor Al 
Maqdissi. In prison together, Maqdissi was the brain while Zarqawi was the 
muscles. However, contrary to this caricature portrait, Zarqawi developed a 
strategy and a vision that shaped part of the regional political landscape. 
To fulfil his long-term goal of creating a caliphate, he envisioned from the start 
the creation, as soon as possible, of a conventional army in Iraq. Different from 
Al Naji’s recommendations to start small and simple, he quickly aimed to instigate 
large signature attacks (Jordanian Embassy, UN headquarters, Bakr Al Hakim’s 
assassination) to shake the basis of the Iraqi society and reshape it later.  Zarqawi 
was aware of the potentiality of media coverage and what it could bring to his 
nascent group in terms of prestige against rival groups and capacity to attract 
recruits.  
From a strategic perspective, “Zarkawism” is paradoxical in its manifestations. It 
is considered as a militarist ideology with a cult of violence considered as the 
pinnacle of faith. War is not only a means but also an end, because it is conceived 
as a form of worship at the individual level. In a sense, Clausewitz’s vision of war 
as a “slaughter”, where one should always strike the enemy where he was 
strongest and that “blood is the price of victory” echoed Zarqawi’s cult of sacrifice 
and offence. Added to this vision, his Manichean vision considered that all the 
states on Earth were “Tawagheet” that must be fought. However, as a strategist, 
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Zarqawi had an early awareness of the imbalance of power facing the US and 
the impossibility of confronting it. 
In a sense, the targeting of the Shia community and its civilians was an indirect 
way to disrupt US’ project in Iraq by creating enough chaos to impede the success 
of Iraqi state building. A document found by US troops in 2006 suggested that 
Zarqawi was also thinking of igniting conflict between the US and Iran by finding 
ways to “entangle the American forces into another war against another country" 
and ”exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America, and the West in 
general, of the real danger coming from Iran".305 
The other idea shared in Zarqawi’s and Al Naji’s vision of violence is its potential 
as a catalyst that encourages mobilisation. Zarqawi believed that armed 
mobilisation and the targeting of the Shia community for its collaboration with the 
US would mobilise disaffected Sunnis and raise among them a “Sunni 
Consciousness”. Unlike other insurgent groups, Zarqawi did not limit its actions 
to guerrilla warfare against the US but opted to ignite sectarian tensions and 
grasp the fruit from the polarisation effect described by Al Naji. His strategy was 
also “unrestricted”  in terms of range of target and resources allocated. 
Guerrilla theorists such as Guevara and Regis Debray argued that insurgents 
should skip the political mobilisation process of guerrilla warfare and immediately 
use violence. “Focoism” refers to the idea that the use of violence itself can 
mobilise the targeted population. The traditional guerrilla strategy considers that 
before starting a military campaign, careful recruitment and education of 
population awareness is necessary before taking arms. Focoism reverses this 
assumption; the military conflict itself can help mobilise the local population. 
Violence becomes the catalyst since its consequences would motivate recruits 
for a guerrilla strategy. However, the difference and peculiarity of Zarqawi’s 
focoism is the combination with a punishment strategy and the goal of purging 
the society from apostates.  
                                            




Zarqawi ultimately forced Al Qaeda’s central command not only to recognise him 
but also to submit to his strategy of focusing on Iraq’s Shias. His violence against 
them was, according to him, a way to show their real intention, which they 
dissimulated as part of their dissimulation techniques, called “Taqiya”.306 His first 
argument against them was political by developing a Shia-centred explanation of 
Islamic defeats in history: Shia treason was the reason for the fall of Baghdad to 
the Mongols or the failure of the Vienna Siege by the Ottomans that would have 
spread Islam to Western Europe in the 15th century. He also warned Al Qaeda 
central of the danger of Shia imperialism in the Middle East that could take over 
the region. His anti-Iranian statements, accusing them of allying themselves with 
the US and being the worst enemies of the Sunni, would act as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy for the group’s supporters who interpreted Iran’s Nuclear Deal of 2013 
or the coalition air support to Shia militias in 2015 as a confirmation of Zarqawi’s 
predictions. Iranian expansionism has given the group a long-term raison d’etre 
that the US departure from Iraq would have put an end to. Moreover, the focus 
on Iran’s role and the so-called “Safavid conspiracy” became mainstream a 
decade later and was adopted by a broad fringe of disaffected Sunnis, not only 
from Iraq but from the whole region. 
The generation of a polarisation effect with mass violence attempted by Zarqawi 
in Jordan failed utterly in contrast to the one in Iraq. For him, the triple suicide 
bombings that hit Amman in November 2005 represented a personal 
achievement of having targeted his most hated enemy, the Jordanian monarchy. 
However, the operation which targeted civilians in the hotels of Amman did not 
achieve any “polarisation” effect but rather a rejection effect from the same people 
he wanted to attract through this attack, the Jordanian people. A few days after, 
Al Qaeda’s number three, Atiyah Abu Abdurrahman, wrote to Zarqawi explaining 
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to him that “Policy must be dominant over militarism”307 and ordering him to stop 
launching operations outside Iraq without Al Qaeda’s permission.  This operation, 
even though it was a tactical victory, resulted in a strategic and political defeat for 
him, which Zarqawi lamented afterwards.308 
Other than igniting a sectarian war in Iraq or trying to destabilise the region, 
Zarqawi’s use of violence in Iraq had several other strategic objectives. First, the 
guerrilla movement aimed to kill as many US soldiers as possible to create the 
necessary political pressure to shift US policy and force a US withdrawal from the 
country. Attacks were carried out to send political messages and show the Iraqi 
Government’s inability to maintain order or undermine their legitimacy during 
election days. Other attacks were carried out and mediatised as an act of revenge 
for tragic events such as the rape and murder of an Iraqi girl by US soldiers, 
torture cases in Abu Ghraib or the stoning of a Yazidi girl converted to Islam. As 
described by Malcolm W Nance, Zarqawi was aware of the use of female Marines 
to search female residents in Fallujah. He decided to strike them with SVBIEDs 
to take the credit of the propaganda effect of such operations in the eyes of the 
local population309. Zarqawi framed his operations to the Sunni community as 
retaliation in their name. Targets were selected carefully to create the polarisation 
effect and deliver a political message: Shia religious leaders, Shia mosques, 
female US Marines, and the Yezidi Community. Government’s collaborators were 
targeted to deter the population from participating in elections. This resulted in a 
de facto Sunni boycott of the 2005 elections that further alienated the Sunnis 
politically. This strategy grew to include tribal figures that failed to cooperate, 
which in turn sparked a growing tribal counter-movement that was angry at the 
violation of tribal customs. All these attacks were also designed to produce a 
disproportionate and violent reaction from Iraqi authorities, the US army and Shia 
militias.  
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4- The Islamic State of Iraq from the proclamation in 2006 
to near strategic defeat in 2010   
The declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and the final maturation of IS’ 
ideology 
At the moment of Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, according to his successor 
Abu Hamza Muhajir, the group was said to have lost 4000 foreign fighters after 
three years of combat.310Nevertheless, it maintained its activities and as 
predicted by the Devlin report, was able to remain resilient after the loss of its 
charismatic leader. However, its presence in Baqubah, in Diyala province and not 
in Anbar, was nonetheless proof that the group began to see the region as not 
sufficiently secure. Three months after Zarqawi’s death,  his followers  fulfilled his 
expectations of creating an Islamic  state, and on October 12th 2006 announced  
the formation of “Hilf  al-Mutayibeen”  (The  Pact  of  the Perfumed  Ones),  a  
coalition  of  movements,  organizations, and groups that fall under the framework 
of the “Mujahideen  Shura  Council,”  in  addition  to  a  number  of  Sunni  tribal 
leaders. Three days later, Muharib al-Jabouri, Spokesman of the Islamic State of 
Iraq, and Minister of Media announced its establishment on October 15th, 2006, 
which covered, in theory, the following provinces: Anbar, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala, 
Salahuddin,   Babil, and Wasit. This announcement by ISI leaders came as a 
separatist solution proposed to Sunnis dissatisfied by the new share of power in 
the Iraqi state. Indeed, just a few days before, an Iraqi law adopted at parliament 
in favour of federalism disappointed most the Sunnis of Iraq. 
 Abu Omar al-Baghdadi became ISI’s chief and the Emir of the Believers. He was 
vouched for to Osama bin Laden by -Zarqawi, and later by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, 
who became the successor of Zarqawi in AQI and the only non-Iraqi minister of 
ISI’s government with the position of War Minister.  For the first time, the rank of 
political leader and supreme military commander was divided, and this new 
structure of power would prevail in the group. At that time, the group announced 
                                            




the creation of its media wing, Al Furqan.  It successfully mirrored its structuration 
with the attributes of a state structure. For that purpose, it formed ministries and 
appointed “Walis” (provincial governors) in the regions under its control. This 
declaration was risky; after its setbacks in 2008, to stress the contrast between 
its aspirations and the reality on the ground, its detractors mocked the Islamic 
State as “Dawla al Cartoniya”, the “Paper State”. After the proclamation of the 
establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006, the group gained in 
autonomy from the Al Qaeda central leadership from an organisational, structural 
and ideological point of view. It is known today that Al Qaeda’s leadership was 
caught by surprise by the dissolution of its branch of Iraq in the newly created 
Islamic State. Despite this misunderstanding, Bin Laden and Zawahiri publicly 
endorsed the establishment of “this legitimate emirate”311. Confronted with 
criticism coming from other Iraqi Sunni groups regarding its methodology, in 2007 
the group issued an explicit declaration presenting its doctrine through a speech 
of its leader Abu Umar al-Baghdadi.  He proclaimed his adherence to Sunni Salafi 
theological methodology and appealed to all Sunnis, and the young men of jihadi-
salafism in particular, across the entire world. He later enumerated several points 
forming the basis of the group’s doctrinal reference.  
First, he proclaimed the necessity to remove and destroy all signs of “idolatry” 
and innovation. He declared as apostate the Shias, the magicians and the tomb 
worshippers (in other words the Sufis) and all the people who insulted the Prophet 
of Islam and his companions. At the same time, however, he distanced himself 
from the accusation of Kharijism by stressing the fact that the group did not 
excommunicate from Islam Muslims who commit sins such as stealing, adultery 
and consuming alcohol. From that day, the group has always tried to position its 
discourse in the middle ground between the excesses of Khawarij extremism and 
the laxism of Irja people who separate faith from actions. 
Second, from a political point of view, the Sharia is claimed to be the only law 
used in resolving disputes and prevailing above all man-made or tribal laws. 
Other ideologies such as nationalism, patriotism, communism and Baathism are 
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presented as apostasy from Islam. Jihadi groups in Iraq are not considered as 
disbelievers; instead, they are considered to be in a state of disobedience 
because they do not work for unity. Borders inherited from the post-colonial 
period are regarded as illegitimate. The only accepted methodology to change 
the status quo is through jihad, understood as a military manoeuvre and as a 
compulsory duty for all Muslims. Following Azzam’s guidelines on jihad, Muslim 
lands have to be defended from foreign aggression while the territories which 
were once governed by Sharia should be reconquered. The organisation also 
vowed to fight the US occupation and the Iranian presence in Iraq. 
Regarding the group’s legitimate targets, all countries ruled by human-made laws 
(and where Islam rules come second) are considered as Dar al-Kufr and have to 
be fought. Their leaders, their security apparatus and their functionaries, are 
legitimate targets. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all the population is 
considered as disbelievers. However, in all the Islamic countries, Christians and 
Jews are all considered in a state of war because they do not pay the Jizya. 
These ideological foundations presented by the leader of ISI in 2007 did not 
change in the year following this announcement and have remained the same 
ever since that time.  
 
 
The erosion of the group’s power from 2007 to 2010 in Sunni provinces 
Anbar  
The group’s popular support began to erode in Anbar despite its new 
strategy of Iraqiisation, which proposed to the Sunnis of Iraq an alternative 
secessionist model. In September of 2006, a coalition of 17 tribal sheikhs led by 
Sattar Abu Risha, announced the formation in Ramadi of the Anbar Awakening 
Council (Sahawat Movement)312. The irruption of this new actor increased the 
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level of violence in Ramadi from July 2006 to April 2007. It was the peak of ISI’s 
capability in the city and the region with an average of 70 attacks per day313. 
Against five US battalions and the Iraqi Army, ISI in Ramadi was still able to 
conduct raids and control some neighbourhoods. 
The academic debate regarding the cause of ISI’s destruction in Anbar shows 
that compared to the Sahawat, the impact of the US surge was minimal in Anbar 
since fresh troops were mostly deployed in Baghdad and its belt314. ISI launched 
a campaign of systematic elimination of Sahawat leaders, with the killing after 11 
failed attempts of its founding leader Sattar Abu Risha in September of 2007315. 
However, this campaign did not prevent tribal groups from joining the Sahawat 
and closely working with the US coalition and the Iraqi Government. What 
changed the course of the battle was the enrolment into the local police of 
thousands of tribesmen and defectors from other Sunni rebellion groups. To 
explain how this turned the balance of power in Al Anbar province so swiftly, 30 
000 new police recruits from the grassroots tribes of Anbar began to support the 
US troops. Tribal leaders were offered millions of dollars from CERP projects 
(commander’s emergency response program) 316 in exchange for the adherence 
of their tribesmen to the police and their valuable local intelligence resources 
regarding ISI members. In Ramadi alone, the US coalition spent 10 million dollars 
from August 2006 to March 2007.Consequently, the local police were much more 
efficient than the Iraqi Army against ISI members. The group never tried to find a 
compromise or a settled solution with the tribes. On the contrary, it confronted 
them with all its firepower and prioritised their targeting over other enemies. The 
Sahawat movement began to grow in number and attracted another 40 Sunni 
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tribes from Al Anbar whose leaders were paid and armed by the US. Not all the 
tribesmen were part of the movement, but Abu Risha succeeded in joining all the 
major tribes of Anbar 317. An emir of the group in Anbar wrote318 in mid-2007 that 
the group was facing an extraordinary crisis in Anbar; civilians were reluctant to 
help ISI fighters fearing the Sahawat and the group began to be overwhelmed by 
the number of enemies.  While ISI troops’ morale was falling, the group began to 
use indiscriminate violence, targeting civilians from the tribes involved in the 
Sahawat. This peak of brutality hastened the backfire from the rest of the civilian 
population. ISI’s fighters and leaders retreated from Ramadi on 29th March 2007, 
its last urban stronghold in Anbar. The overall violence in the governorate 
decreased dramatically throughout the year of 2007 from 1500 deaths in October 
2006 to less than 200 a year after.319  
ISI also experienced a vital blow regarding its recruitment network in the region 
of Al Qaim with the capture in October of 2008 of Abu Ghadiya.320 He was its 
chief coordinator between Syria and Iraq. Al Qaim was the main crossing point 
into Iraq for fighters, money, and equipment in support of the group’s structure. 
Abu Ghadiya was present in the town of Zabadani in Syria and had a bureau in 
Deir Ezzor and Al A’aquidat to transport with the help of contraband tribal network 
fighters to Iraq. Among his team was another Syrian from Idlib, Abu Mohamed al 
Adnani, who would be the group’s official spokesperson in 2010 and who had a 
crucial role in the organisation. The attack on Al Bukamal by US Marines on the 
Syrian side of the border and Abu Ghadiya’s arrest disrupted the flow of fighters 
coming from the crossing point. The operation was the last major one conducted 
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by the US army in Anbar Province. The years of 2008 and 2009 witnessed not 
one operation of the US Marines in Anbar. The group was defeated in the 
province and retreated from cities. However, it maintained its profile by 
orchestrating a series of attacks during that period. In April 2008, following a call 
of Abu Hamza Al Muhajir321 to carry out attacks in the whole country, more than 
eight attacks were orchestrated in Ramadi, Al Qaim and Fallujah using car bombs 
and suicide belts targeting the local police and US Marines, resulting in the killing 
of nearly 60 people. Despite these attempts to cause chaos, the 2009 elections 
were a success in Anbar, unlike in 2005, with massive participation. 
 On October 6th 2009, the last two Marine regiments stationed in the province 
ended their presence in the cities of the governorate as part of the US withdrawal 
plan from the region. On August 31th 2010, the US declared the end of combat 
operations and transferred its last base in Anbar, the Ayn Al Asad base, to the 
Iraqi Government. To express their joy, hundreds of Fallujah residents322 
celebrated the pull-out by burning American flags in the city. During this period of 
restructuration of US forces in Al Anbar, ISI’s campaign of bombing rebounded in 
strength by November 2009.  Throughout the last months of the year, additional 
attacks, mainly assassinations, were carried out in Ramadi targeting 
reconciliation meetings or local figures.323  
 
Diyala 
Zarqawi’s first media appearance was geo-localized in the village of 
Hibhib324 located northwest of Baqubah along the Baghdad-Kirkuk road, which 
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showed that during the first months of 2006 the region was considered by him to 
be safe. In that same area, his safe house was blown up by two American F-16 
fighter jets on 8th June of 2006. However, even after his death, AQI continued to 
use Diyala as a staging ground and potential capital.  As described in the previous 
section, Anbar witnessed a steady decline in violence throughout the year of 
2007. This coincided with a rise of violence in the province of Diyala, where ISI 
attacked coalition forces, ISF and other groups. There was a pre-existing trend 
of Sunni militant actions before 2006, however, throughout that year, the number 
of violent incidents per month was multiplied by five from 100 per month to nearly 
500325.  On the ground, the ISI significantly increased the targeting of the Shia 
minority to provoke sectarian tensions. Progressively, they were controlling 
Baqubah with the help of Shia militias such as the Wolf and Badr Brigades and 
the Mahdi Army326. At the same time, the government was dysfunctional in Diyala 
and failed in providing even the most basic services to the local population. The 
Iraqi police withdrew from Buhriz, the area just south of Baqubah, in November 
2006. Amidst the state of chaos, ISI proclaimed the city of Baqubah and much of 
Diyala Province as part of its new proclaimed state. In reaction to this situation, 
the US launched an anti-insurgency campaign in the province. From June to 
November 2007, three successive, large-scale military operations were carried 
out: Operation “Thunder Phantom” in June followed by Operation “Phantom 
Strike” in August and “Raider Reaper” in November327. The three operations 
concentrated nearly 10,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops in Diyala Province to take the 
city of Baqubah and clear the surrounding areas from ISI’s presence. It began on 
June 19, 2007, when 300 to 500 insurgents were occupying the western 
neighbourhoods of Baqubah328. The first operation resulted in the killing or 
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capture of roughly 150 insurgents.  However, almost 80 per cent of ISI fighters in 
Baqubah escaped from the city before the beginning of combat operations.329  ISI 
fighters dispersed into their safe havens outside the city such as Khalis, 
Muqdadiyah or Khan Bani Sa’ad.  
At the same time, a process of reconciliation between Sunni and Shia tribes 
brokered by the US started in July 2007. This initiative paved the way for the 
formation of a local version of the Sahawat movement. On August 19th, more than 
100 tribal leaders from the Diyala River Valley met and decided to cooperate 
against ISI. This cooperation took shape in Muqdadiyah, where 675 residents 
participated in the “concerned local citizens group” and assisted US forces in 
identifying weapon caches in the city.330  By the summer of 2008, ISI was unable 
to launch complex urban attacks and could only hold public rallies in rural villages. 
In Baqubah, 2032 citizens joined the concerned local citizen groups called “the 
Baqubah Guardians”. Some of the former insurgent groups, such as the 1920s 
Revolution Brigades, also participated in those local groups331. In total, the Diyala 
security operations between 2007 and 2009 saw the participation of a myriad of 
forces against the ISI with the 10-battalion of the Iraqi Army garrison of Diyala, 
reinforcements from the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Police and three US 
brigades supported by local tribal groups. The continued presence of US troops 
collaborating with the Iraqis and “concerned local citizens” prevented the 
organisation from re-establishing itself in urban areas.  
ISI attempted to reconstitute multiple times in the province, and on occasions 
succeeded in conducting complex attacks such as the one against tribal 
reconciliation meetings in June 2007. Nevertheless, its fragmentation into small 
groups scattered in the region meant that its attacks were less complex, taking 
place at longer intervals, with decreasing success. However, despite those 
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setbacks, the group was able to be resilient.  Olive Group’s database of more 
than 100,000 geo-located incidents in Iraq suggests that reported incidents 
decreased from 539 in January 2007 to 252 in July 2008 in Diyala Province332.  
These incidents very likely took place in the remaining areas where ISI had 
sufficient operational space. This was the case on the farmland of Balad Ruz 
district and Hamrin Mountain. Those areas situated in the north represented an 
important line of retreat and reinforcement, linking Diyala to other vital areas such 
as Hamrin Lake, Tuz Khurmatu, Hawijah and Baiji.  
Baghdad  
In the aftermath of the February 2006 explosion at the Samarra mosque, 
one of the holiest places of Shiism in Iraq, the unrest in Iraq mutated into a 
sectarian civil war. Although the group did not claim responsibility for the 
operation, the Iraqi authorities imputed it to AQI. Within hours of the bombing, 
Shia militias attacked 30 Sunni mosques in retaliation and death squads in 
Baghdad killed more than 600 Sunnis during the following months333. In January 
2007, ISI presented with a plan334 to defend the capital and unite the Sunni armed 
groups. It proposed a joint Sunni insurgent and civilian militias structure to protect 
the Sunni neighbourhood. Locals were to defend their areas while Sunni 
insurgent groups waged offensive actions. However, new frictions with other 
armed groups and particularly the Islamic Army in Iraq appeared and caused 
infighting between them. The US and the Iraqi Army began to launch massive 
operations to uproot the insurgency from the capital. The first operation of 
stabilisation began in May 2006 with the arrival of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki. 
Despite the deployment of two US brigades, followed by two others in August 
supported by 50 000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers, the situation remained dire. 
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Coordination between ISF and US forces was weak, and the local police were 
considered unreliable. On 4th November 2006, simultaneous attacks imputed to 
ISI killed 202 people and injured 200 others in the neighbourhood of Sadr city. 
More than 100 US soldiers and 200 Iraqi forces were killed during this first 
operation335. Between December 2006 and February 2007, the US command 
decided on a new approach with the so-called “surge” by adding 20 000 more US 
soldiers as part of the new plan of securing the city. At the same time, a cease-
fire between the Iraqi Government and the Mahdi Army was reached. The 
coalition would concentrate its efforts in the capital only against ISI. 
The second operation, named Fardh al-Qanoon, or the “Baghdad Security Plan”, 
started on 13th of February 2007 and was dominated by the Iraqi Army with 18 
brigades of 50 000 men while the US gathered ten brigades for 35 000 troops.  
Nonetheless, with roughly one member of the security forces per 50 citizens, the 
number of troops deployed remained insufficient. This problem was resolved with 
the critical support of Sahawat groups from the Sunni tribes in the city. The 
support of local groups, which were part of the Iraqi insurgency, was essential to 
take control of a neighbourhood cleared by US operations and Iraqi forces.  The 
combination of these forces enabled a unified US-Iraqi centre commandment to 
be put in place in each of the nine security districts and a network of 75 Joint 
Security Stations or Combat Outposts. Baghdad was cut from the rest of the 
country; three brigades established themselves in the south to avoid any 
communications between the belts. An intelligence breakout is said to have 
helped the US and Iraqi forces in their operations.  They discovered a plan of the 
city drawn by Zarqawi himself336. This offered them an insight into the group's 
methods for moving explosives, fighters and money into Baghdad. The result of 
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the operation was the elimination or arrest of 8000 insurgents mostly belonging 
to the ISI and the destruction of weapons caches. In August, “Phantom Thunder” 
was followed by “Phantom Strike”, which targeted the group from the northern 
Baghdad belt to Diyala Province. To counter this offensive, ISI multiplied attacks 
against the Shia, the government and the coalition. On 12th February, the market 
of Chorja, crowded with Shia citizens, was attacked and in April 2007, 190 people 
were killed in the neighbourhood of Sadriyah.  
The month of June 2009 saw the withdrawal of the US forces from the cities. This 
new situation meant for ISI a fall of the pressure in Baghdad. Three waves of 
attacks in April, August and November 2009 against sensitive and symbolic 
targets showed the renewed capacities of the group to mount multiple 
simultaneous attacks in the capital. On April 6th, simultaneous car bomb attacks 
hit the sector of Sadr city killing 32337. In August, on the anniversary day of the 
attack on the UN compound in 2003, the Ministry of Finance of Foreign Affairs, 
the Green Zone and the Iraqi Army were hit by a powerful truck and car bombs, 
leaving 100 dead and 500 injured. A few months later in October, in the same 
area, the Minister of Justice was attacked by another truck bomb, leaving 150 
dead and 800 injured. This month was the deadliest month in the capital since 
2007.  
Salahudeen 
Under growing pressure from US forces, ISF, the Sahawat and Shia 
militias in Anbar, Baghdad and Diyala, ISI retreated to Salahudeen in 2008.  The 
Salahudeen Governorate, situated north of Baghdad, has 1.5 million inhabitants, 
most of them Sunnis. The governorate has two important cities:  its capital Tikrit, 
the birthplace of Saddam Hussein, and Samarra, home of the Al-Askari Shrine, 
the third-holiest religious site in Shia Islam. With several pockets of Shia-
controlled cities (such as in Balad and Ad Dujayl) and the presence of shrines, it 
had some of the same potentials for sectarian conflict as Diyala.  The governorate 
of Salahudeen had all the attributes of a hub for logistical routes and a potential 
                                            




haven. The majority of the Sunni population were against the US coalition and 
had many resentments towards the Shia-controlled government. As in Diyala, the 
provincial government was weak, dysfunctional and considered as illegitimate by 
the population. This, added to the limited presence of US and Iraqi forces, 
resulted in ISI making significant attacks in the region in mid-2007, making the 
governorate the second most violent place in Iraq behind Anbar338. 
In February 2006, Majliss Shura Mujahedeen was believed to have conducted 
one of its most successful attacks of the entire conflict, targeting the symbolic Al-
Askari mosque.  On 22nd February 2006, explosions occurred at the Shrine 
destroying its golden dome. Earlier, several men wearing a military uniform had 
entered the mosque, tied up the guards there and set explosives, resulting in the 
blast. Curiously, despite the prestige in attacking such a holy place for the Shia 
community the group never claimed responsibility for the attack339. This could 
have been part of its strategy of deception in order to create disorder and chaos 
among the Iraqi community. Some Sunnis accused Maliki of having committed a 
False Flag attack to target them; others considered the Americans to be behind 
it to disunite the Iraqi resistance while Shia militants imputed it to the whole Sunni 
community in order to advance their sectarian agenda. After conducting a series 
of kidnappings and murders targeting Shia workers from the majority-Shia town 
of Balad in October 2006, riots and sectarian violence spread in the province.340  
In 2007, coalition forces attempted to build on the successes of the Sahawat in 
Anbar by engaging more directly with Sunni tribal leaders in Salahudeen. By mid-
2007, leaders from the Juburi tribe began to join forces with local Iraqi Police 
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elements to fight against ISI in Dhuluiyah, a former ISI stronghold.341 In May, tribal 
leaders gathered in Taji and announced the establishment of an alliance to 
combat ISI. This experience was replicated in the rest of the governorates in 
Balad, Samarra, Tarmiyah, and Baiji, resulting in a reduction in ISI’s operational 
capacity.  By the end of 2007, throughout Iraq, the number of the group’s fighters 
was decimated by over 70 per cent from 12,000 to 3,500.342 At the same, 91 000 
fighters from the Sons of Iraq Program of Sunni tribes were actively cooperating 
with US forces in Anbar, Baghdad Diyala and Salahudeen. 
Nineveh 
With the group being under significant pressure in Anbar, Diyala and 
Salahudeen, it started to shift its centre of gravity to northern Iraq and the region 
of Nineveh. Because of its complex ethno-sectarian composition and 
geographical position close to Syria, ISI could count on significant Sunni popular 
support. This granted the group an essential flow of financial revenue coming 
from its capital Mosul and its 2 million inhabitants.  Back in 2005, the city of Tel 
Afar quickly transformed into an AQI stronghold. The US coalition had to launch 
a battle in September to take the city back from AQI militants. Operation 
Restoring Rights343was the most massive operation since Fallujah in 2004, 
mobilising about 5,000 US and Iraqi infantry. Despite its success, the city 
remained a source of tension and violence because of the presence of a Shia 
minority in a Sunni region. From 2006 to 2007, the level of activity and violence 
in the province was low compared to the areas in central Iraq.  Only 1000 US 
soldiers and 6500 ISF troops and police officers were sufficient to secure the city. 
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During that time, the coalition’s and ISI’s efforts were turned to win the battle in 
central Iraq. In December 2006, there was an average of 15-18 attacks a day in 
Nineveh Province.344 In March 2007, this number fell to 10-13 attacks a day. By 
July, it had fallen further to 7-9 attacks. 
Nevertheless, the governorate progressively became ISI’s last urban stronghold 
as many of its top leaders were based there. Coalition intelligence officers 
believed that 400 to 600 fighters were operating in the city and that 1,200 to 1,600 
nationalist insurgents and other individuals could cooperate with them345. Abu 
Hamza al-Muhajir was reportedly in the region; Mohamed MouMou, a Moroccan 
Swedish commander, known as Abu Qasrawah346 was his second deputy and 
was also in the city until Muhajir’s death. ISI was able to carry out spectacular 
attacks, demonstrating a high operational capability such as in May 2007 when 
200 armed militants attacked the central provincial jail, Badoush Prison, using 6 
VBIEDs. In August 2007, several massive VBIEDs targeted Yezidi villages in 
Sinjar, killing 344 people and injuring more than 700.347 In 2008, the number of 
violent attacks in the governorate surpassed those in the other provinces in 
Iraq348.   
In January 2008, the explosion of a weapons cache in an ISI safe house in Mosul 
accidentally killed and wounded 200 people349. The day after, a suicide bomber 
killed the Nineveh provincial police chief, who was inspecting the area. This event 
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pushed PM Al Maliki to launch a military campaign in order to cleanse the city 
from the Sunni insurgency. Attacks in Mosul declined from an average of 40 a 
day in the week before the official launch of operations to between four and six a 
day in the weeks after, a roughly 85% decrease in attacks. By early 2009, 
primarily because of increasingly active joint counterterrorism operations, ISI was 
weakened in Nineveh. However, the group’s leader managed to escape to the 
Jazira desert and find shelter in vast remote areas. In contrast to other provinces, 
the Sahawat experience in Nineveh did not receive comparable support to 
operations in Anbar and Diyala. First, because neither the Shammar nor the 
Juburi, the two main tribal confederations in the region, joined the mass 
movement.  Only 1200 members of the Juburi tribe formed a local Sahawat 
movement while part of the Shammar was more inclined to support the ISI. 
Second, Kurdish fears to see the rise of a powerful Arab tribal militia outside a 
formal security apparatus also prevented its formation. By the end of 2009, which 
coincided with US decision to pull out its troops from the cities, ISI survived 
principally in Northern Iraq after being expelled from previous strongholds in 
Anbar, Diyala and Baghdad. This moment was considered as the low point in the 
organisation’s short history since it did not have any territorial control for a group 
claiming to be a state. This evolution was confirmed in the Al Naba report on 
October 12th, 2017, in which it was described how the ISI had become exhausted 
and could not fight as a conventional fighting force. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi is said 
to have declared:  “we now have no place where we can stand for a quarter of an 
hour’”350.  
5-The reasons behind ISI’s fall in 2008-2010 
Before the research peak observed after 2014, the literature on the Islamic 
State in Iraq (ISI), its fall by 2008 and the reasons behind its demise were the 
focus of much of the academic debate about the group. Most of the literature 
advanced to explain its demise was a dual explanation based on the combination 
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of the US surge, which raised the pressure on the group coupled with the tribal 
backlash the group was the victim with the rise of the Awakening Councils or 
Sahawat351. Making too many enemies, especially from the Sunni nationalist 
camp involved in the insurgency and the tribes, ISI was forced to withdraw from 
the cities. Most of the literature tends to explain the backlash of the tribes against 
ISI due to its excessive use of violence and exactions against the population by 
enforcing Sharia Law.  
A chapter352 of the study on Harmony Documents by the CTC in 2008 entitled 
“Bomber, Bank Accounts and Bleed out” was dedicated to Al Qaeda’s rebellion 
in Al Anbar in Iraq and the success of the US-led counter-insurrection campaign 
in 2007-2008. After the proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006, 
the group forced other groups through negotiation and also coercion to join its 
ranks. According to the authors, grievances towards ISI’s policy caused the 
formation of the Anbar Salvation Council, which represented a “backlash to the 
tactics and techniques” used by ISI against tribes and rebel groups that refused 
to join its ranks. The study’s main argument is that the US military response 
played an essential role in weakening the group’s presence in Al Anbar. However, 
the most determinant factors explaining IS’ demise came from the role played by 
tribal elements in Anbar Province. 
In a 2012 journal article entitled “Testing the surge”353, Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. 
Friedman and Jacob Shapiro examined the relation between the level of violence 
and the formation of Sahawat in 38 areas of operations in Iraq. Reduction of 
violence was faster in 24 areas of operations after the establishment of these 
militias. Concerning the efficiency of Sahawat groups against ISI, the researcher 
Ahmed Hashim considers that its margin of manoeuvre and capacity to move was 
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put under great pressure because of the role of insurgent Sunni groups and other 
Iraqi civilians.354 In his research, he quoted a diary of an ISI emir found by US 
forces in Balad, where to explain setbacks he complained about the “betrayal of 
brothers”, especially the Islamic Army in Iraq in the city of Balad.  
As part of his thesis Sean M. McClure355analysed the many factors that 
contributed to AQI’s demise from 2008. According to him, Iraq’s Sunnis and AQI 
had a pre-existing ideological and cultural gap, which ultimately made it lose 
popular support. However, as explained by the book “The illusion of victory”,   
written by Carter Malkasian356, a former advisor on counterinsurgency, 
dispatched in Iraq between 2003 and 2006, explaining the rise of the Sahawat 
only because of IS’ excesses can be misleading. The Sahawat experience was 
highly dependent on financial and logistical support from the Americans, even 
though many have raised the idea that IS’ brutality or crimes were behind the 
uprisings. The author considers that IS’ violence could not constitute the main 
driving force for explaining the phenomenon and the backlash of the tribe. The 
financial incentive and the greed of tribal leaders who had access to essential 
amounts of cash and weapons from the US also explain the eagerness of some 
tribes to join the program. While tribal leaders cited IS atrocities (beheading of 
Sunni civilians) or odd religious zeal (such as forbidding vegetables or 
excommunicating people for trivial reasons) to explain their involvement, this 
financial incentive was also an essential factor.  
The book “The Master Plan” offers another explanation of ISI’s fall in 2007-2010 
by citing its failure to conclude a broad alliance with other Sunni groups even from 
the jihadist realm such as Ansar Al Sunna357. This particular group suffered a split 
in 2007 after the arrest of its leader, Al Shafai. As a result, part of the organisation 
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joined the Iraqi political process while others remained committed to militancy. 
Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir, ISI’s Minister of War, was eager to exploit this fault line, 
making this group enter the ISI. According to Fishman, he even offered to the 
Ansar Al Sunna leader the position of the Minister of Justice and War in the case 
of receiving allegiance from the group. His offer was rejected by Al Shafai, the 
leader of the splinter group. Fishman speculates that if he had accepted, it would 
have reshaped the Islamic State, increased its influence on the Iraqi insurgency 
and may have changed its fate. 
 Fishman also describes internal problems inside ISI which explain its demise.  
Local emirs were stockpiling weapons instead of using them and building their 
militias instead of defending the organisation’s goals358. Another factor was the 
group’s failure to adequately use its human resources between local fighters 
reluctant to participate in bold operations and foreign fighters lacking military skill 
and alien to the Iraqi society. Due to the surveillance of the US army, local and 
senior leaders could not check on their work because of the risk of being tracked. 
The inability to communicate may have contributed to the group’s strategic errors 
like the involvement of local commanders in fighting with other groups without the 
approval of senior commanders. In Baghdad, during May 2007, 700 fighters were 
killed in heavy fights against the “Jihad and Reform Front” a coalition of rival 
Islamist armed groups. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir tried 
to limit this conflict but failed to see how quickly Sunni insurgents were turning 
against them and how ISI local leaders’ independence was counterproductive. 
For Fishman, ISI’s decentralisation process sparked a wave of violence between 
its zealous local commanders and other armed groups that its leadership could 
not prevent unlike during Zarqawi’s times, when he had the charisma, aura and 
leadership to control his troops359. 
Finally, the last reason for ISI’s demise in 2007 is attributed to the success of the 
so-called “surge” with the injection of 30 000 additional US troops mainly in 
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Baghdad. The idea of a decline in violence caused only by this injection of forces 
should be mitigated since researchers360 have stressed out the existence of other 
factors coinciding with the fall of violence such as the end of the sectarian conflict 
in Baghdad where the potential targets of violence had either been killed or fled. 
As a result, Shia militias won the civil war in the capital and the Sunni-Shia mixed 
neighbourhood disappeared. The Gulf/2000 project361 map detailing the ethnic 
composition of Baghdad illustrates the new religious composition of the city’s 
neighbourhoods after the 2007 sectarian cleansing wave. Indeed, when 
comparing the maps of 2003 and early 2007, a significant number of formerly 
mixed and Sunni blocks were converted to be occupied by Shias. If we examine 
the maps of early 2007 and 2009, only minor changes in the sectarian 
composition of the city were registered, which reinforces the idea that much of 
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VI- Islamic State’s Military Tactics and the 
Indirect Approach (Nov 2011- April 2014)  
Facing multiple coordinated forces at the same time, the pressure on the 
group was continually gaining in efficiency in the capturing of its territories and 
precision by targeting its members. The period between 2007 and 2010 
witnessed the steady rise of an efficient US-led beheading program targeting the 
group’s leadership. The number of US Special Operations Forces increased to 
5000 by the summer of 2007. They spearheaded a very intense “capture or kill” 
campaign against ISI members in the country. Coupled with an anti-terror 
intelligence team in “fusion cells”, they were very effective in the targeting of its 
leaders and gathering intelligence on the group. The arrest in March 2010 of the 
ISI emir in Baghdad at a checkpoint in the capital by the Iraqi Army is said362 to 
have led to the killing in Tikrit of both leaders of the group in April, Abu Hamza Al 
Muhajir the Minister of War and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader. Dozens of 
other middle-level commanders were captured in the following months. According 
to the CIA’s former director, ISI was at that time “near strategic defeat”363. In 2011, 
the departure of US troops became effective and was concomitant with a process 
of restructuration of the group under the leadership of the then leader Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, his deputy Abu Mohamed Al Adnani and the Minister of War, Hajji 
Bakr. ISI pragmatically realised that it had to adapt to the new situation by 
reprioritising and recalibrating the compass of the conflict. It turned towards a 
strategy of signature attacks with media resonance and focused on targeting the 
Sahawat leadership. It temporarily abandoned its ultimate goal of territorial 
control, retreated from the cities to the desert of Anbar and Nineveh.  It also 
profited from a surge in manpower thanks to the release between 2009 and 2010 
of nine thousand detainees from military prisons. Among them was possibly Abu 
Mohamad Al Adnani, released in 2010.  A few years later, the group would 
                                            
362“Captured militant offers insight into Al Qaeda leader”, Dallas News, 1/5/2010, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2010/05/01/Captured-militant-offers-insight-into-al-1726  
363 Joby Warrick, The rise of The Black Flags, Bantam Press, 2015, p68  
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continue to replenish its constituency, preparing a new phase by fomenting large-
scale prison breaks of its leadership and operatives. 
 











Baghdad 79 3 882 29 961 32 
Nineveh 1255 42 5518 184 6773 226 
Diyala 278 9 1841 61 2119 71 




Baghdad 529 18 2994 100 3523 
117 
Total 2722 91 13881 462 16603 553 
Table 2 Confrontational and non-confrontational operations claimed per 
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Figure 1  Repartition of the total 






































Comparison of the volume of operations claimed. 
From a general perspective, most of the military operations claimed by IS 
in Iraq between 2012 and mid-2014 took the shape of non-confrontational 
operations in 83 % of the cases (Table 2) which confirms our expectation. The 
ratio of non-confrontational operations per confrontational operations is 
approximately 5:1 with 462 non-confrontational operations against 91 
confrontational ones per month. Consequently, Figure 3 and Figure 1 are similar 
regarding the same percentage of total and non-confrontational operations 
claimed by the group while for Figure 2, which corresponds to confrontational 
operations, the repartition slightly changes with a gain of 5% for Nineveh and 2% 
for Anbar at the expense of Baghdad (-3%) and Diyala (-6%). This figure confirms 
the fact that even after the US withdrawal in 2011, the group remained conscious 
of the superiority of the Iraqi Army and its allies and did not confront them. The 
province of Nineveh was the location of 41% of the total attacks, while SNB and 
Anbar had 20% each, Diyala 13% and Baghdad 6% (Figure 2). The effort of two 
years of military campaigns combining guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism 
affected the outcome. In the provinces where IS had been the most active such 
as Nineveh, Anbar and SNB, the group was able to seize territory in 2014. The 
only province where it achieved a complete victory by entirely controlling it was 
Nineveh, which counted for almost half of the group’s effort during the study’s 
timeframe. From Figure 2 and 3, we can categorise three types of provinces: 
 Baghdad and Diyala are under-resourced provinces if we compare them 
to the rest of the panel. From November 2011 to April 2014, Baghdad had 
an average of 32 total operations per month claimed and Diyala 71, which 
was far from the average number of operations claimed by the other 
provinces such as Nineveh with 200 per month and Anbar and SNB with 
100 per month. The overall number of confrontational operations claimed 
remained low for two years, 79 for Baghdad and 278 for Diyala. Both 
provinces also had a low average number of confrontational operations 
with three per month for Baghdad and nine per month for Diyala. However, 
concerning non-confrontational operations, the average number of 
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operations claimed was double in Diyala compared to Baghdad. The 
province’s environment and topography are less hostile than Baghdad and 
more prone to guerrilla-type warfare.  
 
 SNB and Anbar provinces share some similarities; their number of 
operations claimed is similar (around 500 confrontational operations and 
3200 non-confrontational operations in total). Their average number of 
operations claimed by month was close to 100, with approximately 19 
confrontational operations and 100 non-confrontational ones. Both 
provinces represent 20 % of IS’ total number of operations in the five 
provinces.  
 
 Nineveh was, not surprisingly, the IS’ province with the most activity. It 
witnessed 41% of the attacks claimed, 46% of confrontational attacks and 
41% of non-confrontational attacks.  According to IS’ claims, the province 
had the best potential to be its “flagship project” for its future military 




















Variation of IS operations variation in Iraq  
 
Figure 3  Evolution of the number of total operations claimed by the Islamic state in Iraq (Nov 11-April 2014) 
From a chronological perspective, we can say that the volume of claimed 
operations made by the group in November 2011 gives us an idea about its level 
of activity at the time of the US withdrawal from Iraq. Except for Nineveh province 
with 150 operations per month, the number of operations claimed by the group in 
the rest of the provinces was meagre and did not exceed 50 operations per 
month. The curve for total operations mirrors the one of Nineveh, which shows 
the critical weight this province had for IS’ military effort.  This confirms the idea 
exposed in the literature review, that Nineveh constituted IS’ last sanctuary in Iraq 
in 2010-2011. 
The total number of operations decreased in November and December 2011 but 
increased from January 2012 right after the last US soldier in mission retreated 
from the country. The second possibility to explain this low starting point was the 



































































































































baghdad nineveh diyala Anbar SNB 5 provinces
171 
 
summer of 2011, Al Jolani and high-ranking officers of the Islamic State in Iraq 
were dispatched to Syria to establish Jabhat Al Nusra with allegedly 50% of ISI’s 
resources. Abu Muhannad Al Suweidawi, as well as Hajji Bakr, one of the most 
capable and important military leaders, were said to have travelled to Syria back 
in 2010 which may have impacted the group’s level of activity in Iraq in 2011.  
The five provinces started from the same point in January of 2012, with 60 
operations per month for Nineveh and around 20 for the other provinces. The gap 
between Baghdad and Nineveh was not important until July 2012. From January 
to June 2012, the number of operations increased drastically in Nineveh from 64 
to 276. July 2012 corresponded to the start of a nationwide campaign of the 
group-oriented towards attacks on prisons located in Salahudeen and Baghdad. 
During that period, Diyala was the second most active province in November 
2012. All the five provinces claimed less than 400 operations per month, which is 
quite low compared to the figure of 2013. Because of the improvement of security, 
the Iraqi Government announced that Iraq’s armed forces would relinquish their 
role in internal security and shift to protecting the borders of the country by July 
2012. In the same month, we can find a peak of operations claimed in Anbar, 
SNB and Nineveh, which coincided with the holy month of Ramadan and the 
beginning of the “breaking the walls” campaign on 21st of July, 2012.  
Contrary to expectations, such announcement resulted in the fall of the number 
of claimed total operations from 542 per month to 300. This decrease was partly 
due to the fall of activity in Nineveh, where the number of operations was divided 
by two in January 2013 while in other provinces it remained stable. The number 
of operations reached a new peak in July/Ramadan of 2013 with the end of the 
“breaking the walls” campaign. From August 2013, a new campaign was 
launched, called the “soldier’s harvest”.  The number of operations declined in 
Nineveh and increased in the other provinces of Anbar and SNB. In Baghdad and 
Diyala, this announcement did not seem to have a visible effect on the volume of 
operations. Baghdad’s curve of operations remained stable while the curve for 
Diyala followed a sinusoid tempo. The point of inflexion appeared in January of 
2014, when the number of operations climbed sharply in Nineveh, SNB and 
Anbar, with similar variations. The conquest of Fallujah and part of Ramadi had 
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the result that in April 2014, the volume of operations claimed per month in Anbar 
for the first time outperformed that in Nineveh (437 against 405).  
A general overview of non-confrontational and confrontational operations’ 
variation. 
 
Figure 4  Evolution of the non-confrontational operations claimed per month by 











   
   






   
   
   



































































































































Figure 6: Evolution of confrontational operations per month claimed by the 
Islamic State ( November 11-April 2014) 
Because non-confrontational operations represent an average of 80% of 
the operations claimed, their variation (Figure 5) is very similar to the one 
representing the evolution of the total of operations claimed. In contrast, Figure 6 
is different from the last one; it shows the evolution of confrontational operations 
in the five provinces. Nineveh’s curve for confrontational operations is sinusoidal 
and is similar to the others until 2014. Until 2014, no province could sustain 
consecutive months of growth in the number of confrontational operations. The 
only provinces which could maintain the number of confrontational operations for 
three consecutive months were Anbar from January to March 2014 and Nineveh 
from February 2013 to April 2013. This proves that these types of operations are 
harder to mount and need more human and material resources than non-
confrontational operations. Non-confrontational operations’ curves are linear and 
stable in their evolution while for confrontational operations they are more 
“chaotic” and unstable. 
Between August 2012 and January 2013, there was a decrease in confrontational 
operations in Nineveh to a minimum of ten confrontational operations per month.  
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exceed ten operations per month. March 2013 marked the start of a spike of 
confrontational attacks with the announcement of the merger between ISI and 
Jabhat al Nusra to form ISIS. This period from April to August 2013 also 
witnessed a general worsening of the security situation in the country because of 
the widespread protests against the Maliki government and the repression of the 
manifestations. The rapid increase of confrontational operations started in SNB, 
Nineveh and Anbar in February / March 2013 while it started a month later in 
Diyala.   
July/August 2013 corresponded to the month of Ramadan when the “Breaking 
the Walls” campaign was declared finished, replaced by a new one called the 
“Soldier’s Harvest”. Baghdad’s figures were meagre and sometimes equalled 
zero except for July 13 with the important attack on Abu Ghraib prison.  After that 
announcement, confrontational operations in Nineveh decreased abruptly while 
operations in SNB and Anbar increased.  During December 2013, the number of 
confrontational operations rose steeply in Nineveh, Anbar and SNB, where the 
number was multiplied by 3. In January of 2014, the number of confrontational 
operations skyrocketed from 40 to 133 between December 2013 and January 
2014. Before controlling territories in Nineveh in June of 2014, IS had the 
capabilities or at least the confidence to claim more confrontational operations 
(133 against 71 in Anbar, which represents almost double)  against the ISF than 
in Anbar where it succeeded in controlling Fallujah and part of Ramadi six months 
before. This significant surge in confrontational operations was for both provinces 
a kind of precursor for the takeover of large areas in both governorates.  
For every province, the curve of confrontational operations was sinusoidal, which 
means that when it reached a peak in operations during a given month, the 
following month witnessed a decrease in activity. This pattern was not observed 
for non-confrontational operations (Figure 5); provinces such as Nineveh, Anbar 
and SNB maintained a continued increase in the number of operations. Such an 
effort was not possible in Baghdad and Diyala for both types of operations. In 
Baghdad and Diyala, the cells involved in both types of operations needed a 
logistical and operational pause while for Nineveh, SNB and Anbar they only 
needed it for confrontational operations. It is probable that in these three 
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provinces, teams tasked for non-confrontational operations (assassinations 
teams, IED teams, sniper cells, and indirect fire teams) had enough manpower 
and logistical resources to sustain and escalate the volume of operations. For 
confrontational operations, however, they still needed between one or two 
months of logistical pause to recover the capacity to perform in quantity as they 
had done before. In neighbouring provinces such as Nineveh and SNB, one can 
observe months where the decrease in operations in one province corresponded 
to the increase in its neighbouring provinces (Aug/Sept 13, Apr/May 12). This 
could indicate somehow a “communicating vessels” relation between provinces 
where some cells were deployed to other provinces at the expense of others.  
Future research might be necessary in order to study the full extent of 
















Confrontational operations’ standard deviation and variation from the mean  
Table 3 Standard deviation, mean and data dispersion for confrontational operations  
 
 Nineveh Anbar SNB Diyala Baghdad 
Sample   Mean x̄ 
 x̄ = ( Σ xi ) / n 
42 19 18 9 3 
σX   standard deviation 
 
28,3 22.5 17, 2 6,1 2, 9 
x̄ + 3σ 
 
126 86.5 69 27 11.7 
x̄ + 2σ 
 
99 64 52 21 9 
Months of an important 
increase 








Months of an exceptional 
increase 












 Nineveh Anbar SNB Diyala Baghdad 
Sample   Mean x̄ = ( Σ xi ) / n 184 88 100 61 29 
σX   standard deviation 
 
99 74 87 22 10 
Mean+ 3* standard 
deviation 
482 310 361 127 59 
Mean  + 2* standard 
deviation 
382 236 274 105 49 
Month increased 








   No 
Exceptional months 
Where n ≥ mean+3 σX 
No April 
2014 
No no no 







           One of the objectives of this statistical study on the evolution of IS’ 
operational claims in Iraq is to explain the variation in quantity and quality of its 
operations. In order to grasp the moments when the group shifted its strategy, it 
is necessary first to define normality and abnormality in the pace of its operations.  
In statistics, there is a tool used in order to observe it, known as the standard 
deviation. Standard deviation shows the distance from the mean and reflects how 
widely a data is distributed about the mean.  It is also useful in order to identify 
outliers, which are data observed that lies an abnormal distance from other values 
in the sample. A typical result would be situated within one or two standard 
deviations from the mean, while other results from three standard deviations from 
the mean would be extraordinary and considered as relevant for a closer look 
from the observer. For the case study, in the case of confrontational operations, 
extraordinary data on confrontational operations could be interpreted as a shift in 
the strategy and modus operandi adopted from guerrilla and concealment 
towards conventional warfare and open confrontation. Except for Anbar in April 
2014, there were no extraordinary results for non-confrontational operations, 
meaning superior to three standard deviations from the mean (Table 3). While for 
confrontational operations (Table 4) it is possible to identify provinces where the 
number of operations was far away from the average number of confrontational 
operations claimed by month while superior to the distance of three standard 
deviations from the mean. These provinces were the ones in which urban 
assaults later succeeded, and territorial control was achieved: Nineveh, SNB and 
Anbar. For Baghdad and Diyala, the standard deviation is low, which means that 
almost all the data is around the mean, showing more regularity of the activity. 
For Nineveh, SNB and Anbar, however, the standard deviation is high because 
of the mean being affected by outliers. There is also a significant increase in 
Baghdad and Diyala in March 2014 and July 2013 with a distance of two standard 
deviations from the mean. These individual cases are worth an extended 
explanation. The dispersion around the mean is less critical for non-
confrontational operations in all the provinces, showing the regularity of IS military 
activity; non-confrontational operations are operations that are more regularly 
carried out in a routinized pace. In the next sections, I try to interpret the results 
that are out of the ordinary and explain them by adopting a provincial scope of 









Figure 7 Evolution of operations claimed by IS in Nineveh per month from November 2011 to April 2014. 
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2-Nineveh province (figure 7) 
Since 2010 in Nineveh, IS was considered to enjoy enough active and 
passive support from the population in order to conduct its operations. After IS’ 
progression in Syria, it proved to be once again a paramount arena for cross-
border operations. It also contains a desert zone of communication and its capital 
Mosul is important for the control of strategic resources in Iraq. In terms of volume 
of operations, Nineveh was the focus of 40% of the total operations of the Islamic 
State in Iraq in 2012 and 2013.  We can divide the evolution of IS’ operations in 
the province following six phases between November 2011 and May 2014, when 
the number of operations fluctuated in function of external factors and the group’s 
calendar.  In contrast to other provinces, Nineveh’s performances seem to follow 
semester cycles. Its curve takes the shape of a progressive and continuous 
increase of six months followed by a decrease during the following semester.  
 The year 2012 
The low number of operations claimed (80) on December 11, and January 
12 coincided with the full withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. Right after, we can 
observe a phase of fluctuation in the volume of claimed monthly operations with 
an oscillation between 100 and 150 claimed operations per month. During the 
first semester of 2012, the total number of operations increased until the month 
of Ramadan 2012, with an increase from 80 total operations to a peak of 275, 
which corresponded to July and August. During these months, we can notice an 
abrupt increase in operations claimed especially for non-confrontational ones. 
Confrontational operations remained low and their volume was inflated by the 
excessive number of reported hand grenade attacks. 
From December 2012, the number of operations continued to increase during the 
six following months coinciding with two important events: the start of a protest 
movement inspired by the Arab Spring in the Sunni provinces of Iraq and the 
control by opposition fighters as well as JN brigades of the border checkpoint of 
Yarubiah with Syria. The protest movement began in Mosul on 30th December 
12, regrouping 300 people in the “Ahrar” place, and called principally to release 
prisoners and put an end to the terrorism law. It opened a period of tension and 
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violence between government forces and local actors. The fact that many Iraq 
Army soldiers stationed in Mosul originated from other provinces in Iraq 
represented a source of friction. The main reasons advanced were their 
harassment of the population and their ostensible use of sectarian slogans or 
flags. According to local press, who conducted a poll364 on a sample of a 
thousand residents of Mosul, 55% called for a retreat of the Army outside the city 
and 72% considered that it hurt trade activities. 
Types of attacks and their volume indicate how confident and well implanted the 
group was in Nineveh. During the two years of the study (2012 and 2013), IS 
reported only 27 VBIEDs in Nineveh. Compared to the 251 operations claimed 
just in Baghdad, the figures in Nineveh are low. This element emphasises first 
the group’s lack of focus on Mosul during the “Breaking the Walls” campaign.  
Few VBIEDs and SVBIEDs were detonated, and large-scale operations did not 
target the prisons of the governorate (like Badush or small prisons in Mosul) 
unlike in Baghdad and Salahudeen. The limited use of VBIEDs and SVBIEDs 
indicates how concerned the group was about civilian losses in its operations. IS 
did not want to antagonise the urban population through which it moved and 
retained passive support. For that reason, the start of the nationwide “Breaking 
the Walls” campaign from July to December of 2012 coincided with a decrease 
of the total operations in Nineveh by 50% in total and 75% of its confrontational 
operations. It is probable that the group’s main focus was to deploy its cells 
responsible for its most devastating operations (SVBIEDs and VBIEDs) to other 
provinces in order to launch waves of attacks using principally VBIEDs in 
Baghdad, Kirkuk and the South and target prisons located in Salahudeen such 
as the Tasfirat Prison in Tikrit. 
January 2013-July 2013 
With the worsening of the situation in Syria, the border-zone with Syria 
offered more freedom of movement for the group in the desert area that lies 
                                            
364“Nujaifi accuses the security of negligence and the people call for a departure of the army” , Al 
Mada Press, 24/11/2012, https://goo.gl/foY8Go  
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between the two countries. In order to tackle this issue, ISF decided to close the 
checkpoints in January 2013.365 Despite this decision, many events on the other 
side of the border indicated the evolution of the frontier towards more porosity. 
First, the Tel Hamis insurgent group pledged allegiance to ISIS in February 
2013366, and the Al Yarubiah offensive saw the fall of the border checkpoint into 
the hands of JN.  In Akashat, 15 IEDs planted by ISIS’ cells from Anbar and 
Nineveh ambushed a convoy of the Syrian army withdrawing from Yarubiah and 
under the protection of the Iraqi army, resulting in the killing of approximately 100 
soldiers367.   
Between January and July 2013, the number of non-confrontational operations 
almost tripled in Nineveh. Most of them were IED attacks and assassinations. 
The targets of assassinations were soldiers but also candidates in the provincial 
elections. Due to security concerns, these elections were postponed for two 
months in Anbar and Nineveh provinces. Assassinations were carried out against 
six provincial council candidates in the province368. During that period, sabotage 
and attacks on pipelines were also reported369. At the same time, the first news 
reports emerged regarding the group’s use of weaponised civilian drones370, 
which were used massively in 2016 and 2017. 
Regarding confrontational operations, an essential increase started from April 
2013 when their number reached the maximum of 62 operations claimed per 
month. It coincided with the Hawijah clashes, which sparked a wave of violence 
                                            
365 “The closing of Yarubiyah cross border checkpoint will start at 6:00 AM”, Al Mada Press, 
13/01/2013, https://goo.gl/zRA8b6  
366 Charles Lister, the Syrian Jihad, Hurst and Company London, 2015, p113 
367 “AQI claims the raid of Aquidat and confirms the killing of 100 Syrian soldiers”, 11/03/2013, Al 
Mada Press , URL: https://goo.gl/tnjbzx  
368“Another Iraq candidate killed ahead of provincial elections”, Daily Star Lebanon, 14 June 2013, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jun-14/220395-gunmen-kill-election-
candidate-in-iraq.ashx#axzz2X550kr6J  
369 “Al Nujaifi : the explosion at two oil drums was the result of Ieds and the securities services 
invented the  guided missile theory”, Al Mada Press,  9/04/2013, https://goo.gl/U5HdNo  




across the country. During that period, the ISF confronted a myriad of Sunni tribal 
groups, former insurgents and militias in Kirkuk, Anbar, Salahudeen and Nineveh.  
 
 
August – December 2013 
Interestingly, like the year before with the “Breaking the Walls” campaign, 
the announcement of a new nationwide campaign entitled the “Soldier’s Harvest” 
was followed a by a continuous decrease in the number of operations in Nineveh. 
We can presume that this phase was an internal restructuration period for the 
group in the province. On September 11, 2013, ISIS announced that the area of 
activity of the Nineveh province was to cover Jazeera desert, Ba’aj district along 
the Syria border, and central and southern Nineveh371. This announcement 
consequently, stretched the area of activity of the province to cover the Nineveh 
governorate south and west of Mosul to the Syrian border. This may also explain 
the increase in the number of operations claimed by the group in the whole area, 
because of the inclusion of new areas. According to a news report372, in October 
of 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ordered three brigades to move from Syria to Iraq, 
which reportedly caused the Iraqi authorities to launch aggressive border security 
operations. On October 4, 2013, the Jazeera and Badiya operations command 
announced the destruction of 42 vehicles at a hidden rest point in the Jazeera.373  
ISIS undertook an extensive campaign of targeting government representatives 
during the fall of 2013. This appeared to be effective in undermining the ISF and 
intimidating the local population. On September 24, 2013, ISIS called sheikhs of 
                                            
371 “Closing of the Mosul airport and tightening of the controls with the Syrian border in the wake 
of  wide security operation”, Al Mada Press, 10/09/2103  https://goo.gl/QdTrv9  
372 “Interior ministry denies entrance of 1,000 Gunmen from Syria – but expert considers it 
‘possible’ because of poor Intelligence Efforts”, Al Mada Press, August 21, 2013 
https://goo.gl/m8GyFW  
373  “Operations in the desert destroyed 42 trucks used for smuggling to and from Syria: al-Qaeda 
has lost 70% of their western Nineveh”, Al Mada Press , 4/10/2013, https://goo.gl/3x36DF  
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the desert tribes of Nineveh to withdraw their sons from the security forces.374The 
warning specified a grace period of 30 days, during which the tribes and their 
sons would be spared. During the same period, leaflets signed by the 
organisation were found on the streets, threatening the Sunni population for 
having any governmental activity375. Their threats were put into practice later with 
a campaign of targeted assassinations of government officials. One of the main 
targets of IS’ security cells was high-ranking military officials or their relatives 
using small weapons or IEDs. Athil Nujaifi, the president of the provincial council 
and the head of the Police Khalid Hamdani, were targeted without success many 
times376.  This exhibits how well it was positioned in Mosul in order to target the 
social and political landscape so precisely and recruit informants from the 
different levels of society. Even very low-level informants of the ISF at the 
neighbourhood level were targeted as detailed by this local news source reporting 
the killing of an intelligence officer disguised as a merchant in the souk of Bab 
Saray in Mosul.377 A Sahawat leader interview broadcasted in the Saleel 
Sawareem series produced by the group said that a police officer or a military 
operating in Mosul couldn’t “live in the city because of the constant fear of being 
targeted” 378.  
The other operation used to intimidate the security forces were HBIEDs, which 
refers to the bombing or torching of houses. This constituted an essential part of 
the non-confrontational operations used by the group in order to intimidate the 
                                            
374 “Al-Qaeda gives Ninewa tribes 30 days to direct their families to abandon the ranks of the Iraqi 
army and police”, al Shafaaq News, September 25, 2013, 
http://www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraq-news/64817--30-.html. 
375 “Finding of  Al Qaeda’s  leaflets warning  functionaries to not continue their work in Southern 
Mosul”, Al Mada Press, 17/09/2013, https://goo.gl/nm8HfB  
376 “The chief of the Mosul police survives an assassination attempt in which three of its guards 
were killed”, Al Mada Press, 19/09/2013,https://goo.gl/Dnu5sG  
377 “Killing of a person linked with the intelligence of the ministry”, Al Shafaaq News, September 
25, 2013, http://www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraq-news/64817--30-.html . 
377 “Killing of a person linked with the ministry of interior infiltrated as a merchant in Central Mosul”, 
Al Mada Press, 31/12/2012, https://goo.gl/UdMSLw  
378 Al Furqan video Saleel Sawareem 1 (footage at min 57)  
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population and weaken the ISF, by directly threatening its members.379 During 
the “Soldier’s Harvest” campaign,380 announced on July 29, 2013, HBIEDs 
reflected the prevailing narrative of the campaign by targeting soldiers in their 
homes. IS’ security cells used HBIEDs in Shirqat, Qayara, and Shura cities south 
of Mosul, as an indicator of their established control in the region. These 
operations were not necessarily designed to kill the ISF officers or their families, 
but to break their morale by destroying their homes.  
January – April 2014 
Retrospectively, the peak of indirect and confrontational operations which 
occurred in December /January of 2014 could have raised all the concerns about 
ISIS’ growing activities in the province. This can be explained first by a necessity 
to divert ISF’s attention from the heavy fights in Anbar or to test their response in 
Mosul as a precursor for the June attack. However, it constituted also a signal of 
the group’s enhanced capacity to confront the ISF and orchestrate urban assaults 
in the province. In January 2014, conflicting reports381 pointed out that part of the 
city of Shura situated 45km south of Mosul was under the control of ISIS fighters. 
Twenty armed men attacked the city while individuals entered mosques and 
called for jihad in megaphones. This attack corresponded to the first attempt to 
launch an urban assault in the governorate. This could have been a way of testing 
ISF’s defences in the governorate.  In the province, the security situation was 
worsening; consequently, a general curfew382  was imposed in February in Mosul 
while the Badush prison was attacked by 20 fighters supposedly linked to 
                                            
379 “Al Qaeda fighters explode 6 houses belonging to security forces after emptying them from 
their inhabitants”, Al Mada Press, 2013/09/17, https://goo.gl/iS74E7  
380 “al-Furqan Media presents a news bulletin from Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: “Harvest of 
Operations for the year 1433 H in Iraq,” Jihadology, August  14,  2013,  
http://jihadology.net/2013/08/14/al-furqan-media-presents-a-news-bulletin-from-islamic-state-of-
iraq-and-al-sham-harvest-of-operations-for-the-year-1433-h-in-iraq/ .  
381 “Nineveh governor deny the reports indicating the fall of Shura and confirms that a division 
should be present and not 10 soldiers”, Al Mada Press, 5/01/2014 , https://goo.gl/ENy85N  
382“The Security commission orders a night Curfew in Mosul for one week”, Al Mada Press,  
4/02/2014, https://goo.gl/Ff7qVW  
187 
 
Baathists and not ISIS383. However, in Mosul, four inghimassi fighters stormed a 
police station in the south of Mosul, and an SVBIED exploded against a 
checkpoint384.   
On the other hand, the other explanation for the rise of confrontational operations 
in Mosul was the increase of ISF’s operations against the group.  At the beginning 
of 2014, the Iraqi Army declared the killing of ISIS’ governor of Mosul385 and 
launched several operations against the group. First, there was the operation 
“revenge for the leader Mohammed”, when it claimed to have destroyed a training 
camp of the group 386 southeast of Mosul. Other operations were launched in the 
successive months, such as “Furious Lion”387, which  lasted  10 days  and resulted 
in the arrest of 100 suspects; or operation “Braves of Iraq”388  in the south  of the 
province which resulted in clashes with IS members, the killing of 38 suspects 
and the destruction of an IED factory and a training camp.   
The number of confrontational operations was so significant that from the figures, 
the battle for territorial control was initiated in January and February of 2014 with 
133 and 126 operations claimed per month. To give an idea about the magnitude 
of such an effort in Nineveh, during the four first months of 2014, the group 
claimed 389 confrontational operations, which almost equalled the volume of its 
operations in 2013 (450) and 2012 (408). From these figures, we can assume 
                                            
383 “Security Forces thwarts an attack on Badush prison in North West Mosul and the disbanded 
Baath claims its responsibility”, Al Mada Press, 5/02/2014, https://goo.gl/dNknKS  
384 “Four suicide bombers attacks the  police HQ in Southern Mosul and fighters take control of it  
and take hostages”, Al Mada Press, 28/12/2013, https://goo.gl/6YVZqD  
385 “Killing of IS’ Mosul governor and two of its aides in heavy fights southern Mosul”, Al Mada 
Press,10/01/2014, https://goo.gl/vrg8jp  
386 “Destruction of training camp and arrest of 7 suspects  is part of  the larger campaign ( the 
revenge for the leader Mohamed) in South East Mosul”, Al Mada Press, 29/12/2013, 
https://goo.gl/pqyLG5  
387 “Operation Furious Lion ends with the arrest of 100 suspects and the killing of 4 terrorists”, Al 
Mada Press, 12/02/2014, https://goo.gl/n92erM  
388  “Security forces start operation “ the braves of Iraq” to pursue Daech South of Mosul”, Al Mada  
Press, 20/02/2014,  https://goo.gl/tDQgjD  
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that the battle for Nineveh and the confrontational phase against the ISF started 
in IS’ minds in January, six months before the “June 2014” surprise attack.  
From the end of 2011 to the spring of 2014, the variation of the operations claimed 
followed an exponential trend line reflecting the dramatic and constant surge of 
operations of the group in the province where it was multiplied by 5. Overall, 
confrontational operations witnessed a dramatic increase, which culminated with 
extraordinary data in January and February 2014, months before the urban 
assault of Mosul. It resulted in extraordinary results where the number of 
confrontational operations was three standard deviations from the mean in 
January and February of 2014. The success of the June offensive confirmed the 
exponential trend line of IS’ confrontational operations, which were multiplied by 
four during the timeframe of the research. Finally, the announcement of new 
operations in July 2012 and 2013 coincided with the month of Ramadan where a 

















Figure 8 Evolution of operations claimed by IS in Diyala per month from November 2011 to April 2014. 
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3-Diyala (figure 8)  
After its withdrawal from Anbar in 2006, Diyala Province has been 
considered as a critical province for the Islamic State in Iraq. First, it constituted 
a place of retreat such as in 2005-2007 for its providing of an effective cover-up. 
Secondly, it still represents a pivotal base for projection towards attack zones of 
the group, in southern Salahudine, Baghdad and its northern belt. As suggested 
by Jessica Lewis389, in 2013, the Diyala Valley had been a “command and control 
node” within the group’s support zones. The security council of Diyala Province 
admitted in December 2012 that signs were appearing of the re-emergence of 
the group in its traditional support zones.390 IS’ numbers reflected this trend; the 
total number of operations claimed was multiplied by three and confrontational 
operations by five from the beginning of 2012 to April 2014. Up to 87% of the 
operations against the ISF, the Sahawat and Shia militias were non-
confrontational, which shows that the group did not have the possibility nor the 
will to confront its enemies. Most of the claimed attacks were IEDs, HBIEDS and 
assassinations.  
After the departure of US troops in January 2012, there was an essential increase 
in operations from 33 in February to 81 in March and a decrease again to 40 in 
April. This trimester cycle shaped most of the variation of IS’ claimed operations 
in Diyala. There were exceptions to this trend, for example, in July, August and 
September 2012, when the number of operations remained stable at around 40 
operations. This anomaly could be explained by the relocation of the group’s 
efforts to Baghdad Province, where the “Breaking the Walls” campaign started. 
The other trimester cycle that was abnormal was the January/ February / March 
2013 cycle. The decrease in operations in that period could have been the effect 
of a large scale operation conducted by ISF on 19th January of 2013 that seized 
                                            
389Jessica Lewis, “The Islamic State returns to Diyala”, Middle East Security reports 18, April 
2014,  http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Lewis-Diyala.pdf  
390 “Diyala’s security commission: “there are indications of Al Qaeda’s return to its previous safe 
havens and we warn politicians to interfere”, 8/12/2012, Al Mada Press, https://goo.gl/YtRTRM  
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a large number of weapons such as IEDs, mortars and RPG in the region of Lita 
situated north east of Baqubah391. Other declines of operations claimed by the 
group sometimes coincided with the launch of security campaigns against it, such 
as in August 2013 with the campaign of “revenge to the martyrs” of ISF 392 or in 
December 2013, when the decrease in activity coincided with a campaign of 
arrests across the province with the dismantling according to the police of 8 
terrorist cells393. Despite these successive campaigns, the total number of 
operations claimed maintained itself at around a mean of 85 operations per month 
between March 2013 and April 2014. It remained higher than the average of 71 
operations per month claimed during the two and a half years of the study.  
Protests and sectarian tensions 
In January of 2013, in Diyala appeared the local version of Iraqi spring 
protests, in which people gathered every Friday demanding for reforms and the 
end of militia impunity394. It started with the rise of tensions between the Sahawat 
tribes and the government forces about the payment of their salaries. The tribal 
reconciliation process brokered by the US in 2007 played a considerable role in 
the success of the anti-insurgency campaign. The number of tribal fighters 
forming part the Sahawat rose to 7000 militiamen. After the US withdrawal in 
2011, the relationship between them and the central government began to 
worsen but never attained the point of no return which it had reached Anbar. With 
the employment by the Maliki government of Shia militias395 at their expense, 
                                            
391 “Seizing of a massive weapon cache in Northern East Baqubah”, Al Mada Press, 19/01/2013, 
https://goo.gl/FwmQFC  
392 “Dajla Operation command : “ Arrest of more than 1000 people during the month of august”” , 
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395“Pro-Iranian forces such as Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous,), Kata’ib 




their number and influence began to drop. The nomination of the Badr 
organisation’s leader Hadi al Ameri as the provincial security chief in Diyala 
confirmed this tendency. These protests and the political rivalries between the 
provincial governor, the security forces, the movement of protests and Shia 
militias initiated a period of political turmoil and sectarian violence not only 
imputed to IS. After this period, the number of operations oscillated between 100 
and 50 operations per month. Curiously, it did not have an impact on IS’ activities 
from January to March of 2013.  However, after the Safiya bombing on a mosque 
of Sunni protestors in April 2014 and the outcry it generated among the Sunni 
community, the number of operations claimed by the group rose to attain a peak 
of 110 operations.    
As described by Jessica Lewis, during the “Breaking the Walls” campaign, 20% 
of the 30 VBIEDs exploding during the first days of the “Breaking the Walls” 
campaign on July 23, 2012, were detonated in Diyala, and more precisely in 
Muqdadidyah. Later, the number of VBIED attacks decreased for two possible 
reasons: the dismantling of its local VBIED cell by the Tigris Operations 
Command on August, 20th, 2013 or the deployment of the cells to neighbouring 
provinces. Targeted assassinations against high-value targets were carried out 
against the chief of the police of Diyala with two IEDs in December 2013396 and 
the governor of the province.  
HBIEDs were used differently than in the other provinces, where they have 
targeted militiamen and militaries. In a context of sectarian violence, they have 
been used in order to push the Shia population to migrate, as was reported in 
Muqdadidyah in October 2013. Assassinations and IED attacks have increased 
at the expense of armed attacks; this trend may support the idea that the group 
has established more presence and are more embedded in the population in 
order to carry out specific attacks. In rural areas, the group also started to 
                                            
396“The chief of police survives after an attack”, Al Mada Press,3/12/2013, https://goo.gl/MD2w6L   
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assassinate the local village state representatives, called “Mokhtar”397. Diyala 
terrain is sustainable for prolonged guerrilla warfare because of the rural safe 
havens where fighters can seek sanctuaries. As explained by Michael Knights, 
Diyala remains “the perfect terrain in Iraq for insurgents seeking to shelter from 
security forces”398.  
At the start of the “Breaking the Walls” campaign, a Kurdish media399 reported 
that the group had extended its control over the northern town of Saadiyah. It was 
also reported that in November of 2011 it had tried to infiltrate the city of Al Wakf 
(east of Baqubah). These zones are traditional areas of support that were under 
the group’s total control back in 2006-2008. The other specificity of IS’ operations 
in the province is that it constitutes the one that has the higher number of what 
the statistics of the group called “repentants” which could be described as Sunni 
members from the security forces or the state apparatus declaring repentance. 
Diyala is also a laboratory for the group’s activity because IS can target the Shia 
community in the same area where it has its support base and causes population 
displacement. Towards the Sunni component, it can rely on a punishment 
campaign against collaborators and the negative perception of the local Iraqi 
police by the Sunni population. Many accusations of torture and mistreatments 
have been directed at the security forces infiltrated by Shia militias. They are 
believed to be behind the extra-judiciary killings of terrorist suspects and the 
displaying of their bodies throughout the streets of the cities of Diyala.400 
Confrontational operations  
                                            
397 “The Dajla operation command twarths the escape of 10 leader of Al Qaeda from Hib Hib 
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The curve of confrontational operations is also sinusoid but has another shape. 
The growth is more moderate while the cycles are more extended in time. The 
peak corresponded to specific spectacular attacks such as SVBIED operations 
against three poll centres401 and at Shia pilgrims coming from Iranian or meetings 
held by Kurdish political groups. By the deliberate targeting of civilians, the group 
in Diyala was following a clear “punishment strategy”. Curiously, confrontational 
operations such as SVBIEDs were used to conduct targeted assassinations402. 
This shows that the control of the terrain was not as developed in Mosul in order 
to use smooth methods for targeted assassinations. Confrontational operations 
were used as part of IS’ punishment strategy with a broader objective of igniting 
a sectarian war in the province by targeting civilians with less restraint than in 
Nineveh.  
The Ramadan effect cannot be observed in Diyala unlike in other provinces for 
the total of the operations. In 2012, the peak of operations occurred in May and 
June 2012 during the provincial elections, while it decreased by almost 50% 
during the Ramadan period. However, the number of confrontational operations 
followed the Ramadan peak cycle. Throughout the study’s timeframe, the number 
of operations remained very limited with a maximum of 10 per month, reached 
three times in Ramadan 2012, 2013 and in April 2014. Another month 
corresponding to a peak of operations was the one of Moharam; this coincided 
with Ashura days and the influx of Shia pilgrims likely to be targeted in the 
province. Diyala constituted a base for projecting attacks against the enemy’s 
centre and a base for controlling territories. In 2013, it claimed the establishment 
of six checkpoints, which demonstrates the group’s relative freedom of 
manoeuvring and goal to establish territorial control. The peak of direct operations 
in confronting the enemy was attained in March 2014 with 25 confrontational 
operations. On March 22nd, IS launched a complex urban assault on Buhriz, 
seizing the city centre and mosques from which it relayed messages from the 
loudspeaker. The city was reconquered two days later by the security forces 
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supported by Shia militias. Before this assault, the number of operations claimed 
reached its maximum in January and February of 2014. 
 Finally, IS’ figures show us precisely why the Diyala province, despite its growing 
activity, did not succeed in what Anbar, Salahudeen and Nineveh achieved in 
2014. In comparison to Nineveh, where there was an average of 387 operations 
claimed, of which 77 were confrontational ones, Diyala registered an average of 
71 operations per month with only 16 confrontational operations. Unlike other 
regions, Diyala is far from the Syrian border, which makes it very hard to take 
profit of IS’ gains there in terms of resources and logistical support. In Diyala IS 
has also to fight a myriad of enemies composed of the US, the Sahawat and 
powerful Shia militias that had limited presence in Nineveh or Anbar. Compared 
to other provinces, the variation of the claimed operations in Diyala is peculiar. 
The variation of the total of operations and non-confrontational operations (which 
are similar) was sinusoidal with general growth in the number of operations 
claimed from which we can draw a linear positive trend line. The number of 
claimed operations goes up and down with a variation in the volume of operations 
claimed of nearly 50% each month. From November 2011 to February 2014, the 
number of operations claimed was multiplied by 5. Despite this overall growth in 
activity, it appears that Diyala Province could not sustain the same number of 
attacks for two consecutive months and needed a rest period of a month. This 
operational pace could be explained with two possible reasons: the effects of the 
counterinsurgency campaign of the Iraqi forces and the relocation of its efforts to 
neighbouring provinces (Baghdad, Kirkuk and South Salahudeen). The 
confrontational operations’ variation does not follow a visible trend line, which 
shows the difficulty for the group to sustain this kind of operation for consecutive 
months in the province. From November 2011, when no confrontational 
operations were claimed to February 2014, when the urban assault on Buhriz 
was carried out, the group increased its capacity to confront the ISF and mount 
a complex assault on a city with enough power to outmanoeuvre its defenders 
and hold it for several hours. However, unlike the provinces where the group was 
able to hold territory, the volume of confrontational operations was still low in 
Diyala. The data never lay three standard deviations from the mean, unlike in 





















Figure 9 Evolution of operations claimed by IS in Baghdad per month from November 2011 to April 2014. 
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4-Baghdad (figure 9)  
From IS’ figures, Baghdad Province has proven to be another singular 
case.  It adopted non-confrontational tactics in most of its operations, as in other 
provinces. The operational pace of the province resembles the one of Diyala 
following trimester cycles. The city’s environment is an important factor in 
explaining this trend. IS had lost the territorial control it over neighbourhoods in 
the capital in 2007. In 2009 and 2010, it marked its return to the city by carrying 
out massive signature attacks against symbolic targets. From 2012, its objective 
was not to target or harass the security forces, but the focus was expanded to 
the population. The idea behind harassing the population and attacking soft 
targets lies behind the fact that constant targeting of the capital would force the 
security forces to stay in order to secure soft targets and hence divert their efforts 
in the rest of the country. Unlike the rest of the other provinces, Baghdad Province 
did not report a high number of IED operations. However, it witnessed many more 
VBIEDs than in the other provinces. In 2013, almost 50% of all the VBIEDs 
claimed in Iraq by the organisation were detonated in Baghdad. The target of the 
attacks remained the same by concentrating the operations on civilian targets in 
the Shia neighbourhood and some security forces personnel. From a logistical 
point of view, IEDs are easier to make than VBIEDS. However, they are more 
difficult to deploy, especially in hostile urban environments. The streets of 
Baghdad are not as safe for IS’ cells as the roads in the deserts of Anbar or 
Nineveh or the vegetation of Diyala. The intended goal behind the use of VBIEDs 
instead of IEDs also differs. IS often uses VBIEDs in Baghdad to create a large 
number of casualties, targeting Shia neighbourhoods. These operations 
demonstrate its strength and degrade the population’s confidence in the 
government. It had targeted mostly Shia neighbourhoods such as Sadr City, 
Kamaliya, Saidiya, Karrada, Husseiniya, and Kadimiyah. The targeting of these 
areas consequently increased the tensions between the government and its 
opposition coming from its extremist fringe and their leaders such as Bettata, the 
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leader of Hezbollah Iraq403 or Moqtada Al Sadr. The government of Iraq was 
condemned by them to be incompetent, corrupted or even responsible for these 
attacks. 
VBIED and SVEST operations as the most used operations 
The other particularity of Baghdad Province’s tactical pattern was the 
extensive use of SVEST operations as its principal confrontational weapon. In 
2013, 50% of the operations in Iraq evolving SVESTs were conducted in 
Baghdad. The question this raises is why at the same time did only a few SVBIED 
operations take place (eight exactly) while 250 VBIEDs were detonated. One 
possible explanation is that the province was under-resourced in manpower. 
However, from IS’ figures, the number of SVEST operations in Baghdad was the 
highest in Iraq with 97 operations during  2 and half years, which is very high and 
demonstrates that the province did not suffer from a shortage of manpower. Then, 
why did these suicide bombers not use cars for SVBIED operations instead of 
walking? The first explanation would be that counter security measures and 
particularly curfews imposed by the Iraqi authorities prevented IS’ suicide 
bombers from using cars. However, this explanation is not satisfactory because 
VBIED operations took place regularly across the capital. The other possible 
explanation that we could advance has to do with the tactical dimension of this 
modus operandi for IS’ strategists. IS in Baghdad follows a punishment strategy 
of urban terrorism and not a classic guerrilla strategy aimed at military targets. 
SVBIED operations, as we explained, are the group’s version of artillery and are 
used mostly in a military context in order to break enemy lines or destroy a fixed 
and protected target. In Baghdad, they were used in the so-called “signature 
attacks” such as on the infamous UN headquarter bombing of 2003 or the 2010 
bombing of ministries. They were also used during the spectacular prison attacks 
of Taji and Abu Ghraib. Nevertheless, this confrontational weapon, unlike 
VBIEDs, is not designed or used for the daily urban terror type of operations 
against civilians but rather for rare spectacular attacks. 
                                            
403 “Battata : “We warned about today’s explosion and the government is responsible for the 
killings””, Al Mada press,17/02/2013, https://goo.gl/tYsJDf   
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SVEST operations are the main confrontational type of operation used in 
Baghdad, mostly against civilian targets. Detonated in confined areas, they are 
very lethal. Generally committed by a bomber in civilian clothes, the primary 
targets are civilian facilities or administrative buildings that lack efficient detection 
devices. The suicide bomber operation is less costly and more efficient in being 
able to reach confined places such as buildings or funeral tents rather than 
explosives packed in a car. In the case of inghimassi attacks, it is a more precise 
modus operandi than an SVBIED.  Historically, foreign fighters were more prone 
to conducting suicide operations in Iraq404. Given this historical fact, we may 
assume because of the high number of SVEST operations in Baghdad that 
foreign fighters may be organised and dispatched on a national basis by a central 
command towards Baghdad. From the selected sample of operations claimed by 
the group, almost 50% of such operations in Iraq were claimed in Baghdad. For 
such operations, the origin of the perpetrator was not systematically indicated. 
For Baghdad Province, I could only identify three foreign suicide bombers in 2013 
and 2014. One was named Muhajir, an immigrant and two others were from the 
Levant and Libya.  For the rest of the SVEST operations in Baghdad, it was an 
Iraqi or the bomber’s origin was not mentioned. Therefore, it is possible that the 
assumption that the majority of the suicide bombers were foreigners was true in 
2003-2007 from the Sinjar document, but for our study on the 2012-2014 phase, 
it does not appear to be the case. This may confirm a more recent trend among 
the group we presented in the literature, which is its “Iraqiisation”. This time this 
refers not only to its leadership but also to its foot soldiers and the ones carrying 
out “martyrdom operations”. 
Baghdad’s operational pace evolution towards the Abu Ghraib operation 
Regarding the volume and evolution of IS’ operations in Baghdad, the 
province is less active compared to the other provinces. There is no aspiration 
for the group to hold territory at all. The activity there is to inflict damages, break 
the social unity, divert the Iraqi Army and increase the pressure on the 
                                            
404 Joseph Felter, Brian Fishman, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar 
Records”, West Point Combating terrorism Centre, December 19, 2007, 
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government. The evolution of the curve is sinusoidal, in a way that the group 
cannot sustain a rise of activity for consecutive months. It needs logistical pauses 
due perhaps to tighter controls of security in the capital. The most common 
measure is the imposition of curfews or the interdiction of vehicles. The most 
striking example of the success of such measures was the dramatic decrease of 
activity the group witnessed in Baghdad in late March and April 2013. To prepare 
for the Arab League summit on 27th of March, nearly 100,000 ISF were deployed 
to Baghdad to provide security and control its entrances405. During that period, 
only one S-VEST operation took place, no VBIED attacks were reported, and only 
two rockets were fired towards the Green Zone. Similarly, in April 2013, the 
provincial elections in Baghdad took place on the 20th; the Baghdad Province only 
claimed 20 operations for that month. During that period the number of non-
confrontational operations decreased. The cells for non-confrontational 
operations were likely in a pause during the previous months and rested ahead 
of the attack on Abu Ghraib planned for July 13th. During that operation VBIEDs, 
IEDs and mortars were used extensively. The peak of confrontational operations 
can be observed during the month of Ramadan when the attack on Abu Ghraib 
took place. Another peak of operations can also be observed from February 2014. 
The conflict escalation in Anbar, where open confrontations took place, saw 
another increase in Baghdad of non-confrontational operations (VBIEDs) as well 
as confrontational operations with SVESTs.  As a result of this surge of activity, 
the Iraqi authorities had to maintain troops stationed in Baghdad406, in particular 
after the reports emerging that IS’ cells infiltrated the wave of 22 000 refugees 
coming from Anbar407.  Overall, there was not much variation in the number of 
operations claimed per month, so no trend line emerged from the study. The 
number of operations claimed in November of 2011 was about 40, which 
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corresponds to the same in March of 2014. We should note that July 2013 was 
the month with less non-confrontational operations and more confrontational 
operations, the only one for the whole study where we could observe this ratio. 
The complex spectacular attack in Abu Ghraib is described and analysed in depth 
in part 5 of the study; it was extraordinary for the group and explains this 
observation. The number of operations for the first time was two standard 
deviations from the mean.  For the month of Ramadan, a peak of operations is 
observable; in July 2012 and 2013 the group was much more active compared to 
the rest of the year.  Again, for both months the number of operations claimed 







Map of Anbar Province 
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Figure 10 Evolution of operations claimed by IS in Anbar per month from November 2011 to April 2014. 
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5-Anbar (figure 10)        
During the US occupation, Anbar was paramount for the IS because of its 
unique social composition with tribes having the same origin and the same 
sectarian orientation. It was considered a perfect social incubator for the group 
before the backlash of the tribes. IS held great importance for the region for its 
proximity to the Syrian border. It granted them access to a significant flux of 
foreign fighters in the 2000s and a sustainable line of communication. During the 
period following the US withdrawal in late 2011 and after being pushed out from 
the cities, it retreated to the remote areas of the governorate. These areas remain 
almost impossible to monitor for the security forces because of how vast they are 
(its size equals two Gulf countries) and the consequently ridiculous human 
resources it needs to stabilise it. In general, in the Anbar Province, IS’ tactical 
manoeuvring was to avoid confrontation with the Iraqi Army and the Sahawat. It 
developed a guerrilla strategy in the urban environment and a “hit and run” tactic 
in the countryside and the desert region. The variation of the curve of operation 
claimed is different from Diyala and Baghdad in the sense that IS could maintain 
an increase in the number of operation for consecutive months. We can observe 
two main phases in the variation of the volume of operations claimed by the group 
with a turning point situated at the beginning of 2013. 
From November 11 to January 2013 
IS’ figures started quite low compared to those in Nineveh with few 
operations claimed while many of them happened in the desert region. In the 
Anbar desert, IS cells could move fast from camp to camp and erect mobile 
training facilities. At the time of the US withdrawal, the group’s activity there was 
at its lowest level ever with only 11 operations claimed in January 2012. 
Nevertheless, in early 2012 it executed significant operations targeting ISF like in 
Haditha, where it stormed the city disguised with police uniforms and arrested 
and executed members of the security forces408. This episode was recorded and 
                                            




broadcast in its propaganda video series entitled “Saleel Sawareem”. During the 
following months, the volume of activity steadily rose following an exponential 
trend line. The increase of activity during 2012 was periodical following a trimester 
cycle. In other words, the province sustained two months of expansion in its 
activity followed by one month of decrease. The Ramadan peak of operation can 
be observed in 2012 and corresponded to the announcement of the “Breaking 
the Walls” campaign. This campaign did not trigger an increase in the number of 
operations in the governorate. The number of operations claimed it remained 
stable at around fifty operations per month during the eight following months until 
January 2013.  
Anbar Province did not participate much in the “Breaking the Walls” campaign 
with few VBIED operations carried out and no prison break attempts. As part of 
“the Breaking the Walls” campaign effort, some VBIEDs were detonated in the 
governorate in September 2012. However, according to Jessica Lewis, the fact 
that those attacks were not synchronised with others in Iraq may indicate that at 
that time “the cell had difficulty communicating with the rest of the VBIED 
organisation, or that it suffered from some other constraint”409. This was in 
contrast to Anbar, where 55 VBIEDs exploded in 2012 and 2013 and the southern 
province that is close geographically witnessed 175. It is more likely that, as 
suggested by Stern, VBIED cells in Anbar were redirected to target Shia urban 
centres in the south and Baghdad later in 2013. 
The ability of the group to establish control and manoeuvre freely in the porous 
Syrian Iraqi border area has been a vital goal for the Anbar Province. ISF 
repeatedly conducted raids and military campaigns to secure this vast area. In 
January 2013, an operation in the border between Iraq, Syria and Jordan 
destroyed a training camp and the arrests and killings of 18 members410. This 
coincided with the decrease of operations claimed by the group during that period 
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with only 50 operations claimed. In March and June 2013, other military 
campaigns411 were orchestrated alongside the Syrian border as a response to 
the killing of six Iraqi soldiers by armed militants coming from the Syrian side. 
Despite its relative weakness in the region during that period, the group was able 
to display its forces and organise parades like in December of 2012 in Rutbah412. 
Those parades were more a show of force in order to intimidate the population 
rather than a manifestation of the group’s capacity to hold terrain because of the 
relatively low number of confrontational operations at the same time. 
As Michael Knights observed413, during the first half of 2013 the group conducted 
around eight to ten attacks per month in Ramadi’s urban areas. The number 
doubled to an average of 20 attacks per month from September-December 2013. 
In terms of opportunities, this surge of IS attacks in the period of 2010-2013 
created a “vicious” circle for the Sunni tribes, which were hostile to the 
government and this benefited the group. Indeed, more attacks on ISF in Al Anbar 
gave more excuses for Maliki’s government to deploy additional forces from 
outside the governorates. Their extensive presence did resolve the security 
issues but consolidated Maliki’s power over the local Sunni dignitaries, which 
were hostile to it. Knowing the collective mind of the Anbari and the hostility 
against any foreign occupation (US, even foreign jihadis or Shia forces), the more 
ISF forces were deployed, the more former insurgent forces (such as the 1920 
revolutionary movement and the Islamic Army), and tribal leaders were prone to 
take arms against them.  
April 2013 to April 2014 
From April 2013 to April 2014, the average number of confrontational 
operations rose to 37 operations per month while it represented only six per 
                                            
411 “Large security operation against armed groups along the Syrian borders after the killing of 7 
border control guards”, Al Mada Press, 11/04/2013, https://goo.gl/mWkocZ  
412 “Al Qaida displays its forces in Rutbah”, Al Mada Press, 29/12/2012, https://goo.gl/HhMfLM  
413 Michael Knights, “The ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor”, CTC sentinel, May 2014, 
vol 7 issue 5, p8, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-isils-stand-in-the-ramadi-falluja-corridor 
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month a year before. On the 23rd of April, many checkpoints were attacked414  in 
Fallujah, in October of 2013, six inghimassi attacked the HQ of the police in 
Fallujah415, and several S-VEST attacks were claimed in Rawa targeting 
officials416. In May of 2013, the governor of the province, Kassem Fahdaoui, was 
targeted by an SVBIED operation. During the provincial elections, a Double S-
VEST operation in June 2013 targeted a security compound in Ramadi417. 
November 2013 saw a peak in the volume of total operations claimed in 2013, 
reaching around 150 operations that month. In December 2013, we can observe 
a fall in the number of operations especially the non-confrontational ones. This 
may be due to the countermeasures undertaken by the authorities during that 
period. On the 9th November 2013, the authorities announced the arrest of 
dozens of IS’ fighters in the south of Fallujah418. This could also have represented 
a necessary operational rest before new eve’s urban assault. Compared to other 
provinces, Anbar Province had a high number of attacks using IEDs and 
assassinations. The police in Anbar found that most of the non-confrontational 
attacks were conducted by bicycles controlled at a distance419. It also took 
measures against the manufacture of tools that could be used for the 
manufacture of silenced weapons and mortars420.  
                                            
414 “Fallujah announces a complete curfew on vehicles and individuals after attacks against the 
Federal police”,  Al Mada Press, 23/04/2013, https://goo.gl/hbuLRj  
415 “Suicide bombers and fighters attack Fallujah police HQ and seize control of the building in its 
vicinity”, Al Mada Press,  21/10/2013, https://goo.gl/X57486  
416 “Source : “one of the suicide bombings in Rawah targeted administrative buildings and resulted 
in the killing and wounding of 25 people of whom local leaders”, Al Mada Press, 20/10/2013, 
https://goo.gl/gAQM4S  
417“The Anbar police elaborates a Security plan during Ramadan after receiving intel about 
possible attacks”, Al Mada Press, 2/07/2013, https://goo.gl/GqK56v  
418“Anbar police announce the arrest of high profile Al Qaeda suspects south of Fallujah”, Al Mada 
Press, 9/11/2013, https://goo.gl/kqCYnD  
419 “Anbar police : assassinations and explosions are made with bicycle equipped with engines”, 
Al Mada Press,10/08/2013, https://goo.gl/Tu8sid  
420“Security forces tighten their control of factories suspected of manufacturing of silenced 
weapons  and mortars components”, Al Mada Press, 4/11/2013, https://goo.gl/UU2kdt  
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Despite these measures, the number of confrontational and non-confrontational 
operations almost doubled between January and April 2014. During that period, 
IS was able to assert control over Fallujah and many parts of Ramadi. From 
January 2014 to April 2014, the number of operations increased dramatically due 
to the open confrontation against the Iraqi Army. Like in Nineveh, before the 
January urban assaults we can observe a decrease in the activity in the months 
preceding the assaults on both cities equivalent to the one in Nineveh in March 
and April of 2014 before the seizure of the city in June.  
 
The spark of the Anbar protest movement 
The protests in Al Anbar were triggered on 21st December 2012 by a raid 
on the home of Sunni Finance Minister, Rafi al-Issawi, who was from Fallujah and 
the arrest of ten of his bodyguards. Since 2006, his tribe, the Albu Issa, had been 
the principal component of the Sahawat force against the ISI. Despite their 
conflict with the central government, the IS still targeted this tribe by killing one of 
its principal leaders, Shaykh Aifan al-Issawi,421 in January of 2013. 
The year of 2013 saw an escalation in the political Sunni Arab opposition against 
the government of Nuri al-Maliki through demonstrations as well as violence. He 
refused to incorporate the Sahawat into the Iraqi National Army in order to keep 
Shias as the dominant force in the Army and targeted all his competitors, whom 
he accused of being terrorists422. All of a sudden, thousands of Sahawat fighters 
who were the pillar for the Petraeus anti-ISI strategy in Anbar saw their wages 
cut. He also accused some Sahawat leaders of being responsible for terrorist 
                                            
421 “Killing of the sheikh Eifan Al Isawi”, Al Akhbar Newpaper,16 January 2013, https://al-
akhbar.com/Arab/44724   
422 A State of Law official declared: “We are confident we will win. We are already collecting 
documents proving the affiliation of Sunni politicians with al-Qaeda, and we are determined to 
unveil this before the elections”.  See Crisis Group report on Fallujah. “Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian 
Bargain”, Crisis Group Middle East, Report N°150, 28 April 2014, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-falluja-
s-faustian-bargain     
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attacks or of having ties with ISI.423 This lack of confidence with the Sahawat in 
Anbar pushed the Maliki government to establish a new Sahawat movement424 
of 2500 tribal fighters in the summer of 2013.  Led by Ahmed Al Hardan, it rose 
against the old movement led by Ahmed Abu Risha, who was one of the figures 
of the movement protest against Al Maliki. ISF in Anbar was commanded by the 
commander of Anbar, the General Rashid Falih Al Hanafi. The 1st division based 
in Ramadi; the 7th division in Baghdadi, the 10th and 9th armoured division, the 
Golden Division for anti-terrorists tasks and the 6th division of the Federal Police 
composed the forces deployed in the province. They represented 60 000 soldiers 
supported by around 10 000 pro-government tribal fighters425 .  
On the 29th of December 2013, another arrest warrant in Ramadi was issued 
against the Muslim Brotherhood-oriented Iraqi Islamic Party parliamentarian, 
Ahmad al Alwani. When his bodyguards from his tribes tried to resist, a firefight 
resulted in the death of Ali al-Alwani and his sister, as well as the arrest of MP 
Ahmad al Alwani. They were from the Albu Alwan and Albu Jabr tribes, 
considered as a pillar of the Sahawat movement in Ramadi.  On the 30th of 
December,   the governmental forces decided with the Provincial Council to storm 
the protest camps in Fallujah and Ramadi with forces from outside the province.  
Shia forces coming from the southern city of Kut were deployed, which sparked 
a backlash from tribes as well as the groups from the Sunni insurgency. The 
Ramadi-based Anbar Provincial Council negotiated a withdrawal of Iraqi Army 
and Emergency Response Brigade forces from Ramadi on December 31st. I 
describe and analyse the urban assaults on Ramadi and Fallujah in the section 
                                            
423“Maliki reopens the case of Sahawat leaders”, Al Jazeera Net, 22/01/2012, 
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dedicated to the strategical analysis of IS’ successes through the indirect 
approach.  
To conclude this part on the quantitative analysis of the variations of claimed 
operations per month in Anbar, we can observe that the variation of operations 
claimed followed an exponential trend line confirming the surge in the group’s 
capacity in the province. The group’s operational rhythm followed a semester 
tempo with a rise during the six months followed by a decrease in the following 
months. IS’ figures show that from November 2011 to December 2013, the 
number of operations claimed oscillated between 50 and 150 operations per 
month. However, in January 2014, the number increased sharply from 73 to 300 
operations per month. Unlike Nineveh where the increase of operations was 
massive, in Anbar, the increase of the group’s military activity was not as 
important before the launch of the assaults in both cities. Less than a proactive 
operation, the urban assaults on Ramadi and Fallujah were more a reaction to 
the deterioration of the security and the opportunity presented by the tensions 
between tribes and Baghdad. However, the variation of the confrontational 
operations followed an exponential trend line, where the increase in the number 
of operations started in May of 2013 following Hawijah clashes and the spillover 
of violence across the country. While before that date, the average number of 
operational confrontations was around six operations per month, it tripled to reach 
an average of 24 operations per month during the six months preceding the urban 
assaults on the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. Later, during the four first months 
of 2014, the average number of confrontational operations was 70 per month. 
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Figure 11 Evolution of operations claimed by IS in Salahudeen and Northern Baghdad per month from November 2011 to April 2014   
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6-Salahudeen and Northern Baghdad (figure 11)  
Salahudeen and Northern Baghdad provinces (SNB) were treated by IS 
as a single operating area in both annual reports of 1434 and 1435. However, 
from December 2013, each province started to have its monthly report. This 
restructuration manifested a change in the structure as well as in the number of 
operations and objectives for each province. Salahudeen Province includes the 
principal cities of Tikrit, Balad, Samarra and Baiji while Northern Baghdad has the 
cities of Al Taji and Tarmiyah.  One of the explanations of the 2012-2013 merging 
of both structures is their synchronisation both at the strategic and operational 
levels for the objectives stated in the framework of the “Breaking the Walls” 
campaign. Almost all the prisons raided successfully or not were present in 
Baghdad and Salahudeen provinces: Tasfirat in Tikrit, Taji in Northern Baghdad 
and Abu Ghraib in Baghdad. The independence of Salahudeen province from 
late 2013 confirmed later its readiness for the 2014 campaign in the north and its 
role in the takeover of Mosul.   
The SNB province represented 19.7% of total operations in 2013 while in   2012 
it represented 12.7%. Most of the attacks were not confrontational at 85%, with 
only 15% of confrontational operations. The group followed a strategy of guerrilla 
warfare with a gradual increase of confrontational operations from March of 2013 
to April 2014 (multiplied by 3). In 2012 and 2013, the number of assassinations, 
indirect fire, destruction of houses, targeted attacks, and IEDs increased. In 
comparison, very few confrontational operations such as SVBIEDs and SVESTs 
operations were carried out. Unlike in other provinces, many homes were 
destroyed by VBIEDs and this resulted in high casualties among the families and 
the neighbours. These operations pushed the security forces to impose a curfew 
on vehicles. Targeted assassinations of high-value targets were carried out in 
provinces such as in Anbar, Diyala and Nineveh. The chief of the police of 
Salahudeen was targeted in the centre of Tikrit twice by two simultaneous IEDs 
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in February of 2013 and 2014 with a VBIED426. The governor of Salahudeen was 
also targeted three times, in December 2012 and in June and September 2013 
by a complex attack involving the use of IEDs and a VBIED during an ambush 
using light weapons. For both cases, attackers had previous knowledge of their 
target’s route and were able to carry out accurate attacks that confirm the group’s 
extensive intelligence network in the province. 
Attacks on prisons held great importance during the “Breaking the Walls” 
campaign in SNB Province. The attack upon the Tikrit Tasfirat prison on 
September 27, 2012, was highly successful. Over 60 ISFs were killed or 
wounded, and 100 prisoners escaped. In July 2013, the Taji prison, situated in 
northern Baghdad was attacked with mortars and SVBIEDs. Even though the 
region is composed mainly of Sunnis, it holds a highly symbolical value for the 
Shia creed. It holds some of the most sacred shrines and religious places such 
as the Askari shrine, whose bombing in 2006 ignited two years of sectarian war 
across the country. There is also the shrine of Said Mohamed in Balad and the 
shrine of Imam Mahdi mountadar as well, the place, where according to Shia 
scriptures, the Mahdi is said to have disappeared and is expected to come back. 
These elements explain the group’s eagerness to conduct operations specifically 
targeting Shia civilians or pilgrims.427 For those reasons, security measures are 
usually taken by ISF and Shia militias for religious processions or religious 
holidays. SVESTs as a confrontational type of operations are usually used to 
target these groups and inflict as much as possible damage, as occurred in Toz 
Khurmato.428 The city of Samarra was also a place of tensions between locals, 
which are Sunni in the majority, and the army. Most of the army stationed there 
are from the southern region and Shias. Residents protested and called for a 
                                            
426 “Chief  of Police of Salahudine survives an attempted assassination in Toz involving  twice 
synchronized IEDs explosions resulting in the killing of seven people”, Al Mada Press, 
19/02/2014, https://goo.gl/nzUaMt  
427 “Thwarting of a suicide bombing targeting Iranian pilgrims South of Tikrit”, Al Mada Press, 
14/05/2013, https://goo.gl/5L2BVX  
428 “Dozens of killed and wounded in a suicide bombing targeting funerals of Turkmens in Tuz 
Khurmato”, Al Mada Press, 23/01/2013, https://goo.gl/zeJrwo   
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strike429 in October of 2013 calling for the deployment of the local police and the 
Sahawat (mostly Sunnis) in their city. In Tarmiyah, a religious maqam was 
attacked by IS in an attempt to ignite sectarian tensions in the province.430 
We can observe three different phases in the evolution of IS’ claimed operations 
in the SNB province. From November 2011 to January 2013, we observe a 
sinusoidal curve, meaning that the group could not sustain a prolonged effort in 
its activity and needed an operational rest period of a month. The number of 
operations claimed reached an average of 50 operations per month. From 
January to June 2013, there was a continuous and important increase in 
operations from 48 to 170. The governorate of Salahudeen saw the emergence 
of a protest movement led by Sunni tribes and political parties in January 2013. 
In February, the police tried to disrupt the movement by forbidding strangers from 
entering the city of Samara to join the protestors431. Clashes between protestors 
regrouped in camps, and the police started in Samarra in March 2013432. 
Tensions between local authorities and the government rose at the same time. In 
Toz Khormato, local authorities called for the creation of a local force composed 
of different ethnic elements of the region. This call was viewed with suspicion 
from Baghdad. The “Kaymakam”, a local leader of the district, also asked to 
remove Shia symbols and flags from the city433. Tensions between the Sahawat 
and the security forces also worsened after the decision of the Army to exercise 
direct control on them in January 2013. In an attempt to call Baghdad for more 
decentralisation of power especially regarding security affairs, the governor of 
                                            
429“The people from Samarra call for the return of their sons to police inside the city”, Al Mada 
Press, 13/10/2013, https://goo.gl/Zsk8VG  
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Salahudeen pointed out to the lack of executive power in the hand of the governor 
to explain the deterioration of the security situation from which IS took 
advantage434. This declaration echoes one of the local councils of Salahudeen 
affirming that the transfer of power regarding security affairs could lead to a 
decrease of 80% of violence in the province435. 
After these tensions appeared, the activity of the province continuously increased 
with no rest to triple from 50 to 150 operations per month. April 2013 saw a spark 
of violence after the Hawijah confrontation, which is very close to Salahudeen. At 
the same time, the group increased its confrontational operations, reaching a 
record of almost 50 per month. During the Ramadan month, there was a decrease 
in the number of operations from 175 to 120. We can assume that like for 
Baghdad, the number of operations decreased because many cells were rested 
for the preparation and execution of the twin attacks on Abu Ghraib and Taji 
Prison situated in northern Baghdad.  The decrease of activity of June/July 2013 
coincided with the new security plan of the ISF in the governorate, more precisely 
in the Sinia area in the region of Baiji and Tikrit. Conscious of the lack of human 
intelligence and preparedness of its forces, Salahudeen police called for the 
recruitment of a thousand additional forces436. The head of the police announced 
the arrest of 77 people on terrorism charges for the diffusion of 4 VBIEDs. In 
August 2013, the national campaign to “revenge the martyrs” was also conducted 
in Salahudeen and resulted in the arrest by the police of 42 suspects.437 The Wali 
of the organisation in Salahudeen was reportedly arrested by the Kurdish Special 
Forces (Asaysh) during the same period in the south of Tikrit. In September 2013, 
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the police announced a new anti-terrorist campaign and the arrest of 39 
persons438. However, in Northern Baghdad an important complex operation took 
place with the simultaneous attack439against the police HQ in Taji with a VBIED 
detonation and an intrusion team. 
During the last six months of 2013, the degradation of the security situation in 
Salahudeen was such that the governor called Baghdad to launch a military 
operation comparable to the one in Anbar.440 Unlike in Anbar and Nineveh, most 
of the anti-terrorist operations in Salahudeen were led by the police rather than 
the military. Five months before, as a proof of the worsening of the security 
situation in the province, “for security reasons” the government decided to move 
the aircraft stationed at the military airport of Tikrit to “Imam Ali” airbase situated 
in Di Kar in the more stable southern part of the country441. This situation was 
aggravated with the deployment of the SWAT anti-terrorist division from 
Salahudeen to Anbar in late 2013, which further expanded the security vacuum 
in the governorate. 
Confrontational operations 
We can observe in the last six months of 2013, two peaks of 
confrontational operation in April 2013 and January / February 2014. The April 
2013 peak coincided with the bloody Hawijah confrontation between the army 
and protestors. This sparked a wave of violence in the governorate, where tribal 
armed groups confronted the security forces. Suleiman Pek fell into the hands of 
tribal groups affiliated with the protesters, but the city was retaken by security 
forces after tribal mediation. We can interpret IS’ announcement of a peak of 
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confrontational operations concomitant to the spark of violence because it took 
advantage of the opportunity the confrontation between the ISF and the tribes 
was providing. In addition, it can be interpreted as a way for the group by surging 
its attacks to show its capabilities and demonstrate its status of the shield of the 
Sunni. In the aftermath of attacks led by Shia militias on a Sunni mosque in 
Diyala, we observe a similar peak of confrontational operations. During the 
following month, the group’s confrontational operations per month were multiplied 
by 5, from 6 per month before April 2013 to 30 per month until April 2014.  As a 
major operation, we can cite the attacks of five inghimassis against a highly 
guarded target such as the HQ of the Special Forces in the north of Tikrit442. The 
attackers did not succeed in entering the building; one was killed, and four 
activated their explosive vests killing four soldiers. A month later, the same modus 
operandi was used with four suicide bombers this time supported by a VBIED, 
which targeted the entrance of the explosive department in Tikrit and caused the 
killing and wounding of 10 soldiers443. In Taji, an S-VEST operation targeted a 
Sahawat gathering444 while 2 S-VEST operations were conducted in Samarra 
against an army checkpoint and near the highly symbolic Imam Askari shrine445. 
Another complex operation was carried out by inghimassi fighters against the 
municipal council of Samarra in March 2014446. A VBIED was detonated before 
three fighters stormed the building and took hostage dozens of citizens waiting to 
take their voter cards. Finally, in November 2013, a checkpoint of the ISF was 
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targeted by two SVEST operations in Tarmiyah, killing and wounding 61 
soldiers447. 
In parallel to this surge of confrontational attacks across the region, the group 
started to try to establish its control over urban areas in Salahudeen. Reports 
emerged in November of 2013 about the storming of some territories near 
Suleiman Pek (90km east of Tikrit).448 Three neighbourhoods in the western part 
of the city were said to be controlled by IS. As a result, more than 5000 inhabitants 
had to leave the city, and 40 % of the city was destroyed. While regaining control 
of parts of the city, the ISF claimed to have killed and arrested 100 fighters and 
destroyed ten terrorist camps in the governorate.449  
In conclusion, we can observe that IS’ trend line for its operations claimed in SNB 
was exponential; in two years it was almost multiplied by 9. The group increased 
its military capacity and activity in the region following some events such as the 
spark of the protest movement or the attacks on prisons or the Hawijah clashes. 
Regarding the variation of confrontational operation, the turning point in the 
number of operations claimed started in September of 2013. Before that month, 
the average number of confrontational operations claimed was around ten 
operations per month, with the impacting exception of April 2013 coinciding with 
the Hawijah clashes, when 44 confrontational operations were claimed in SNB. 
During the following eight months after September 2013, the average number of 
operations claimed was 35. During this period, the group claimed the same 
number of operations as during the 22 preceding months. This shows an increase 
in capacity and confidence to confront the ISF and their allies in the governorate. 
Once the confrontational operation variation deviated by three standard 
deviations from the mean; this happened in January 2014 and was exceptional. 
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It confirmed the increase in the capacity of the group in the governorate and the 
effort of the group at the nationwide level to confront the Iraqi Army at the same 
moment that it entered Fallujah and parts of Ramadi.  
7-Findings and Conclusion  
Regarding the first hypothesis of the study, there is confirmation from IS’ 
claims that in its tactics it mostly avoided confrontation in the two years preceding 
its urban assaults in Iraq.  As with Lawrence’s Arab rebellion or Fabien strategy, 
the majority of IS’ operations orchestrated against its foes were applied through 
a modus operandi whose primal nature was to attack while avoiding confrontation 
with the target: IEDs, VBIEDS, indirect fire, HBIEDs and targeted assassinations 
were the most preferred types of operations. This way of fighting has shaped 
different strategies the group has undertaken in the provinces where it operated. 
For its guerrilla strategy, it has taken profit from the environment (desert of Anbar, 
urban areas of Nineveh or highly dense vegetation of Diyala) to conduct hit and 
run tactics and undiscovered operations. In other provinces following a 
punishment strategy, it has also deliberately targeted Shia civilians with the 
massive use of VBIEDs in Baghdad, Diyala and Salahudeen. The second finding 
of this investigation is that each province had its operational rhythm and 
developed its tactical patterns for different strategic objectives. We can also 
observe that its military performances and type of operations follow the context 
where they operate. From the figure it provided, the group has been reactive to 
the political turmoil in Iraq and the security vacuum it generated in some areas 
from mid-2012. 
 
Nineveh was the most active region; it developed a classic guerrilla strategy of 
hold and control when the number of operations expanded in time without any 
pause. Anbar and SNB, being part of the so-called” triangle of death” during the 
US occupation, shared an exponential growth in their operational trend. Until late 
2013, both provinces had a sinusoidal evolution in their activities, showing the 
need for IS’ cells to have a rest period. Nevertheless, they developed the same 
ability to surge in their number of operations and raise their capacity to launch 
confrontational operations. The variation of the operations claimed in these three 
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provinces followed an exponential trend line. The tactical pattern they shared 
shows how certain these provinces were in confronting their enemies; this 
confidence confirmed later in the territorial gains IS was able to claim. In these 
three provinces, the use of IEDs and HBIEDs was widespread, and the accuracy 
of targeted assassinations demonstrated an extended level of human intelligence 
and mastering of the terrain. The use of VBIEDs across these provinces was 
limited while SVBIEDs were understood as a modus operandi for military 
purposes similar to artillery in conventional warfare.  
 
The study’s result confirms that Diyala Province was under-resourced compared 
to the others. It is said to have been the laboratory of the Iraqi state because of 
its sectarian and ethnical composure. For IS’ tactics, it also served as a 
laboratory. It was the only province where the group developed the three tactical 
patterns for three possible strategies in Iraq: urban terrorism against minorities, 
guerrilla operations taking advantage of the dense vegetation to hide and urban 
assault for territorial control with its failed assault on Buhriz. The trend line of the 
group’s variation of claimed operations was linear, confirming empowerment of 
the group in the province, with a steady increase of operations following the 
trimester cycle. Finally, Baghdad Province’s tactical manoeuvres focused on 
SVEST operations and VBIEDs for a classic tactic of urban terrorism and 
punishment strategy. Because of the sectarian composition of the city, it could 
rely on the Sunni pockets there and generally use the neighbouring provinces 
(Baghdad belt, South, and Diyala) as a starting point to launch terrorist attacks. 
Confrontational operations were shallow, except for the complex and 
“extraordinary” attack on the Abu Ghraib Prison, which involved dozens of units 
and the resources of neighbouring provinces. The attack variation trend line was 
polynomic in a sense it followed a constant variation without a significant apparent 
trend line while the figures at the end of 2011 do not differ much from those in 
2014. The fact that no data for the confrontational operations was dispersed three 
standard deviations from the average shows that unlike in other provinces, in 
Diyala the group never had the capacity to surge in the number of confrontational 
operations, which could have given the group the ability to seriously pose a threat 




IS’ figures in terms of operation claimed (not the death toll, which is generally 
inflated or when a failed operation may be pictured as successful) were in phase 
with the reality and the state of power of the group during the period of the study. 
The evolution of the number of claimed operations per month found an echo with 
the political and security events occurring at the same time. The spillover of the 
Syrian war and the strengthening of IS’ Syrian wing, the deterioration of security 
in the aftermath of the protests in January, clashes of April 2013 in Hawijah,  the 
political mess between Sunni local authorities and the Sahawat and the 
government in Baghdad have  impacted IS’ number of operations claimed in 
Nineveh, Diyala, Anbar and SNB. At the same time, security operations and 
campaigns of the ISF against the group by coinciding with a fall of activity seemed 
to have had a decreasing effect on the number of operations claimed by the 
group. 
 
Confrontational operations, which are more spectacular, making headlines and 
affecting the collective consciousness, generally increased on special occasions. 
They were designed to send a message for the Ramadan month for its 
constituency, the Moharam month against the Shia community, for the 
inauguration of military campaigns or as a response to tragic events (Hawijah and 
Saadia attacks).  In some provinces, we can observe the validity of the so-called 
“Ramadan peak of operation” but just for confrontational operations (SVBIED, 
incursions, S-VESTS). Jihadi literature has envisioned Ramadan as a month of 
battle and sacrifice; a spike of confrontational operations might be interpreted as 
a way for the group to show and prove its zeal and commitment to religion. The 
studied sample indicates that all the provinces underwent a peak of direct 
confrontational operations for July 2012 and 2013 except for Anbar and SNB, 
which announced a decline in these types of operation for July 2013. We may 
assume that resources for such operations were relocated between neighbouring 
provinces in order to grant the success of complex attacks such as the Abu 
Ghraib assault in Baghdad, which was an IS’ catalyst operation in Iraq for 2013. 
It has been stressed that the establishment of checkpoints was an indicator for a 
rise of capacity before the seizing of territory. In Diyala, the group established 
more checkpoints than in any other province (seven in 2013). In reality, this 
parameter does not say much about the ability to launch urban assaults but rather 
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its control of rural areas. For the case of Diyala, the establishment of checkpoints 
did not serve as a prelude to a successful shift of strategy from guerrilla to 
territorial control. The Diyala Province never succeeded in launching more than 
20 confrontational operations per month even during the Buhriz assault on March 
2013. The other provinces where IS was later able to seize urban areas 
permanently (SNB, Anbar and Nineveh) reached at least the operational level of 
sustaining 50 confrontational operations per month. Finally, after analysing the 
variation in operations claimed by the group in the months before its urban 
assaults we cannot talk about a “June” or “January” surprise for the event in 
Mosul and Anbar. Control of these territories was preceded by a steady rise of 
non-confrontational operations during the two years preceding the events. The 
sharp increase of confrontational operations just before the conquests of the 
cities could have increased the attention of the authorities. The existence of data 
dispersed from the average number of operations claimed by three times the 
standard deviation contributed to highlighting the exceptionality of the moment 
the group enjoyed at that time. The existence of these exceptional abnormal 
results could have focused attention perhaps not on IS’ real capacity (it depends 
on the veracity of its claims), but at least it sheds light on the high level of 
confidence it had in confronting ISF and its aspiration to establish control over 
territories. The group also undertook small-scale urban assaults in these 
provinces in order to control to test the reaction of ISF and prepare for operations 
that were more important. 
 
Moreover, the fact that IS’ exceptional confrontational figures in Nineveh and SNB 
occurred in January 2014 could lead us to make two assumptions. First, that in 
January the group tried to take other cities than Anbar, like Shura and Tuz 
Khurmato in January 2014. Secondly, that the shift from guerrilla to open 
confrontation in Nineveh and Salahudeen happened earlier than the June 
offensive, which had been prepared six months before by the dramatic surge of 
confrontational operations in January. Instead of a sudden unexpected event, the 
fall of the city would be the result of a six-month campaign of confrontational 
operations that led to the fall of the city. If IS figures were to be verified and right 
Mosul’s takeover would be the outcome of a campaign that had started months 
before the 5th of June 2014 events.  
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Table 9 Summary Table giving an overview of the observation of the variation of 
operations claimed by IS in 5 provinces from November 2011 to April 2014 
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Ratio Total / 
confrontational 
operations  
 4 : 1   8 : 1   12:1  6: 1 7 :1 












Trend line for 
confrontational 
operations   
 Exponential  No trend line  No trend 
line 
 Exponential   Linear  
Ramadan peak of 
operations  
 Yes    No     Yes    No   No  
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VII - Analysis of IS’ 2012/2013 prison 
break campaign and 2014-2015 urban 
offensives from a strategic military 
perspective. 
1– IS’ prison break strategy  
IS’ VBIED strategy from dispersion to concentration  
During July of 2012, corresponding with the holy month of Ramadan, the 
organisation launched a year-long operation, they named the “Breaking the 
Walls” campaign. This campaign is considered to have prepared the terrain for 
ISI’s operational objectives to retake territory and to establish governance in parts 
of Iraq and Syria. It consisted of a series of hundreds of VBIED attacks in total 
and eight prison breaks across the country. According to IS’ figures, around 900 
VBIEDs and 100 SVBIEDs were claimed across the country in 2012 and 2013. 
As stated by Jessica Lewis, in analysing the campaign, “these attacks required 
extensive planning and logistical structure and followed a well-conceived 
strategy”450.Her contribution was to seek to interpret VBIED wave patterns in 
order to assess ISI’s organisational evolution. She argues that VBIED waves 
during that campaign were “not an environmental condition, nor a disorganised 
and frenzied attack phenomenon, but a highly organised and meticulously 
planned military operation with forensic signatures that can be tracked”.451 Lewis 
                                            
450 Jessica D Stern, “Al Qaeda in Iraq is resurgent”, Middle East Security Report 14, September 
2013, p8, www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf,  
451 ibid p20 
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pointed to four different phases for the one-year campaign.452 These phases were 
not announced but instead assessed by her observing qualitative and quantitative 
differences in attack patterns over time. From a geographical angle, most of the 
attacks concentrated on zones the group did not control or where they did not 
have consistent support bases. Support zones of the group such in Anbar, Diyala, 
Nineveh and Salahudeen were less targeted than in the South, Baghdad and its 
belt and Kirkuk Province. Particularly in Baghdad and Kirkuk, the VBIED 
campaign followed a 2006-2007 pattern of targeting civilians in crowded areas in 
order to ignite sectarian tensions. In contrast to its previous campaign, this time 
VBIEDs were weaponised massively in waves of synchronised attacks 
throughout the country. 
For the non-state actors, which lack airpower, VBIEDs can be considered as 
weapons for strategic penetration associated with the poor man's air force. Liddell 
Hart saw how the objective of dislocation could be achieved for regular forces 
with air power. He wrote that “aircraft enable us to jump over the army, which 
shields the enemy government, industry and people and to strike direct at the 
opposing will and policy”453.  He believed that the nerve centre of a modern state 
was particularly vulnerable to air attack454. Additionally, he claimed that “an air 
force is a super-guerrilla instrument”455 to emphasise its non-confrontational 
dimension. IS lacks air power; the only weapon in its hands to target the nerve 
centre on its enemy while avoiding confrontation is the VBIED. IS’ cells have the 
ability to detonate it behind enemy lines particularly in Baghdad, to inflict high 
maximum damages, and target its nerve centres as well as its civilian 
infrastructures. This parallel with the air force regarding the targeting of civilians 
was emphasised by Ivan Arreguin-Toft with the notion of “barbarism”456 of 
                                            
452 Ibid p12 
453 Basil H. Liddell Hart, On the Future of War, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,1972, p37 
454 Ibid p 40–41. 
455 Liddle Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, London, 1946, p. 25 
456 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars. A theory of asymmetric conflict, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005 
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conventional and non-conventional forces when he compares deliberate attacks 
against civilians by non-state actors to strategic bombardments of states against 
civilian targets. 
     
     Map showing prisons attacked by IS in Iraq since the start of the “Breaking the 
Walls” campaign in August 2012 
Prison breaks strategy: adaptability and flexibility   
 Although the campaign was announced in July 2012, prison breaks 
involving IS’ inmates around the country had started several months before. No 
assaults were carried out but prison breaks succeeded in different and adaptive 
ways. In April 2011, 30 inmates succeeded in escaping from the Ghozlani and 
Ahdath prisons in Mosul.457 Additionally, in September 2011, 35 inmates accused 
                                            




of terrorism successfully escaped after digging a tunnel from a provisional prison 
in Mosul. In January 2012, in Dohuk, 11 inmates succeeded in digging a tunnel 
of 80m and escaped from the Zorkah prison.458  The Kirkuk prison break occurred 
on 23th of February 2012.  Inmates poisoned dates served to the guards and 
escaped from the air-conditioning system of the prison.  In January 2011, at the 
Basra intelligence unit related to the Iraqi Army, 12 inmates from IS succeeded 
in escaping. The Taji prison (25 km north of Baghdad) was attacked for the first 
time by an SVBIED detonated at the main gate, killing 11 Iraqi soldiers. However, 
the attack was not designed to provoke a prison break, but instead it targeted a 
gathering of Iraqi military vehicles at the entrance of the main gate459. 
The announcement of the “Breaking the Walls” campaign marked the start of a 
new phase using complex armed assaults against prisons coupled with VBIED 
waves across the country. While VBIED waves were first dispersed, the prison 
assaults were concentrated in Baghdad. These assaults were complex and 
synchronised attacks involving confrontational and non-confrontational 
operations: VBIEDS or SVBIEDs, assault teams of inghimassi fighters, indirect 
fire teams with mortars and support teams planting IEDs and ambushing the 
routes leading to the prisons. From July 2012 to July 2013, prison break 
operations evolved in their complexity, timing, intelligence planning and level of 
coordination between attackers and inmates inside the prisons.  
The First Wave in Baghdad of August 2012  
The first prison break attempt after the announcement of the campaign 
occurred on 19th July 2012. Sixteen inmates on death row tried to escape from a 
                                            











high-security prison in Khadimiyah in Baghdad.460 The first assault occurred on 
2nd of August 2012 against the Baghdad Counterterrorism Directorate, where 400 
inmates were detained. Two VBIEDs exploded at the entrance of the building 
killing around 20 people461. Right after, six inghimassi fighters in police uniform 
wearing suicide vests stormed the building; three of them were killed at the 
entrance while the others went to the second floor to free the inmates. The 
Golden Division unit thwarted the attack, and the remaining attackers were killed 
after five hours of significant fighting. The following day, the prison of Taji was 
attacked for the first time. The assault failed despite the attackers succeeded in 
destroying the main gate, which was under construction. Three attackers were 
killed; the rest were arrested while three out of four VBIEDs deployed were 
defused. At the same time, an ISF patrol was ambushed in Taji462. During the 
same period on August 5th, at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, inmates tried to 
tunnel out of prison but failed in their enterprise463. Inside their cells, they dug a 
17m tunnel in order to escape. The prison was already under high surveillance 
after the interception of intelligence reports on August 2nd about the imminence 
of an attack. Later on March 13th 2013, the authorities announced the thwarting 
of another tentative escape from the prison, where the inmates had planned to 
set the prison on fire464. 
The first VBIED waves on July 23, 2012, and September 9, 2012, involved 30 
and 21 VBIEDs for the two days. The geography of these attacks was 
widespread, stretching from Basra in the south to Mosul in the north while the last 
                                            
460 “Thwarting of prison Break of 16 inmates in Baghdad”, Al Sumariyah, 19/07/2012 
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focused on Baghdad, considered as the centre of the enemy.465 For both cases, 
it shows how the strategy of the operations’ masterminds was to strike as many 
targets as possible and not concentrate on specific points yet. Most of the VBIEDs 
were detonated across northern Iraq in Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Salahudeen and 
Anbar. In comparison, only four of the VBIEDs were detonated in Baghdad, with 
one north in Tarmiyah. This first wave of attacks saw a dispersion of the VBIED 
operations across Iraq and concentration of the prison break assaults inside 
Baghdad. These early assaults on prisons did not succeed in breaking their 
defences and freeing inmates, but they sent the message that ISI was willing to 
orchestrate prison breaks and able to launch attacks on very fortified targets in 
the heart of the capital. 
The Second Wave:  Tikrit / Diyala late September and October 2012 
The second wave of prison attacks took place in Salahudeen and Diyala. 
First, the Hib Hib police directorate in Diyala (70 km North Baghdad) was attacked 
on 20th September by three suicide bombers, a VBIED and indirect fire466. The 
attackers tried to storm the building and free ten important leaders of the group. 
The attack was thwarted likely because the VBIED detonated close to the main 
gate did not cause any damage to the facility. This first assault on a prison outside 
Baghdad failed while there were no indications of possible coordination between 
attackers and the inmates. 
The second attack against the Tikrit Tasfirat prison occurred a week later on 
September 27, 2012, at dawn against a target situated in the centre of the city. 
Tasfirat refers to a temporary jailhouse for inmates accused of terrorism and 
awaiting trial and for convicts to be transferred to prisons. The attack was 
preceded on September 19th by an attempted escape from Tikrit Central prison 
                                            
465 Jessica D Lewis, “Al Qaeda in Iraq is resurgent”, Middle East Security Report 14  , September 
2013, www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf 
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thwarted by intelligence services, without details467. There is a possibility that this 
attempted escape was to be launched at the same time as the attack on Tasfirat 
prison, which was less guarded that the city’s Central Prison.  
In the video entitled Saleel Sawareem 3468, the IS media production wing Al 
Furqan revealed some details about the prison break. Five minutes in, a fugitive 
narrates what occurred inside the prison. According to him, inmates were in 
coordination with attackers and were divided into seven groups of 56 inmates, 
ready to attack the guards. The fugitive revealed that an attack from outside was 
the only possible modus operandi to free the prisoners after their failure to dig a 
tunnel a few months before. This episode was confirmed by the Iraqi press, which 
revealed that in January 2012, an attempted escape with a tunnel was thwarted 
by the authorities469. According to the group, silenced weapons, hand grenades, 
and explosive belts were smuggled into the prison to the inmates. The Minister 
of Justice confirmed that “collusion between some guards and inmates occurred 
in the Tasfirat prison”470. The prison break was coordinated from inside and 
outside the prison, which was the first time this had occurred. An SVBIED was 
detonated at the entrance of the prison while the roads leading to it were cut off. 
The whole prison fell into the hands of the inmates and the attackers. The 
attackers wore police uniforms and used cars similar to those driven by police to 
cross the checkpoints in the city471. From the 303 inmates at the prison, 116 
escaped including 47 inmates awaiting their execution; 12 guards and police 
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officers, as well as five inmates, were killed. Prison files were destroyed during 
the prison break to conceal the identity of the fugitives. During the attack, two 
VBIEDs were parked in Tikrit downtown but were defused by security forces. 
Their deployment was likely a diversion manoeuvre in order to accentuate the 
dispersion of the ISF in the city Iraqi forces announced the arrest of 40 escaped 
inmates in the following days of the prison break. Three days after the jailbreak, 
a new wave of 13 VBIEDs hit the country, the majority of which targeted Baghdad 
and Taji, with additional attacks in Baqubah, Kut, Fallujah, Hit and Mosul472. 
The campaign passed through a rest period of several months with no prison 
breaks attempted, and few VBIEDs detonated. As a result, from November 2012 
to February 2013, IS’ VBIED waves focused their attacks upon civilian and 
government targets along the green line separating Iraqi Kurdistan from the rest 
of Iraq473.During this operational pause, most of the effort was oriented on Kirkuk 
with the deliberate strategy to exploit a critical vulnerability of the Iraqi 
Government.  This time range permitted the incorporation to IS ranks of the Tikrit 
Tasfirat prison fugitives and was part of the defensive requirement to protect 
against ISF’s security measures as a consequence of the prison break.  
 
2-The July 2013 Abu Ghraib Prison Break  
From February to June 2013, ISIS focused its nationwide VBIED campaign 
on the capital Baghdad with large VBIED waves striking at a steady tempo of 30-
day intervals474. After May 15th, 2013, the VBIED campaign quadrupled in 
frequency and remained focused upon Shia targets in Baghdad. Half of the 
VBIED waves documented in Jessica Lewis’ study occurred during this last 
quarter of the campaign. At the end of the campaign, Baghdad, considered as 
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the nerve centre of the Iraqi state, had the highest number of VBIEDs. This 
methodology of attacking the periphery before focusing on the centre mirrors 
Hart’s advice to first concentrate on the periphery before attacking the enemy’s 
centre. 
The last phase culminated with the attack on the Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons on 
21, July 2013. The prison assaults and the VBIED waves in Baghdad 
synchronised the non-confrontational operation of VBIED waves and 
confrontational assaults on prisons. At the time of the attack, around 70 000 
members of the security forces were present in Baghdad while 3000 were 
positioned in Abu Ghraib prison and its vicinity475. In the statement taking credit 
for the attack, the group presented the details of the operation, named “Qahr Al 
Tawagheet”, the “Destruction of the Idols”. The attack was planned by Abu 
Muhannad Al Suweidawi, a former air force intelligence unit officer in the Iraqi 
Baathist Army. He was part of the same unity than Hajji Bakr and would lead the 
IS during the Anbar offensive 2014.   
In preparation for the attack, the roads between Baghdad-Mosul and Baghdad- 
Abu Ghraib were cut while the linking of both prisons was secured with the 
elimination of army checkpoints leading to them476. The Al Taji prison is 
entrenched inside a heavily fortified military camp in Al Taji situated 25 km north 
of Baghdad.  Back in January 2013, 12 inmates from the group escaped by night, 
but the modus operandi of their prison break was not disclosed by the press477. 
The method of escape was “soft” and did not require an assault from the outside. 
At the beginning of the attack, the eighth division and Al Taji military base were 
pounded by Grad missiles. Three SVBIEDs were detonated targeting the 
principal entrance, the south entrance and the second entrance. At the same 
time, prisoners started a rebellion by igniting a fire. They managed to escape from 
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their cells, killing some guards but could not escape from the prison after being 
fired upon by the remaining guards, causing the death of 150 prisoners. 
Nevertheless, 50 inmates managed to escape according to security sources. 
Despite the use of SVBIEDs, the perimeter of the prison was not breached and 
prisoners did not receive any further help from outsiders. Indeed, the prison of 
Taji, situated inside a military heavily fortified garrison, was considered almost 
impossible to breach for IS’ forces. It is likely that the attack was not meant to 
succeed but was orchestrated as a diversion in order to disperse and disorientate 
the enemy’s forces and push ISF stationed in Baghdad into a dilemma.  
Unlike Taji prison, the Abu Ghraib prison was guarded not by the Army but rather 
by the police, which had the responsibility to guard the perimeter outside the 
prison. Around 340 members of the Federal Police under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Interior were guarding the towers, the main entrance and the vicinity.  
The guards inside the prison were not armed while Army patrols were conducted 
as a routine on a daily basis before the sunset.478 Curiously, it was reported479 
that the day of the attack, the 17th division was not deployed for its routine patrol 
while the only one deployed was the fifth division. The group very likely had 
previous knowledge that on that day of the attack, the prison was less guarded 
than usual. 
Simultaneously with the Taji prison attack, at 9 pm the perimeter of Abu Ghraib 
prison, situated west of Baghdad, was first bombed by a hundred of rockets and 
RPGs. It was breached from its main entrance and the exterior walls by three 
SVBIEDs and finally assaulted by nine inghimassi fighters wearing suicide vests, 
small arms and mortars. A riot started from inside the prison after the power was 
cut off.  The rescue teams coming from Baghdad were ambushed and slowed for 
more than three hours, offering enough time for the fugitives to escape480. The 
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Abu Ghraib prison was overrun, and the attackers were able to occupy the facility.  
Like in Tikrit, inmates were armed and managed to smuggle light weapons and 
grenades inside the prison.  ISF returned fire into the morning, killing an unknown 
number of IS’ fighters and 71 prisoners while 41 security members were reported 
killed. Despite their efforts and the security measures taken in Baghdad, between 
600 and 1000 prisoners escaped from Abu Ghraib that night.  
The Abu Ghraib prison was the less fortified prison attacked that night and had 
topographic attributes more prone to see the attack succeed. The operation saw 
a massive use of 12 SVBIEDs in order to breach the prison’s walls and gates. 
This effort was accompanied with coordination from inmates inside the prison and 
the support of IED and mortar cells. The synchronicity of both operations 
demonstrated a high level of planning for a complex, specialised and risky 
operation. Abu Ghraib prison break was a fully-fledged military operation 
requiring intelligence gathering, pre-planning and a well-studied escape plan with 
all the required logistical resources.  
Consequences of the prison break 
Because of its enormous impact, this operation concluded the “Breaking 
the Walls” campaign and had important benefits for the group. First, it provided 
an essential influx of human resources by freeing fighters and high-level cadres 
of the first and second generation of jihadists in Iraq.  With at least 500 fighters 
freed, this infusion of manpower was five times greater than the one produced 
after the Tikrit prison break. The press 481indicated that multiple cars were waiting 
for the inmates at a one-kilometre distance from the prison before dispersing in 
many areas such as Samarra, Al Amiriyah (west of Baghdad), Fallujah and 
Ramadi. Some fugitives were also transferred to Syria for operational 
deployment.  According to the local press,482 leaders of the group in prison before 
their escape were already planning the takeover of Iraqi cities in 2014. It is said 
                                            
481 ibid 
482“Daesh planned to take over the cities from inside the prisons” , Al Araby newspaper , 8/8/2017 
URL: https://goo.gl/MYkpy1  
241 
 
that the future governor of Wilayat Jazira and the charismatic ground leader Abu 
Waheeb from Anbar were among the fugitives. Other reports 483 which have not 
been confirmed went even further speculating that the architect of the Mosul 
assault in 2014, Al Bilawi, was freed. What was confirmed484 by IS was the freeing 
of Abu Nabil al-Anbari, the future governor of Salahudeen, who led the attack on 
Samara in 2014  and was sent in 2015 to Libya to be the group’s leader there.  
What was worrying for the Iraqi security forces is that it lost track of many IS 
members arrested by the US forces from 2007 to 2010. 
For the group, it constituted a lesson learned after having failed twice to breach 
Abu Ghraib prison in 2004 and 2005485. On both these occasions, AQI faced the 
US forces and planned the operations as retaliatory raids in response to the 
torture perpetrated in the facility. The mentor of Zarqawi, Abu Anas Shami, died 
while leading the first attempt. A year later, poor intelligence gathering did not 
allow the attackers to breach the prison. Regardless of their failure, these 
operations held great symbolic and propaganda value for the group. This time IS 
succeeded in what its predecessors had tried, which was a source of prestige 
and confirmation of the group’s military evolution towards a more professional 
army.  
The operation generated a climate of suspicion among the security apparatus in 
Iraq and the political factions. The chief of the 17th division, Nasr Al Ghanam, 
whose division did not show up the day of the attack on Abu Ghraib Prison 
resigned. The Minister of Justice quickly presented internal documents of the 
prison distributed to the Federal Police showing that it had prior knowledge that 
an attack against the prison was imminent and that attackers had collaborators 
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at the top level from inside the prison486. The security forces were said to have 
neglected important information that would have got their attention such as the 
fact that two days before the attack, militants had warned civilians in villages in 
the vicinity of the prison not to take the main road487.  On the 8th and 24th of June 
Prime Minister Al Maliki received memos from the Ministry of Justice warning 
about an incoming large-scale attack against prisons in Baghdad using car 
bombs488. Five other memos, one even 12 hours before the attack, warned the 
security forces about the imminence of an attack489. According to Iraqi journalist 
Al Habobi’s article, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior also redacted a note before 
the attack, warning about “the gathering of Al Qaeda in Iraq terrorists and the 
likelihood of the targeting of prisons”490. This note suggests that the Iraqi 
intelligence services were able to breach the organisation’s structure but without 
the expected result of thwarting such attacks. According to the Committee 
Defence of Security, “Al Qaeda in Iraq lured the intelligence services before the 
operation by spreading tones of information which were false and true, making it 
impossible for them to find the valid information”491.  
Finally, this operation was also an advantage for the group, consolidating their 
popular support through spectacular attacks that raised their prestige. Many of 
the fugitives were Sunnis of the region whose families claimed they were 
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innocent. The ISF conducted security operations in 4800 houses north and west 
of Baghdad in response to the attack and detained 250 suspects, but none of 
them were fugitives492. These actions further alienated the ISF from the 
population, which considered it as a measure of collective punishment. At the 
same time, it negatively influenced the confidence of the Iraqi people towards 
their government and security forces, demonstrating the group’s ability to breach 
the government’s most secured areas. These elements participated in the public 
disaffection towards the government and the steady dislocation of ISF’s 
psychological balance, which is the indispensable prelude to a decisive victory 
according to Liddle Hart’s precepts.  
To conclude this section, I present now the points of convergence and divergence 
of IS’ strategy during its prison break attempts and the principles of LH’s theory 
of the indirect approach.  
1-Adjust your end to your means 
This guideline refers to the necessity of the group using its forces with 
limitation by taking into account the balance of power. Throughout the “Breaking 
the Walls” campaign, IS maintained the initiative in its offensives and held the 
surprise effect in successive phases divided by operational pauses. It affected 
the enemy’s morale by launching regular waves of attacks, which culminated in 
eight prison escapes and more than 800 inmates liberated. The first prisons 
attacked were the less guarded targets such as the police station in Diyala 
(September 19th, 2012 attack on the Hib Hib police directorate) or Tasfirat prisons 
but progressively, the group turned to target the most fortified prisons and highly 
symbolic prisons in Baghdad.   
Strategic planners and VBIED cells seem to have been in coordination in order 
to advance the strategic objective of the campaign. Indeed, during the first assault 
on Baghdad prisons on August 5th, the VBIED wave was dispersed throughout 
Iraq. For the second assault on Baghdad’s prisons, the VBIED waves and the 
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attacks on prisons were concentrated on Baghdad.  Comparing the two assaults 
on Baghdad prisons, the resources used were also very different. During the first 
assault in August 2012, no SVBIEDs were used, and attackers did not have the 
logistical support for carrying out a mass escape. The first assault had the 
characteristic of the classical inghimassi operations, storming a building with no 
escape plan while the second assault a year later in July 2013 was a full-fledged 
military operation with the use of 12 SVBIEDs and dozens of units. We can 
speculate that the first assault on August 12th 2012 was more a show of force at 
the heart of the capital to mark the inauguration of the campaign proclaimed by 
the leader of the group a few weeks before. A month later, the group attacked 
prisons in the Iraqi provinces of Diyala and Tikrit with storming assault groups 
and SVBIEDs. During this first phase, the real target for which more resources 
were allocated was the Tikrit Tasfirat prison. For the reasons presented above, I 
consider that IS leaders adhered to this principle. 
2-Always keep your object in mind. 
This principle highlights the fact that the objective rather than the means 
is the most important in a military campaign. It refers to a flexibility of the mind in 
the selection of the means according to circumstances. For the case study, every 
prison assault saw first a “soft” prison break attempt using tunnels or deception 
to distract the guards: Abu Ghraib in August 2012, Tasfirat Prison in January 2012 
and Taji Prison in January 2012. Only the Taji prison break succeeded.  When 
this soft modus operandi failed, the group used assault teams to storm the 
prisons. Other prison breaks did not see a soft attempt before the violent one 
such as the assault on Baghdad anti-terrorist unit on August 5th and the assault 
of Hib Hib in September 2012. Both assaults failed, and there was no coordination 
with the inmates inside the prison. Afterwards, we can observe that the nature of 
the attacks went further into complexity with better coordination between 
attackers and inmates and the involvement of many military cells such as in Tikrit 
Tasfirat, Abu Ghraib and Taji. While for Tikrit and Abu Ghraib both assaults 
succeeded completely, in Taji it succeeded partially with only 50 inmates freed. 




3 -Choose the line (or course) of least expectation. 
The purpose of this guideline is to achieve psychological surprise. As 
described by Jessica Lewis, the “Breaking the Walls” campaign, because of its 
wide geographical dispersion, seems to have been shaped by a coordinated 
leadership and a decentralised execution. This operational framework made it 
very difficult for ISF to foresee where the next attack would occur.  Most of the 
VBIEDs detonated in Baghdad were manufactured outside the capital. 
Throughout 2012-2013, IS’ cells used a network of unofficial suburban roads in 
Baghdad’s belt without being spotted by the security forces.  In the days following 
and before the attack on Abu Ghraib and the Tikrit Tasfirat prison, VBIED waves 
were orchestrated as a diversion for the attack.  However, we shall note that Iraqi 
intelligence had prior knowledge of an imminent prison break attempt that would 
take place, but it did not know where or when.  The attackers in the prison breaks 
sometimes used uniforms and vehicles of the police (Tikrit and Baghdad 
counterterrorism centre) to deceive the ISF, which emphasised the surprise effect 
of the operation. All the attacks on prisons occurred at night adding to the surprise 
effect and the impossibility for the guards to figure out what was happening. 
According to the testimony from a guard inside Abu Ghraib, they had to use their 
flashlight from their mobile phone during the clashes to see the attackers.493  For 
the reasons presented above, I consider that IS leaders adhered to this principle. 
4 -Exploit the line of least resistance.  
  This principle is a corollary of the previous one by achieving physical 
surprise on the enemy.  The “Breaking the Walls” campaign first phase 
concentrated on weak points in Iraq such as the Kurdish cities in the North and 
the Iraqi province of the South, Salahudeen, before turning to the centre. On 21st 
July 2013, the prison which was the focus of IS efforts, was the least fortified one, 
the Abu Ghraib prison. The day of the attack was not fortuitous; it took place when 
the 17th division did not patrol to secure its perimeter. During the three main 
complex assaults on prisons (Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tikrit), attackers came from 




four fronts encircling the prison. Unfortunately, I did not find any report or 
information about the routes of the attackers and their projection site for the 
attacks on Tikrit, Abu Ghraib and Taji to determine which roads they took and 
how the ISF could not spot their convoys.  They also benefited from collaborators 
from inside the prison, which reduced the capacity of the defenders. Except for 
the attack on the Counter Terrorism Centre in August 2012, which failed, if we 
consider that the objective was to free inmates. In the eight prison breaks that 
succeeded, the group tried to attack the less guarded targets and before the 
assaults, reduced the defensive capacity of the guards.  
6-Ensuring that both plans and dispositions are flexible―adaptable to 
circumstances.  
The planning of the prison breaks was a long-term work of infiltration. 
When they failed using a soft way, the attack on the prisons took place a few 
months later with the support of corrupted guards and inmates inside the prisons. 
The Tikrit prison break was followed by an attempt to dig a tunnel inside the prison 
to secure the escape of the prisoners. The same applied to Baghdad and the Abu 
Ghraib Prison. Regarding the Taji prison, an escape using a soft method 
succeeded in January 2013, when 12 important members of the group escaped. 
This element gives even more weight to the suggestion that despite its large 
scale, the attack on Taji was a diversion given the fact that six months previously 
the group had managed to free its members by an alternative method. During the 
campaign, the group was flexible and used techniques adaptable to each 
situation: soft prison breaks or armed assaults coordinated with inmates and with 
the help of insiders from the prison. 
5-Taking a line of operation which offers alternative objectives.  
This derives from the idea of putting the enemy on the “horns of a dilemma” 
by forcing him to disperse its forces and be indecisive.  The synchronicity of the 
Abu Ghraib and Taji attacks, which are about 50 km apart, demonstrated the 
important logistical capacity of the group. Attacking both prisons at the same time 
was a deliberate attempt to put the ISF in Baghdad into a dilemma, which 
produced indecision. Ambushes against rescue teams coming from Baghdad 
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increased the state of paralysis of the security forces furthermore during the first 
hours.  
7- Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard, 
while he is well placed to parry or evade  
This maxim is one that seems not to have been followed by IS during the 
prison break attacks. The way that IS’ planners sacrificed their soldiers and the 
prisoners in Al Taji Prison knowing that it was a diversion does not follow LH’s 
recommendations of not wasting human and material resources while attacking 
a well-defended target. At the same time, using SVBIEDs in divertive attacks 
makes it more “real” in order to deceive the enemy with more efficiency.  Equally, 
during the Abu Ghraib prison break, attackers targeted the most fortified zones 
which were guarded such as the entrance and the military points nearby. The 
group’s confidence in SVBIEDs to breach defence lines did not deter it from 
attacking strong and heavily guarded points. For that reason, IS did not follow this 
principle during this campaign. 
 
8-Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it 
has once failed. 
Testing IS’ adherence to this principle can be studied in the cases where 
IS’ first assault did not succeed and they could carry out others. Abu Muhammad 
Al Suweidawi and Hajji Bakr were from the first generation of Iraqi leaders who 
joined Zarqawi in 2003. They graduated from the same military school and were 
part of the same air force intelligence unit. They joined Tawheed Wal Jihad during 
the early months after its creation around the figure of Zarqawi. They likely 
participated in or at least witnessed the two failed assaults on Abu Ghraib prison 
in 2004 and 2005. The difference between these attacks and the one on Abu 
Ghraib seven years later was the poor level of intelligence they had at that time. 
The attackers did not coordinate with prisoners inside and did not even know that 
US troops had dug trenches around the prison, which made it impossible for the 
SVBIEDs to reach the walls. The attack this time was different in its scale, the 
level of preparation and the coordination that confirmed a process of lessons 
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learned among the group’s strategists and military planners. This surge in 
capacity and resources in 2013 was paramount for the group in order to prepare 
its urban assaults. The same planners of the prison breaks were those that 
planned the assaults on Iraqi cities a year later. It is very likely that the attack on 
prisons understood as highly guarded fixed targets served as a small-scale 
simulation for the more significant manoeuvre of mounting urban assaults a year 
later. From our study of the prison attacks, a strategic pattern seemed to emerge 
based on a simultaneous attack on two targets (prisons or cities) with one move 
being a diversion while the group put most of its forces on the less guarded target. 
 
Map of the Fallujah region Source Google Maps 
3-The Battle of Fallujah in January 2014: a quick decision 
after a patient run 
As narrated in the tactical study on the IS’ rebound, throughout the year of 
2013, the group’s activity in Anbar and more precisely in Fallujah expanded. As 
described by Middle Eastern specialist Michael Knights, the number of attacks 
claimed by the group rose from an average of 16 per month in the first quarter of 
2013 to 31 in the last quarter of that year, with a peak of 39 incidents in December 
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2013494. IS’ initial takeover of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi was preceded by an 
attack in the Horan Valley on 23rd December 2013, which diverted ISF from the 
cities of Anbar to track down IS’ cells in the Anbar desert. This decapitation attack 
involved three suicide bombers targeting the commander of the 7th Iraqi Army 
Division and the commander of the 28th Brigade495. According to the press, 
informers lured the commanders to a house in a remote area in Rutbah under the 
pretext of raiding a training camp. Mohammed Ahmed al-Kurwi, commander of 
the 7th Division, was portrayed in social media by Sunni activists as the 
perpetrators of the Hawijah Massacre back in April 2013496.  
During the night of December 30th, armed locals groups were deployed in the 
streets. Massed at the main Fallujah protest site, they answered calls made by 
leaders of the protests Abd al-Malik al-Sadi and Grand Mufti Sheikh Rafi` al-Rifai 
to block the road preventing reinforcements from reaching Ramadi and western 
Anbar. Fighting erupted between protestors and the Army in Fallujah leading to 
14 casualties. The Iraqi Army retreated from the city the same night and imposed 
a prolonged siege on the city497. IS’ convoys felt there was enough security to 
hold parades in daylight across the city. Before declaring Fallujah unilaterally as 
part of the Islamic State at Friday prayers on January 3, 2014, the group strategy 
was patient and pragmatic. 
In order to repel ISF’s assault, IS fighters in Fallujah openly cooperated with 
insurgent groups and tribal leaders opposed to the government. The opposition 
forces against the presence of the army in Anbar were linked with the protestors. 
They represented the military wing of pro-autonomy parties in Anbar. They had 
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coordination with the military council of the Iraqi revolution, the Karama political 
party and were composed of the tribes of Al Jamila and Albu Alwan from south 
Fallujah. They were not against IS nor the Federal Police (composed of locals) 
but were in total confrontation against the Iraqi Army. The tribe of Albu Issa, which 
the ex-minister of Finance was from, had since 2006 been the biggest ISI enemy 
in the city.  However, many factors forced tribal groups and their military council 
not to confront it. 
First, as advanced by tribal fighters in the ICG report498, it was due to shortages 
of weapons and the group’s efficiency in defending the city that created a needed 
buffer zone between them and the ISF. IS members were also allowed to join the 
military council under certain conditions such as not targeting Sahawat leaders, 
not imposing their agenda, and joining it as individuals.499 Theoretically, they were 
supposed to be under the command of the military council. However, their 
efficiency in defending the city made the council more and more dependent on 
them. The more military pressure there was upon the city, the more the council 
needed IS fighters to defend itself. Due to its military supremacy and the 
dependence of the military council on its military experience and capabilities, the 
group ultimately gained the upper hand. In a sense, Nouri Maliki’s policy in Al 
Anbar and the inflexibility towards tribal leaders pushed them into the arms of the 
group, which appeared to become vital for the city’s defence.   
Despite the claims that the group was subordinate to the military council, there 
were no real means of checking the group’s decisions and it manoeuvred freely 
inside the city. After IS conquered the city of Fallujah in January, it changed its 
approach against the Sahawat leaders and the other groups by monopolising the 
power. Consequently, the spokesperson Abu Muhammad al Adnani made a 
statement on Fallujah in April 2014 in which he claimed: “We have returned to 
the cities and controlled the ground, and we will be killed a thousand times before 
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we think of going back. In the cities and provinces that are under our control, on 
top of them, Fallujah…there will be no place in it for the secularists. For Fallujah 
is Fallujah of the Mujahidin and Anbar is Anbar of the Mujahidin”500. By late June 
2014, fighters coming from Syria seized the borders with Iraq. At least 70% of 
Anbar Province was under IS control, including the cities of Fallujah, Rutbah and 
half of Ramadi. The border town of Al Qaim was conquered after the withdrawal 
of Iraqi troops, offering to the group a territorial continuity with its Syrian territory 
and the city of Albu Kamal501.   
The city of Saqlawiyah (15 km north of Fallujah and 50 km from Baghdad) was 
the theatre of a siege made by IS fighters to an important army base. A thousand 
soldiers were without support or food supply after the fall of the last supply route 
represented by a bridge a week before the assault. The soldiers under siege were 
in such a state of disarray that they “started to dig and drink dirty salt water and 
eat rotten tomatoes”502.  On 21st September, the camp was stormed using a very 
original way. Soldiers interviewed by the Washington Post indicated, “They 
received a message coming from army commanders via walkie-talkie that a 
rescue mission was on its way and had taken control of a nearby bridge”503.In 
reality, they were IS’ fighters dressed as Iraqi counterterrorism forces. As 
described by survivors, “The first three Humvees were ahead of the rest with 
some military trucks. We just let them in […] One Humvee exploded in the middle 
of the camp. The two others drove to the perimeter and detonated”504.  
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Only two hundred Iraqi soldiers were able to flee the camp while the remaining 
three hundred were killed or abducted by the group. There were also allegations 
that the group used chlorine gas in the attack, which sparked fear among the 
troops.505  IS fighters also used the cell phones of dead soldiers to communicate 
with and intimidate the remaining trapped soldiers506. This episode is an example 
of how the group’s local commanders used a deceptive manoeuvre not expected 
by the enemy by taking advantage of its dire situation. They surprised them in 
order to storm a well-entrenched base after their failure to storm it with standard 
means. Several guidelines of Liddle Hart’s indirect approach were thus applied 
during this assault. 
 
 
Map of Ramadi and its tribes. Source507 
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4-Ramadi Battle January 2014-May 2015: a 14-month war 
of attrition.  
The first assault on Ramadi and stalemate in the city (January 2014-October 
2014) 
           Comparing to Fallujah, the situation in Ramadi was different because of 
the historical defiance the group suffered from tribes in the city. The same night 
that Fallujah was attacked, IS took advantage of the security vacuum created by 
ISF’s decision to withdraw from the city’s downtown after tribal mediation. On 
January the 1st of 2014, IS’ sleeper cells inside the city ransacked police stations. 
The group also was able to spoil the weapons of the Iraqi Army and its “new 
Sahawat movement” led by Sheikh Mohamed Al Hais in Ramadi and Sheikh 
Wissam Jordan in southern Al Anbar508. Under the command of Abu 
Abdurrahman Al Bilawi, convoys coming from the desert seized many areas on 
the periphery of Ramadi. They concentrated their efforts on the weakest part of 
the city, avoiding clashes with powerful tribes of the Sahawat such as the Albu 
Alwan and the Albu Jabr. Al Bilawi’s sleeper cells in Albu Farj, Albu Ali, Malahema 
and Khhalidiya were activated in the wake of the ISF retreat. They started from 
Al Jazeera and tried to storm Hamidiyah, Sofiya, Zawiya and Habaniyah, but the 
Albu Fahd tribe stood against them. The least defended places in Ramadi were 
the areas of Albu Faraj, Albu Ali, Albu Abid and the Stadium, while the best 
defended were the Albu Alwan, Albu Jaber Albu Risha and the downtown 
government complex. In fact, despite its ideological animosity and historical grief 
the group did not attack the other groups of the military council and focused on 
attacking the forces coming from outside of Anbar and its local allies. IS fighters 
also took advantage of the fact that ISF could not distinguish between opposition 
forces and IS’ fighters.  
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The Offensive in November/ December 2014   
The situation did not evolve much in Ramadi during the following months, while 
the eyes of the world were turned towards Mosul. In October of 2014, IS took the 
city of Hit, executing many coordinated attacks throughout the principal enemy 
centres in Anbar. The town of Hit was attacked from three fronts at dawn while 
other assaults were coordinated against the Anbar Operations Command north 
of Ramadi and the 7th Division headquarters at Al Assad Airbase in Al Baghdadi. 
These synchronised attacks were probably designed to disperse the coalition’s 
airpower supporting the Iraqi Army509. The takeover of Hit was necessary in order 
to isolate further the city of Ramadi, cutting its supply lines coming from the west. 
IS’ second push to take the city of Ramadi occurred on 21st November of 2014. 
The attack started at night in the village of Al Shujairiya, situated 20km west of 
the city. According to military expert Hamid Shandoukh, the attack was possible 
after “the river dried up, which granted the possibility to IS’ fighters to cross the 
river without using boats”510. This surprise move by taking advantage of a change 
in the environment surprised ISF forces in the village and attracted their allies in 
Ramadi. Three days later, the group attacked Ramadi’s downtown part held by 
government forces and seized houses of the Dulaimi tribe after taking control of 
the Al-Mu'allimin district and the Haouz area in the centre. The attackers were 
able to infiltrate into neighbouring areas controlled by their enemy using small 
boats to cross the river511by night and infiltrating the refugee flow of civilians. The 
fighting focused on Ramadi’s eastern Sijariya neighbourhood512. At the same 
time, the districts of Albu Hayis, Albu Fahd, and Albu Alwan, which were 
traditional strongholds of the Sahawat, also came under attack. Unlike in January 
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of 2014, this time powerful Sahawat districts were targeted by the group. The Abu 
Fahd clan claimed that civilian refugees settled in their neighbourhood facilitated 
the entry of IS’ fighters at 2 am. They took them to the rooftops of the houses and 
started to target tribal fighters with sniper rifles. 
These clashes and infiltrations were intended to divert the attention of tribal 
fighters and prevent them from supporting the ISF entrenched in the city centre. 
There, IS fighters tried a push and were able to seize Ramadi’s Education 
Directorate and were, as described in this press report, “less than 20 meters away 
from the government complex that includes the Anbar Council seat and other 
government departments, including the prison and the province’s intelligence 
branch directorates”513. At the same time, supply lines to the Ramadi government 
complex represented by the roads to the Iraqi Army’s 8th division in the west and 
Habaniyah air base in the east were cut off. However, the whole operation was 
thwarted because of the massive air support offered by coalition fighters. In the 
following days, tribal groups and the ISF were able to retake entrances that led 
to the al-Hoz district and push back IS’ forces to their initial positions. Sporadic 
fighting continued during December. IS’ fighters took some new areas but failed 
to advance towards the well-entrenched government complex. During this 
offensive, the group did not use a massive range of SVBIEDs in order to 
overwhelm the heavily fortified static defences.  
The third push in March 2015 
During the third assault of the group on the city, this time it used new 
techniques with tunnels and explosives to avoid detection. On March 11th 2015, 
after digging an 800-foot long tunnel during two months, IS fighters detonated 
seven tons of explosives below the government complex, killing and wounding 
dozens of Iraqi soldiers514. At the same time, a major assault using waves of 
SVBIEDs tried to dislocate ISF’s defences in the government complex. The attack 
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failed because by using precision anti-tank missiles the defenders destroyed the 
SVBIEDs before they could explode. On March 15th, IS exploded another tunnel 
below the government complex, but without a coordinated assault. This type of 
operation holds a significant surprise effect and can have demoralising 
consequences on the enemy. However, in both cases IS could not exploit the 
dislocation effect of such an operation with subsequent concentrated use of 
SVBIEDs to overwhelm the defenders. This time, airpower was not necessary to 
support ISF troops entrenched in the government complex. 
The final offensive May 2015 
IS fighters commanded by Abu Muhannad Al Suweidawi waited two 
months before conducting the final assault on the city’s downtown. From 
September 2014, entrenched Iraqi troops were short of ammunition and had to 
purchase weapons and ammunition on the black market. Most of the 7th Division, 
based in the province, were combat ineffective. Tribes such as Albu Nimr were 
claiming to have a shortage of weapons back in December515. In contrast, IS took 
advantage of its freedom of movement in the Anbar desert to deploy to the 
Ramadi front its best troops from Anbar, Salahudeen and Aleppo. On 15th May 
2015, it launched a large-scale offensive against the Albu Jabr area and the 
government complex. The same day it suffered the killing of the commander of 
the assault, Abu Muhannad Al-Suwaydawi, by a coalition airstrike. He was the 
planner of the Abu Ghraib prison break back in July 2013 and he had been the 
IS Governor for the Anbar region since 2014. The attack started at dawn with the 
use of 12 cars and captured Humvees as SVBIEDs. They filed behind a bulldozer 
against the government complex’s concrete barriers and detonated, creating 
huge explosions. This time, the flow and pace of the SVBIED wave were so high 
that ISF’s anti-tank units did not succeed in targeting them before their explosion. 
As a result, the morale of the army cracked, and some fighters began to flee. The 
next day, 20 additional SVBIEDs were deployed hitting Iraqi Army bases and 
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breaching fortifications in the city. IS was able to control the downtown by the end 
of May 17th after using around 30 SVBIEDs for a single battle516. The Iraqi Army 
and its Golden Division retreated entirely from the city while the tribal militias were 
still resisting in their neighbourhoods but were finally overwhelmed.  
Air support, which was crucial for preventing IS’ assaults on the city back in 
November 2014, could not intervene because of a sandstorm.517 During the first 
day, it delayed American warplanes and kept them from launching airstrikes 
helping the ISF and their allies. After the storm, IS’ fighters and ISF troops were 
so intermingled in close combat that pilots could not distinguish between them. 
IS took profit from this momentum to overrun the city. The timing of the attack 
was perfectly chosen from a tactical point using the sandstorm to suppress air 
support for ISF troops. Politically, it coincided with the death penalty sentences 
pronounced by Baghdad against Sahawat leaders, which affected their will to 
fight.  The Battle of “Abu Muhannad As-Suweidawi” as called by IS’ media, unlike 
the attack on Mosul, was not the result of a strategic surprise but rather a 
positional battle, a 14 months effort to take the city.   
After the takeover of the city, the group was able to achieve its strategic goals of 
securing a corridor and a continuous supply route of 500 km from Fallujah to Deir 
Ezzor in Syria.  Only one city resisted the IS’ 2014/15 offensive in Anbar. It was 
Haditha where the Sahawat led by the Jaghafiya and Albu Nimr tribes resisted 
while being surrounded by the group. Historically, the Jaghafiya tribe always 
spearheaded the fight against IS and its predecessors in the province. This city 
is important in IS’ eyes since it is believed to be the birthplace of the Islamic State, 
where the Mutayaboon alliance took place back in 2005. Despite multiple 
assaults, the city never fell into IS’ hands.  Even Al Adnani directly threatened the 
tribe with complete annihilation comparing their fate to the one of the Shuweitat 
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tribe in Deir Ezzor518. IS tried to settle an arrangement with the tribe by proposing 
to the Sahawat safe passage after handing over the city without fighting but it was 
never accepted519.  
In addition to the tribal rejection of IS in Haditha, the presence of the Iraqi Army’s 
8th Division and Shia militia volunteers and the air support provided by the Ain 
Assad airbase situated 50km south of the city explained IS’ failure to take the city. 
From October 2014, major assaults on the city were always foiled by the fierce 
resistance of the tribes coupled with the systematic intervention of coalition forces 
stationed near the city. Even when the city of Baghdadi near the airbase fell in 
February 2015520, the group was not able to reach and storm Ayn Assad airbase 
due to the presence inside of hundreds of US Marines. The first direct clashes 
between IS’ fighters and US Marines took place inside the airbase when 
inghimassi fighters succeeded in entering the facility but were quickly eliminated 
by the defenders. The same applies to the Taqqadum airbase in Habaniyah, 
(situated 74 km west of Baghdad) another strategic point of Anbar heavily fortified 
and defended by airplanes that was nearly impossible to overrun. The base 
offered to the coalition the ability to mobilise and deploy their aircraft quickly in 
the different theatres of operations in Anbar and beyond. The airbase was also 
separated from IS fighters’ position by the Euphrates River. The group used the 
Ramadi Dam it conquered back in May 2015 in an attempt to cut off much of its 
flow in order to build a passage521.  In front of this situation, the soldiers stationed 
at the airbase were pumping water in from nearby Habaniyah Lake to keep levels 
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high. Both airbases and the city of Haditha resisted IS’ assaults, which 
demonstrates that the group was not an irresistible force in 2014 and could be 
stopped by the combination of two factors: active air support and the intact 
fighting spirit of ground troops whether from the tribes, Shia militias or the army.
 
Map showing the territories controlled by IS (in black)in Anbar  creating a corridor from 
Fallujah  to Hit (23/08/2015) 522 
5-North east offensive and the takeover of Nineveh 
province  
The province of Nineveh remained, even after the US withdrawal and the 
relative pacification of the country, the last stronghold for the group. Back in 2008, 
ISI identified it as a critical region for its logistics and freedom of movement in 
order to maintain its connection with Syria. From 2013, the Al Jazeera desert, 
which is traversable by vehicles, offered a vast ‘no man’s land’ for its convoys, 
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from which reinforcements from Syria could arrive. IS’ other focal point in the 
governorate was to isolate the city of Mosul from Baghdad by controlling or 
disturbing ISF’s provision routes around the axis  Shirqat –Qayara –Shura.  While 
the Anbar crisis occupied three Iraqi military divisions to fight IS and the tribes, 
the security situation started to deteriorate seriously in Nineveh with the setup of 
fake checkpoints and surge in attacks throughout the Baghdad – Mosul highway. 
We saw in the analysis of IS’ claimed operations how the months of January and 
February were the ones where the group confronted the ISF at a magnitude never 
seen before. 
A couple of months later, the events leading to the takeover of large parts of the 
northern Iraqi territory started with a blow for the group, the death of the alleged 
mastermind of the assault. Abu Mohamad Al Bilawi was killed on June 4th; while 
surrounded by ISF he detonated his explosive belt. Instead of preventing the 
assault on Mosul, his death did not change the planning of IS’ grand offensive 
and likely accelerated it. Al Bilawi was for IS the chief of the general military 
council in Iraq. He graduated from military school in 1993 and joined Tawheed 
Wal-Jihad in 2003 as a captain of the Iraqi Army forming the first nucleus of the 
Iraqi commandants surrounding Zarqawi.  
The divertive attack on Samarra (5th June) 
The North Eastern offensive started in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s birthplace, 
the city of Samarra, in Salahudeen. Samarra, because of its symbolic value, is 
considered as one of the most sacred places for Shias and is a hotbed for Sunni 
groups allied with the government in Baghdad such as the Islamic Party (Muslim 
Brotherhood-oriented party). On the midnight of 5th of June, 150 fighters attacked 
the city from the south using pickups mounted with anti-aircraft guns. According 
to local reports523, they came from the south and more precisely the Hamrin 
Mountains.  According to the eulogy of IS leader in Libya killed in 2015, Abu Nabil 
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al-Anbari was leading the assault as governor of Salahudeen Province. The chief 
of operations in Samarra confirmed that convoys attacked three neighbourhoods 
on the eastern side of the city.524 IS’ fighters quickly captured five525 of its seven 
districts including the main municipal building and the university. They were only 
4km away from downtown when police retreated its positions to the Al-Askari 
Mosque. Its cells also had specific targets inside the city and a kill list of prominent 
Sunni figures collaborating with the government. The house of the Minister of 
Science and Technology and members of the Islamic Party were targeted in their 
houses526. Also, in order for the group to gain fluidity and move faster, bulldozers 
were used to destroy walls and checkpoints across the city while a bridge was 
demolished in order to prevent any reinforcements from entering. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the day, reinforcements from the Golden Division 
backed by helicopters pushed back the militants outside of the city. The army 
claimed to have killed 40 IS fighters while 60 security forces were killed and 
wounded. Just like in Shura a couple of months before, armed men entered in 
mosques and called people to join them for jihad527. According to journalist 
Wassim Nasr’s contact inside the group, the goal of such raids was to target the 
“traitors helping Maliki governments, terrorise them and dissuade the others” 528. 
The main objective of the operation was to attack Islamic party members in the 
city. Ibn Rafydayn, who is a member of IS’ media department, gave details about 
the raids: “The police stations fell quickly one after the other; they did not expect 
that would come to us in Samarra, where they thought they were safe. We 
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followed a precise plan from which we did not deviate. We wanted to disperse 
government forces to decrease the pressure on Fallujah. We made raids on 
Suleiman Bek and the outskirts of Mosul. Everything was coordinated; it was just 
the start of the bigger operation”529. He confirmed that the previous assaults on 
Suleiman Bek and Shura were incursions planned in order to “test the readiness 
of government forces in the cities, their coordination and response time” 530. 
Samarra’s raid was, according to this IS operative, part of a broader plan 
executed in order to disperse the Iraqi Army and ease the pressure on Anbar. 
The specificity of the Samarra raid is its conformity with the concept of “alternative 
objectives” following the traditional principles of concealment of aim, surprise and 
distraction. As defended by Liddle Hart, this concept is a low-cost method of 
distraction, because it allowed the group to mobilise the bulk of its forces to its 
real objective, which was Mosul. In Samarra, there was no intention to grasp 
terrain nor attack the Askari Mosque but to occupy the city briefly, attract the army 
while targeting the government’s collaborators inside it.  
During that operation, the mobility of the convoy was vital in order to move quickly 
at dawn with maximum concealment for an utter surprise. The convoy was 
coming from Hamrin Valley to attack Samarra and the Al Jazeera desert to attack 
Mosul.  Because of their vulnerability to airpower, IS convoys can only rely on 
dispersed movement on clandestine roads for its convoys. This first operation 
was thought in order to disperse Iraqi forces, which were concentrating their 
forces in Anbar. Throughout its offensive IS’ great mobility permitted its fighters 
to concentrate on chosen objectives in a short period. As argued by Liddle 
Hart531, concentrated mass attacks are counterproductive because they give the 
enemy time to concentrate. A dispersed attack will not generate a strong defence 
but rather a parallel dispersion of force. 
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Map showing the simultaneous attack on 5th and 6th June on Samarra and Mosul with the 





Map of the city of Mosul. Source Institute for the Study of War 
 
The 6th June assault on Mosul  
It took two days for IS fighters to take control of the second biggest city in 
Iraq, causing the collapse of four Iraqi divisions and the capture or deaths of 
thousands of soldiers. During the months preceding the attack, the general 
situation was deteriorating, and many areas in Nineveh were left without the 
presence of the security forces. This security vacuum offered the group the 
freedom of movement it needed for preparing the attack. As we saw in the tactical 
analysis of IS’ rebound, the Nineveh region was the most targeted one by the 
group. While the months of January and February in Nineveh were its most active 
months in terms of volume of operations claimed. According to a press report, 
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four army divisions were deployed in Mosul and the rest of the 17 cities and 
townships of Nineveh Province532. So how did 2000 fighters overrun four ISF 
divisions and take the whole governorate in a few days?  
According to the commission established by the Iraqi parliament in order to 
explain the fall of the city, authorities had prior intelligence about a forthcoming 
attack against the city533.  In May of 2014, it is said that the intelligence services 
in Nineveh knew about an attack prepared for June. The last report about an 
imminent attack was dated the 5th of June, the day before the assault on the city. 
It included the testimony of a high-ranking detained leader detailing the attack 
and the front lines the group was planning to follow. In order to prevent it, the 
authorities imposed a curfew on vehicles on the same day. Despite these 
warnings about a particular attack, the security forces were taken by surprise a 
day later. At that time, the authorities received the Intel about an imminent attack 
but could not exploit it due to the amount of information they received.  
During the midnight of 6th of June, a convoy of 100 pickup trucks with at least four 
fighters per vehicle was advancing from the Al Jazeera desert west of Mosul. By 
3:30 am, IS fighters advanced into the western district of the city (Musherfa, 
Haramut, Tamoz 17, Hay Tanak and Hay Al Islah al Ziraiz). This part of the city 
was the less defended one. In the district of Mushayrarfa, there were only 40 
soldiers on duty that night534.  IS fighters were able to destroy the checkpoints and 
storm a police station in the Tamoz 17 neighbourhood. An IS media wing member 
interviewed by Wassim Nasr confirmed that “Fighting started after dawn, brothers 
started to deploy in the right side of the city. Police stations and checkpoints 
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started to fall without resistance. Quickly the eastern side was under our control, 
and government forces could not reach their troops there. They bombarded the 
whole area blindly”535.  
Lieutenant Mahdi Al Gharawi told Reuters that “the city’s defenders were ill-
supplied since much of the defenders’ armour and heavy weapons had been 
ordered to the south to help retake Ramadi and other Anbar Province towns 
during the January fighting”.536 Colonel Dhiyab Ahmed al-Assi al-Obeidi added 
that in their battalion they had only one machine gun while IS had one in each 
pickup. The deployment in Anbar of heavy weaponry from Mosul left the city with 
virtually no defence.  Also, the first line of defence, which was supposed to have 
2,500 men from the 6th brigade of the 3rd Iraqi army division, was closer to 500.  
In all, according to Reuters, there were supposed to be close to 25,000 soldiers 
and police in the city. In reality, there were at best 10,000. If we take this number, 
the ratio was 5:1 as at its peak when 2000 IS fighters were deployed in the city. 
When entering Mosul, IS’ strategists targeted the lines of least expectation and 
hence of least resistance. It can be assumed that before the assault, the group 
managed to infiltrate fighters in the city and activate an effective combat support 
infrastructure inside. At the same time, the response of the Iraqi Army was to 
send helicopters and bomb residential areas blindly resulting in the killing of 
dozens of civilians537. 
On the 7th of June, the situation was limited to the western edge of the Tamoz 17 
neighbourhood. Gharawi received a call from the Iraqi President Al Maliki 
ordering him to hold things until his replacement by Qanbar, the deputy chief of 
staff at the defence ministry, and Ghaidan, the commander of Iraqi ground forces. 
According to Gharawi and the chief of staff General Babakir Zebari, there were 
not sufficient forces in the city in order to launch a counter attack. This dire 
                                            
535 Wassim Nasr, Etat Islamique le fait accompli, Tribune du Monde Plon, Paris, April 2016, p104 
536 Joby Warrick, Black Flags, The Rise of ISIS, BANTAM PRESS, London 2015, p302-303 
537 “How did extremists take over one of Iraq’s biggest cities in just five days?”, Niqash, 
10/06/2014, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/3455/  
267 
 
situation was emphasised by Maliki’s rejection of Peshmerga’s proposition to 
send their forces to the city. From the radio transmission between Gharawi and 
his troops, it also appears that he was desperately asking for air support, which 
never came.538 The fact that the air support did not come can be explained by 
Hashim’s description539 of the assault, where he affirms that Qiyara airbase and 
Shirqat airport were under assault during the attack on Mosul. What characterises 
the success of this attack was excepting the use of helicopters the absence of air 
support for the Iraqi troops. 
Facing a situation of turmoil and indecision among the Iraqi forces, IS responded 
by sending additional forces to the city. On June 8th more than 100 vehicles with 
at least 400 men crossed from Syria to join the battle. IS’ fighters on the western 
flank despite being under heavy shelling of Iraqi artillery, were able to penetrate 
the al-Uraybi neighbourhood and were close to the area around the Mosul Hotel 
where 30 SWAT members were stationed. The new commanders Ghaidan and 
Qanbar ordered a divisional commander to defend the Mosul Hotel, which he 
refused knowing that most of its soldiers had deserted. The decision to sack him 
in the midst of the battle emphasised the state of disarray among the Iraqi troops 
preceding their psychological dislocation. 
At 4.30 pm, an IS fighter originating from the Arabian Peninsula raced towards 
the Mosul Hotel and exploded his military water tanker. The SVBIED wiped out 
the building and its occupants. High-ranking officers from the police were killed, 
among them the general chief of the fourth brigade of the SWAT in Nineveh, 
Diyab el Obeidi.  After this blow, massive desertion started among the Federal 
Police in the districts of New Mosul and Arrisala. Following that episode, the 
defensive line in the western part of the city crumbled. Soldiers and police officers 
were left without any plan or rallying point and started to run when IS’ fighters 
were closing on their positions.   
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By June 9th, most of the western side of the city was under IS’ control. The eastern 
side and the south of the city and its military airport were still under governmental 
control. The same day, IS fighters stormed the base of the 3rd division in the 
Thawra district situated west of Mosul. The base was surrounded for three days 
and stormed from all four sides with the use of an SVBIED. By Monday morning, 
there was a siege of the governorate in Mosul, as well as the HQ of the police of 
Nineveh, Mosul airport and the Ghazlani Military Base. 
The Iraqi Army 2nd Division was still deployed on the eastern side of the city and 
prepared to defend it. However, the retreat of the commanders from the military 
airport used as an operational centre on the west flank caused chaos and 
depression among them. Qanbar and Ghaidan, who were reporting directly to 
Maliki, decided to retreat in a convoy of 30 vehicles and regroup on the eastern 
side of the city. Reports emerged that they escaped disguised as civilians fleeing 
to Erbil to fly back to Baghdad. According to Reuter’s interview of high-ranking 
military personnel, the retreating convoy “created the impression that Iraq’s 
security forces were deserting”540. Athil Al Nujaifi, the governor, explained that 
soldiers assumed their leaders had fled and deserted the city’s eastern part.   
Instead of reassuring its troops to prepare a counter attack, the decision sparked 
an irrational wave of defections among the rest of its troops. The lack of 
confidence between the leaders and their troops was behind their assumption 
that their commanders had abandoned them. It provoked a chaotic situation 
which led to IS’ advance and control of the other half of the city without fighting. 
According to the commission, IS amplified the chaos among Iraqi troops by 
spreading the news that the leadership was retreating from the city541. Without 
shooting a single bullet on the eastern side, IS intoxicated the soldiers’ minds and 
                                            
540 “Special Report: How Mosul fell - An Iraqi general disputes Baghdad's story”, Reuters, 
14/10/2014,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-gharawi-special-report-
idUSKCN0I30Z820141014 
541 “The investigation regarding the Fall of Mosul reveals the responsibility of Maliki and other 




confidence. Civilians started to quit the city in huge numbers, breaking the curfew 
imposed, to flee towards Erbil. Many soldiers changed their clothes and mingled 
among them.542This episode confirms the importance of psychological dislocation 
emphasised by the indirect approach to explain decisive military victory. Panicked 
men at a low level of the ISF did much more harm than the number of Iraqi 
soldiers casualties inflicted by IS soldiers during the assault. When an enemy 
commander is at a disadvantage, and its troops lose confidence in him, according 
to Liddle Hart psychological dislocation is near, and the Mosul case study 
confirmed this. On June 12th a statement by the group was released taking 
responsibility for the attack and paying tribute to its mastermind Abu Abdul 
Rahman Al-Bilawi. It also gave details of the planning and achievements of IS’ 
takeover543. It confirmed that extensive intelligence work had prepared the 
assault. During the first 72 hours after its takeover of the city, the group had a 
special list of personalities to eliminate544. We can assume that the group’s 
intelligence units also spotted the ghost soldiers phenomenon among the troops 
stationed in Mosul and the level of unpreparedness of ISF.  
Conclusion on Mosul’s fall 
The synchronicity of IS’ attack with Anbar’s operations and the raid on 
Samarra shows how different battlefields in Iraq were interconnected in the minds 
of IS’ strategists. Fighting in Anbar attracted most of the ISF heavy weaponry; as 
a result, no tanks and no heavy artillery were in their hands in Nineveh. The attack 
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on Samarra the day before created a dilemma for the Iraqi command between 
defending Samarra, which was attacked two days previously and send 
reinforcements to Mosul. Meanwhile, the war was continuing in Al Anbar theatre 
of operation, which mobilised much of the Iraqi Army’s heavy equipment or 
troops. On Saturday, at the same time as the assault on Mosul, the University of 
Anbar at Ramadi, which had 10,000 students, was attacked while seven bombs 
exploded in an hour in Baghdad, killing at least 52 people.545   
The attack on Mosul was well prepared because other similar urban assaults on 
a smaller scale had been set up in Shura and Suleiman Bik. The group tested the 
enemy’s readiness before the offensive. According to a Reuters report on the 
city’s fall, “the jihadists hoped only to take a neighbourhood for several hours. 
They did not expect state control to crumble”546. Whether or not IS’ objective was 
to take over the whole city or occupy some neighbourhoods remains unclear. The 
fact that IS did not bring its full force on the first day but instead waited until the 
second day of the assault shows that the first assault was limited to test the 
defence of the Iraqi Army and grasp some territories. The group did not risk using 
all its forces during the first day of the attack.  
Two days later, the injection of reinforcements and their mobility was vital in order 
to secure the final push on the western side of the city. The mobility of IS’ convoys 
of 4x4s was key in order to bring reinforcements to maintain the pressure on the 
remaining Iraqi troops on the western side of the city. On the first day of the 
assault, 400 fighters were involved; later this number increased to almost 2000, 
counting the reinforcements coming from Syria and the activated sleeper cells.  
The surprise for IS was not the takeover of the districts of the western part but 
rather the massive defections on the eastern side, where the entire 2nd division, 
which had the manpower and equipment to resist a possible assault, fled. As 
                                            
545“Iraq university hostages' ordeal ends in Ramadi”, BBC news, 7/06/2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27746048  





detailed by Ahmed Hashim, IS’ troops inside the city showed a high degree of 
battlefield tactical skills547. Mobility and flexibility coupled with deception and 
concealment proved that the group was mastering urban warfare. Reserve units 
were concealed and in battle position at the disposal of the commanders to 
reinforce the troops on the frontline.  
As we saw, the battle was highly dependent on the troops’ morale and confidence 
in its leaders. While IS troops lost the mastermind of the attack a few days before 
the assault on June 4th, it did not prevent them from executing it following a well-
established plan. In contrast, because of the lack of confidence towards their 
commanders, Iraqi troops misinterpreted their move and retreated fearing that 
they abandoned them. Using LH’s terms, IS’ assaults combined with the 
campaign to target soldiers in the city succeeded in breaking ISF’s psychological 
equilibrium.  
Psychologically, the dislocation may have been achieved by weakening the 
troops, or the commanders, or both. In the example of Mosul’s troops, the 
psychological equilibrium was broken before the physical one. From a 
psychological perspective, the detonation of multiple large-scale SVBIEDs had a 
specific demoralising effect on the enemy. In Mosul, the SVBIED that led to the 
destruction of the Mosul Hotel triggered ISF’s collapse in the western part of the 
city. Inversely, it also had a moralising effect on IS’ troops and gave them more 
zeal and enthusiasm to penetrate the breach created by the explosion.   
As theorised by Liddle Hart, to achieve a decisive victory dislocation should be 
both physical and psychological. On the western side of the city, it became 
psychological and physical when the SVBIED destroyed the Mosul Hotel where 
the SWAT teams were entrenched. On the eastern side, without firing a single 
bullet, dislocation was only psychological because of soldiers’ misinterpretation 
coupled with the spreading by IS of rumours that the higher commandant had 
retreated from the military airport. This strategy has been the most successful 
because the economy of resources achieved. 
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The reasons behind the fall of Mosul have been traced back primarily to the crisis 
inside the Iraqi Army following the 2011 US withdrawal. The massive desertion 
on the eastern side was triggered by the lack of confidence of the troops in their 
commanders. As Liddle Hart stated, “the impression made in the mind of the 
opposing commander can nullify the whole fighting power that his troops 
possess”548, and this seems to have occurred in Mosul. According to Dodge549, 
widespread corruption seriously undermined the ability of the Iraqi Army to fight 
and had a negative impact on their morale. The fact that most of the soldiers were 
from the south and did not have ties with the city explains their minimal will to 
resist when defending the city. In a fight to defend their homeland, the resistance 
would have been higher. Moreover, soldiers in Mosul had to pay for their 
provisions and cook their food,550 undermining their trust in their leadership as 
well as sapping their morale. The Iraqi army suffered from “ghost payrolls” with 
thousands of fictitious soldiers paid by the Ministry of Defence. This fraud was 
estimated to have cost 25% of its annual wage budget. The politicisation of the 
Iraqi military by Maliki has also been pointed out. His office is said to have 
established an unchecked control over the army, Special Forces and the 
intelligence services. The politicisation of the higher ranks of the armed forces 
had adverse effects that were visible during the collapse of the 2nd Division in 
Mosul and the indecision of the Iraqi high command structure. 
Finally, other local nationalist groups are said to have participated in the attack. 
According to interviews with locals made by researchers, other armed groups 
took the streets during the fall of the city and showed slogans that were not 
accepted by the new conquerors of the city551. IS was the spearhead of the 
assault, which was planned and executed by its fighters. We can assume that 
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other armed groups took advantage of the situation inside the city by 
bandwagoning on the assault. It could explain why a few days later they vanished 
from the streets. The situation was completely different from the fall of Ramadi 
and Fallujah, where the group had to deal with insurgent groups. IS imposed its 
rule on the city quickly, made other groups pledge allegiance to Baghdadi and 
deterred others from challenging its rule. Like in Anbar, it refrained from attacking 
powerful actors on the ground. In this case, it did not attack the Peshmerga 
forces, which also did not take part in the battle. An IS’ fighter interviewed by 
Wassim Nasr confirmed that “250 Peshmerga vehicles entered the city the day 
before to take away their members” 552.This move before the assault suggests 
that Kurdish forces were aware of something taking place and adopted a neutral 
posture after Maliki’s refusal to let them take back the city.  
The August 2014 offensive on Kurdistan  
In the aftermath of the successful takeover of the city of Mosul, IS’ first 
objective was to liberate prisons. It opened Badush Prison, where 3 000 inmates 
were imprisoned. Then it focused its offensive towards the city of Tel Afar in order 
to secure the border region with Syria and guarantee its freedom of movement, 
and it started to push south towards Salahudeen. On 23 June, insurgents 
captured the Tal Afar airport and secured the town itself. While still engaged in 
Salahudeen and Anbar and a month after announcing the establishment of the 
caliphate, IS launched a new offensive from Nineveh in order to expand its 
territory in Northern Iraq. IS surprised the Government of KGR and penetrated 
deep into its territories. During the first half of August,  it conquered the cities of 
Zumar, Sinjar, Wana, tel Mosul Dam, Tel Keppe and Kocho, in the south and 
east of Mosul the towns of Karamlish, Bartella and Makhmour. Its convoys also 
advanced within 40 km of the Kurdish capital of Erbil before being bombed by US 
aircraft. IS’convoys could move easily on the surface plains of Nineveh breaching 
Peshmerga lines, which were surprised. Being overstretched all along the border 
with Iraq, under-equipped and with little will to fight in zones, which were not 
Kurdish, the Peshmerga were rapidly overrun. KRG leaders were not expecting 
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an attack and posted only light infantry in most of the frontlines. IS had heavy 
weaponry captured from the Iraqi Army, which offered to its fighters a serious 
advantage against the Peshmerga. Even Washington and its intelligence 
services were caught by surprise, thinking that IS would concentrate its efforts 
against Baghdad and thought that Peshmerga’s strength would have deterred IS.  
6-The Salahudeen offensive and the failed push towards  
the Northern Baghdad belt 
Just after Mosul’s fall, the collapse of a part of the Iraqi military was certain 
in Northern Iraq. The 2nd Division fled in Mosul; the 1st Division lost four brigades 
in Anbar and Salahudeen, two brigades of the 3rd Division vanished. IS took 
advantage by advancing south towards Baiji and its refinery and Tikrit. Brett 
McGurk attributed this collapse to the social media campaign orchestrated by IS 
“indicating that ISIL columns would soon be heading down the Tigris River Valley 
to Baghdad with no mercy for anyone who resisted” 553. According to McGurk,   
five Iraqi Army and Federal Police divisions (out of 18 in total) vanished during 
the next days. The rumours about an imminent attack on Baghdad and 
Salahudeen created a fog moment when the Iraqi Army was disoriented. In 
Northern Samarra, a range of cities quickly fell into the hands of the group on 
both sides of the Tigris River: Tikrit, Adour, Al Alam, Baiji, Shirqat and Zowiya. 
For the Iraqi Government, Samarra was the place to defend at all costs in the 
governorate. Also, the city of Balad, which is the place of a Shia mausoleum, was 
also highly guarded by Shia militias. As a result, the group tried to circumvent 
both cities in its offensive.   
The Tikrit offensive  
The city of Tikrit was attacked on June 11th from the north with IS fighters 
managing to take the police and the governorate HQ. The city fell quickly, half of 
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the 4th Division disappeared and the other half were annihilated by the group in 
the infamous Speicher massacre on June 12 2014. The only resistance in the city 
came from the Juburi tribe and the suburb of Hay Al Alam where they were 
crushed and wiped out. During June and July, the Iraqi Army tried many 
counteroffensives to take back Tikrit and its surroundings but ultimately failed. 
This occasion was the first to test IS’ defensive capabilities after the fall of Mosul. 
On 16th July, the Iraqi Army was about to declare the city liberated when reaching 
its downtown without a fight, its troops were ambushed and trapped. Suddenly, 
ambushes and suicide bombers “leaping from windows” 554 decimated the ISF. 
The ways used by the group to take over cities defended by tribes and the local 
police varied and were adaptable to the circumstances.  On June 23, IS managed 
to take over the city of Alam (situated west of Tikrit) after negotiating with its 
inhabitants for two weeks.555 They offered the inhabitants the possibility of 
conducting mixed patrols of IS and tribal fighters inside the city in exchange for 
the repentance of local security forces. In this case, instead of attacking the area 
or pounding it, the group opted for a negotiated settlement to enter the city. At 
the same time, it used a more brutal approach against the village of Zawiya, 
whose inhabitants refused to surrender. It pounded it relentlessly with mortars, 
destroying the village. By using this method, IS tried to make an example to 
population of  the governorate because its people tried to “break the rules of the 
Islamic State” 556.  In Amerli, a Turkmen Shia city, the group imposed a siege on 
its inhabitants, cutting water and electricity and starving them out before being 
dislodged 80 days later by the ISF and the Peshmerga in August 2014.  Despite 
the collapse of part of the Iraqi Army in Salahudeen, IS’ fighters in their advance 
encountered resistance from tribal fighters. Generally, they lacked support from 
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the Iraqi Army meaning that IS could over-match them. However, in the case of 
Dhuluiyah, the level of resistance of tribes was of another magnitude. 
The battle for Dhuluiyah: the turning point 
 
Map showing IS’ offensive on Dhuluiyah on July 14th 2014 
The city of Dhuluiyah is situated 32km southeast of Samarra. On July 14th, 
IS attacked it but was prevented from entering the southern part of the city by 
members of the Jubur tribe and the local police. In its push towards Baghdad, IS’ 
strategy in Salahudeen was to bypass nodes of resistance, such as Samarra and 
Balad, that would likely stop its advance. The only passage in order to access to 
the highway leading to Baghdad and its Northern Belt was through the city of 
Dhuluiyah, which takes the shape of a Presque-isle. IS tried without success to 
negotiate a settlement with the inhabitants in order to enter the southern part of 
the city without fighting. 
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Its assault was preceded by a VBIED attack on the bridge that connected the 
district to Balad in order to prevent reinforcements from arriving. IS took control 
of the northern part of the town after bombing government buildings, including a 
court and local council headquarters. The Jubur tribe in the southern part of the 
city showed a fierce resistance to IS’ advance of convoys. They even nicknamed 
their fight as “the battle of walls”. Their area was surrounded from three sides and 
the bridges accessing the city were destroyed. The only route by which the 
fighters could access the left bank of the river was by going through Al Jabur’s 
agricultural lands (orange and palm trees). This dense vegetation was not 
suitable for armoured vehicles and contributed to halting IS’ advance. It disturbed 
its plans to reach the highway heading to Baghdad and connect with its cells in 
the Northern belt of the capital. The siege of this tiny piece of land lasted for 200 
days. The Jubur tribe were able to resist thanks to the support and ammunition 
coming from Shia militias in Balad and the air support of the Iraqi Army from Balad 
airbase. IS pounded the area relentlessly with mortars and perhaps chlorine557 
but was not able to breach the defences. 
Indeed, the topography did not help the attackers to use SVBIEDs against the 
defences due to the dense vegetation. As a countermeasure, IS polluted the 
Ishaqi river558 with oil in December of 2014, which passed by the city in order to 
isolate it further. Stopped in Dhuluiyah, IS tried to divert the attention of the 
defenders and their supporting forces by attacking other cities in the area. It 
infiltrated its forces through the river and attacked the outskirts of cities situated 
on the western flank. In September, it launched an attack on the Dujail region559 
and in October and November on the outskirts of Balad560. Both night assaults 
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failed because of IS’ lack of firepower. Due to logistical issues, the attackers did 
not use SVBIEDs or VBIEDs but rather motorcycles561they managed to embark 
in small boats while crossing the Tigris River. For that reason, the terrain was not 
suitable for the deployment of IS’ confrontational weaponry that penetrates 
defence lines. The snowball effect of the disagreement of the Sunnis against 
Maliki that could have let IS forces march towards Baghdad stopped in this city.  
While the tribes in the neighbouring area of Yathrib cooperated with the group562, 
the two tribes in Dhuluiyah, the Albu Fajr and Juburi did not (in the next section 
of the study on IS’ relations with tribes I explain this in depth).  
A confluence of factors was behind IS’ failure to take Dhuluiyah: its topography 
as a bottleneck, the air support received from Balad airbase, the support of PMU 
from Balad, the tribal resistance and refusal to negotiate, IS’ impossibility to 
deploy SVBIEDs and the absence of a viable alternative route towards Baghdad. 
As a result, IS failed to take the southern part of the city connecting it with the 
eastern flank of the Tigris. It never threatened the main supply route between 
Baghdad and Samarra. It could have put the Iraqi Government and the Shia 
militia into a profound dilemma, to choose to defend either Baghdad or Samara. 
In case it had fallen into IS hands, we can suppose that the curse of the conflict 
would have changed. Baghdad would have been put under higher pressure, and 
maybe the group would not have turned its eyes to grasp territories in Kurdish 
areas. By putting an end to IS’ momentum in Salahudeen, Duluhuiya’s resistance 
was thus a turning point in the conflict.  
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Map showing IS’ route bypassing Samarra to get the Baghdad/Samarra Highway in 
summer 2014 
 




7-The battle for Baiji (June 2014 – October 2015): an 
attrition war resulting in a final defeat and the failed Diyala 
offensive. 
Parallel to its push south towards Northern Baghdad, IS struggled to take 
control over the city of Baiji and its refinery for more than a year. On June 11th, 
an IS convoy composed of 60 vehicles advanced towards the town of Baiji 
situated along the Tigris River between Zowiya and Tikrit. Located about 250 km 
north of Baghdad, its refinery was crucial more for Iraq’s economy than IS:  its 
facility consisted of three refineries refining 310,000 barrels a day.  IS controlled 
the city and freed inmates from the prison on 12th June. Only the refinery resisted 
with hundreds of guards from the SWAT teams and Iraqi Army’s 37th Brigade 
entrenched there and showing a fierce resistance. During the same week, IS 
launched 8 SVBIEDs and 200 fighters into this part of the refinery but could not 
break the defence of the besieged soldiers563. In the next days, a phase of 
negotiation began between IS fighters, local tribal chiefs and the guards 
supported by the Army. The siege of the refinery continued for ten days with the 
group avoiding taking a direct assault that could damage the infrastructure. 
Civilian workers inside were accorded a safe passage while the guards of the 
refinery still refused to go. IS’ strategy was to keep the facility under siege until 
the troops ran out of food and ammunition. Ten days later, it was reported that 
400 soldiers of the 37th  Brigade, including its officers, deserted from the refinery 
following an agreement reached with tribal leaders according to which the troops 
had free passage to leave for 24 hours564.  However, up to 75 police commando 
troops refused to surrender and received the support of the Golden Division units 
and became surrounded in a small compound of the refinery. IS was controlling 
almost all the facility and decided not to directly attack the dozens of police 
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commandos retrenched but instead continued to starve them out. The siege of 
the building continued until mid-July.  
At the end of the year, ISF was able to take back the city of Baiji but for a limited 
time, IS forces recaptured the city on 21th of December and re-established a siege 
on the refinery. The situation in Baiji throughout the first half of 2015 remained 
static, with the ISF controlling 20% of the refinery and the town while the rest of 
the area was either contested or under IS control. In March 2015, while Iraqi 
troops were redeployed to take back Tikrit from IS forces, IS forces in Baiji 
launched successive assaults on the refinery supported by troops coming from 
Syria.565 The group recaptured the entire city in May 2015.  
The turning point in the battle seems to have been when the US decided to allow 
Shia militias under the control of the Iraqi Government to join the battle.  On June 
7th 2015, the PMU supported by Iraqi forces captured the downtown of Baiji, 
including local government buildings. By 9th June, half of the city was under Iraqi 
Government control. By the end of July, IS controlled only the Muhandeseen 
neighbourhood situated in the eastern part of the city. 
Despite those losses, IS’ supply lines situated north and west of the city were still 
working. In September, it recaptured parts of the city and controlled half the 
refinery. However, the supply route from the west was cut by the PMU in late 
September.  A large-scale offensive of thousands of ISF troops and Shia militias 
coordinated by the IRCG and supported by the coalition air force was launched 
in October. On 15th October they managed to capture the village of Makhoul, 
situated north of Baiji, marking the Iraqi Army's farthest advance north since the 
June 2014.  They seized IS’ last supply route and a day later IS was driven out 
from the Baiji refinery and the neighbouring town of Al Siniyah to control only 40% 
of the city.  The last supply route the Baiji pocket had from the city of Zawiya was 
cut, which a few days later precipitated the fall of this pocket.  
                                            





The difference between Ramadi and Baiji was the group’s posture. It was an 
offensive one in Ramadi and a defensive one in Baiji. Although over 14 months 
IS managed to destroy a large number of bridges to disrupt and further isolate 
Ramadi, in Baiji it did not. IS’ offensive in Salahudeen did not benefit from the 
initial work of sabotaging and cutting off ISF’s supply routes. The cutting of its 
supply routes by ISF and the Shia militias was a determining factor in the defeat 
of the group and the unsuccessful defence of the city ahead of the successive 
counter-offensives launched by mid-2015. The other turning point in the battle of 
Baiji was the involvement of the Shia militias commanded by General Qassem 
Soleimani from June 2015, which had an impact on the balance of power in the 
battlefield. However, in Anbar, in 2014 and 2015 the militias were not significantly 
deployed because of the opposition coming from locals and the coalition.   
Diyala failed offensive attempts 
We saw in the previous section how the situation in the areas situated 
north of Diyala and south of Salahudeen began to worsen for the Iraqi 
Government at the beginning of 2014. The events of Fallujah obliged the 
reassignment to Anbar of the 5th Division, which was assigned to northern Diyala 
as well as Tuz Khurmatu and Suleiman Beg. IS was able to operate freely and 
project its forces from one of its historical safe havens, the Hamrin Valley. On 
February 13, 2014, gunmen took positions within some villages near Suleiman 
Beg.566 IS’ attempts to grasp territory in Diyala started in Buhriz in March of 2014 
when it attacked the city of Buhriz (9 km South of Baqubah). It seized the city 
centre on March 22, 2014, at sunset after the Maghreb prayer and relayed 
messages from loudspeakers in mosques calling the inhabitants to jihad using 
the same method as in Shura and Mosul. According to the chief of police in 
Diyala, cells of the group were wearing Niqabs to dissimulate themselves and 
pass through the checkpoints leading to the city centre.567 These cells gathered 
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at the old market before starting to attack the security forces. The Iraqi forces, 
supported by Shia militias managed to take over the city two days later on 25 
March. The authorities announced the killing of 25 fighters and the formation of a 
new Sahawat composed of 100 citizens from Buhriz to defend the city. IS failed 
to take control of the city for more than two days, but it showed a capacity to pass 
by checkpoints using deceptive methods and mount a complex urban assault with 
few men.  
During the June events, IS tried to take advantage of the desertions among the 
Iraqi Army by taking control of some villages close to Baghdad. On 12th June, it 
controlled parts of the small town of Udhaiym, 90 km north of Baghdad, after most 
of the army troops left their positions and withdrew towards the nearby town of 
Khalis in Diyala Province.  On 13th June, the Iraqi security forces retreated from 
other cities in the periphery of the Diyala governorate in Saadiyah and Jalula. At 
the same time, both IS and Kurdish forces entered the city of Jalula, which 
became divided between them.  The group also took the area of Saadiyah.  
IS tried to mount a complex urban assault on Baqubah, the capital of the province, 
on 16th June. Some neighbourhoods were taken during a night assault targeting 
the western outskirts of the city.568 IS briefly overran the security forces and 
militias. However, these areas were regained quickly by government troops and 
their allied Shia militias. Around 44 Sunni prisoners were executed at a police 
station in Baqubah during the retreat of the security forces. As in Buhriz three 
months previously, the group could not maintain its presence in the urban areas 
it conquered. Despite the failure in Buhriz, the group tried at all costs to take a 
Sunni city close to Baghdad. In the case of success, it would have increased the 
pressure on the capital and strengthened itself with Sunni volunteers. In October 
2014, the group tried to launch a direct assault on the base of the 2nd division in 
Muqdadidyah, but it failed569. This last episode confirmed IS’ inability to shift from 
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guerrilla warfare in the province to confront the Iraqi Army and the Shia militias. 
To grasp territory in Diyala, the group waged what was called a “Water War”570. 
On October 3 2014, it flooded the area of Mansourah (40km east of Baqubah) 
after releasing water from the Khalis River. The flood destroyed more than 750 
hectares of agricultural fields and caused dozens of people to flee the area.  This 
new method permitted the group to take back some territories it could not conquer 
with conventional ways.   
For the particular case of Jalula, IS local commanders did not attack the 
Peshmerga for two months. The city remained divided between the two parts. IS 
local commanders were obeying a clear chain of command despite operating in 
a town situated far from the IS’ centres of command. This coordination was 
confirmed later when IS launched the offensive on Jalula in synchronicity with a 
widespread offensive against the Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq.  Kurdish forces 
were anticipating an attack on Makhmur as part of IS’ run toward Baghdad by 
deploying their forces from Jalula to Makhmur. On August 11th, a surprise attack 
on the city part occupied by the Peshmerga started with the explosion of an 
SVBIED on their headquarters situated downtown. At the same moment, a 
second SVBIED using a tanker exploded in the city centre. The shock and 
massive explosions shattered Peshmerga’s morale while 12 checkpoints in the 
city were attacked by inghimassi fighters with SVESTs wearing Kurdish-style 
uniforms. Half of the city occupied by the Kurdish forces was taken by the group 
very quickly using concealment, surprise and the shock created by SVBIED 
explosions.   
The few isolated cities taken by the group on the periphery of Diyala Province 
were taken back by the Iraqi Army at the end of 2014. On 25th January 2015, the 
leader of the Badr militia, Hadi Al Ameri, announced that the province had been 
liberated entirely from IS’ control, putting an end to the limited conquests of IS in 
the province. IS’ momentum in Salahudeen and Nineveh never occurred in 
Diyala. The fall of villages into its hands situated at the borders of the Salahudeen 
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governorate was more related to the collapse of the Iraqi Army in Salahudeen 
rather than a strategy to take over territory. The closer ISF were from Baghdad 
the fewer desertions were observed, and in fact, there was an increased zeal of 
ISF and Shia militias to defend their areas. 
During IS’ urban assaults on cities in the north, Baghdad Province continued to 
launch SVBIED and SVEST attacks. However, due to the heavy security 
measures taken by the Iraqi authorities in the capital and its vicinity the group 
could not or did not want to mount urban assaults similar to the ones in Diyala. It 
only used indirect fire, mortars in Abu Ghraib to target the International Airport.571 
Perhaps it reserved its forces until the arrival of reinforcements from the offensive 
in the north or the west. For that reason, it never presented an imminent threat to 
the capital. Baghdad Province’s role was also to try to disturb ISF’s supply routes 
heading to the north by destroying bridges connecting Baghdad and its 
neighbouring northern provinces. 
8-Findings and Conclusion  
To conclude this section, I present the points of convergence and divergence of 
IS’ strategy during its urban assaults and the principles of LH’s theory of the 
indirect approach.  
1-Adjust your end to your means. 
This refers to starting embracing a strategy of limited aims awaiting a shift 
in the balance by not deploying all your power on the battlefield but instead 
waiting until a better situation comes. The takeover of urban areas in Anbar was 
preceded by a spectacular attack in the desert of Anbar that decapitated the 
commandment of the Iraqi Army in Anbar. The operation was carried out in order 
to disperse the ISF in the desert and outmanoeuvre them in the cities. With regard 
to IS’ strategy inside Fallujah and Ramadi, the group did not attack the powerful 
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Sahawat militias but rather concentrated on the security forces abhorred by most 
of the tribes in both cities. In order to drive out the Iraqi Government from both 
cities, IS’ strategists could not permit themselves to attack all their foes inside 
both cities. Instead, they decided because of the balance of power to prioritise 
their fight. For IS’ attack on Mosul or Jalula, the group voluntarily did not confront 
the Peshmerga until the balance of power was to their advantage. 
The fact that IS held the initiative during 2014 indicates that the timing of their 
massive urban assault was not fortuitous. Indeed, the time space between the 
Anbar urban offensive and the Mosul offensive of 6 months caused a maximum 
deployment and dispersion of ISF forces. As a result, troops from the north were 
redeployed, and military equipment and heavy weaponry were transferred to 
Anbar. For the attack on Mosul, we observed that during the first assault on 6th 
June only 400 fighters were deployed for the initial assault. In the next days, 2000 
more fighters coming from Syria and the Al Jazeera desert reinforced them for 
the decisive push on the western side of the city.  
The attack on Kurdish areas was probably undertaken after IS’ awareness of the 
impossibility to take Baghdad. IS attacked the Peshmerga after defeating the Iraqi 
army and stealing hundreds of armoured vehicles and artillery from them. It 
offered its army a strategic advantage to break Kurdish defensive lines easily. As 
a result, it was a tactical success and the Peshmerga’s defences crumbled 
against IS’ assaults. However, IS’ advance was later halted by US air power 
intervention converting a tactical victory into a strategic mistake.  
In Diyala, IS’ urban assaults on Baqubah and Muqdadidyah failed because of a 
miscalculated assessment of the balance of power in the province driven by a 
political urgency to put pressure on Baghdad. As in Buhriz three months earlier, 
attackers were driven out from the city and did not manage to occupy the areas 
they conquered for more than a day. We can presume that it was a risky bet and 
likely a hurried manoeuvre in order to get closer to Baghdad. As described, the 
resistance of the Iraqi Government and the support of powerful Shia militias 
meant that the balance of power in the province was never in favour of the group. 
It is true that the group was not deterred from launching attacks while 
outnumbered, but for the case of Diyala, the level of resistance and morale of the 
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defenders was never close to dislocation. The findings in part three of the study 
about Diyala Province’s incapacity to launch repeated confrontational operations 
against ISF and Shia militias were confirmed in 2014 and 2015 by its inability to 
launch a successful urban assault on an urban area with permanent control of 
territory. The strategical shift from rural guerrilla to conventional warfare in urban 
areas was more precipitated by IS’ political needs and their will to follow the pace 
of other provinces rather than a comprehensive strengthening of its capacities in 
Diyala. In Baghdad, the group did not try to mount a complex urban assault 
probably knowing the fact that the situation was even more unbalanced than in 
Diyala for the group there.  
Finally, in Anbar, the group applied this principle by a comprehensive strategy of 
cutting supply lines and isolating cities before launching an urban assault. During 
the summer of 2014, the group worked in order to cut the city of Ramadi from the 
rest of Anbar and avoid the arrival of supplies by destroying bridges.  On July 5th, 
the bridge linking Anbar to Baghdad was destroyed by an IS’ cell, which resulted 
in the cut of the highway traffic between Baghdad and Anbar572. 10 days later 
another bridge, the Albu Ghraib Bridge between Ramadi and Saqlawiyah (15km 
north of Fallujah),573 was destroyed with explosives. Another bridge was 
destroyed in December in the city of Shamiyah in Baghdadi, west of Ramadi to 
prevent the supply routes from reaching the city. According to a member of Anbar 
Governorate, a total of 85 bridges were destroyed by IS with Anbar with IEDs and 
VBIEDs in 2014 and 2015574. This high number proves that a deliberate policy of 
systematic bridge destroying was undertaken in order to isolate cities under siege 
and cut the Iraqi Army’s supply routes. This process of isolation as a prelude to 
dislocation and exploitation is in total line with Liddle Hart’s vision of the indirect 
approach. As described by him, the indirect approach is understood by “cutting 
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their supply lines, dislocating their control-system, or producing paralysis by the 
sheer nerve-shock of deep penetration into their rear”575. The “nerve shock of 
deep penetration” was the use of waves of SVBIED explosions, which caused 
fear and broke the physical equilibrium of the entrenched enemy.  
Because of its experience gained waging insurgency and terror tactics, when the 
group evolved into a conventional force it could use different means in order to 
penetrate the well-secured areas. When it failed to enter as a conventional force, 
it could quickly return to other tactics to achieve its goals. By definition, the 
group’s heteroclite experience makes it prone to adhere to this first principle. In 
general, I conclude that except for Diyala Province, IS’ strategists adhered to the 
principle of adjusting the end to your means. 
 
2-Keep your object always in mind. 
This principle highlights the fact that the objective rather than the means 
is the most important in a military campaign. It refers to a flexibility of the mind in 
the selection of the means according to circumstances. During its urban assaults, 
the group demonstrated its possession of a whole range of means at its disposal 
in order to take over cities using what could be compared to a “carrot and the 
stick” policy:  
 Through coercion such as the attacks it launched in Mosul, Ramadi, 
Fallujah, Tikrit and the extended use of artillery to pound well-entrenched 
areas. Dhuluiyah was pounded with hundreds of mortars and rockets 
destroying many homes. Chlorine may have been used in Saqlawiyah and 
Dhuluiyah, which confirms the group’s unrestricted use of weapons as 
theorised before by Zarqawi and legitimised by its religious mentor Abu 
Hassan Al-Muhajir. 
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 By imposing a siege (Zawiya), starving out the population (Amerli), 
polluting its water as in Dhuluiyah, and flooding them like in Diyala 
Province. 
 Through negotiation by brokering deals through tribal mediation with the 
defenders, granting safe passages for entrenched enemies (Baiji refinery) 
or the possibility to keep their weapons and participate in patrols (A’alam).  
 Through deception, by pretending to be the rescuers of entrenched 
enemies making them open their gates (Saqlawiyah) or wearing the 
defenders’ same uniforms while attacking them to increase their confusion 
(Jalula). 
For this principle of using different means to achieve an objective, IS adhered to 
this principle by showing a certain degree of adaptability, flexibility and versatility 
in the means used in taking control of territories and subduing its enemies. IS’ 
strategists adhered to this axiom using a wide repertoire of ways and means in 
order to gain greater military effectiveness and resilience against the ISF. 
3-Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.  
The purpose of this principle is to achieve psychological surprise. The 
strategist needs to adopt the enemy’s perspective and consider the moves he is 
expecting to receive. For the assaults on Mosul and Ramadi, according to 
government sources, authorities had previous knowledge that an imminent attack 
would occur. Both attacks on the cities were not “strategic surprises” per se. 
However, even with previous knowledge that an assault was planned, the Iraqi 
Government did not put in place the adequate measures in order to prepare itself 
to confront it. The Iraqi Army was so overstretched by an intense war in Anbar 
that it sent its heavy equipment there leaving the Nineveh province defenceless 
against IS’ massive offensive. 
The attack on Samarra was a real surprise given how the group quickly reached 
the city centre which had the reputation to be well defended. The Iraqi authorities 
in Northern Iraq did not interpret this attack as a diversion from something bigger 
but likely thought that it was the event forecasted by its intelligence services. The 
Peshmerga were also completely surprised by the August 2014 offensive on their 
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territory. They were thinking, as were the rest of the regional players, that IS 
would continue its push towards Baghdad. 
Almost all the group’s attacks were launched by night or at dawn to multiply the 
surprise effect on the enemy (except for Tikrit but the city was so vulnerable that 
surprise was not required). Mobility and rapidity also permitted IS’ columns of 
vehicles to take the dense, high-quality road network of Iraq. Moving fast was 
essential in order to achieve tactical surprise over an enemy superior in number. 
The group also used to test the enemy’s defences before an attack like in 
Ramadi, Suleiman Beg and Shura. It also used a range of tactics of concealment 
taken from its experience in urban terrorism and guerrilla tactics to surprise the 
enemy. Because concealment among civilians is in the group’s first nature, it was 
able to infiltrate refugees to reach the enemy’s zones (Ramadi) or even wear the 
same clothes as its enemy and deceive them (Jalula attack and Saqlawiyah 
storming). The hybrid nature of the group shows the group’s flexibility while 
waging a conventional war to use several tactics from its guerrilla and terrorist 
repertoire. 
The preparation of the offensives has evolved effective reconnaissance of the 
enemy's strength, armament, main defence positions and weak points. Using 
Human intelligence by infiltrating opponents forces or by the knowledge of the 
terrain of its local field commanders its intelligence collection process did not limit 
to HUMINT. It also started in 2014 to use reconnaissance drones to get vital 
information on the battlefield and have a decisive advantage against its 
opponents. 
To summarise, intelligence efforts before the battle, attacks by night, speed in its 
movements, and the use of non-conventional modus operandi have given the 







4-“Exploit the line of least resistance”.  
This principle is a corollary of the previous one by surprising the enemy 
physically. It can also require the use of the least expected routes. IS’ long 
experience in its desert safe havens offered the group the ability to project its 
forces quickly and without being noticed to urban centres. Its convoys did not take 
regular highways but rather passed through remote areas by night without being 
observed by the Iraqi Army. Most of its assaults were from the desert and its 
routes, were very hard for its enemies to monitor without the 24h surveillance 
system of US intelligence satellites. These routes were: the Jazeera desert for 
Mosul, Thar Thar lac for Fallujah, the desert of Anbar for the cities of Anbar and 
Hamrin Valley for Samarra and Diyala.  In addition to the mastering of routes and 
supply zones in the desert, the group used to bypass solid defences using 
alternative means of transport such as small boats to cross rivers.  
Prior intelligence work may have spotted weak points in the city’s defences. In 
Mosul, it attacked the western flank of the city and its less defended 
neighbourhood (Al Muthana). In Ramadi, the group first conquered areas which 
were always the weakest ones; it did not attack first the government complex and 
the powerful tribes of Albu Nimr and Albu Risha. During its attack on Salahudeen, 
the group continued to run towards Baghdad and bypassed cities such as in 
Samarra and the Baiji refinery. As described, it appears that in Diyala such a 
guideline was not applied perhaps as we suggested because of the urgency the 
group had to put pressure on Baghdad by taking urban areas in the province.  
From an operational perspective, in its assaults, the group used to create a line 
of least resistance by concentrating on SVBIEDs in order to breach defence lines. 
In a sense, the group used suicide car bombs against strongly defended points, 
dislocating the enemy’s equilibrium physically before exploiting the breach and 
penetrating with small concentrated units of fighters (inghimassis).In its June 
urban assaults, one of the reasons for IS’ lightning advance, which gave the false 
impression of a Blitzkrieg, was its systematic bypassing of nodes of resistance. 
Liddle Hart and Sun Tzu considered that in war, the way was “to avoid what is 
292 
 
strong is to strike what is weak”.576 In 1939, the Germans broke through the 
defences with tanks and went deep to cut the enemy’s communication lines. For 
IS, its lightning advance was different.  The mobility of its motorized units coupled 
with their liberty of action offered the possibility of doing reconnaissance on 
enemy’s positions, feigning assault or bypassing the opponents. Using SUV 
convoys, they went from city to city avoiding areas of resistance while the ISF 
was retreating and crumbling. In order to overwhelm the enemy, the group also 
used the military swarming tactic by attacking simultaneously on multiple axes 
using SVBIEDs to saturate the enemy’s defence like in Ramadi in May 2015.  As 
defined by it Edwards Sean it consists of a “scheme of manoeuvre that involves 
the convergent attack of five (or more) semiautonomous (or autonomous) units 
on a targeted force in some particular place”.577 More precisely, for IS case study 
it took the shape of a dispersed swarm,  where its units initially dispersed, then 
converged on the battlefield and attacked without ever forming a single massed 
army. This type of manoeuver relies on the units’ fast mobility in a suitable terrain 
and a high level of synchronization between them. 
Before an assault IS fighters sequenced the battlefield by ambushing the roads 
that can be used by support teams and by the opponent fleeing troops. They also 
planted mines and IEDs throughout the roads leading to their target coupled with 
systematic destruction of bridges to avoid being taken by surprise from its 
flanks.IS was prone to attack and adopt an aggressive and offensive posture by 
taking advantage of any weakness spotted among the enemy’s lines. In order to 
always maintain the pressure on the enemy even after losing its positions, IS 
fighters continued to harass the enemy launching counter attacks and project its 
inghimassi fighters whom a handful can cause massive damages.IS’ military 
doctrine was to avoid passivity and continuously pressure the enemy’s weak 
points with indirect fire, SVBIEDs or the infiltration of shock troops in order to 
                                            
576 Bevin Alexander, Sun Tzu at Gettysburg: Ancient Military Wisdom in the Modern World , W. 
W. Norton & Company; First Edition, 2011, p14 
577 Edwards, Sean J. A., “Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future”, Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2000. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1100.html. 
Also available in print form. 
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exhaust it. For the reasons mentioned above, I consider that this axiom has been 
followed by IS during its takeover of Iraqi territories. 
5-“Taking a line of operation, which offers alternative objectives.” 
  This principle derives from the idea of putting the enemy on the “horns of 
a dilemma” by forcing him to disperse its forces and making him indecisive. As 
described above, the timing of the attack on Mosul, six months after the assaults 
on urban areas in Anbar, was planned to ensure a maximum overstretch and 
dispersion of Iraqi forces engaged against IS.  
In Salahudeen, the attack on Samarra a day before the one Mosul was purely a 
movement of diversion. The fact that the group did not try another complex 
assault on the city shows that its strategists were conscious of the extreme 
difficulty of breaching its defences while losing the surprise factor they had on 
June 5th.  IS’ offensive on northeastern Iraq overwhelmingly adhered to this 
principle with the dilemma created for the Iraqi authorities by attacking Mosul and 
Samarra simultaneously. The two main cities of Northern Iraq are important in 
Baghdad’s eyes, one for its economic importance and the other for its religious 
symbolism.  The resistance in both cities was completely different. While in 
Samarra, home of a sacred shrine, it was defended with vigour, Mosul and its 
population did not defend themselves, and even the reinforcements from the 
south did not come. IS created this dilemma but at the same time knew which city 
would be less defended by Iraqi Government forces and concentrated its power 
there.  
In other assaults, we observed that the group used often synchronised attacks 
on several points while focusing in reality on one. The attack on Hit, in October 
2014 was synchronised with attacks on the Ramadi government complex and the 
Centre of Command of the Iraqi Army in Anbar situated north of Ramadi. The fact 
that the group use highly motivated fighters ready to sacrifice themselves for the 
cause make feigned attacks look similar to real ones in the eye of the defenders. 
These “fake attacks” are the primary tool of the deceptive strategy used in order 
to disperse the enemy. However, the intervention of the coalition and its 
intelligence gathering efforts has altered the capacity of the group of successfully 
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mount this kind of operations which are paramount in order to disperse an enemy 
with more manpower and resources. 
6-“Ensuring that both plans and dispositions are flexible―adaptable to 
circumstances.” 
This principle means that the strategist has to be flexible and adapt its 
approach to each situation. It stresses the importance of planning the next phase 
of the war with flexible troop deployment. In a way, this principle succinctly 
captures the essence of the previous five; the group was proven to be responsive 
to its plan especially after the fall of Mosul. It was able to launch its cells and 
project its forces south in Salahudeen to take advantage of the collapse of the 
Iraqi Army. As a matter of fact, except for Kirkuk where the Peshmerga took the 
entire city, IS was able to react and fill the void left by ISF’s defections by 
projecting its relatively small forces. Its vehicle columns moved quickly from city 
to city and did not let other actors from the Sunni rebellion take the opportunity of 
filling the void of the Iraqi Army’s chaotic withdrawal. It also exploited the bounty 
it took to redeploy them quickly on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria.  
The loss of the architect of the June 2014 offensive, Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, a 
few days before the attack and its commander Abu Mohamad Al Suweidawi, the 
day of the final push in Ramadi in May 2015 confirmed the group’s resilience in 
decapitation attacks and high-level of structuration. The loss of key leaders did 
not cause disarray and disorder like for the Iraqi Army. The group did not 
postpone the planned operations and perhaps even hastened them, as for the 
assault on Mosul. It also shows the flexibility of the planners of the offensive in 
the face of unexpected events of the magnitude of the loss of its commander. 
Unlike the fragile Iraqi Army, for ideological reasons, the group was far from 
psychological dislocation even with the fatal loss of its military leaders. 





7-“Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on 
guard―whilst he is well placed to parry or evade”. 
Throughout the offensive in Iraq, IS never put all its forces in a single battle. 
Before launching an attack, it waited before attacking until the enemy’s capacity 
of resistance was degraded, like in Mosul by deploying its forces gradually there. 
Nevertheless, in some battle like in Ramadi or for the Baiji refinery, it tried 
relentlessly to take over protected areas despite how well the defenders were 
entrenched and the aerial support they enjoyed from coalition planes. These two 
strategic battles of 2015 were a turning point in the conflict for IS in Iraq and were 
instrumental in pushing the group to many sacrifices for political gains. It can be 
explained by the group’s ideology and culture of warfare, more precisely, the 
group’s ideological zeal in seeking martyrdom, which cannot be deterred by its 
numerical disadvantage. It has created a tendency among field commanders with 
tremendous freedom of manoeuvre to launch risky attacks on well-defended 
areas. We can cite the attacks in urban centres in Diyala, or the military bases of 
Habaniyah and Ayn Assad to describe this tendency. It can also push its political 
leaders to refuse to retreat as this is considered as shameful and not honourable. 
We can stress out the end of the year of 2014 and beginning of 2015, where 
emboldened by its momentum, IS military leaders may have fallen into 
overconfidence in their capacity like in Kobane in Syria. IS’ momentum, may have 
spread among its fighters and commanders the idea that providence that would 
grant them constant victory despite the critical change in the balance of the 
conflict the International coalition intervention caused. The amendment of their 
slogan from “baqiya” to “baqiya wa tatamadad”, meaning “endure and expand” 
expresses this euphoric mindset in the framework of the group’s cult for the 
offensive.  
Indeed, the inherent Offensive nature of IS’ military doctrine was a weak point 
which was emphasized during the intervention of the Coalition airpower. Counter 
attacks launched after the loss of a position were easily spotted by the Coalition 
fighters and had a high cost for concentrated IS troops. Facing airpower, the 
group’s strategists recognized the bloodbath caused by this emboldened posture 
and presented countermeasures to deal with the enemy’s air campaign. In the Al 
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Naba newspaper578, the author recognised that it was counterproductive for the 
group to engage forces that enjoyed air power support. These forces only 
provoked IS’ fighters to leave their hideouts and expose themselves to airstrikes 
from drones. 
For the reasons cited above I consider that IS strategists did not follow this 
recommendation on many occasions.  
8 -“Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it 
has once failed”. 
IS’ adherence to this principle can be tested in cases where its first assault 
failed. For the Ramadi offensive case study, we can observe that IS applied this 
guideline. Each of its three assaults on the city centre was different, which can 
make us believe that the planners of the assault likely developed a process of 
lesson learning to adapt their manoeuvres to evolving circumstances and the 
enemy’s defensive posture. The first attack in January 2014 filled the void left by 
ISF when retreating in January and did not confront a powerful tribe. After this 
move, the heavily defended government complex situated in downtown became 
its objective. In November and December of 2014, it tried an attack with an 
incursion by small units with boats and by infiltrating refugees. The attack failed 
because of the decisive intervention of the coalition air force. In March 2015, it 
launched an attack using underground tunnels and SVBIEDs into strong points 
in the government complex. However, this time defenders were not overwhelmed 
by the SVBIEDs and succeeded in foiling the attack by destroying the car bombs 
with anti-tank missiles. The final attack carried out in May 2015, intended to 
downgrade the influence of the anti-tank missiles and the impact of coalition air 
strikes. The attackers used 30 SVBIEDs, succeeding in overwhelming the 
defenders and started the attack during a sandstorm to suppress air support for 
the ISF on the ground. The combination of both elements was vital in order to 
dislocate physically and psychologically the ISF entrenched in the city. The 
evolution in the scale and resources and different means used has shown a high 
                                            
578 Naba Issue 96 and 97 
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level of adaptability and versatility of IS which confirms the adherence to this 
principle during the Ramadi battle.  
Conclusion about the end of IS’ momentum 
We can conclude that IS’ strategists adhered to and applied most of the 
principles established by Liddle Hart for the indirect approach during their 
offensive on Iraqi cities.  Seven of the eight principles of LH were applied by the 
group except for concentrated attacks on well-guarded and defended targets. For 
the seven other principles, empirical evidence has demonstrated the group’s 
adherence to them, confirming a high degree of adaptability, mobility and 
flexibility.  
From a provincial scope, Diyala Province appeared to be an exception while 
assessing IS’ adherence to LH’s strategic guidelines. The necessity to put 
pressure on Baghdad likely hastened IS' operations in the province. It confirms 
the previous assessment that unlike other provinces, in 2014 it was not prepared 
to shift from a rural guerrilla to an urban assault strategy. The level 
unpreparedness of Diyala Province may also indicate that IS was surprised by 
the rapid fall of the Iraqi Army in Nineveh and Salahudeen. As a result, IS failed 
to consolidate on this eastern front and seriously threaten Baghdad. The 
opportunity of taking Baghdad was politically tempting, but after failing to get a 
permanent foothold in Diyala and Northern Baghdad, it realised that its takeover 
was unrealistic. For that reason, it turned to a second objective by launching a 
surprise attack, ending its tacit agreement with the Kurds and internationalising 
the conflict.  
Both the Mosul and Ramadi case studies proved to be relevant, showing that the 
only variable of the Iraqi Army’s level of resistance was not sufficient while 
explaining IS’ victory in both battlefields. The attack on Mosul was fast and took 
a couple of days while Ramadi’s fall was the result of 14 months of positional 
attrition warfare with multiple assaults, and the intervention of US-led coalition 
airpower. For both cases but by using different means, the group physically and 
psychologically dislocated ISF’s equilibrium. Regarding the reasons behind the 
end of IS’ momentum, the first factor that emerges is foreign intervention. In 
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Northern Iraq and the rest of the country, from August 2014 air support provided 
by the US-led coalition to its allies on the ground was key to pushing back IS’ 
forces and later taking back the cities and destroying much of their infrastructure. 
In Baiji, after its conquest in May 2015, the irruption of new and motivated militias 
coordinated by Iran in support of the Iraqi Army was decisive in order to dislocate 
IS’ defences. However, these interventions changed the fate of the conflict later; 
they did not end IS’ momentum but rather rolled back its gains. The first signs of 
the end of IS’ momentum appeared before any foreign intervention in the country 
when the Iraqi Army was falling apart and the PMU still forming itself. 
 We can explain the halt of IS’ expansion to endogenous and exogenous factors. 
As explained, the group resources were likely overstretched while conquering 
new territories far from its support areas and its supply lines. Also, the 
combination of topological factors (the dense vegetation) and the fierce 
resistance encountered from Sunni tribes south of Salahudeen played a 
significant role in halting IS’ military momentum before the US coalition 
intervention and the involvement of Iran. Indeed tribes of Dhuluiyah or Dulaim 
seriously affected IS’ military advance. The Jubur tribe, a Sunni tribe in the south 
of the town, resisted for six months stopping IS’ push towards the south. 
Dhuluiyah was a strategic node located on the roads linking the eastern province 
of Diyala to Salahudeen province in the north. The resistance of the tribes there 
was perhaps a turning point in the conflict, which is not often pointed out while 
explaining the end of IS momentum in Iraq. The outcome of the battle would have 
been different if all Sunni tribes had adopted at best a passive posture toward the 
group’s advance. When tribes stood up at all costs against IS, the military 
situation remained in a stalemate (Haditha, Dhuluiyah) despite its superiority in 
arms and weapons against them. For that reason, in the final part of the study I 
assess IS’ resurgence and analyse its relations with the tribes and the Sunni 
insurgency from a non-military perspective in what was defined by Liddle Hart as 
Grand Strategy.  
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VIII- Islamic State’s Strategy towards 
competitive social structures and 
propaganda efforts.  
Resilient organisations are those who can rebuild themselves after a shock 
by putting into practice a new set of routines and principles. At the worst of its 
situation in 2008-2010, there was an awareness among ISI’s leadership about 
mistakes that could have been avoided. In 2008, Riyadh Al Ogeidi, a senior ISI 
emir, conceded, “We do not deny the difficulties we are facing now. The 
Americans have not defeated us, but the turnaround of the Sunnis against us 
made us lose a lot and suffer very painfully. We made many mistakes over the 
past year”.579 The same year, the chief of Al Qaeda in Pakistan and number three 
of the organisation, Atiyah Abdu Al Rahman, expressed in an internal memo that 
the “brothers in Iraq are making political gaffes, which give our enemies and rivals 
an opportunity to exploit the people”.580 This consciousness that errors were 
made is at the base of the development of a new strategy embraced by the group 
and applied later in Syria and Iraq to interact with other socially organised groups 
such as tribes or insurgent groups. The choice of groups inside the society and 
an analysis of their interaction with IS is not fortuitous; it corresponds to IS’ 
mindset for its state-building project. The main way of reaching political legitimacy 
is by obtaining allegiances of entire groups through their representatives and not 
individuals. It follows the political thoughts of Ibn Taymiyah, who considers that 
an Islamic State has to treat with communities and not individuals and that the 
social contract is not between individuals and the ruler but rather between 
                                            
579 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Diary of an Insurgent In Retreat”, Washington Post, 10/02/2008, 
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580 “Atiyaah abd al Rahman, letter to Mustafa abd al yazid”, Socom 2012-000011, 28/03/2007 
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communities and the Caliph, where the allegiance is an acceptance of domination 
against the granting of rights. 
.In this last section of the study I analyse the influence of such a strategy on IS’ 
relation with other social structures such as Sunni insurgent groups and the tribes 
in order to explain its resurgence.  In the last part, I compare IS’ frames towards 
the Sunni population in Iraq to protestors’ demands during the so-called “Iraqi 
Spring” of 2012-2013 and verify the adherence of to the L 
1-IS’ policies with its social incubator (Sunni tribes and 
armed groups)   
The question of IS’ influence and interaction with the Sunni society remains 
a field of research with more questions than answers. Reports of fights, 
allegiances, and declarations made by the group are available, but no deep 
sociological research on IS’ tribal policy has been done yet. Despite this research 
gap, this section tries to describe IS’ tribal policy from the interaction it had with 
tribes and the few research studies conducted in order to grasp IS’ sociological 
and tribal roots in Iraq. Tribes in Iraq are one of the main social structures shaping 
identities and social bonds. They are classified based on their number of 
members; they can be confederations of tribes or a simple clan. The biggest 
structure in size is the “Kabila”581 followed by the “’Ashirah”, the “Fakhd” clan, the 
“Khams”, which is the extended family and the lowest structure “al Bayt” which is 
the family. Tribal culture and codes are still significant in society in matters of 
traditions such as blood feuds (al-Tha'r) or protecting family honour ('Ird).  In the 
Khams structure, male members are obliged to avenge the death of another 
member. During its early years, IS under Zarqawi did not pay much attention to 
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the tribes, considering them as an obsolete structure that obstructed its 
recruitment and had questionable moral values. No tribal chiefs had any role 
offered, and it did not rely on the tribal structure to control society. As explained 
by Witheside back in 2009, to counter the widespread Sahawat movement Abu 
Omar al-Baghdadi created a tribal engagement office582. Its role was to manage 
and co-opt Sunni tribal figures. The continuation of this structure as part of the 
2016 Islamic State caliphate confirms the importance of this structure and the 
new place accorded to tribes from IS’ perspective. 
Two tribal confederations were important in the study of IS’ relations with tribes. 
In the last decade, the Dulaim and Jubur tribes were significant to the Iraqi power 
structure. They both represent two of the biggest tribes in Iraq and historically 
have played a major role in support of and later against Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. The first, the Dulaim Sunni tribe, is based in Anbar governorate and is 
composed of the sub-tribes (‘Achira) such as Albu Alwan, Albu Fahd, Albu Issa 
Albu Assaf, Albu Nimr, Albu Jughaif and Albu Risha. In September 2007, 20 out 
the 30 tribes of Dulaim cooperated with the US and joined the Abu Risha tribe to 
form the Council of Awakening of Anbar (Sahawat). The second, the Jubur tribe, 
includes both Sunnis and Shias and is primarily centred along the Tigris River in 
Salahudeen and to the south of Nineveh. Its members spearheaded the Sahawat 
movement in Salahudeen from 2007. The posture of this particular tribe was key 
in stopping IS’ offensive in Southern Salahudeen, in the city of Dhuluiyah. The 
next section explains why these two tribal confederations had an influence on IS’ 
tribal strategy during its resurgence in Iraq in 2014.    
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The Dulaim Confederation Tribe in Anbar  
IS predecessors’ tumultuous history with tribes started in 2005 when the 
first dispute with the Albu Mahal tribe erupted on the Syrian-Iraqi border of Anbar 
province. This tribe has been traditionally linked with smuggling activity, which 
became threatened by AQI’s networks. The beheading of police officers from the 
tribe triggered a revolt against the group. This episode symbolises the two major 
points of discordance between the group and some tribes: ideology and 
resources. In the aftermath of the fall of the Iraqi state, one of the few social 
structures which remained stable was the tribe. The control of resources coming 
from smuggling activities has been a major source of income for them; they also 
have a sense of tribal bonds and solidarity which can surpass all other identities. 
The Wala and Baraa ideology obliges the group to put religion above tribal bonds 
at the expense of sectarian and ideological identity. In addition to that, tribes had 
a financial incentive to see their sons join local security forces and avoid seeing 
Shia troops stationed in their areas.  For both reasons, the killing of local police 
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officers from the tribes was unequivocally a catalyst event to driving a war 
between AQI and the tribes. In September of 2006, the Anbar Salvation Council 
was put in place to uproot the ISI by a tribal leader called Abu Risha, with the 
logistical and financial support of the US. This experience was later applied in 
Diyala and Salahudeen. At its creation, ISI presumed the attachment of the tribes 
to its project. From their creation, the Sahawat were targeted by the group, 
specifically their leaders (targeting strategy). The group’s communication labelled 
them as collaborators and worshippers of the dollar to justify their targeting. From 
2009, according to the count made by Whiteside from media reports, 1,345 
Sahawat members across Iraq were killed.583The other response to the creation 
of the Sahawat was the inclusion of tribes in ISI. On 12 October 2006, Majliss 
Shura Mujahedeen united with three smaller groups and six Sunni tribes to form 
the Islamic State. The six tribes had upwards of 300,000 members, but there 
were existing divisions within the tribes supporting ISI. The identification of the 
tribes exposed their loyalties and made them direct targets for the US and the 
other tribes.584  
During the attack on Ramadi in January 2014, a state of division and disarray 
prevailed among the tribes. At that moment, they were confronting the army when 
the IS attacked the city and were again divided in their response.  In 2012-2014, 
the Sunni tribes of Iraq were divided between several postures towards the 
government and the IS. Thirty-seven tribal figures announced their condemnation 
of the Sahawat tribes still supporting Al Maliki. The only tribes of the Dulaim which 
were “neutral” were the Albu ‘Assaf and Albu Mar’i585. The Albu Faraj tribe was 
an exception since part of it opposed IS while the other joined it. Its leaders issued 
a “public announcement of hostility against any tribe or group fighting IS and 
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https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/alqaedas_grand_coali.php#  
585 Al Mada newspaper issue of 29 November 2015.  
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supporting the government.”586 The Albu Fahd tribe joined the Anbar Salvation 
Council and vowed to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq back in 2007.587  Other tribes, which 
were not part of the Sahawat movement and were hostile to the government, 
joined the group such as the Jumeilat, the Meshhadeh tribe in Fallujah, the 
Halabsa and the Albu Issa and Al Janabat. 
These de facto allies, despite their ideological differences, cooperated with IS 
against a common enemy. IS’ relationship with the tribes was always delicate and 
susceptible to disruption. Even in the early days of IS’ push into Iraq, some tribal 
leaders publicly stated that their alliance with IS was temporary and could be 
reversed if changes occurred in Baghdad. For instance, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman 
expressed this idea by saying that “When we get rid of the government, we will 
be in charge of the security file in the regions, and then our objective will be to 
expel terrorism, the terrorism of the government and that of IS”588.  
Nevertheless, despite its tensions with Baghdad, the core of the Sahawat 
movement continued to fight against IS. The Jaghafiya in Haditha chosen to fight 
until death against the group. The tribe was accused of fighting other tribesmen 
and becoming the chiefs of the city arresting other tribes by accusing them of 
collaborating with IS589. On 23rd June of 2015, the group proposed the last chance 
for the tribe to repent by the voice of Adnani, who from a position of force called 
the Jaghafiya to surrender without exception.590 In Ramadi, the Albu Risha, Albu 
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Tiyeb and Albu A’etha tribes sided with the army against IS. The division between 
Baghdad and the Sahawat in Anbar did not prevent IS’ commanders from 
continuing targeting tribal leaders opposed to them. In June 2014, the nephew of 
Abu Risha and a leader of the Sahawat in Ramadi, Mohamed Khamis Abu Risha, 
was killed with four Iraqi commanders in a triple suicide operation in the centre of 
Ramadi. The operation was sophistically planned by IS; it managed to infiltrate 
the army’s security ring with two of its members. They blew themselves up 
pretending to be bodyguards of the chief of the Sahawat Council in Ramadi. A 
few months later, in Abu Risha’s village, General Ahmad Sadak al Dulaymi, 
Anbar’s police chief, was targeted and killed with two IEDs591. The leader of the 
new Sahawat592 later accused the former leader of the Sahawat, Abu Risha 
Mohamad, to have facilitated IS’ incursion in Ramadi. Whether those accusations 
were true or false, it proves the high level of suspicion and mistrust between 
members of the Sahawat fighting IS and the Iraqi security apparatus at that time. 
Mohamed Abu Risha, who was no longer the leader of the Sahawat Council, was 
later accused of supporting terrorism by the Iraqi authorities with a warrant issued 
against him in April 2016.593The same day, Baghdad pronounced the death 
penalty for the MPs arrested in December 2013, among them Sahawat leaders 
from Ramadi still fighting the group.  At the same time, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
announced594 a general amnesty for the tribes and local security forces who had 
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surrendered in Ramadi. Otherwise, they would face massive annihilation such as 
the Albu Fahd in Hit who suffered the execution of around hundreds of its 
members in October 2014595. However, the fact that the ones who executed them 
were members of the same tribe shows IS’ awareness of Iraq’s tribal codes. By 
killing members of a tribe by their fellow tribesmen, it avoids a revenge cycle of 
violence and breaks the tribe itself. 
When in 2013 leaders of Sahawat who were members of insurgent groups began 
to be arrested on charges of terrorism, the project of the Sahawat as the Sunni 
local shield against the IS utterly collapsed. Most of the Sahawat chose to hold 
on and wait to confront IS because they were not ready to fight and preferred to 
see who would be victorious in the confrontation between ISF and IS. IS took 
advantage of Anbar tribal leaders’ political miscalculation and tensions to co-opt 
them and win their support. In the eye of the majority of the tribes, IS became a 
lesser danger than Al Maliki’s policy. Facing the tribes still resistant to it, the group 
used the threat of massive annihilation by the hands of fellow tribesmen to make 
them surrender and avoid a future backlash. 
Tribes in Salahudeen  
  It is essential to distinguish between the Sahawat of Anbar and the 
Sahawat in Salahudeen and Diyala.  The Sahawat based in Anbar merged with 
Iraq’s security institutions from the beginning and were equipped by the Iraqi 
Government. They enjoyed some independence and freedom of manoeuvring. 
Meanwhile, the Sahawat in Diyala and Salahudeen were under the pressure of 
Shia militia and the suspicion of the government. From 2010, the payment of the 
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Sahawat in mixed areas began to dry up, and the promise of integrating them into 
the security forces vanished; the whole system began to crumble.  
Like in Anbar, Sunni tribes in Salahudeen were split between opposition, 
neutrality, and support of IS. Some tribes switched their sides according to the 
winners. As in Mosul after the fall of the city, it is said that in Baiji and Tikrit, IS 
used money from refining and smuggling oil to co-opt the tribes and distribute 
essential resources to the population for free596. Other tribes were divided 
internally, with some members aligned with IS and others neutral or allied with 
the Iraqi Government. The case of the Ubaid tribe is compelling because it 
symbolizes how fluid tribal and IS’ relationships can be and oscillate between 
cooperation and advice to hostility and revenge. The tribe paid a tremendous 
tribute in the clashes against the Maliki government security forces.  Members of 
tribes were killed during the Hawijah massacre making its cooperation with IS 
very close in the following month. According to Zeidel, the tribe advised IS’ 
commanders to attack Baghdad, but instead, the group attacked Kurdistan 
Peshmerga and assassinated its prominent members597. Since then, there has 
been a blood feud between them.  
On June 23, 2014, IS managed to take over the city of Alam (situated west of 
Tikrit) negotiating with its inhabitants for two weeks598. Tribal leaders and the 
group agreed to have the tribes hold their weapons and conduct mixed patrols 
with IS fighters in their zone, showing further adaptability in the ways to achieve 
territorial domination. Instead of attacking the area or pounding it, the group opted 
for a negotiated settlement to enter the city. At the same time, it used a more 
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brutal approach against the village of Zawiya, whose inhabitants refused to 
surrender. It pounded it relentlessly with mortars, destroying the village. Using 
this method, the Islamic State made an example of the city because its people 
tried to “break the rules of the Islamic State”599.  
In Salahudeen, the case of the Albu Ajil and Albu Nasir tribes in Tikrit symbolises 
how tribal allegiances to IS are interlinked with tribal traditions and local 
dynamics.600  Like the Albu Nasir, the case of the Juburi tribe in Dhuluiyah, which 
confronted IS, does not confirm the idea that all the tribes are actors simply 
following the wind of power for their survival and interests but rather can impose 
their own dynamic to the conflict. After the occupation of Tikrit by IS in June 2014, 
the Albu Nasir, the tribe of Saddam Hussein, was the first local tribe swearing 
allegiance to IS with 38 members joining it.601 Later, many of its members 
participated in the Speicher mass execution of Shia soldiers.  For historical 
reasons, the main rival of the Albu Nasir was the Juburi tribe. Because of their 
involvement in an attempted coup against Saddam in 1982 and the consequent 
repression they suffered, they have a long-standing hostility with the Albu 
Nasir602. The battle in Dhuluiyah can also be explained from the perspective of 
intratribal dynamics, where a tribe which had the upper hand before 2003 saw 
the opportunity to take the advantage from the shift of power following IS’ 
advance against other tribes603. In Dhuluiyah, people from the Juburi tribe were 
known to be good collaborators with the US army and Iraqi Government. The 
Juburi remained powerful in Salahudeen after 2003 because it was one of the 
few tribes to participate in the political process while the majority of the Sunnis 
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boycotted the 2005 elections604. Back in 2009, Al Maliki had already thought to 
create a new Sahawat with more supportive Sunni tribes, among them the Juburi 
tribe605. In addition to that, the tribe have a history of self-governance and 
resistance to IS. The tribe suffered in the past from ISI’s operations with the killing 
of cadets at a police centre in 2011 and the killing of its tribal leaders even before 
the rise of the Sahawat movement in the region.606  Some members of the tribe 
are Shia and did not have hostility towards Iran or Shia militias unlike other tribes 
in Anbar. In May 2015, the mayor of Hawijah, Sabhan Khalef Ali al-Juburi, joined 
the PMU saying, “One day Iran was our enemy, but now Iran is helping us fight 
our enemy”.607As a result, the tribe was not part of the widespread movement 
against the Iraqi PM in 2013. According to the Sunni protest social movement 
page608, Dhuluiyah was the city with less participation in a manifestation against 
Maliki in Iraq Sunni provinces. For all these reasons, unlike in Anbar IS could not 
take advantage of the protest movement in Dhuluiyah while its narrative of Sunnis 
being victimised as a community by the Shia government had little chance of 
finding an audience among the tribe.  
As described in part IV, in a siege imposed by IS the Al Juburi and Albu Faraj 
tribes in Dhuluiyah resisted for more than 200 days. This area was strategic for 
the group since it offered a direct way into cutting the supply line between 
Samarra and Baghdad and connecting to the Northern belt of the capital. During 
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the negotiations, IS asked the Sahawat and local police to give up their arms and 
accept the same terms as in A’lam. According to IS, part of the tribe was willing 
to give up arms, but the other part was bribed by the government and Shia militias 
in Balad to continue their fight. According to locals interviewed by the pro-
government press, the locals decided to resist because of the insistence from IS 
commanders in pledging allegiance to the group and accepting IS patrols to be 
stationed in their city.609 IS’ fighters did not respect an agreement made with the 
locals to stay outside the city but rather tried to seize it by force. Juburi tribesmen 
interpreted the IS’ entrance to their land as the return of former regime elements 
and members linked with Saddam Hussein’s tribe, the Albu Nimr.  
2-IS’ tribal policy 
Assessing IS’ tribal policy is not easy since not many sources are available 
from the group. Another perspective for studying IS’ tribal policy would be to study 
it from the organisation’s perspective. One study610 conducted by Roman Zeidel 
offers a collective profile of the commanders and is one of the few attempts to 
draw a sociological picture of the group from a tribal perspective. By collecting 
the names of IS commandants from primary sources and media reports, Zeidel 
formed a comprehensive collective profile of IS military middle and high-level 
leadership. Unravelling their origins may help to understand IS social structure 
and the level of support in tribal regions such as Anbar and Salahudeen. Zeidel’s 
account of IS commanders shows a great tribal diversification from the group with 
34 tribes represented. From Zeidel’s figures, we can assume that the group does 
not rely on one tribe while recruiting members or promoting commanders. It still 
has the attractiveness to recruit members from tribes which form the column of 
the Sahawat such as the Jaghafiya, the Albu Fahd, and the Albu Issa. These 
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recruits from opponent tribes are essential since they can be used to eliminate 
their fellow tribesmen, break a tribe’s cohesion, and halt any tribal revenge 
process.  IS cannot rely on recruiting whole tribes even though the tribe of Jumaila 
was neutral in Fallujah and that all of IS commanders in Karma were tribesmen 
from Jamila.611 
The release of IS internal documents from Mosul shows that a large number of 
Juburis served in IS’ police forces in their areas612. This confirms the application 
of the strategic recommendation issued a few years ago of using locals to enforce 
Sharia law in conquered territories and appointing local leaders from the same 
tribal ascendance to reduce the feeling among locals that IS was exogenous to 
them. The biggest tribal confederation (Kabila) in Anbar is the Dulaim, in which 
most of the tribes support the government and have spearheaded the fight 
against the group for a decade. The Albu Bali from Ramadi is a small tribe from 
the Al Khalidiya region, which was one of the first to fall to IS’ control in 2014.  
The researcher counted eleven commanders from Jumaila, eight from Albu Ali 
and six from Albu Issa. For the other tribes from the Dulaim confederation they 
only had one to three commanders from IS. In Anbar, tribal identity remains 
essential and the IS could not turn many members of these tribes which have a 
bloody history with the group that would prevail in time. 
The Jabur is the other significant tribal confederation, regrouping between four 
and eight million people in Iraq. It is normal that many of the IS Iraqi commanders 
counted are Jaburis (20 members), but this does not mean the tribal 
confederation is aligned with the group because of the gargantuan size of the 
tribe. Despite the tribe’s vast size and its opposition to IS, the fact that a senior 
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Juburi commander, Abu Fatima al-Jaburi, was Baghdadi’s deputy and governor 
of Iraq shows the no tribes are excluded in IS’ upper echelon. 
One other result of the research is that Abu Bakr Baghdadi’s tribe is under-
represented. It suggests that unlike Saddam Hussein’s nepotism, the caliph did 
not promote its tribesmen. Tribal affiliation is thus not relevant in determining the 
structural hierarchy in the group. It confirms that the group’s ideology and identity 
transcend traditional clan ties and surpass all the other ones. In a sense, the 
organisation is more modern than other rivals (militias, Iraqi state) as it does not 
rely on an archaic system of solidarity or alliance for promotion — the fact that all 
tribes are represented shows that in the Sunni tribal landscape the group is well 
represented. Not a single tribe is predominant in its leadership nor blacklisted for 
its hostility towards the group. On the other hand, the group wants to erode the 
prevalence of the tribal identity without wiping it. The fact that its commanders 
use their tribal surname by not hiding it but instead promoting it shows the 
acceptance of the tribal dimension of the country. Moreover, IS intended to 
project an image of tribal support by hosting tribal figures of Fallujah, Ramadi and 
Mosul and publicising their allegiance. Adnani claimed that in June 2015, “The 
Sunni people are now behind the jihadists ... the enemies have been petrified by 
the daily pledges of allegiance by the chiefs of tribes to the Mujahedeen”. 613   
Finally, the other tribal dynamic from which IS can thrive is the perpetual revenge 
cycle between them. When tribes or many of its members join the group, each 
member of the tribe become responsible for the actions of his fellow tribesmen. 
Since the ousting of the group from Tikrit, a revenge cycle has prevailed between 
tribes and individuals judged for the collective action of the whole tribe or some 
of its members. In Balad, the tribe of Beni saad in Yathrib, who pledged allegiance 
to IS, is still in conflict with other tribes because of the cooperation of their 
members with the group.  Because of the continuation of intratribal conflicts, 
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members of a tribe linked with IS are still considered as sympathisers of the group 
and therefore suffer discrimination and a form of collective punishment614. In 
2016, the Salahudeen governorate decided to impose between 10 years and a 
life sentence of expulsion from their homes to members of IS and their families in 
the governorate.615 This tribal social excommunication means that tribes from 
which members have joined IS will always be labelled as such for generations. 
This creates a multi-generational discrimination process, from which the group 
can take advantage in the future.  
3-IS’ policy towards insurgent groups during the 2014 
offensive.  
The other actors the group interacted with during its resurgence are the 
armed groups from the Sunni insurgent landscape, in particular, with the 
militarization of the protests throughout the Sunni governorates of Iraq. Despite 
the protests being non-violent at the beginning, armed groups began to be 
involved. Among them, the most active, the Sunni nationalist militant movement 
Jaysh rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) led by Izzat Ibrahim Al Durri. The 
group is a neo-Baathist insurgent group most active in Salahudeen and Mosul. 
Members of this group were present in protest camps in Ramadi to call the people 
to take arms. The same demand was made by IS, which repeatedly called the 
protestors to take arms and return to violence. Leaflets were distributed to the 
protestors, and sometimes flags of the groups were raised. The bloody clashes 
in April 2013 at the Hawijah protest camps sparked a wave of violence across 
Sunni-majority areas of Iraq. JRTN militants clashed with security forces at Qara 
Tapa in Diyala Province, Suleiman Bek, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul.  Tribal 
militias were thus formed in the following days in Anbar and Samarra. The 
militarization of the protests benefitted IS by using the tribes’ anger against the 
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government. Many militias lacking experience, arms and manpower had to 
cooperate with IS against their new common enemy, the Maliki government. 
Sunni politicians were claiming that all violence in Iraq was due to Iran’s 
manipulation of ISI in order to marginalise the Sunni and justify their repression. 
A vicious circle was created, where Maliki accused protestors of being infiltrated 
by IS, whom, in turn, accused Maliki and Iran of sponsoring IS’ actions.  In the 
face of the rise of a myriad of tribes and armed groups, the main difficulty for 
Maliki’s forces was to distinguish protestors and their militias from IS’ fighters. 
Knowing that the camps were continuously portrayed as staging areas for 
terrorism, some Sahawat leaders joined the protests, especially after they saw 
their wage cut by the government in Baghdad. 
Other Sunni insurgent groups against the government in Baghdad had a different 
stance on IS.  The general military council of Iraqi revolutionaries (GMCIR) was 
considered as the strongest among the anti-government groups in Iraq616. It 
appeared at the end of December 2013 during the wave of violence resulting from 
the crackdown of Sunni protest camps. The JRTN was the dominant leading force 
inside the council with other smaller groups such as the “1920 brigades”. After 
the fall of Mosul, the leader of JRTN, Izzat al-Duri, did not show hostility towards 
ISIS and described Al Qaeda and the Islamic State fighters who liberated the city 
as “heroes and knights”617. He also praised nationalists and Islamists and called 
them to unite in order to break the “Safavid cancer” and occupation. Aware of the 
equilibrium of power, this positive mention of IS oriented its fighters in order to 
minimise the conflicts and protect its group’s members.  The GMCIR claimed that 
“revolutionaries” had seized the western side of Mosul during the June fall of the 
city and that it had played an essential part in the conquest of the city. Those 
claims were very doubtful given the fact that IS fighters imposed their agenda on 
the city so quickly (imposing rules, destroying shrines, arresting former 
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Baathists).  A few years later, it was clear that IS was the leading force capable 
of conquering the city and the only exerting its control over it.  
Other leaders from the myriad of Sunni armed groups have tried to depict IS’ 
actions as part of the revolution in order to take credit from the situation. Leaders 
such as Abdul-Sammad  al-Ghrairi  considered that IS “accomplished goals and 
helped the revolutionaries achieve their goals and we are semi-[parallel] with 
them in facing the Iranian  Safavid project in Iraq”.618  Similar to JRTN, the Islamic 
Army (Sunni resistance group linked to Muslim Brotherhood willing to participate 
in the political process) demonstrated the same rhetoric towards IS’ advance by 
minimising its role in the collapse of the Iraqi state. They denied their relationship 
with the group while at the same time acknowledging its role to protect its 
members and show a popular among the Sunni population anti-government 
posture. As described in the report on Sunni insurgency, their positive labelling 
of the IS’ conquest may also have intended to prevent any potential retaliatory 
measures against its members. Hashim also explained their non-clear stance 
towards IS' advance as a political manoeuvre in order to gain time waiting for the 
support from the intelligence services from regional actors619.   
In Fallujah, the IS had to deal with the Fallujah Military Council as the umbrella 
for the tribal and insurgent groups opposed to the government. The council was 
influenced by Abdullah al-Janabi, a Salafist figure who participated in the battle 
of 2004 alongside AQI. He coordinated the different armed groups inside the city 
in January 2014. Nonetheless, his role is said to have diminished at the profit of 
IS in 2014. As explained in the strategic assessment of IS’ conquest of Fallujah 
(part V), the balance of power inside the city was so in favour of IS that other 
armed groups relied on its enhanced military capabilities to defend the city. Its 
greater military capacity pushed other groups to accept its domination in order to 
prevent the Iraqi Army from entering the city.  In April 2014, the Fallujah Military 
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Council denounced the assault, torture and kidnapping cases by IS after the 
refusal of its members to pledge allegiance to the group620. Initial cooperation 
with other groups and their further marginalisation when the group’s military 
capacities outweighed them was IS’ trademark in its relation to smaller armed 
groups having a different ideology. For that reason, groups against the 
government and the traditional Sunni insurgent groups positively labelled IS’ 
moves. At the tactical level, they had had some degree of cooperation while their 
strategic goals were the opposite.  Indeed, while Sunni insurgent groups were 
calling to launch the final attack on Baghdad after the fall of Mosul, IS’ actions 
proved that the group had its own agenda. By attacking the Peshmerga in August 
2014 and the Yazidi community in Northern Iraq, IS’ commanders decided for 
several reasons to internationalise the conflict. This move, as well as the 
treatment of Mosul’s Christian community, was widely criticised by revolutionaries 
and the Sunni insurgent groups. Both episodes show that there was no strategical 
cooperation or even concertation between IS and other insurgent groups. As a 
matter of fact, beyond expelling the Iraqi security forces from the areas they 
sought to control, GMCIR’s operational goal was completely different from IS’ 
goal.  
The relation of tactical cooperation between both groups was shaped by the 
balance of power between them and the shared priority of combating a common 
enemy. However, heavy fights erupted on June 22, 2014, after IS ordered other 
armed groups in Hawijah to surrender their weapons and pledge allegiance621. In 
Mosul in July 2014, dozens of ex-Iraqi Army military officers and figures of the 
Ba‘ath Party were arrested by the group, questioned and perhaps executed. In 
areas where JRTN had a substantial presence, IS worked to diminish it by 
displaying its power in the streets and banning the displaying of photos of Al Durri, 
                                            
620 “ISIS  kills  leaders  in  armed  groups  for  refusing  to  pledge allegiance during a meeting in 
Fallujah”, Sumaria News, 8/07/ 2014,  https://goo.gl/JV7tRu  
621 “Iraq: 17 killed in the clashes between “the Islamic State” and the extreme Naqshbandi group”, 
France 24, June 22, 2014, https://goo.gl/UoJkB7  
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Saddam and the Iraqi Baathist flag622.  In Diyala Province, clashes occurred with 
the Islamic Army with the execution of 10 leaders in Sadia. In July 2014, a 
meeting of several JRTN leaders was targeted by an IED623.  In order to contain 
IS, JRTN started cooperating with Sunni tribes linked with the government. In 
September 2014, JRTN supported Sunni tribes624 as they fought IS in the Iraqi 
Arab neighbourhoods of Wihda and Tajnid of southern Jalula. 
Whether the JRTN, the Islamic Army or Sunni tribes, they share a history of 
conflict and an irreconcilable ideological rift with the IS and its predecessors. 
Because of their nationalist orientation, they are considered as apostates in IS’ 
religious canon.  However, in a state of inferiority the group has shown a high 
degree of pragmatism and awareness of its strategical environment by following 
Sun Tzu’s advice of “first attack the enemy’s strategy, then his alliance, next to 
his army and last his cities.”625 In 2006, the strategy of the US and next, the Iraqi 
Army was to isolate IS and its predecessors from their social incubators and put 
the organisation in a constant state of war against other Sunni groups. The new 
strategic environment in the post-US-withdrawal Iraq put an end to the group’s 
isolation. First, with the rise of sectarianism, the Maliki government overpassed 
IS as the main enemy for many Sunni actors. The more Maliki alienated the 
Sunnis, the more their posture was at best neutral towards IS. For example, in 
the hub that constitutes the desert between Syria and Iraq in Nineveh, tribes in 
the Al Jazeera desert stopped their cooperation with the Iraqi military against IS 
because of their provocative attitude626.  
                                            
622 “Daech is worried about the competition of other Sunni groups and the Sharia court is the 
destiny of its opponents”, Al Mada press , 27/07/2014, https://goo.gl/y4syNa  
623 “Killing and wounding of 7 Naqshbandi Army commanders north east of Baquba”, Al Sumaria 
News, 10/07/2014 , https://goo.gl/YxsyFj  
624 “More than 20 killed and injured in clashes between tribal gunmen  supported  by  JRTN  and  
ISIS  in  Jalula”,Shafaaq,02/09/2014,http://www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraq-
news/82644---20----------.html 
625 Sun Tzu, translation Griffith, The Art of War, Oxford, 1963, p 77-78. 
626 “Sources : the border with Syria became a fertile ground for Al Qaeda and tribes have 




IS’ pragmatism towards other groups pushed the group to concentrate its fight in 
Iraq on government forces and their allies while from January 2014 in Syria it 
launched an all-out war against Syrian rebels.  It is important to note that in both 
theatres of operation the group developed a different strategy.  Because it had 
the upper hand in Syria and feeling the rising hostility of rebel groups supported 
by Arab and Western intelligence, it ended its cooperation with them and then 
while in Iraq it started to cooperate with insurgent groups. A tactical reason was 
the growth of the international involvement in the Syrian Civil War and especially 
the question of rebel’s support from Western powers, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia, which had torn apart the rebellion. This prompted a reaction from the 
group, which anticipated that the flow of weapons destined to rebels would be 
used against it. Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq did not have such international 
backing that would orientate their military operations and thus concentrated their 
fight only on the Iraqi Government. 
The group had an awareness of its strategical environment and adapted its level 
of cooperation with insurgents in different political landscapes. In Syria, it was 
already in the midst of a territorial strategy of state-building while in Iraq it was 
still involved in guerrilla strategy. The group’s doctrinarian obsession of 
ideological purity did not make it impossible for the group to adopt strategic 
postures of neutrality, alliance or open hostility against these armed groups. It did 
not yet adopt an all-out war policy based on a Manichean vision of the world.  
Indeed, IS’ ideology considers that all other political entities are “tawaghit” and 
therefore they are illegitimate and must be fought. However, from its relations 
with tribes or armed groups, we can conclude that there was a kind of strategical 
realisation from its leadership to prioritise the fighting depending on the context, 
the group’s strength, and its strategic objectives. 
As a result, open confrontation never took place before the caliphate´s 
declaration of July 2014. However, clashes localised in space and time erupted 
after IS’ takeover of large parts of Iraqi territory. Even before the proclamation of 
the caliphate, IS was imagining itself as a state that would never have to lower its 
statutes and negotiate or be judged as equal as militias or armed groups. Since 
the proclamation of the caliphate, it has urged all the armed groups to pledge 
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their allegiance in the name of Wala wal Bara. Because it elevated its status to a 
“caliphate”, IS has implicitly proclaimed itself as the sole holder of legitimate 
violence in the Islamic world. Since 2014, it has an obligation of reuniting the 
Islamic Ummah under one banner. Consequently, no groups, no militias or any 
other entity should be tolerated. This strategic consequence of the ideological 
evolution explains the future conflictive nature of its relations with all other armed 
groups from the Islamist political spectrum around the world. 
4-IS’ frames and the Sunni 2012-2013 protests  
       This part sheds light on the issue of IS’ rise and popular support it enjoyed in 
the context of the protests of Sunni Iraqis in 2012 and 2013.  We observed how 
these protests, which started peacefully, certainly helped IS’ resurgence by 
dispersing the Iraqi Army and turning many tribes from fighting IS to fighting the 
Iraqi Government. Facing this events, the group had its Grand Strategy (see part 
A of section III), which goes beyond its military actions and focuses on its ability 
to generate support among the Sunni population in Iraq. The group labelled 
popular support (Hadina shaa’biya) as a Taghut in the case it delays the full 
application of sharia627. However, from the 2010 strategic document it proved to 
be aware of the necessity of forming a constituency inside the Sunni population. 
Its strategy for gaining support is not based on a pragmatic gradualist approach 
but rather on the thriving on the sentiments of humiliation, the show of its moral 
superiority and the rise of sectarianism as the main identity shaping political 
allegiances and solidarities.  
This part assesses the group’s ability to spread frames that resonate among its 
targeted audience in order to enjoy a critical mass of popular support. Framing is 
a form by which actors in a social movement diffuse ideas and discourse that 
resonate among those they intend to mobilise. The theory argues that frames are 
articulated to resonate with the grievances of the Iraqi Sunni population. When 
there is frame alignment, recruitment and mobilisation are possible. The objective 
                                            




of this last section is to determine the coincidences between IS’ discourse 
towards the Sunni population and its demands that were widely voiced during the 
2012-2013 protests. This part of the study is articulated to verify if the group 
purposely voiced demands and grievances shared by a large part of the Sunni 
population which were not part of IS’ support base. It will be an opportunity not to 
focus on the ideological or religious frames the group is famous for diffusing but 
rather emphasise the social and political dimension of its discourse. I selected 
the major IS videos centred on Iraq released in the years preceding the protests 
to identify its main socio-political frames. From the video material released by IS, 
I show how the group had identified the grievances of the Sunni population in Iraq 
by spreading them before the start of the protests.  In the second part, I compare 
those frames with the bulk of the protestors’ demands presented a few years 
later. A sample of six major video productions released between 2010 and 2014 
was selected. Al Furqan is one of the media wings for the Islamic State and its 
prior incarnations and represents its oldest and most influential media production 
in Arabic.  
 “Khawanatu Al Assuna” (Lit the traitors of the Sunni) released in 2010 by 
the Islamic State of the Iraq Ministry of Information628. 
  “Saleel al-Sawarim”  ( Lit The Clanking of the  Swords);  four episodes 
were made available by Al Furqan Media Production in  July  2012,  August  
2012,  2013 and May 2014 629. 
 “Khams A’wam Aala ikamat Adawla” (Lit Five years after the establishment 
of the state) released in 2011 produced by Al Furqan Media Production630. 
                                            
628 Lit “The traitors of the Sunni”, a video issued by the Islamic State’s Minister of Information,  
available  on  the following link;   https://archive.org/details/Koonah  
629 Lit “The  Clanking  of  the  Swords”,  al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the 
Islamic State of Iraq: “Clanging of the Swords available  on  the  following link 
https://archive.org/details/abohafsaalkaisy_gmail_HD4 and   https://jihadology.net/2012/08/16/al-
furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-clanging-of-the-
swords-part-2%E2%80%B3/  
630  Lit “Five  years after the establishment of the State”, a video  issued by the Islamic State’s Al-




Khawanatu Al Assuna” (Lit the traitors of the Sunni) 
The first video entitled “Khawanatu Assuna”; the “traitors of the Sunni 
community” was published in May 2010 by the Ministry of Information of the ISI. 
It starts with a statement about the decline of the Islamic Ummah by making a 
historical parallel between the fall of Baghdad to the Americans in 2003 and its 
takeover by the Mongols during the thirteenth century. According to the narrator, 
the fall of the Abbasside capital was possible because of “Shia’s community 
felony”. Similarly, the “US crusaders” relied in 2003 on the Shia and the traitors 
among the Sunna community to take the city. The video’s primary purpose is to 
show Shia’s responsibility and role in harming the rights of the Sunni community.  
The narrator first denounces “Majliss Al Hukm”, “the council of power” of the 
political parties that represent the Sunni community in the political process of the 
newly established Iraqi state. The Hizb Al Islami is the main Muslim Brotherhood-
oriented party and the principal target of this video. Other groups are highlighted 
such as the coalition formed by Sunni Arab parties such as the Islamic party, the 
dialogue party, the colloquium party (Hizb al mou’atamar), and political 
representatives of the Islamic Army, the main Sunni nationalist insurgent group 
during the US occupation. The narrator considers that these parties and coalitions 
are a “façade” where the means justify the end. The first frame of the video is that 
representatives of the Sunni in the Iraqi state are corrupt politicians running for 
their private interests at the expense of the Sunni’s general interest. The second 
frame presented in this part is that the Sunni elite is not only corrupt but remains 
in the hands of the Shia government. Their acceptance of having only the head 
of the parliament and not the government or the presidency is depicted as a 
confirmation of their status as puppets of the Shia government in Baghdad. 
Splits inside the Sunni bloc are proof of the prevalence of personal interests over 
the Sunni general interests. Parties who have chosen political inclusion in the 
political process have failed to defend the Sunni and be their shield. They are not 
the political resistance as they like to portray themselves but traitors and puppets 
of the government in Baghdad. The exemplum cited is the one of Machhadani, 
who joined the Dawaa’ party of President Al Maliki to be nominated as the 
president of the parliament and was later deposed by Shia and Kurdish blocks 
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thanks to the Islamic party’s vote at the parliament.  Another example cited is the 
quarrel between the Islamic Army’s political wing and the Islamic party for money 
and seats. The narrator reduces Sunni politics to a fight for personal interests 
symbolised by the political disagreements of politicians spending most of their 
time in the hotels of Amman and Damascus. 
The next important frame presented is about Sunnis’ humiliation in the post-2003 
era. Despite the Sunni political elite’s claims of joining the political process in 
order to defend Sunni rights and improve their situation, the population only 
received discrimination and humiliation in return. Sunni women’s mistreatment in 
prison symbolises this humiliation. The narrator cites the example of A’adamiyah, 
Mosul, Diyala and Abu Ghraib prisons, where cases of rape were registered with 
the knowledge of powerless Sunni politicians. The other expression of this 
collective humiliation is the fate of Sunni men arrested without proof. Again, Sunni 
politicians are presented as powerless against the abusive arrest campaigns of 
the ISF with the accusations of widespread torture.  Even the general amnesty 
project presented by the government in Baghdad to free innocent people was 
designed according to the narrator as a way to free “the better treated Shia militia 
fighters” from prison.  The reality is that Sunnis are jailed in their dozens on a 
daily basis while their families have to pay ransoms in order to release them to 
avoid their extra judiciary execution.  As an echo of these claims, many reports 
have emerged confirming the widespread cases of prisoners´ mistreatment by 
Iraqi prison authorities631. The security deal in the final part of the video refers to 
the Iraqi Government’s agreement with foreign companies regarding the 
exploitation of the country’s natural resources. According to the commentator, it 
constituted “a political and economic crime against Iraq” and a green light 
accorded to foreigners and neo-colonialist groups to exploit the country’s wealth. 
The bottom line is that the country’s independence is an illusion. Since 2003, it 
has been destined to remain occupied and under the “protection” of foreign 
countries. 
                                            
631“MP from Iraqiya confirms  mistreatment of prisoners in Taji prison and asks the Prime 
minister to intervene”, Al Mada Press , 30/01/2013, https://goo.gl/99hxnA  
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From this first video, three main socio-political frames are worth to be underlined:  
 The Sunni political elite is corrupt and maintains the illusion of power for 
the Sunni community.  
 The Sunni political elite is weak and powerless to protect the Sunni 
community from humiliation.  
 Independence from the US and Iran is another illusion shared by the Sunni 
political class.  
Khams A’wam Aala ikamat Adawla” (Lit Five years after the establishment 
of the State). 
The next video entitled Khams Aa’wam A’ala ikamat Adawla” (Lit Five 
years after the establishment of the State) was released by the end of 2011 by Al 
Furqan Media Production. It was produced to commemorate the fifth anniversary 
of the announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006. Here, the 
principle frame is to present the group as the shield of the Sunni community in 
opposition to the Sahawat who are depicted as the shield of the Iraqi 
Government. The video starts with the interview of an IS Iraqi ground 
commander. First, he tries to counter the accusations repeated by the media 
against the group of spilling the blood of the Sunni. He denies this accusation 
with the narration of an episode involving Emirati tourists with no links with the 
ruling family being spared and freed after being caught with Sahawat leaders. 
Footage of aborted IED operations of the group in Diyala was also presented to 
show the group’s restraint in not killing Sunni civilians used as human shields by 
the Iraqi Army. At the 10th minute, there is footage of ISI’s fighters patrolling by 
night in the street and warning civilians not to approach any army checkpoints in 
order to be safe. A fighter expressly tells them while parading by night at the 14th 
minute: “We are your shield with Allah’s will”.  
The recurrent theme of women’s brutalisation is again exposed at the 41st minute, 
where the narrator disapproves the arrest campaign by the security forces 
targeting women as a response to terrorist attacks in Baghdad. To illustrate this, 
the video makers used an interview of an Iraqi civilian claiming that the forces 
under the direct authority of Al Maliki threatened him with the rape of his sisters. 
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Another former inmate is shown claiming that they threatened to rape his wife 
unless he pleaded guilty for a crime he was accused of. Those interviews were 
taken from Sunni Arab channels close to the Islamic Party known for its hostility 
towards Al Maliki. The interviewed member of ISI commented on this footage with 
the following statement: “the i´rd of the human is a red line especially if this person 
is a Muslim. We need to defend i´rd by taking revenge and punishing the 
criminals. What is the responsibility of the women and children if his son, husband 
or brother take arms? Women are not responsible for their husbands´, sons´ or 
brothers´ acts because they do not have authority over them. These apostates 
have women and children, but the Mujahedeen do not target them on purpose 
even though they are easier to spot. These people do not have values”.  
Another piece of footage is a mix of interviews of diverse women narrating how 
the security forces arrested and brutalised them. The spectator can see a mother 
showing her young girl crying after being taken by the security forces while 
another mother narrates how they forced her girl through forced confessions to 
admit her adherence to Al Qaeda. At the bottom of the screen, is the writing says, 
“There is no good in us if we do not avenge them” while a sad nasheed dedicated 
to imprisoned women is played in the background. The speaker later connects 
the situation of these women to the military operations of the group and warns 
the enemy that “as long as women will be jailed all the doors of jihad and war will 
be opened and that our blood is cheap for their liberation”. A fighter of the group 
is shown at the 45th minute holding a gun and portrayed as Abu Mujaheed Al 
Shami and calling for revenge for his imprisoned sisters: “Oh my sister you have 
brothers who don’t sleep and don’t accept this situation. Our bodies will be slain, 
and our blood spilt in the path of defending your honour and avenging you”.  At 
the end of the video, a fighter appeared at the 48th minute called Abu Osama Al 
Shami from Syria urging the Syrian people not to protest for democracy, freedom 
or socialism but instead for Islam. Also, even before the apparition of Jabhat Al 
Nusra in 2012, he announced the arrival of ISI brigades in Syria and the 





Saleel Al Sawareem” (The Clanking of the Swords), 
A few months later, Al Furqan Media Production released the first episode 
of the series “Saleel Al Sawareem” (The Clanking of the Swords), which shows a 
diverse range of violent operations and frames that the group want to carry out to 
its audience. The first part of the video is almost entirely dedicated to convincing 
and attracting the Sunni population. First, the Sahawats are depicted to be weak 
being placed after the US withdrawal in a situation between “the hammer of the 
ISI and the nail of the Iraqi Government”. Meaning, without US support they are 
a prey for the group’s targeted killing campaign and Iraqi Government and Shia 
militia’s provocations. For the narrator, the US has retreated and left them at the 
mercy of a government led by Shia sectarian political powers. Sunnis were used 
by the government as a shield to fight other Sunnis before being discharged by 
them. The most symbolic case cited is the one of the president of Parliament, 
Tariq Al Hashmi, depicted as someone who was deceived after being presented 
as the symbol of the successful Sunni Arab collaboration with the US and the 
Iraqi Government. His position held an important representation since it was the 
result of the power share between the three communities in Iraq. With a Sunni 
vice president, Sunnis’ collective consciousness maintained the idea of still being 
represented at the top level of the state apparatus. Al Hashmi was in exile in 
Turkey when he was sentenced to death in absentia in September 2012. This 
decision was like a watershed for the Sunni community from which the IS was 
keen to take profit as a confirmation of its narrative. In the video, he is depicted 
to be powerless and without any real prerogatives like the rest of Sunni politicians. 
Like him Sunni politicians are aware of the imbalance of power but still pretend 
to hold responsibilities because of the huge amount of money they generate from 
their position. Rising Sunni politicians who are against Al Maliki such as Osama 
Al Nujaifi and Al Issawi, the Finance Minister are also depicted as such.  
The other message directed towards the Sunni community focuses on the 
policies of marginalisation and exclusion against it. For the video makers, the 
government’s discriminatory measures against the Sunni follow a sectarian 
agenda that goes well beyond the fight against the Islamic State. The bottom line 
is that from a Sunni perspective, Al Hashmi’s persecution is a symbol of the fate 
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awaiting every Sunni, meaning whether they collaborate or nor with the 
government Sunnis will be mistreated equally by the Shia government. Shias do 
not differentiate between “good” and “bad” Sunnis. Therefore they share a 
common fate and must stop fighting each other and start to concentrate their 
efforts against the government in Baghdad.  In the four videos of the series, IS’ 
leaders from different generations emphasise the existence of a shared Sunni 
identity threatened by what they consider a “Safavid” plot. Beyond the socio-
political frames cited, the videos try to create a Sunni identity based on a shared 
fate and feeling of victimisation.   
In January of 2013, Saleel Sawareem 3 was published, which celebrates and 
narrates the successful prison break in Tikrit of October 2012. Testimonies of 
fugitives from the prison claimed that: “Sunnis are hanged while Shias are spared, 
the Sunni community is treated globally and Shias do not make exceptions 
between terrorists, political leaders, Sahawat and innocent civilians”. The best 
example cited is again the one of Al Hashmi who, after signing death execution 
orders on Sunni prisoners, was later condemned in absentia to be hanged five 
times by the same Iraqi state for which he was working.  For that reason, the only 
faction in the country able to defend the Sunni are the Mujahedeen.  The last part 
of the video shows how ISF badly treated Sahawat militiamen in Diyala as a 
confirmation of the counter-productiveness of their collaboration with the Iraqi 
state. 
 Facing the violence of the government towards them, IS offers the hand of mercy 
and repentance to them in Saleel Sawareem 4 (released in May 2014 after the 
takeover of Fallujah and part of Ramadi), in which dozens of security members 
of Fallujah were gathered for collective repentance ceremonies. Two pieces of 
footage represent this intent to grasp this opportunity to attract new Sunni recruits 
with skills and experience by not seeking revenge but instead offer them a 
partnership in order to construct the future Islamic State. In Saleel Sawareem 4 
at the 7th minute, Adnani’s message is presented, asking the Sahawat, the Sunni 
politicians to repent and stop fighting the Mujahedeen. According to the IS 
spokesmen, “anyone repenting before his capture will be granted safety without 
asking for money or being judged whatever actions he could have committed 
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before”. He offered the opportunity to all the armed men to give up their weapons 
to benefit from this offer. Later, a speaker inside a Mosque packed with former 
Sunni soldiers and policemen addressed them saying: “We are your brothers, 
your sons, we came to protect your religion and your properties, today is the day 
of hug, and you know that our Sheikh and Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said if they 
killed from us thousands of thousands pardon them. We pardoned you. Do you 
know why? We want to protect and unify the Sunni community”. At the 45th 
minute, during another mass repentance ceremony at another mosque in 
Fallujah, a speaker from IS says, “We do not want you to come and repent out of 
fear. You should not fear us, we are your brothers and sons”. 
Nevertheless, he warns the people not to reverse their allegiance citing without 
naming it a tribe which, after its repentance, returned to support the government 
by joining the new Sahawat. The IS speaker threatens any tribe following the 
same path with utter annihilation. This message was a clear warning to end this 
reputation among tribes of switching their side according to their interests. Now 
the group is passing through a period of decline; it will be interesting to see if it 
will accept repentance from all the tribes which pledged allegiance to it at the 
apex of its control and retracted it later after the recapture of their zones by the 
Iraqi forces supported by the coalition. The “repentance door” which has a 
religious dimension is not new in IS’ discourse and strategy. When the group was 
in a dire situation in Iraq in 2008, its leaders were already calling the troops not 
to confront other Sunni groups but rather to find common ground for 
reconciliation. Back in 2008, an internal communique seized by US forces by Abu 
Hamza Al-Muhajir urged its fighters to “to fight the true enemy only in order to 
avoid opening up new fronts against the Sunni who turned against them.”632 
According to Whiteside’s recent article633 on IS’ policy towards the Sahawat 
movement, this redemption policy was even criticised by an Al Qaeda’s 
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representative at that time, the Saudi jurist Abu Suleiman. He was disgusted by 
Al Muhajir’s and Baghdadi’s 2008 plan to reconcile with Sunni tribes and Iraqi 
insurgents he considered to be lenient634. 
Conclusion on the frame used by IS in the selected sample 
I identified five specific frames disseminated in the selected videos of the study:  
 Sunni politicians are corrupt and are divided over personal interests. 
 They are powerless to face the Sunnis’ humiliations as is illustrated with 
women’s rape cases and the mass arrest of Sunnis.  
 In its treatment against the Sunnis, the Shia government in Baghdad does 
not differentiate between them; they, therefore, share a common fate.  
 The Islamic State is the shield of the Sunni community in Iraq. The only 
salvation to change the situation is by the use of force. 
 The door of repentance remains open for Sunni individuals, whatever 
opposition they previously manifested towards the organisation. 
These frames produced by IS towards its Iraqi Sunni audience are not 
ideologically or theologically driven but instead try to cement a Sunni identity and 
convince their Iraqi audience that IS is the only political group able to defend them 
as a community.  For that purpose, it has to show its strength by giving the 
impression in its videos of being the only striking force capable of devastating the 
Iraqi Army, Shia militias and countering Iran’s influence in Iraq.  
The main difference between protestors’ demands and IS’ frames towards the 
Sunni community is that protestors did not rise primarily against the Sunni political 
elite but first against Al Maliki’s security policies. The level of disaffection vis a vis 
the government in Baghdad in Sunni areas was deep, and polls conducted 
between January and May 2014 confirmed it. Polls conducted by Greenberg 
IIACSS found that Sunnis in the west of the country considered that elections 
were not fair and that “only 25% in Diyala and 27% in Nineveh thought the 
                                            
634 Ibid p20 
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elections would offer a genuine choice, against 75% in Basra”.635 On the eve of 
Mosul´s fall, a Gallup Poll indicated that in Sunni provinces only 30% of the 
population had confidence in the national government636. According to IIACSS’ 
polls conducted in the northern provinces of the country, 50 % of Iraqis 
considered that sectarianism was too deeply rooted in local politics to ever really 
go away. The widespread idea that the Iraqi Army was not a national army but 
rather a tool in the hands of the Shia government and Iran was becoming 
mainstream.  Even though Sunni’s anger was not directed toward its elite, IS’ old 
discourse since Zarqawi´s times of a Shia conspiracy targeting the Sunni as a 
community was becoming mainstream among the Sunni community.637 
 
5-The spark of the 2012 protests and the grievances 
expressed by the Sunni protesters. 
Following the regional context of the Arab Spring, where the civil society 
demanded political reforms, social equity and dignity, Sunni Arab tribal leaders 
and political groups started to organise rallies and protest camps across the 
country against Al Maliki. Before their militarization, the 2012-2013 protests 
started peacefully and spontaneously and occurred only in Sunni majority areas. 
Every Friday after the prayer, protestors gathered to listen to the sermons of 
Sunni clerics who emerged as leaders in the criticism of President Al Maliki. Iraqi 
Sunni political leaders such as Usama al-Nujaifi, Atheel al-Nujaifi, and Salih al-
Mutlaq were losing the popular support they had by the end of 2013 due to the 
                                            
635 Craig Charney, “Polls Key to Understanding and Defeating ISIS”, IPI Global observatory,  
9/9/2014, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/09/polls-understanding-solving-isis-crisis/  
636Steve Crabtree, “Faith in Iraqi Government Falls Sharply in Sunni Regions”,Gallup, 
27/06/2014,https://news.gallup.com/poll/171959/faith-iraqi-government-falls-sharply-sunni-
regions.aspx  
637 Craig Charney, “Polls Key to Understanding—and Defeating—ISIS”,IPI Global Observatory, 




rising figures of the protests. According to the report on the protests made by 
Stephen Wicken638, two leading figures appeared to lead the protests: Abd al-
Malik al-Saadi, the spiritual guide, and Said al-Lafi, the spokesman of the protest 
in Anbar. Both had a conflictive relationship with the IS and its predecessors, 
which contradicts any claims that the group could have triggered the protests.  
Abd al-Malik al-Saadi was one of Iraq’s most senior Sunni scholars whose brother 
was killed by IS. He is said to have influenced the list of demands that were 
announced by the coordination committees in Anbar and Nineveh on January 
6th.639  
Aymenn Tamimi’s article640 on the subject stresses the fact that contrarily to 
popular opinion, Sunni Arabs did not form a united political front. The demands 
and the interaction with the authorities were quite different depending on where 
they took place. For example, protesters in Ramadi endorsed negotiating with 
Maliki’s government, but others in the same city, primarily affiliated with the cleric 
Abd al-Malik al-Saadi, rejected this approach, denouncing those who supported 
negotiations as traitors. In Fallujah, more extreme sentiments were spotted, 
where “al Qaeda banners have been observed in some of the demonstrations 
together with calls for jihad to overthrow the government and banners endorsing 
terrorist incidents like the attack on the “Safavid” Ministry of Justice in 
Baghdad”641. For some protestors, the major demand was the complete abolition 
of the de-Baathification program while others protested against the warrant 
issued against the Vice President Tariq Al Hashimi and the former Minister of 
Finance, Rafi Al Issawi. However, the question of female prisoners’ fates and the 
allegation of their systematic rapes was unanimously repeated to mobilise the 
Sunnis (a constant theme in IS’ propaganda as we saw earlier).  
                                            
638 Stephen Wicken, “Iraqis Sunnis in crisis”, middle east security Report, May 
2013,http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Wicken-Sunni-In-Iraq.pdf 
639 Ibid p27 





Protests across the county culminated with the clashes of Hawijah Camp in April 
2013, when government forces attacked the camp claiming that IS members were 
present and killed dozens of protestors. This clash sparked a wave of sectarian 
violence across the country and created a strong feeling of discrimination and 
opposition within the Sunnis and among them the Sahawat movement. IS tried to 
infiltrate protest camps in Anbar and influence protestors by calling them to 
choose between “elections and their parties and the tax of humiliation” and “arms 
and jihad and the tax of dignity”.642 Divisions between Sunni Iraqi political parties 
were widened by pro and anti-Maliki protesters. It was thus confirming one of IS’ 
frames: the inherent fracture of Sunni political parties based on their interests. 
Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun bloc and leading Islamic Iraqi Party members such 
as Ahmed al-Alwani defied Al Maliki while appearing regularly at protests in 
Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahudeen. Facing them, were Sunni politicians allied with 
Maliki such as the Mutlak karbouli´s Arab Iraqiyya bloc, which remained with the 
President and presented itself as a mediator with the protestors. This attempt was 
unsuccessful since they ejected them from protest camps.  In Nineveh and Anbar, 
elections were postponed officially for security reasons after a wave of attacks 
perpetrated by IS. This decision was also interpreted as a political move “intended 
to strengthen Maliki’s Sunni allies and hamper his strongest opponents”643.  
Many of the demands were broad and referred to long-held grievances among 
Sunnis.  Al Saadi personally proposed two specific demands on TV regarding the 
possibility for female prisoners held in Baghdad to be transferred to detention in 
Anbar and the repeal of the law formalising the division between Shia and Sunni 
religious endowments. Al Saadi emerged as a voice for the protestors and 
presented their 13 demands644 on TV on 6th, January 2013. 
                                            
642 Sinan Adnan  and Aaron Reese , “Iraq’s Sunni insurgency”,  Middle east security report 24,  
October 2014, p32, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sunni%20Insurgency%20in%20Iraq.pdf 
643 Ibid  
644 “ 1. Release all female prisoners accused under the counterterrorism law and referral of their 
cases to their home provinces; refer the women of Baghdad specifically to Anbar, and transfer 
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We can distinguish between two types of demands, the broad ones that referred 
to long-held grievances among Sunnis and others with a national scope asking 
for state neutrality. Grievances were accurately framed by Al Furqan Media in the 
five years preceding the protests such as the denunciation of the 
Counterterrorism Law645  to conduct mass arrests, the outcry related to female 
prisoners’ fates, the surge of death penalty sentences for Sunnis and the 
condition of living under occupation because of the barriers and raid nights on 
civilian homes. Other demands formulated were part of the protestors’ agenda 
                                            
the case against Rafia al-Issawi and his guards to courts in Anbar; prosecute culpable officers 
and rapists connected with the above-mentioned cases. 
2. End implementation of the death penalty. 
3. Freeze execution of Article 4 of the Counterterrorism Law until it can be voided by parliament. 
4. Parliament should pass the General Amnesty Law, remove exceptions, and release all 
prisoners. 
5. Freeze execution of the Accountability and Justice Law until parliament can repeal it. 
6. Achieve balance in all institutions of the state, especially the military, security services, and 
judiciary. 
7. Repeal the operations commands in all provinces and all unconstitutional elements of the 
security services; withdraw the army from cities and inhabited neighbourhoods in Baghdad and 
the provinces; remove the concrete barriers; Work fervently to provide security to citizens, and 
devolve responsibility for security to local police. 
8. Reinvestigate cases related to religious and national leaders inside and outside Iraq in neutral 
judicial forums free from political influence. 
9. Prohibit the use of sectarian phrases and slogans in state institutions, especially in the security 
services and the media. 
10. Undertake a comprehensive national census before the next general elections, including 
reference to religious, sectarian, and ethnic identity. 
11. End arbitrary night raids, arrest accused persons in the light of day by legal methods, and end 
the “secret informer” law. 
12. Form a Federal Supreme Court of professional and non-corrupt judges who does not belong 
to any specific ruling party or bloc, to serve as an independent, non-politicized judiciary. 
13. Return all mosques and other religious properties as well as private properties improperly 
taken under expropriation, and repeal Law No. 19 of 2005 (the Law Governing the Holy Shrines 
and Shia Pilgrimages, which formally separated the Shia and Sunni religious endowments. 
645 “Mosul’s protestors :  we don’t trust the government’s promises and will continue to protest 
until the abolition of the terrorism law” , Al Mada Press , 9/01/2013, https://goo.gl/8JfBcd  
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and ideological spectrum such as the repeal of the accountability and Justice Law 
of 2008 that governs de-Baathification and the withdrawal of the law formalising 
the division between Shia and Sunni religious endowments. They were demands 
principally formulated against sectarianism asking for more sectarian balance 
within the state apparatus and differed radically from IS´ sectarian separatist 
views. 
The issue of female prisoners was a source of mobilisation among Iraqi Sunnis 
even before the Arab Spring-inspired protests of late 2012. Protests646 were 
taking place in Mosul in early 2012, where tribal leaders and civil society figures 
organised rallies in the governorate to call for the release of female prisoners. 
Reports emerged that women were being arrested without being prosecuted and 
raped to extort their confessions, implicating their husbands in terrorist activities.  
In January 2013, during the wave of protests, the imam of Mosul Idriss Rifai called 
for civilian disobedience until the female prisoners were freed647. The traditional 
value of “’I’rd” which means honour, is significant among the traditional tribal 
society and can constitute a motive of mobilisation and revenge as defended by 
IS in its frames.  
There were other demands widespread among protestors that were not 
formulated in the 13 demands of Al Saadi, such as the call for federalism or the 
creation of tribal militia for self-protection. These demands found an echo in IS’ 
frames with its early calls for separatism and its presentation as the shield of the 
Sunni facing Shia forces. Even though some anti-IS figures led the protestors, 
such as Sahawat leaders Ahmed Abu Risha, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, Mohammed 
Mahmood Latif al-Fahdawi, and Al Saadi, the group nonetheless had an indirect 
influence on them. Because of the attacks on and harassment of the security 
forces, many protestors began to call for the formation of a protection force. The 
self-fulfilling prophecy of IS videos in 2010 that “Shias will turn against Sunnis” 
                                            
646 “Nineveh protests against the rape of Female prisoners and the National council: Nujaifi harms 
the reputation of Iraqi women”, Al Mada Press, 29/11/2012, https://goo.gl/GtkuGP  
647 “The chief of the Federal police : we attacked the protestors when they tried to take over our 
Humvees and call for a Free Army”, Al Mada Press , 07/01/2013,  https://goo.gl/JvFgx7  
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was becoming a reality in their minds. The more Shias marginalised the Sunnis 
the more IS’ discourse accurately depicted their reality. The prevalent idea among 
the protestors of the necessity of having a protective force may have confirmed 
the idea of the IS as protector of the Sunnis. In Salahudeen, protestors were 
calling for the formation of a “tribal army”648 for self-defence, and the same call 
was made in Anbar, where “the army of pride and honour” was to be formed to 
“defend the Sunnis from the brutality of the Prime Minister Al Maliki”.649  
The militarization of the protests was another element that could explain the 
acceptance of the group by some Sunni protestors. Pacifism and the change of 
the status quo by democratic means were not only considered by IS as 
illegitimate from an Islamic point of view but also counterproductive. At the same 
time as the Iraqi protest, the military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood elected 
president in Egypt and the bloody repression against the Rabiaa protest camp on 
August 14th were, according to IS’ spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, 
confirmation of the rightness of its methodology. On August 31st, 2013, in a 
recording entitled “Al-Silmiyya Dinu Mann?” (Lit-Pacifism is the Religion of 
Whom?650), he stressed that the Muslim Brotherhood’s methodology and 
democratic system were un-Islamic and that fighting following the Islamic 
methodology was the only way to change the status quo651. To justify his claims, 
he used 14 verses from the Quran652 calling for violence and by intertwining the 
                                            
648 “Protestors in Salahudine give 24 h to the religious councils to give  their position on Maliki 
and start to form a tribal army”, Al Mada Press, 23/04/2013, https://goo.gl/aeHLVB  
649 “Anbar’s protestors to the governor : change your position , the army of dignity will be formed 
soon”, Al Mada Press, https://goo.gl/Mz3piY   
650 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, an audio recording entitled “Al-Silmiyya Dinu Mann?” (Lit., 
Peacefulness is the Religion of Whom?),  available  [in  Arabic]  on  the  following  link: http://bab-
ul-islam.net/showthread.php?t=20110 and in English 
https://archive.org/details/PacifismIsTheReligionOfWhom  
651 ibid p4 Confrontation is unavoidable and the peaceful calls are to the garbage:   Time  has  
come  for  us  to  understand  and  recognize  and  acknowledge  that  pacifism doesn’t bring a 
right or invalidates a falsehood; time has come for the callers to stop their false claims, the people 
of Kufr can never be at peace with the people of Iman, and an unarmed peaceful Iman cannot 
stand in the face of an assaulting armed criminal Kufr.” 
652 “No!  Gaining  dignity  and  liberation  from  oppression  and  breaking  the  shackles  of 
humiliation is only by the clank of the swords, and shedding blood, offering the souls and spirits, 
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situation in Egypt and Iraq he demonstrated that authoritarian regimes could not 
be overthrown through peaceful means, mocking protestors who were still 
committed to pacifism.653   
Adnani’s discourse shows how the group tried to benefit from the violent 
crackdown on peaceful protests to recruit new members deceived by the failure 
and impossibility of a peaceful regime change experience in the Arab region. In 
the context of the international community’s backing of the Iraqi Government, 
Sunni protestors in Iraq felt that Al Maliki’s departure with peaceful means was 
impossible. On January 11th, members of the UN council expressed support for 
the efforts of the Iraqi Government in Anbar province against the described 
violence and “terrorism”.654As recalled by Hassan Abu Haniyeh, the UN 
condemned IS´ terrorist attacks without any actual reference to the demands of 
protestors655.  The US also supported Al Maliki without giving any credit to the 
protestors. In November 2013, President Obama said how he appreciated Prime 
Minister Maliki’s commitment to ensuring a strong, prosperous, inclusive, and 
democratic Iraq. He also declared “that we were encouraged by the work that 
Prime Minister Maliki has done in the past to ensure that all people inside of Iraq 
Sunni, Shia, and Kurd feel that they have a voice in their government”.656As 
                                            
it will never by the peaceful calls or parliamentary elections. No! this isn’t the guidance of our 
prophet peace and blessings of Allah (…) If  we  want  today  to  lift  the  injustice  and  spread  
justice  and  invalidate  falsehood  and restore our glory, dignity, pride and sovereignty then we 
have to return to the Book of our Lord Almighty the truest words, and the guidance of our prophet.” 
653 Ibid p12, He says “Firstly: we advise Ahli Sunnah in general and in Egypt and Iraq in particular 
to reject the peaceful calls, and carry the arms and do jihad for the sake of Allah to repel the 
assaulter from the Egyptian army and the Safavid army, since the sane people have agreed to 
repel the assaulter, so is the mind of the atheist communist better than the mind of the peaceful 
subservient Sheikh of Al-Azhar?! Even the chicken repels who assaults it chicks! So is the chicken 
braver than you callers for pacifism in Egypt and Iraq?!”   
654 “Anbar Province Terrorism Major Threat to Building Democratic State in Iraq”, Top United 
Nations Official Warns Security Council , Security Council 7149th Meeting (PM) 27 MARCH 2014,  
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11339.doc.htm  
655 Hassan Abu Hanieh , Dr Mohamed Abu Ruhman, The Islamic State organization : the Sunni 
Organization and the struggle for Global Jihadism, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015, Amman, p167,  
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/11458.pdf   





explained by Abu Haniya, “this declaration essentially confirmed the world’s 
indifference towards Iraqi Sunni’s peaceful activism”.657 This feeling of isolation 
further increased their victimisation rhetoric especially in a context where all the 
regional efforts for Sunni powers were directed at supporting the Syrian rebellion. 
The rise of a Sunni identity based on perceived victimisation overpassing 
regional, tribal bonds thus created a breeding ground for the group’s ideology to 
thrive.  Sectarian divisions exacerbated this trend, like in 2006 with the potential 
of dividing other solidarity bonds such the tribal culture or the national feelings 
inside the Iraqi society. 
Moreover, the rise of autonomism as a new form of self-government called for by 
Sunnis in the protest could explain to a certain degree the acceptance of some 
of IS’ political project. It was a climate of anger and resentment in a wide segment 
of the protestors that prompted the establishment of insurgent military councils 
and calls for separatism. For the first time, voices inside the Sunni community 
began to ask moderately for what Zarqawi argued for from the beginning: 
sectarian separatism658. After the 2003 reconfiguration of power, many among 
the Sunni Arab elite did not accept their new status of minority and their reduced 
political weight. In fact, by 2012, the idea of a Sunni autonomous region became 
popular in certain circles in the elite. During the protests, the protestors’ 
committee of the six Arab Sunni provinces called for the adoption of a white flag 
of the Sunni Arabs659. In Salahudeen, protestors gathered to call for more 
decentralisation and more autonomy like in Kurdistan. Imams voiced those calls 
during the Friday sermons in Samarra in 2013. According to Hashim, when 
protests surged many among the Sunni thought that it was time to take revenge 
and give a massive blow to the Shia dominated government in Baghdad. At the 
same time, Shia’s paranoia of giving power to Sunni meant that many pragmatic 
                                            
657 Hassan Abu Hanieh , Dr Mohamed Abu Ruhman, The Islamic State organization : the Sunni 
Organization and the struggle for Global Jihadism , Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015, Amman p167,  
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/11458.pdf   
658 Ahmed S Hashim , the Caliphate at war, Hurst and Company London, 2017, p245 
659 “Protestors in Salahudine : the white flag will be the flag of the Sunni of Iraq and we will not 
follow a single party in the elections”, Al Mada Press, 20/12/2013, https://goo.gl/AH92cT  
337 
 
Sunni leaders were thinking about the promotion of an autonomous region at that 
time but were surprised by IS’ creation of the caliphate. Many tribal leaders 
overestimated their power by choosing to confront the Islamic State only after a 
change of government in Baghdad660. Some of them were hoping to take 
advantage of the jihadists and get rid of them after taking Baghdad. IS grasped 
this opportunity by taking advantage of Sunni Arab grievances and armed 
opposition to the sectarian policies as well as proposing itself as an alternative to 
the Sunni political and tribal elites. Its media was efficient in redefining the Sunni 
identity in Iraq to discredit the Sahawat and enhance IS’ status as the 
community’s shield. Sectarianism and bad strategic planning of its foes were thus 
key in explaining the conjunction of elements in line with IS’ strategic goals. 
The idea shared after the success of the Sahawat experience in 2007 that Iraqi 
Sunnis were immune from sympathising for the group because of its brutality and 
actions was proven to be wrong. As detailed by Carter Malkasian661, the 
vanishing of US aid to the Sahawat, the end of the cooperation with the 
government and the withdrawal of the US were the main reasons for the return 
of the group in Anbar. The domination of the tribes against IS was “artificial” not 
“natural”662, and popular support for them or against ISI was not a fact to explain 
their success. The group’s popular support is difficult to weigh in. Nevertheless, 
we can observe that it was able to attract enough support to sustain its 
operations, break and divide tribes and when imposing its rules, not suffer a 
backlash from the population. The turning point in Anbar was reached when the 
Maliki government become more irritant and unpopular than the Islamic State. It 
explained why tribesmen unaffiliated with the group began to join the movement, 
considered as the best and the more efficient actor capable of stopping 
                                            
660 Ahmed S Hashim, “the Caliphate at war”, Hurst and Company London, 2017 p180 “Our 
experience in Anbar with Al-Qaeda in 2006 is a perfect example of our ability to deal with ISIS. 
We’ve postponed fighting ISIS until we get rid of Nouri al-Maliki. As for the Anbar tribes, we 
consider Maliki to be more dangerous than ISIS” said Sheikh Hatem al-Suleiman, a former 
influential tribal leader from the Dulaim confederation. 
661 Carter Malkasian, Illusion of victory : the Anbar Awakening and the rise of the Islamic State, 
Oxford university Press,  2017 
662 Ibid p8 
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government forces. While its strictness was considered as the reason for the 
backlash of the tribes in 2006, it became a minor irritant overpassed by the 
necessity to expel the army from the Sunni heartland. This openness regarding 
the Islamic State was also due to the underestimation of its power by other actors. 
Tribal openness towards IS was faced by a reconciliatory policy of the group, 
accepting the repentance of Sunni enemies. As a result, the situation in 2014 was 
very fluid with the adherence to the group of hundreds of Sunni from different 
backgrounds and with different reasons for joining. Security members or 
militiamen joined the group and the bureaucracy and security apparatus of its 
nascent state.   
IS did not instigate the protests even though it may have had a certain degree of 
influence in protest camps where the group’s flag was present663. Its physical 
presence may have given it a forum to fight for the heart of the people and spread 
its ideas, but this topic remains so far under-investigated. The hypothesis that IS’ 
frames mirrored the protestors’ ones is therefore partly true. The analysis of Al 
Furqan videos highlights that contrary to the widespread idea, its videos are not 
just focusing on gruesome and action scenes (Flames of War) or theological 
decrees but hold a political and social dimension. By denouncing corruption and 
the double standard treatment, the group uses frames used by social movements 
such as NGOs in other contexts. The group framed accurately the main 
grievances of the Sunnis during the five years preceding the protests : 
humiliations, women´s mistreatment in prisons, double standard policy, 
sectarianism and elite’s corruption. It interpreted the protestors' demands as a 
confirmation of its diagnosis back in 2010. Furthermore, the realisation of its self-
fulfilling prophecies about the fate of the Sunnis confirmed in the eyes of its 
members the righteousness of the group’s prognosis.  
 
 
                                            
663 It was the case in Fallujah  
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6-Findings and Conclusion 
Concerning LH’s Grand Strategy in Iraq and its application by IS, I have 
presented the group’s influence and strategies towards tribes and armed groups. 
I now assess IS’ adherence to LH’s Grand Strategy principles that should govern 
war.  
1-“The better your strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand and the 
less it will cost you”.  
 
This maxim refers to the ability to use limited resources to achieve its 
objective. As defined by Liddle Hart, Grand Strategy is “the art of finding the 
Achilles heel of the enemy to make war”. For the case study, the Iraqi 
Government’s “Achilles heel” was Maliki’s sectarian policy. Some of the frames 
used by the group’s propaganda were essentially capitalising on Sunnis’ 
resentment and emphasising the sectarian polarization the country was 
witnessing. By taking advantage and framing the political and social grievances 
of the Sunnis accurately, the group could attract support and ease the hostility of 
some groups towards it. According to the SMT, the fact that protestors shared 
many of its frames shows that it could align its frames with the demands and 
opinions shared by many Iraqi Sunnis and thus create a favourable mobilisation 
process in its favour.   
This process may have been significant in order to gain the community’s tacit 
acceptance as well as the neutrality or tactical collaboration of competitive groups 
from the tribes or the Sunni insurgency. This alliance of convenience had the 
particular effect of overstretching Iraqi forces in Anbar, Nineveh and Salahudeen 
Province and opening up breaches for the group to infiltrate. Most of IS’ frames 
towards the Sunni population were not ideological nor religious which can make 
us believe that part of the support it enjoyed was not for its Salafi-jihadist 
worldview but rather its perception of itself as a shield for the Sunni population in 
Iraq and Syria.  Further research specifically focusing on Iraqis joining the group 
on an individual basis could confirm or deny this observation. However, this level 
of pragmatism was not sufficient to build up a broader favourable tribal dynamic. 
Indeed, some social structures antagonistic to the group remained impermeable 
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to its propaganda or the necessity of fighting Al Maliki. The most striking example 
is the case of the city of Dhuluiyah, where the IS’ narrative did not have an impact 
since the Sunni tribes of Jubur preferred to ally with the most aligned pro-Iran 
militias from Balad rather than surrender their area to IS.  
 
In addition to its growing appeal among the Sunni population, the group was able 
to take advantage of the rise of autonomism among Sunnis and the militarization 
of the protests. Because Sunni militias were not experienced and did not have 
access to weapons, Sunni calling for a protective force would not have any other 
alternative than turning to IS as a protector. Consequently, Sunni organisers of 
protests were not for IS’ presence but could not confront it because they were 
aware of their vulnerability. Protestors close to Ahmed Abu Risha in Ramadi were 
partisans of dialogue with the Maliki government and supported the ISF against 
IS while others distanced themselves from it. Fallujah’s case symbolised best the 
growing dependence of the armed protestors on IS’ protection. When in 
December 2013 Ahmed Al Issawi was arrested, most of the protestors supported 
armed confrontation with the Iraqi security forces. IS started low profile by sharing 
power with the different militias and participating in the city’s war council with few 
participants on an individual basis.  A month later, IS captured the entire city while 
the ISF was occupied clearing protest camps. By taking Fallujah, it symbolically 
positioned itself as the defender of Iraqi Sunnis giving more weight to this frame. 
The following months saw the broad-based offensive north-west of the country 
confirming it. To conclude, the level of pragmatism shown by the group in order 
to come back, its sophisticated propaganda effort to gain support and its political 
choice to prioritise its fight are in line with what we can expect from the adherence 
to this principle of Liddle Hart’s Grand Strategy. 
2) “The more you are brutal, the more your enemy’ resistance will be”.  
 
Regarding the use of violence, LH’s vision of the use of violence is 
inversely proportional; the more brutal your methods are, the more bitter you will 
make your opponents, with the natural result of hardening their resistance. IS’ 
methods towards the non-Sunni components were utterly in opposition to LH’s 
vision regarding the counterproductive effects of using mass violence. While IS’ 
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used strategic violence to shock, deter664 and mobilise, Liddle Hart considers that 
its widespread use might exacerbate the opponent´s will to fight. Consequently, 
the perspective of breaking its psychological equilibrium would be jeopardized. 
We saw how for the whole IS’ campaign, the morale and will to fight were 
paramount in determining the opponent´s psychological equilibrium and the 
subsequent dislocation of the ISF in the north of the country. 
   
The Speicher massacre in June 2014, where 700 Shia cadets were executed, 
generated a massive outcry among the Shia community. In the eyes of the Shias 
of Iraq, the war against IS became a war for survival which would ignite a fierce 
resistance especially after Adnani’s speech threatening to destroy Karbala and 
Najaf and occupy Baghdad. The threat was credible; the city Jurf Sakhr situated 
in Babel governorate was only 50km from Karbala and had been occupied by the 
group since February of 2014. The level of resistance shown by the Iraqi Army 
and the Shia militias defending Baghdad and Shia cities was of another 
magnitude and intensity than the one they displayed in Sunni cities in 2014. The 
creation of the PMU, coupled with the surge of Iran’s interference boosted the 
defence of Baghdad and shifted the psychological equilibrium to the advantage 
of the forces fighting IS. The same counterproductive effect applies to recalcitrant 
tribes refusing to surrender to IS despite being outnumbered and under siege. 
The Jaghafiya, the Jubur and the Sahawat tribes in Ramadi had a history of 
bloody fights against the group that could not be overpassed by their hostility 
towards a common enemy.    
The fact that IS uses violence and mediatises it in order to multiply its impact also 
had another counterproductive result according to Liddle Hart’s vision. The 
group’s decapitation policy can be traced back to Abu Mosab al-Zarqawi’s 
infamous beheading of American hostage Nick Berg in 2004. He was dressed in 
an orange jumpsuit to mimic the prisoners of Guantanamo Bay, and his 
beheading was broadcasted online as retaliation for the tortures in Abu Ghraib.  
                                            
664 It follows Abu Bakr Al Naji´s assertion that there is no place to softness since “Regardless of 
whether we use harshness or softness, our enemies will not be merciful to us if they seize us. 
Thus, it behoves us to make them think one thousand times before attacking us.” 
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In 2005, the group saw the strategic benefit of these type of scenes confirmed 
with the withdrawal of the Philippines from the coalition in Iraq to avoid the 
beheading of one of its citizens. Ten years later, the beheading of Western 
journalists after the US Air Force’s intervention to save Erbil had an opposite 
effect. Instead of forcing the disengagement of the US and the UK for their 
support of the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Government, the airstrikes expanded to 
Syria, and it hastened the formation of an international coalition against the group. 
The efforts of such a coalition in supporting its allies on the ground would be the 
angular pillar behind the takeover of all the cities occupied by IS. 
The only exception of the unlimited use of violence by the group was their 
treatment of the Sunni population in Iraq. The consistency of the repentance 
policy proposed to Sunni tribal and state collaborators is worth noting.  From 2008 
to 2014, under different leaders and in different circumstances from a non-
favourable balance of power in 2008 to undisputed domination, the group’s 
repentance policy towards its Sunni constituency was constant. It translates a 
clear broad and long-term strategy applied in order to gain the support of the 
Sunni community. This policy could have worked as an incentive for the 
allegiance of tribes or the neutral position adopted by other groups during that 
period. Sunni cadets at Speicher Camp were spared during the massacre, and 
until late 2013 the beheadings of Sunnis were not broadcast by the group. We 
shall remember that at the same time the group was fighting until death against 
the Sunni Syrian rebels, labelled as new Sahawats by the group’s propaganda. 
In sum, the group applied this recommendation but only against its Sunni foes for 
a limited period. However, from a general perspective, it appears that the group 







3- Wage war while preparing future peace refers to foresee the peace 
condition.  
   The discriminatory use of violence by the group can be linked to the group’s 
long-term strategy of building a Sunni state. While reconquering Sunni cities,it 
made the political decision of not seeking vengeance but instead accepting the 
repentance of hundreds of Sahawat fighters and Sunni security forces. This policy 
finds an echo in Liddle Hart’s principle of preparing for peace while waging war. 
As Liddle Hart says, “the object of war is to obtain a better peace. Even if only 
from your point of view, it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the 
peace you desire“. He adds that “if you concentrate exclusively on victory, with 
no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, 
while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs 
of another war.”665  
The group wanted to build a Sunni state in Iraq and could not afford to execute 
or lose the competence of hundreds of Sunni Iraqis with experience in 
bureaucracy, law enforcement and state affairs. Through al- Baghdadi’s voice 
during the assault on Ramadi the group repeatedly called the families of the 
Sahawat fleeing towards Baghdad to come back with the assurance of not being 
harmed. Inside the Sunni Arab sphere, IS understood the necessity to build peace 
during the wartime by offering an amnesty to the Sunni members of the security 
forces they were fighting.   
However, IS’ maximalist vision of peace and revolutionary anti-world order vision 
makes it completely repulsive to LH’s terms of peace at the international level. 
Before the declaration of the caliphate, IS’ strategy was to fight against the near 
enemy, the one “martyrizing” the Sunni population of Iraq and Syria: the Shia of 
the region supported by Iran. Fighting the near enemy and the building of a 
borderless caliphate were the two pillars of IS’ Grand Strategy at the international 
level. Despite some basic plots carried out under its name (2008 failed attack in 
Scotland), IS did not focus much of its international activity unlike Al Qaeda 
                                            
665 Paul M. Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, Yale University Press ,1992 , p 168 
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Central in targeting the West. Instead, it tried to operate regionally by targeting 
Jordan and providing support to the Fath Al Islam group in Lebanon. These 
moves were not endorsed by Al Qaeda central, which preferred to target the West 
and see AQI focus on targeting US troops in Iraq. Al Qaeda also prevented ISI 
from targeting Iran directly for logistical purposes and because of the presence 
of many of its cadres in the jails of the Iranian regime. Al Zawahri´s main argument 
against Baghdadi’s decision to merge its Syria and Iraqi organizations was his 
obligation to operate within its geographical boundaries. The ideological and 
theological roots of both IS and Al Qaeda can also explain their divergence in 
terms of strategy. IS’ action is more centred on purifying Islam by focusing on 
attacking apostate Muslim states from its interpretation of Ibn Taymiyah’s fatwas 
and endorsing Ibn Abd Wahhab’s vision of cleansing the Islamic world from the 
deviant sects such as Shia and Sufi. In both cases, Ibn Abd Al Wahhab’s and Ibn 
Taymiyah’s foes were two non-western powers claiming to represent Islam: the 
Mongols and the Ottomans. Al Qaeda has an anti-western and anti-colonial 
centred paradigm inherited from its Egyptian Brotherhood and Qutbist branch, 
which embraces Al Banna and Qutb as its ideological founding fathers. IS’ 
political horizon does not end with expelling the US from the Arabian Peninsula 
and destroying the state of Israel, which were the two main objectives presented 
by the fatwa of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” 
presenting the political framework of Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri’s organisation in 
1998. As long as IS stuck to it near enemy project it did not attract much attention 
from the big powers. The US, especially after 9/11, considered the threat and 
power of a jihadi group only from the prism of its capacity to target the West. 
President Obama compared IS to a rookie team wearing Lakers shirts (Al 
Qaeda)666, showing how he underestimated the threat the group was posing to 
the international order as well as explain the West’s inaction before the 
declaration of the Caliphate.  
The Caliphate declaration in July 2014 changed IS´ strategic aims and ambitions. 
By declaring itself the sole legitimate political actor of the Islamic world and the 
                                            




unique legitimate depository of jihad, it automatically had to take the lead in 
targeting the Far Enemy: the West led by the US and other international powers. 
The surprise attack on Kurdistan’s capital Erbil in August 2014 internationalised 
IS’ aspirations. It was a tactical victory but was a wrong political calculus from 
LH’s perspective. Some analysts have pointed out to the impossibility of IS taking 
Baghdad and the end of a deal with the Kurds to explain the attack while others 
have only pointed to its boldness and the euphoria of victory. Luizard considers 
that the decision to build the caliphate across the borders was taken after the 
Kurdish decision in July 2014 to finally intervene against IS’ expansion after 
having passively witnessed the group’s takeover of the region of Nineveh. IS’ 
decision to internationalise the conflict and provoke the West was due, according 
to the author, to their failure to conquer Baghdad and the “reversal of the 
Kurds”667. 
 At the same time that the group witnessed a stalemate in Dhuluiyah as we saw 
and failed to take urban areas in Diyala, it decided to proclaim the caliphate and 
to become a regional actor and a state representing Islam worldwide. The 
internationalisation of the conflict and the expansion of the group made the US 
and their allies intervene by providing air support to the ISF and the Peshmerga. 
One of the reasons for IS’ advance was the absence of air forces for the Iraqis 
and the Peshmerga, which is paramount in order to halt the advance of IS’ 
convoys in flat terrain and desert areas. By provoking stronger enemies, IS 
attracted them and changed the balance of the conflict in its disadvantage despite 
the repeated claims of IS leaders that the US and their allies would send boots 
on the ground and deploy them massively, repeating the quagmire scenario of 
the past decade. This strategic forecast proved to be wrong; the coalition opted 
for a limited deployment of advisers and special operation forces supporting their 
local allies. Combined with massive air support, this indirect and limited strategy 
was enough in rolling back the group’s conquests. 
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The declaration of the caliphate and destruction of the Sykes-Picot borders 
propelled the group into a new strategic framework, from the creation and 
fortification of a Sunni state between Iraq and Syria into adopting the vision of an 
Islamic Empire.  By proclaiming itself as the state of the Muslims worldwide, this 
political move obliged the group not to conform to the international borders. While 
before its transnational aspiration was theoretical, it became real in July 2014.  
Acceptance of the state-nation model by recognising the legitimacy of a 
neighbouring state is antithetical to IS’ ideology. It, therefore, put the state it 
proclaimed in a state of constant war with the international system, even though 
there is still the possibility of brokering truces. As the Islamic State of Iraq 
explained in its early scriptures, “the state of war is a natural state in the life of 
the Islamic State, whether at the beginning of its development, before and 
after”.668 Despite its frontal opposition to the international order, in particular 
moments, the group can find some conveniences and diplomatic contacts with 
other states. We can cite the negotiations to free hostages (50 Turkish citizens 
from Turkey consulate in Mosul) or the neutral posture adopted with Syria 
between 2003 and 2011 and Turkey between 2011 and 2016. The group 
leadership can, for logistical reasons, prioritise its fighting. These examples are 
not permanent and too specific to shape any broad strategic shift that could 
change its ideological framework toward an acceptance of the international order. 
The group is against the principle of sovereignty inherited from the Westphalia 
model.  It is not conceived as a state but rather as an empire where local 
allegiances are structuring the relations between the governed and the governor. 
IS´ vision of international relations is complex to grasp since it shares many ideas 
from the diverse schools of thought explaining international relations. It has a 
realist dimension since this school of thought considers that because of the 
anarchical model of the international system, there is a constant state of war 
between states in a zero-sum game. Peace is not permanent but rather the fruit 
of a balance of power and interests shaping states’ relations. However, the realist 
school considers that survival and rational calculus are shaping the state´s 
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decisions. This contradicts the vision of IS’ strategists; its ideological purity is 
more important than its military performance or strategic considerations. They 
believe its survival is part of God's universal rules and part of what we could 
explain as providence.  In this aspect IS is liberal, understood in its philosophical 
roots as an idealist school of thought. It believes that the main driver behind its 
state is not its selfish interests or survival but its ideology and religious doctrine. 
By focusing on the Sykes-Picot agreements, the destruction of borders inherited 
from the colonial period, it also has a postcolonial dimension in its vision of 
international relations as the result of colonial political decisions. Finally, IS´ 
transnational aspirations and global reach with the building of an international 
identity and its structure with cells shaped in networks or by inspired individuals 
go against all the state-centric models cited above.  
In the context of its rivalry to lead the Jihadi International movement, IS for 
ideological reasons could not focus only on preserving its nascent state, by 
accommodating itself with international borders. Indeed, a new dimension in IS 
rhetoric and strategic framework is the battle of credibility and outbidding for 
ideological purity among the jihadi public worldwide against Al Qaeda. The 
sudden change of paradigm from defending the Sunni of the Middle East to 
expanding a caliphate worldwide without possessing the necessary means and 
resources proved to be fatal in the middle term for the group’s capacity to sustain 
its state model in Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, at the same time, it had the effect 
of internationalising the group’s presence worldwide with a dozen new safe 
havens, from which the group would apply its five phases as part of its strategic 
framework669. By aspiring to be the global leader of the jihadi movement, it 
consequently decided not to sequence its fight and attack at the same time all its 
enemies. However, challenging the US and the rest of the world is also a way to 
strengthen its ideological narrative and confirm its authentic and unique status of 
the defender of Islam.  Perpetual warfare until the final hour, as described by IS’ 
literature to describe its fight and the impossibility of peace, illustrates the group’s 
ambitious aims that go against any adoption of Liddle Hart’s Grand Strategy 
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guidelines at the international level. Unlike IS, Al Qaeda claims publicly its 
adherence to LH’s approach by adopting with its affiliates Grand Strategy 
principles that impact its methodology such as truces offered to its enemies, the 
seeking of popular support, gradualism, sequencing of battles and cooperation 
with groups from a different ideological spectrum. A further comparative study on 
the adherence of both group to the LH’s approach in their strategy as a variable 
impacting the ideological rift between both movements could explain why they 
became in frontal opposition despite claiming to represent both the legacy of 
Osama Bin Laden and Abu Mosab Al Zarqawi.  
 

















The thesis’ research question aimed to understand IS’ strategy during its 
resurgence, using, as a theoretical framework, LH’s principles from a tactical, 
strategic and Grand Strategy perspective. Based on the analysis of IS’ strategy 
during its resurgence in 2012-2015, it has contributed to the field of terrorist 
organisation behaviour, jihadi strategy and guerrilla warfare. The hypothesis was 
that IS’ resurgence was due to its adherence to LH’s principles at tactical, 
strategic and Grand Strategy levels. After reaching a low point in 2010 facing 
near extinction, a confluence of factors led to the group’s resurgence four years 
later. As already presented in the literature, external factors coupled with 
extraordinary political opportunities offered by the Syrian conflict were crucial 
factors explaining its rebound. Monocausal determinism being impossible for the 
case study, it is sure that the group’s resurgence was no accident and resulted 
from a convergence of many factors. The most important of these elements being 
the specific historical circumstances which happened between 2011 and 2012 
such as the collapse of the Assad government in Eastern Syria, the US 
withdrawal from Iraq and rising antagonism between President Maliki and the 
Sunni political and tribal elite. However, an explanation that relies merely on the 
fall of ISF or the Sahawat and their internal problems while not taking into account 
the strategy deployed by the group is not satisfying.  
The contribution of this study was to shed light on how IS exploited these 
opportunities by using LH’s approach. IS’ strategy while taking advantage of the 
context was patient with a protracted and thoughtful policy that proved to be 
successful in order to extend its domination over a broad span of the Iraqi 
territory. The group took advantage of its mastering of technology, a resilient 
ideology coupled with smart strategic decisions taken that led the group to 
capitalise on significant opportunities after 2011. The observation of IS’ 
adherence to his axioms gives a new perspective to the explanation of its 
resurgence and its military strategy. What I found is that IS’ military operations in 
general adhered to LH’s principles at the tactical and strategic level during its 
period of rebound except for launching frontal attacks and some geographic 
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exceptions. From a Grand Strategy perspective, in its relation with Sunni rivals, it 
applied LH’s recommendations but did not apply them at all against its other rivals 
and enemies. This finding goes against the idea shared in the literature that limits 
the understanding of IS policy only from a brutal maximalist approach 
perspective. In IS’ strategy, there is room for gradualism but it is a discriminated 
one only directed at its targeted audience. 
 The fact that IS’ resurgence can be explained from LH’s perspective has as a 
first consequence concerning the literature that it is resisting the temptation to 
see the object of the study as something exceptional. The second consequence 
is that it can fill a gap about the understandings of the events that led to the fall 
of 1/3 of Iraq into its hands which were sometimes oversimplified to the 
weaknesses of the Iraqi Army. The fact this thesis proves that IS by its actions 
successfully exploited the dislocation of the Iraqi Army according to LH´s theory 
to reach a decisive victory makes its originality. The adoption of a three-
dimensional prism of analysis can verify this assertion and stress out the group’s 
shapeshifting nature. Indeed, the literature argues that IS is a guerrilla army and 
territorial administrator (Fromson and Simon, 2015), a hybrid terrorist 
organisation (Karatrantos 2015)670, a revolutionary armed group (Kalyvas, 2015), 
a revolutionary state (Walt, 2015), and a pseudo-state (Cronin, 2015). By 
adopting the insurgent’s central principle of non-confrontation, inspiring itself from 
successful COIN experiences, continuously use terror as a mode of action and 
by spreading worldwide a broad and consistent media campaign, IS was a fluid 
and shape-shifting actor. Its use of COIN strategy reinforces the literature that 
envisions IS as a group that reached state-level infrastructures and 
professionalism in the art of war.  
When associated with strategy, IS’ scope or inspiration is limited in the literature 
to a blind following of Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery guidelines or its 
2010 Strategic guidelines. Other authors went moreover, claiming that it did not 
                                            





have any strategy such as Max Abraham saying that “not all strategies are 
strategic and effective” 671 while mentioning IS. There was a trend in the literature 
to consider IS behaviour from the perspective of its sole International policy since 
the Declaration of the Caliphate and its maximalist political behaviour opposed to 
Al Qaeda pragmatism, without taking into account the more flexible facets of IS 
pre-2014 Caliphate strategy that this thesis wants to stress. Regarding the debate 
on the group’s nature, this investigation’s contribution is to advance the view that 
despite its radical views, eschatological propaganda and maximalist ideology, 
from 2012-2014 the group had a rational strategic perspective by prioritising its 
fights and making a cost-benefit calculus to preserve its interests in Iraq. It tackles 
some study that considered IS only as a millenarist apocalyptic cult. (Berger, 
2015; LaPalm, 2014; Schmid, 2015 Mac Cants 2015). These authors did not 
consider the behaviour of IS as the product of miscalculations, bad strategic 
choices, or its use eschatology as a propaganda tool but as an irrational strategy 
to provoke the Apocalypse. By using the scope of LH´s theory and verifying its 
adherence to many of its axioms, the thesis goes against the ideas that IS’ 
irrational or maximalist behaviour is occurring structurally.  
The maximalist prism of analysis is anachronic while analysing the group’s 
strategy for the 2011-2014 period. For example, since the proclamation of the 
Caliphate, it has urged in the name of Walaa, all the other groups to pledge their 
allegiance to the Caliph. Because it elevated its status to the one of “Caliphate”, 
IS has implicitly proclaimed to be the sole holder of legitimate violence in the 
Islamic world. Ideologically, it has the obligation of reuniting the Islamic Ummah 
under one banner. Consequently, no groups, no militias or other entity, should be 
tolerated. This ideological posture is very different from the one during its 
resurgence and explains the actual inherent conflictive nature of its relations with 
all the groups who are claiming to represent Political Islam.  For that reason, an 
analysis of IS’ resurgence only through its maximalist strategic turning point taken 
by 2015 does not describe accurately IS’ behaviour before the July 2014 
declaration of the Caliphate. The thesis takes into account these type of shifts by 
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adopting a perspective that tries to understand IS strategy without retroactively 
drawing its conclusions on IS’ rationality.   
Tactical adherence to LH’s principle 
In the tactical study on IS’ claimed operations, I verified the first hypothesis 
that from 2012 to 2014, IS in its operations avoided confrontation in its 
manoeuvres against the ISF and their allies. Following LH’s recommendations on 
avoiding confrontation with a stronger opponent, it followed guerrilla theorists’ 
main recommendations of mobility, flexibility and avoiding contact with the 
enemy. For its guerrilla strategy, it took profit from the environment (desert of 
Anbar, urban areas of Nineveh or highly dense vegetation of Diyala) to conduct 
hit and run tactics and undiscovered operations. VBIEDS, indirect fire, HBIEDs, 
and targeted assassinations were the most preferred types of operations against 
the ISF. In other provinces, following a punishment strategy, it has also 
deliberately targeted Shia civilians with the massive use of VBIEDs and SVESTs 
in Bagdad, Diyala, and Salahudeen. Finally, when the phase of territorial control 
was approaching, I found an increase in confrontational operations such as 
SVBIEDs used against military fixed points, inghimassi operations (storming 
assaults), armed assaults and SVEST operations preluding the takeover of urban 
centres. For our case study, the variation of the nature of the operations claimed 
by the group (ratio confrontational and non-confrontational) was shaping the 
power balance of the conflict.   
The second finding of the investigation is that each province had its 
operational rhythm and developed its tactical patterns for different strategic 
objectives. In 2014, the provinces of Anbar, Salahudeen, and Nineveh were ready 
for a shift from a guerrilla to a conventional type of warfare. This shift in strategy 
was premature in Baghdad and Diyala. The fact that the group failed in its urban 
assault in Diyala confirms the province’s un-readiness to face an asymmetrical 
balance of power in the province. The necessity to put pressure on Baghdad may 
have precipitated the shift of the Diyala province from efficient guerrilla warfare 
before the spring of 2014 to a failed campaign of urban assaults in the summer 
of the same year.  
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Strategical adherence to LH’s principles 
Before its 2014 urban conquests, the group’s operations in 2012 and 2013 
were designed to achieve the strategic goal of freeing hundreds of its fighters 
from Iraqi prisons. By infiltrating prisons, preparing the terrain and deceiving the 
intelligence enemy forces, the group succeeded in mounting complex military 
assaults which became a trademark of its future operations. I argued first that the 
“Breaking the Walls” campaign and the attack on Abu Ghraib prison embraced 
the majority LH’s guidelines for military strategy. Unlike urban assaults, which are 
strict military operations, the “Breaking the Walls” campaign was hybrid, taking 
the shape of VBIED waves and sophisticated assaults on prison facilities. 
Nevertheless, the same methods and level of preparedness were used in 
2014 by the same persons behind these successful military campaigns such as 
Abu Muhannad Al Suweidawi, who planned the Abu Ghraib attack in 2013 and 
the continuous assaults on Ramadi in 2014 and 2015. I observed the same 
strategic pattern which was not present in the literature while comparing the 
attack on Abu Ghraib prison in 2013 and the offensive in Nineveh a year later. 
Both operations were on a different scale, creating a dilemma for the defenders. 
They involved a night attack on the most entrenched and defended target as a 
diversion in order to facilitate the attack on the less guarded target and put the 
enemy in a state of indecision.   
We can summarise the ingredients of IS’ successful urban assaults in Anbar, 
Nineveh, and Salahudeen by following both LH’s advice of dislocation and 
exploitation672. Firstly, the group shifted from a guerrilla to an urban assault 
strategy at the right time by adjusting its means adequately to its objective. 
Secondly, they attacked the lines of least expectation and least resistance that 
had the advantage of confusing the enemy’s defensive ripostes. Thirdly, it 
achieved the dislocation of the enemy’s physical equilibrium primarily achieved 
with frontal attacks using SVBIEDs in order to break the defensive lines. Fourthly, 
it was achieved at a low cost, while being outnumbered by a combination of 
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dispersion, concealment, flexibility, mobility, and surprise. Fifthly, the 
psychological dislocation of ISF was the fruit of years of attrition war, corruption 
and the decay of minds among ISF in Northern Iraq. This dislocation did not occur 
in Diyala and Baghdad, where the stake was different for the Iraqi Army and its 
allies. Finally, these urban assaults were possible because of the group’s 
flexibility in the use of diverse means to achieve its goals (armed assaults, 
deception, concealment, negotiation). Even though the outcome of IS’ operations 
appeared to be quick (only 72h in Mosul and some days in Salahudeen), it was 
the product of years of harassment of ISF by IS’ cells. When the enemy’s 
psychological dislocation was reached tactically, it has been shrewd and 
dynamic, taking advantage of the fissures of its opponents and the opportunities 
on the ground. The literature on IS resurgence considered that Iraqi army 
condition in 2014 was in such a poor condition in terms of training, capabilities, 
discipline, and command and did not have the capabilities to confront IS. The 
contribution of this study and the adherence to LH´s axioms observed make this 
statement not convincing enough.  The Iraqi army was in bad shape due to the 
corruption and weaknesses but IS exploited them with a strategy that goes 
beyond the points laid out in the 2010 document “the Strategic Plan for the 
Consolidation of the Political Standing of the Islamic State”. Limiting IS’ strategy 
to the following of this strategy can be reductionist, this study confirms the fact 
that there is room to use other strategic frameworks to understand IS. 
From 2012 to 2015 and despite the heterogeneity of its action (VBIED waves, 
prison breaks, lightning urban assaults, attrition war in an urban environment, 
guerrilla warfare), the group appeared to stick to a strategic framework that fits 
LH’s guidelines. I found one exception, with the principle of mounting frontal 
attacks on the enemy’s strongest point, which is disapproved by Liddle Hart. This 
exception can be attributed to the group’s culture of sacrifice and the ideological 
predisposition to underestimate the adversary’s power despite being 
outnumbered and outgunned. Because of its concentrated use of SVBIEDs, IS 
was not deterred from targeting the most guarded and strongest point of the 
enemy’s defence line. The second exception was the group’s assault in Diyala 
Province, which may have been hasty due to the necessity to pressurise Baghdad 
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and did not follow many principles of LH’s strategy such as adjusting the means 
to the end and not repeating an attack on the same point.   
Adherence to LH’s Grand Strategy principles 
Finally, the other reason for IS’ resurgence in Iraq can be explained by the 
application of a new strategic framework inspired by COIN strategies with a 
political and social dimension. The application of Grand Strategy principles 
towards the Sunni population by adopting a holistic approach coupled with a 
flexible posture towards its social incubator made it gain the support or the 
passivity of some tribes. From LH’s perspective, we can say that in its post-US 
withdrawal strategy, there was a genuine conviction from ISI that winning the 
hearts and minds of the Sunni was vital in order to prosper in Iraq and achieve its 
strategic goals. The group had a Grand Strategy orchestrated in Iraq by the 
mobilisation of all the possible means other than the kinetic one and with a vision 
and a preparation of the after-war period for the Sunni population. This vision was 
absent from the precedent version of the group under Zarqawi and Al Muhajir 
(2003-2008), which was more ideological rather than politically and socially 
driven. Making a pause of its ideological repulsion of other groups, it adopted a 
pragmatic approach prioritising its targets and not engaging anti-government 
tribes in Anbar and the Peshmerga for a time in Nineveh. It also promoted a 
decentralised relationship with the tribes, giving them incentives (financial and 
resources) and political guarantees (repentance and the possibility of having local 
militias) to join them. At the same time, the government in Baghdad was following 
the de-Baathification policy and pursuing many tribal leaders for terrorism 
charges. IS’ flexible posture at a political level offered the group the possibility to 
take advantage of the grievances of the Sunni population and to redefine the 
group’s priority targets.  
If we take into account the framing dimension of the Social Movement theory, IS’ 
propaganda and frames may have also reached frame resonance with its 
targeted audience. The fact that some of its historical frames were part of Iraqi 
Spring demands indicates that it channelled in its propaganda the grievances 
shared by a widespread part of the Sunni Arab population in Iraq.  I found the 
following frames which were part of IS’ propaganda well before the spark of the 
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Sunni protests in Iraq and could resonate among the protestors: the abuses of 
women in Iraqi prisons, the repression of the Sunni population through the 
Terrorism Law, the growing Iranian influence and the mistreatment of the Iraqi 
Sunni as one block by Baghdad. The confluence of these elements could explain 
the fall of the government's confidence and state institution in the eyes of the 
Sunni Arab population and the subsequent passive or supportive posture 
adopted towards IS. The confirmation of IS’ self-fulfilling prophecies/frames 
diffused from 2010 about the state of the Sunni population and the perception of 
the Sunni Arab community of sharing the same fate in 2014 and being the victim 
of Baghdad’s mistreatment could according to the framing theory, have played a 
role in increasing the group’s frame resonance and mobilising Sunni individuals 
in their recruitment. The Iraqi Government’s violence against protestors was the 
trigger point that led the group to take advantage of the situation by attracting 
Sunnis recruits reaching frame resonance that led the group to adhere to the first 
axiom of LH’s of three principles for Grand Strategy, achieving maximum gain 
with minimum means.     
The tribal factor was crucial in explaining IS’ demise in 2008 and was also 
important in explaining its revival six years later. The “neutralisation” (in the sense 
of making them neutral) of competitive social structures such as tribes or armed 
groups was as vital to explain the group’s ebb and flows in 2014. From the 
investigation, I found that the end of IS’ momentum in its rush from Salahudeen 
toward Baghdad was due to the fierce resistance coming from Sunni tribes. While 
IS campaign against the Sahawat is considered by Whiteside (2015) as the most 
important factor preluding to the resurgence of the group. This finding is not 
sufficiently stressed out in the literature. This study confirms the importance of 
the balance of power of IS with the Sahawat by adding a new explanation of the 
halt of IS’ advance, their fierce resistance. The places where IS’ June 2014 
advance was halted were the ones where Sunni tribes did not adopt the group’s 
narrative and continued to defend their areas, namely, Haditha, Ramadi and 
Dhuluiyah. The battle of Dhuluiyah appeared to constitute a U-turn point in the 
conflict before the intervention of the Coalition because it symbolised the place 
where because IS’ sectarian narrative did not function, its advance was halted 
which had severe strategic consequences. The Jubur tribe, composed of Sunnis, 
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cooperated with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (a Shia militia part of the PMU and funded by 
Iran) in Balad and caused the halting of the IS’ offensive towards Baghdad’s 
Northern belt while the Iraqi Army was crumbling. Indeed, never presented in the 
literature and by commentators, IS’ offensive because of recent and spectacular 
nature did not attract much of analysis in order to explain it. Even tough Coalition 
airpower is said to have halted IS’ momentum in Iraq by mid-August 2014, the 
group’s impossibility to junction its forces in the triangle North of Baghdad, Diyala 
and South of Salahudeem represented the real end of IS’ offensive to pressure 
on Baghdad. 
One of the primary limits to IS’ adherence to LH’s grand strategy principles was 
its extreme use of violence and its ideological and maximalist vision of 
international relations. While IS uses strategic violence to shock and also deter, 
LH considers that excessive violence is unproductive. The resistance of the 
enemy is inversely proportional to the level of violence imposed on him. The more 
IS was violent and publicised its crimes against its enemies, the more resistance 
it faced. Shia troops defending Baghdad and their holy cities found a 
determination to fight the ISF which was lacking in Sunni Arab provinces. IS 
applied LH’s indirect approach guidelines only for its policy towards the Sunni 
population but not with other populations or at the international level. We shall 
note that IS understood that its failure in 2008 came from the worsening of its 
relations with the Sunni population and its subsequent strategy applied later was 
directed towards them. Resilient organisations are those who react to disturbance 
by changing their structure and behaviour. This study argues that this change of 
strategy toward the Sunni population was paramount in explaining the group’s 
resilience first and resurgence years later with the addition of external factors.  
What are the implications of IS’ following of most of LH’s principles? The 
conclusion of the thesis is that IS had a strategy at multiple levels and that its 
adherence to many of LH’s axioms gave the group flexibility in balancing the 
reality of the political terrain and its ideological aspirations, something that is 
neglected in the literature while explaining its resurgence. It reinforces previous 
researches stating that it did not constitute a loose group of unconnected military 
commanders but rather a hierarchical, disciplined group with a military doctrine 
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applied in different battlefields on a different size. This military doctrine deployed 
requires centralised leadership decision-making and risk-taking, with orders and 
resources allocated by leaders. The group’s reputation of militarism, the Iraqi 
Baathist army background of some of its military commanders, their cult of 
violence and dogmatism did not make its adherence to principles calling for more 
flexibility, a given fact. Especially when LH’s vision of the indirect approach is not 
limited to military affairs but has a broader perspective. The adherence of IS to 
these principles may confirm the substantial gain in professionalism, experience 
and strategic vision the group benefited from through its military leaders with 
previous military experience (Hajji Bakr, Suweidawi, Bilawi …). Despite having 
graduated in an army, which did not apply much of LH’s theory, they have been 
keen to adapt their political behaviour and military strategy to their new context. 
IS cannot be reduced to small operatives, its maximalist rhetoric or the savagery 
of its propaganda videos as its profound gain in professionalism and aptitude 
cannot be dismissed. It confirmed that regarding its military warfare, IS’ resilience 
was possible because it is a “learning organisation” (Fishman, 2017) as described 
in the literature as an entity that facilitates the learning of its members and 
continuously transforms itself.  The result of this thesis reinforces the state-level 
structure reached by the group in 2014 thanks to the quality of its human capital. 
It also argues that IS can borrow and apply ideas coming from different 
backgrounds and not necessarily only Islamic ones.  
As a military doctrine taking into account military and non-kinetic interactions, IS’ 
unique pattern of behaviour combining flexibility at the strategic level with an 
overall adherence to LH’s axioms and a limited but still discriminatory adherence 
to its Grand strategy principles couldn’t have been better grasped by any other 
strategic theory than the indirect approach. LH’s approach has proved to be 
relevant and well suited by using different dimensions of analysis avoiding 
oversimplifications surrounding IS’ behaviour and strategy. This thesis came to 
counterbalance pre-conceived idea on the group, such as its reduction to a mob 
without other strategies than taking advantage of political crisis and sectarianism. 
It brings more nuance to its frozen classification as the most extreme and 
maximalist actor in the Jihadi landscape contrarily to a more moderate Al Qaeda 
wing, which is part of Al Qaeda’s communication and storytelling. 
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A comeback to the 2012 situation? 
From IS’ perspective, the blow of the 2017-2018 military defeat compared to the 
2007-2010 defeat was different in Iraq. In both cases, the group was driven out 
of cities, but while in 2007 the main driving force was internal with the group’s 
rejection by its social incubator, in 2017 the main driving force was external with 
the utter destruction of IS’ controlled cities which were bombarded into dust. After 
$14.3 billion was spent on more than 24,000 airstrikes, which destroyed most of 
the urban areas of Iraq (Ramadi and Mosul especially) and Syria (Al-Bab, Raqqa) 
the group was considered as defeated. We shall see if a future strategic change 
of vision and gain of flexibility will be applied to its international relations and the 
treatment of the non-Sunni population that Al Qaeda with its affiliates or Jolani’s 
pragmatic experience in Idlib appears to have adopted during recent years. Both 
movements have the same ultimate objective of establishing through violence a 
transnational Islamic State applying tactical and military principles defended by 
LH but have a different approach regarding Grand Strategy principles affecting 
their methodology. Al Qaeda’s new strategy was the fruit of introspection made 
by Seif el Adl and Al Suri, while from IS’ perspective there was no introspection 
regarding its political and strategic choice that led to the loss of its territories in 
2017. At the time of writing this conclusion, the perspective of an internal debate 
on these issues is unlikely. Military defeats are so far interpreted as God's test 
and punishment for members’ deviation from the right part and a way to separate 
evil from good. For that reason, the main internal debate among the group 
remains theological on the issue of Takfir as part of the group’s quest for 
ideological purity. Nevertheless, it could have strategic and political implications 
in the case of adopting extreme postures with the risk of opening the door to the 
broad use of Takfir that could jeopardise IS’ flexible policy toward the Sunni 
population, further increase its maximalist political behaviour and lead to internal 
divisions. 
Regarding the possibility of a new resurgence of IS, reports have emerged that 
despite the territorial losses, IS was still an “organised force with around 17 000 
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fighters in Iraq”673. While retreating to their historical safe havens (Hawijah 
Mountains, Hamrin Lake, Anbar, and the Jazeera desert), they were still 
maintaining an organization and an “intact collective discipline” transitioning to 
insurgency and operating mostly by night in rural areas of Central Iraq (Kirkuk, 
Salahuddin and Diyala). This transition to insurgency and the group’s resilience 
can be verified by a quick overview of the group’s operational activities.  From IS’ 
figures 674 and using the provincial division used in 2012-2013, in August 2018 IS 
claimed675 responsibility for 21 operations in Anbar (close to March 2012 figures), 
32 in Nineveh (its lowest was 64 in January 2012), 38 in Diyala (figures of 
February 2012), 39 in Salahudeen and Northern Baghdad (Beginning of 2012) 
and 14 in Baghdad (lowest figure in March 2012). Regarding the volume of 
operations claimed by the group, its August 2018 figures came back to the start 
of 2012. The group could somehow maintain an operational presence in the 
provinces which made it resilient but IS’ own figures should mitigate the threat of 
a short-term resurgence of the group comparable to the one of 2014. Further 
research would be necessary to determine in detail the type of operations and 
their confrontational nature in order to have a better picture of IS’ capabilities in 
2018 and 2019 compared to 2012.  
In conclusion, after reaching its apex in 2014-2015, IS’ ideological appeal has 
suffered important blows, both from the outside with the demise of its “physical 
Caliphate” and from the inside with the rise of internal divisions. Facing those 
challenges, the group has been adaptive, resistant and tried to build political 
victory from military defeats. The fierce resistance showed in urban centres in 
Mosul and Raqqa sent a message to its constituency to prove its supposed moral 
superiority against rivals while defending symbolic places. While at the same 
                                            
673 The figure of 17000 may be inflated by counting the fighters and their entourage and families 
See http://undocs.org/S/2018/705  
674 For episodes https://jihadology.net/2018/08/30/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-
harvest-of-the-soldiers-5/ 
675 See Annex 3 
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time, it retreated from other areas to avoid unnecessary losses and preserve its 
resources such as in Hawijah, Deir Ezzor and Al Qaim.    
The group’s ideology has demonstrated to be fluid, evolutional, and hence 
resilient. Its propaganda production adapted to the new stakes. Its latest 
productions described its territorial losses as evidence of God’s trial (ibtiliaa), 
promoted patience (sabr) as the right attitude against hardship, and explained the 
depletion of its ranks as God’s way to purge away the deserters, traitors and 
extremists in the necessary quest towards theological purity. The same applies 
to its military strategy, IS has been fluid in changing in its tactics and methods to 
go back to urban terrorism, rural guerrilla waiting the right moment for semi-
conventional warfare. 
Therefore, in spite of its difficulties, IS will probably continue to inspire hope 
through propaganda and maintain a military profile mirroring its 2009-2012 
regression phase in Iraq. We saw how in two years the group was able to exploit 
a deteriorating political and social environment to surge its operations. The 
internally displaced Sunni population’s fate remains uncertain and the grievances 
of the population have worsened. Tensions within the Shia camps between pro-
Iranians and pro-US after the elections and widespread protests in the south 
against corruption and lack of services could weaken the anti-IS front in the 
future. IS tried to take advantage of these protests by sabotaging electric lines in 
Iraq to further harm the population’s faith in the government.676 To pressurise 
Bagdad, PMU started to retreat from Sunni areas such as Nineveh where they 
were stationed677.  
Out of necessity and facing a tremendous coalition against it, its current global 
strategy seems to follow Abu Mosab Al Suri’s general strategy based on “open 
fronts” and independent actions worldwide. After 9/11, Al Suri envisioned jihad 
                                            
676“Kirkuk-Diyala electricity lines sabotaged again; Iraq blames ‘terrorism’”, Rudaw, 
22,http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/020820182  





as an order and not an organisation (nidham and not tandhim) structured to avoid 
destruction as a leaderless jihadi network with a concentration of thought and a 
decentralisation of the execution. The fall of the caliphate by the hands of the 
International coalition may also push the group’s strategist towards Al Suri’s 
recommendation of destroying the international order before re-establishing the 
caliphate. This may have counteracted IS’ pre caliphate top-down organisational 
structure and its aspiration to create a state in a territory but may constitute a 
necessary evolution to avoid destruction facing a much more advanced military 
international coalition. However, after the losses of the territories it controlled in 
Iraq, the group’s presence in zones of conflicts and failed states from which “the 
exhaustion phase” could evolve to a state-building experience like in Iraq in 2005 
and 2014 has given the group new areas where it could reproduce its model 
(Sinai, Libya, Northern Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, South Philippines and 
Khorasan). In case it decides to decentralize it could evolve from the 3 rings 
models developed by ISW678 to describe IS’ post-Caliphate global strategy 
divided between: “the centre” in Syria and Iraq, “the near Abroad” referring the 
Muslim world from Morocco to South Philippines and the ‘Far Abroad’ (the West 
and the cyberspace), where it wage sporadic attacks. Each of the provinces 
where it is trying to reproduce its model could evolve to be local centres where it 
tries to build a sanctuary and expand its influence. These provinces will continue 
to wage low-intensity warfare waiting for a geopolitical opportunity such as a 
revolution, a civil war, a weak central government or a regional conflict. Its 
propaganda, the resources allocated to its affiliates and the designation of a 
province of Iraq regrouping all the sub-regional provinces in its operational reports 
in 2018 seems to confirm this geographical decentralization process of the Iraqi 
group. It also raises the question about the possible exportation of IS’ military 
strategy and warfare to its affiliates around the world.  
IS’ current state as an insurgency in Iraq raises more questions about what will 
be the strategy of its leaders in case of a return to the cities. A maximalist 
revanchist approach with a general Takfir of the Sunnis who did not side with the 
                                            
678 Richard Barret, ”The Islamic State goes global”, CTC sentinel , Volume 08 Issue 11, November 
December 2015, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-goes-global/  
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group or the continuation of a pragmatic and inclusive policy towards Sunnis like 
in 2014?  What will be its attitude particularly towards tribes, especially the ones 
that once pledged allegiance and changed their camp afterwards? IS’ capacity to 
take cities and hold them depends largely on the ability to manoeuvre without 
fearing air attacks. Until when will Western support to Baghdad continue? What 
would be the consequence in Iraq of a regional conflict between Iran and its allies 
and Israel, the US and the some Arab States?  These questions may determine 
IS’ future capabilities in Iraq that oscillate between the ability to nurturing tensions 
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Nov-11 2 36 38 
Dec-11 2 31 33 
Jan-12 2 22 24 
Feb-12 4 22 26 
Mar-12 4 42 46 
Apr-12 2 38 40 
May-12 8 71 79 
Jun-12 8 52 60 
Jul-12 17 62 79 
Aug-12 7 48 55 
Sep-12 10 64 74 
Oct-12 7 31 38 
Nov-12 4 50 54 
Dec-12 9 59 68 
Jan-13 7 35 42 
Feb-13 10 85 95 
Mar-13 11 90 101 
Apr-13 44 102 146 
May-13 19 126 145 
Jun-13 21 152 173 
Jul-13 7 111 118 
Aug-13 11 143 154 
Sep-13 35 172 207 


























Nov-13 33 137 170 
Dec-13 33 113 146 
Jan-14 71 229 300 
Feb-14 35 209 244 
Mar-14 37 233 270 
Apr-14 41 277 318 
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Anbar Confrontational Non confrontational total 
Nov-11 4 58 62 
Dec-11 5 6 11 
Jan-12 1 30 31 
Feb-12 8 42 50 
Mar-12 1 19 20 
Apr-12 4 50 54 
May-12 4 70 74 
Jun-12 4 40 44 
Jul-12 15 82 97 
Aug-12 6 51 57 
Sep-12 4 51 55 
Oct-12 3 41 44 
Nov-12 7 43 50 
Dec-12 6 56 62 
Jan-13 14 36 50 
Feb-13 6 60 66 
Mar-13 5 64 69 
Apr-13 14 124 138 
May-13 24 93 117 
Jun-13 23 83 106 
Jul-13 19 73 92 
Aug-13 26 72 98 
Sep-13 21 90 111 
Oct-13 32 100 132 






Dec-13 20 53 73 
Jan-14 71 229 300 
Feb-14 51 209 260 
Mar-14 61 267 328 
Apr-14 97 340 437 
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Nineveh confrontational  Non-
confrontational  
total  
Nov-11 37 97 134 
Dec-11 37 66 103 
Jan-12 20 44 64 
Feb-12 50 89 139 
Mar-12 20 74 94 
Apr-12 43 98 141 
May-12 24 86 110 
Jun-12 28 99 127 
Jul-12 51 225 276 
Aug-12 18 158 176 
Sep-12 31 146 177 
Oct-12 16 134 150 
Nov-12 18 102 120 
Dec-12 13 123 136 
Jan-13 17 115 132 
Feb-13 12 159 171 
Mar-13 32 174 206 
Apr-13 62 178 240 
May-13 52 242 294 
Jun-13 44 245 289 
Jul-13 66 316 382 
Aug-13 46 254 300 








Oct-13 22 213 235 
Nov-13 36 249 285 
Dec-13 41 212 253 
Jan-14 133 343 476 
Feb-14 126 372 498 
Mar-14 75 331 406 
Apr-14 56 349 405 
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Diyala confrontational  Non-
confrontational   
total  
Nov-11 0 28 28 
Dec-11 1 32 33 
Jan-12 4 29 33 
Feb-12 5 32 37 
Mar-12 11 70 81 
Apr-12 8 40 48 
May-12 18 81 99 
Jun-12 3 56 59 
Jul-12 10 30 40 
Aug-12 8 36 44 
Sep-12 3 33 36 
Oct-12 3 76 79 
Nov-12 1 61 62 
Dec-12 5 87 92 
Jan-13 9 59 68 
Feb-13 16 62 78 
Mar-13 7 70 77 
Apr-13 4 60 64 
May-13 19 90 109 
Jun-13 5 53 58 
Jul-13 9 94 103 
Aug-13 11 60 71 
























Oct-13 11 60 71 
Nov-13 18 45 63 
Dec-13 15 96 111 
Jan-14 12 52 64 
Feb-14 20 111 131 
Mar-14 25 75 100 
Apr-14 8 69 77 
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Baghdad confrontational Non-confrontational total 
Nov-11 0 43 43 
Dec-11 3 27 30 
Jan-12 1 39 40 
Feb-12 1 19 20 
Mar-12 2 12 14 
Apr-12 0 25 25 
May-12 3 42 45 
Jun-12 0 23 23 
Jul-12 8 42 50 
Aug-12 3 34 37 
Sep-12 1 30 31 
Oct-12 1 17 18 
Nov-12 1 23 24 
Dec-12 0 39 39 
Jan-13 1 38 39 
Feb-13 1 38 39 
Mar-13 4 40 44 
Apr-13 0 20 20 
May-13 1 42 43 
Jun-13 3 11 14 
Jul-13 10 10 20 
Aug-13 4 40 44 


















Oct-13 3 27 30 
Nov-13 2 18 20 
Dec-13 3 26 29 
Jan-14 4 25 29 
Feb-14 2 39 41 
Mar-14 5 35 40 
Apr-14 9 35 44 
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Week 1 Week 2 Week 3  Week 4  Week 5             
total  
Kirkuk 6 7 20 23 15 71 
Diyala 4 2 10 10 12 38 
Anbar  Fallujah 0 2 4 4 11 21 
Nineveh  1 7 9 11 4 32 
Baghdad 1 2 4 7 0 14 
SNB 6 15 14 4 0 39 
South  0 0 0 4 0 4 
Total  19 37 64 67 47 234 
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Annexe 4 Iraq Map679 
 
                                            
679 Source : https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_pol-2009.jpg 
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